

# Impact Turn File

Consequentialism 2

**Democracy Bad**

Consequentialism 3

## **Environment/Rights Malthus**

## 1NC Environment

**Democracy fails to provide a solution to coming environmental collapse which causes extinction – evolutionary and structural problems mean that only a shift to an expert-run eco-authoritarianism can solve**

**Shearman 7** (David Shearman is emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an independent assessor on the IPCC. "Democracy and climate change: a story of failure" 7/7/07  
[https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/climate\\_change/democracy\\_climate\\_change\\_failure](https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/climate_change/democracy_climate_change_failure))/CW

It seems that some of the most perceptive brains in society have given up on an effective response to climate change. Stephen Hawking infers that mankind should colonise distant planets. James Lovelock thinks the remnants of humanity will seek refuge on the tropical shores of the Arctic. Scientific data now strongly suggests that physical and biological changes in the planet are increasingly greater than those defined by the modelling in the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. Despite the steadily rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, even countries expressing commitment are having little impact compared to the huge task in hand. Democratic governments continue to approve projects that will make reductions difficult if not impossible. David Shearman is emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an independent assessor on the IPCC. His most recent book (co-written with Joseph Wayne Smith) is *The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy*, (Praeger, 2007). In an openDemocracy article, Andrew Dobson contrasts this environmental inactivity with the speedy response to a recent international financial emergency (see "A climate of crisis: towards the eco-state", 19 September 2007). If governments can recognise a cyclical financial emergency and in an instant move heaven and earth (and billions of dollars, pounds sterling and euros) to contain it, why can they not do the same in response to a global environmental emergency? His answers embrace institutional, ideological, and interest-laden factors together with the issue of who controls the public argument. It can be argued that all these factors have a common denominator: the fundamental flaws in liberal democracy. The market economy, now the linchpin of western culture, is fused with liberal democracy, such that each is dependent upon the other for survival. Together they have developed a liberty for the individual that has environmentally destructive consequences. The liberty to negate these consequences is constrained. This article discusses some of the psychological aspects of this situation and introduces the idea of authoritarian action led by experts to address the ecological emergency. The short-term fix. In psychological terms, a financial emergency immediately threatens self and the understood and valued way of life. This carries more danger to self than the future and ill-understood threat of ecological crisis. Human psychological mechanisms profoundly influence the primacy of self-preservation and the need to procreate that determines our quest for goods, status, and power. Humanity's inability to think long term is related to the brain's evolutionary need to adapt to the conditions of a local environment (see EO Wilson, *The Future of Life* [Little, Brown, 2002]). Our ancestors had to think short term with an emotional commitment to the limited space around them and to a limited band of kinsmen. This is the Darwinian priority of short-term gain that bestowed longevity and more offspring upon a cooperative group of relatives and friends. As a result, we ignore any distant possibility not yet requiring examination. If we imprint these responses upon the cult of liberal democracy as it operates today, it is possible to explain the illogical happenings that have brought us to current governmental responses - or indeed non-responses. An illustration close to home is the responses of the John Howard government in Australia, now facing the challenge of an election campaign - though similar responses are documented in the United States and to a lesser degree in Britain. Two recent detailed studies are used to document the permissive infiltration of government processes by the fossil-fuel industries (see Clive Hamilton, *Scorcher: The Dirty Politics of Climate Change* [Black Inc. Agenda, 2007] and Guy Pearse, *High & Dry: John Howard, climate change and the selling of Australia's future* [Penguin, 2007]). The behavioural block. The mechanisms used by industry to reinforce its interests are intensive lobbying, financial support for think-tanks and government decision-making bodies, interchange of staff between industry and government bureaucracy and the writing of cabinet papers. In its eleven years of power, the Howard government has been united with industry in believing that the threat to Australia was not from climate change but from

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possible actions to alleviate it that might harm industry, exports and the rule of government.¶ During this period, a closely woven network of individuals with the intent of denying climate change and delaying any government responses to it has been in continuous operation. The network involved many government politicians, some members of cabinet, and conservative think-tanks linked financially and ideologically to their counterparts in the US. Clearly, it is doubtful if this could have happened if the government was not ideologically receptive. Government was fervent in denial of climate change, scientists were suppressed, research was terminated and disdain was expressed for expert opinion. The total denial of access to those who could explain the problem contrasted with an open-door policy for fossil-fuel lobbyists.¶ The functions of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (Abare), a government resource, merit particular discussion. This organisation prepares and researches figures for government and industry yet it is supported financially by polluting industries. It prepared the model that underpinned the Howard government's greenhouse study and the polluters oversaw this process. Abare produced reports that stressed the dangers of cutting emissions.¶ On 16 August 2006, John Howard told parliament: "According to Abare, a 50% cut in Australian emissions by 2050 would lead to a 10% fall in GDP, a 20% fall in real wages, a carbon price equivalent to a doubling of petrol prices, and a staggering 600% rise in electricity and gas prices. They are the calculations of the Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics" (see Australia, House of Representatives, "Question without notice", Hansard, 16 August 2006). The report was embellished by John Howard. To give the impression that deep cuts in emissions would mean by 2050 an economy 10% smaller than today and with 20% lower wages, Howard's numbers excluded the words, "compared with business as usual". Despite the fact that the report was prepared to support him, he felt the need to embellish it.¶ These actions can be analysed in the context of conservational psychology and behavioural change (see O Hernández & MC Monroe, "Thinking About Behavior", in BA Day & MC Monroe, eds., Environmental Education and Communication for a Sustainable World: A Handbook for International Practitioners (Academy for Educational Development, 2000). Behaviour change is seen as a gradual process involving several stages. In the pre-contemplation stage the person or group does not know or does not consider adopting ecologically sustainable behavior, such as the acceptance and response to climate change. The contemplation stage sees the person thinking about these issues and considering adopting such behaviours. The person may then progress to preparation for action and then to the action stage.¶ In Australia, the Howard government has spent eleven years in the pre-contemplative phase, with its kinsmen industries in self-preservation mode and with an unsullied market ideology. In 2007 Howard still showed little acceptance of the effects of climate change. When asked what life would be like in Australia if temperatures around the world rose by 4-6 degrees Celsius, he said. "Well, it would be less comfortable for some than it is now" (see "Howard 'no idea' about climate change", The Australian, 6 February 2007). Public opinion has now forced him reluctantly into contemplation and into some action but he has employed actions that still fit within his ideological concerns. Proposals involve "aspirational" targets and clean coal that do not threaten the market ideology. This behavioural change cannot progress further because there is conflict of interest between the understanding of the science and the commitment to an unfettered market that supports political power and material existence.¶ The systemic flaw¶ The John Howard government has acted with integrity according to its own value-system. That value-system includes the righteousness of access and policy-making to those who support conservative government and free markets, and the exclusion of those experts who might endanger the system. The corruption of democracy is justified by the cause. Furthermore, the ideological kraal has become secure from contaminating thought by the politicisation of the public service which feeds government with what it wants to hear and by the interposition of politically appointed staffers.¶ This conflict between system and appropriate action is expressed in two statements by Tony Blair:¶ \* "Making the shift to a sustainable lifestyle is one of the most important challenges for the 21st century. The reality of climate change brings home to us the consequence of not facing up to these challenges" (quoted in Tim Jackson, ed., The Earthscan Reader on Sustainable Consumption, Earthscan, 2006)¶ \* "If we were to put forward a solution to climate change, something that would involve drastic cuts in economic growth or standards of living, it would not matter how justified it was, it would simply not be agreed to"¶ The conflict - the fusion of democracy and market - cannot survive without economic growth, and neither can the politician (see David Shearman, "Kyoto: One Tiny Step for Humanity", Online Opinion, 4 March 2005). George W Bush after seven years of denial and sabotage of climate science has reluctantly moved forward from the pre-contemplative stage but is constrained by the same paradigm.¶ We must lead the world to produce fewer greenhouse gas emissions, and we must do it in a way that does not undermine economic growth or prevent nations from delivering greater prosperity for their people."¶ The big leap forward in behavioural change has to be an acceptance that economic growth in its present form threatens our survival. It is not a simple matter of changing to renewables which will bring an explosion in employment and continuing growth. Climate change is but one of a network of factors destroying the ecological services which support the world's burgeoning population. It is questionable whether the leaders elected through liberal democracy have the

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ability to understand these complex issues, and indeed the commitment to act upon them.¶ Plato recognised the problems that would befall democracy. The needs of the populace would not be resisted by those who sought power; power is best exerted by those (experts) who did not seek power.¶ Clearly expertise is needed in this complex world issue, but how do we get there in the face of "mediocracy"? The first step is to float the issue; and indeed we find that some intellectuals are thinking this way, though cautiously - so as to avoid being labelled as revolutionary.¶ Václav Havel, former president of the Czech Republic, says: "I don't agree with those whose reaction is to warn against restricting civil freedoms. Were the forecasts of certain climatologists to come true, our freedoms would be tantamount to those of someone hanging from a 20th-storey parapet" (see "Our Moral Footprint", New York Times, 27 September 2007).¶ Tim Flannery (in *The Weather Makers: Our changing climate and what it means for life on earth*) contrasts the freedom of humanity with the need for a more directive leadership.¶ The case for an authoritarianism of experts has been explored with the philosophical conclusion that continuing absolute liberty cannot be preferable to life (see David Shearman & Joseph Wayne Smith, *The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy*, Praeger, 2007). It may well be non-western states (including China) will find ways to deliver while the west continues to display its extreme liberty with ineffectual debate and a surrender to powerful interests in its grinding democratic institutions.¶

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## **Terrorism**

## **1NC Terrorism**

### **Democratic deadlock and freedoms exacerbate and encourage terrorism**

**Li 5**, (Quan, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational terrorist incidents?" Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University, Florida State University MS, PhD, international relations.  
<http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/49/2/278.full.pdf+html>)

Institutional constraints on the democratic government are likely uncorrelated with the negative effect of democracy on terrorism. Policy inaction and political deadlock often occur in democratic polities as a result of the constraints on the policy-making power of government. To the extent that policy inaction and political deadlock fail to reduce grievances but heighten public frustration, government constraints do not reduce but rather encourage terrorism. If one considers the implication of Fearon and Laitin's (2003) argument on civil war, terrorist groups are typically extremely marginal groups whose political grievances are too narrow to be resolved through a democratic system. Policy inaction and political deadlock, induced by institutional checks and balances, will increase the grievances of marginalized groups, pushing them toward violence. More important, I argue that institutional constraints significantly weaken the ability of the democratic government to fight terrorism. Because the winning coalition in democracy tends to be larger, institutional checks and balances hold the democratic government accountable to a broader range of societal interests. It is, therefore, difficult for democracies to enact antiterrorist strategies that are as strict as those commonly adopted by nondemocratic regimes (Wilkinson 2001). Enacting repression and effective deterrence is more costly to the government in a competitive political system because it may harm political support and cause the government to lose power. In contrast, the largely unconstrained, repressive military regime, for example, can disregard civil liberties, effectively crush terrorist organizations, and reduce terrorist incidents (Crenshaw 1981). Finally, I also argue that institutional constraints perversely strengthen the strategic position of terrorists in their interactions with the government. Institutional checks and balances allow a broad range of interests to influence government policy making and involve careful and regular oversight and scrutiny of government performance and policy failures. As a result, the security of a vast number of citizens becomes the concern of the democratic government. Creating a general terrorist threat that affects most citizens is likely to be effective in democratic countries. Also, the cost of generating such a threat is low because of the abundance of targets valuable to the democratic government. In nondemocratic countries, the government is constrained only by the ruling elite, so an effective terrorist threat need only target those in the small ruling coalition. Because the ruling elite are easier to protect than the general population, an effective terrorist threat is much more costly and difficult to mount in nondemocratic regimes. Within the context of transnational terrorism, the effect of government constraints applies to both domestic terrorists and foreign terrorists in a country, thus influencing all three types of transnational terrorist attacks.



### **Terrorism causes WW3 - causes critical miscalculations in foreign policy**

**Mueller 5**, (Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, "REACTIONS AND OVERREACTIONS TO TERRORISM". <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/nb.pdf>)

In some cases terrorist acts have had consequences because they are used as an excuse for--or seized upon to carry out--a policy desired for other reasons. The terrorist acts do not "trigger" or "cause" these historically-significant ventures, but rather facilitate them by shifting the emotional or political situation, potentially making a policy desired for other reasons by some political actors possible but no more necessary than it was before the terrorist act took place. World War I, 1914. An important case in point is the reaction of Austria and Germany to the assassination in Sarajevo in June 1914. It is frequently suggested that that terrorist act "triggered" or even "caused" the cataclysm that soon came to be known as the Great War. It seems clear, however, that rather than causing the massive (and, in the end, spectacularly counterproductive) Austrian and German overreaction, the violence in Sarajevo more nearly gave some Austrian leaders an excuse to impose Serbia-punishing policies they were seeking to carry out anyway. In an extensive discussion, Richard Ned Lebow concludes of the episode: the Sarajevo assassinations changed the political and psychological environment in Vienna and Berlin in six important ways, all of which were probably necessary for the decisions that led to war. First, they constituted a political challenge to which Austrian leaders believed they had to respond forcefully; anything less was expected to encourage further challenges by domestic and foreign enemies. Second, they shocked and offended Franz Josef and Kaiser Wilhelm and made both emperors more receptive to calls for decisive measures. Third, they changed the policymaking context in Vienna by removing the principal spokesman for peace. Fourth, they may have been the catalyst for Bethmann-Hollweg's gestalt shift. Fifth, they made it possible for Bethmann-Hollweg to win the support of the socialists, without which he never would have risked

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**General**

## **1NC Problem-Solving**

**Democracy dodges productive discussions and promotes oversimplifications and short-term solutions – turns all their offense and prevents solvency**

**Stevens 15** (Brett Stevens is a writer for Amerika.org, “Democracy is disease” 5/07/15  
<http://www.amerika.org/politics/democracy-is-disease/>)/CW

Democracy encourages “football-style” decision making where people root for a team and defend it against all comers. At that point, they stop looking into their own beliefs to figure out what the intent is, and focus on the game of beating the other team. Over time, this leads to the teams being very similar, which by the nature of leftism as more general than rightism, leads to a leftward drift.¶ Voting is an alternative to the old fashioned way of making decisions, which is either to have truly excellent people and/or wise elders in control, or to get together your best people and talk it out. Ask every relevant question. Take every line of thought to a conclusion. Never fall back on “well that’s just subjective” or “that’s your ideology.” Remove ideology and politics entirely, and look at the task itself.¶ Of course, that is hard work. It can result in all-nighters and substantial risk, since appearance is the opposite of reality. Voters panic if a new program does not immediately deliver results, which causes politicians to avoid rocking the boat and to construct new programs so that there is always someone else to blame for their failure. Voters respond to flattery, such as programs that show off how wealthy their nation is, and glaze over when negative, difficult or complex things are mentioned. But even more, voting itself causes distancing from the task. The question is no longer what should be done, but which of the two options — absurd oversimplifications polarized by the necessity of differentiation — seems a safer bet.¶ Our civilization has dedicated itself to avoiding the hard work of making choices and taking leadership roles out of fear of the crowd. We look for “systems,” or “objective” and automatic processes like democracy and the economy, to lead for us, but all of them succumb to decay through inevitable entropy and drift toward what humans want to believe is true and not what is. Economics reflects what people are willing to buy, not what they need. Democracy reflects what people want to think is true, not what is real. Even systems like “education” presuppose that simply indoctrinating people gives them the magical ability to make decisions that they lack the intellectual or moral fortitude to make. The future is not found in systems, but in organic leadership, which is putting the best people in charge and having them debate out questions instead of putting them to a vote.¶

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## **AT: Disease Module**

## **AT: Disease Module**

### **Democracy effect is minimal on disease-correlation not causation**

#### **Justesen 10**

(Mogens Justesen, 2-10, University of Southern Denmark, "Democracy, Dictatorship, and Disease: Political regimes and the fight against HIV/AIDS", [http://www.hha.dk/nat/christian/BBQ\\_10/Justesen.pdf](http://www.hha.dk/nat/christian/BBQ_10/Justesen.pdf), Accessed 6-29-15, AA)

HIV/AIDS has evolved into being the major killer in developing countries today. Indeed, it is no longer confined to being an issue of public health. Due to its devastating human and economic impact, HIV/AIDS has become a major development issue. Yet we know very little about why medical treatment of HIV/AIDS victims is provided on a large scale in only some countries, and we know practically nothing about the role of political regimes in this process. The purpose of this paper has been to fill this gap by analyzing the impact of political regimes on public health care policies relating to the treatment of HIV/AIDS victims by ARV drugs. The general argument linking political regimes to government performance implies that competitive democratic elections impose an accountability constraint on governments. In theory, democratic politics creates incentives for government to accommodate to voter preferences and rely on a relative large supply of public goods and broad-based services as means to stay in power. By contrast, a non-democratic government does not face any formal accountability constraints through competitive elections. This creates incentives for such governments to rule by distributing selective benefits targeted specifically at coalition members, rather than by means of general public services available to broad segments of citizens. Using regression and matching methods, this paper has tried to assess the relative merits of democracy in the case of medical treatment of HIV/AIDS patient. Across various model specifications, the results have provided some support for the idea hypothesis that democracies tends to perform better than non-democracies in terms of providing access to treatment by anti-retroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS patients. While this suggests that political regimes do have some tangible effects on public health policies – at least in this limited, but vital, policy area – there is also reasons for caution, in particular since the substantial effect of democracy compared to non-democracy may not amount to more than a ten percent difference in ARV coverage. At the very least, we therefore need a more detailed understanding of the conditions under which democracy works as predicted by theory – and the conditions under which it does not.

### **No extinction from disease, lack of data to support**

**Smith, Sax, and Lafferty**, USGS Channel Islands Field Station, University of California Santa Barbara, University of Georgia, Institute of Ecology, **2005**

(Katherine F., Dov F., And Kevin D, Evidence for the Role of Infectious Disease in Species Extinction and Endangerment, pg 1355)

First, the lack of historical data make it difficult to support claims that infectious diseases have been emerging at increasingly high rates and are therefore likely to be of significant concern in the future. Alternative indirect methods should not be discounted. For instance, Ward and Lafferty (2004) tracked the proportion of published scientific papers related to infectious disease in several marine taxa to assess whether normalized reports of infectious disease could serve as an indirect proxy for infectious disease monitoring. In the absence of baseline data, this approach is useful for detecting quantitative trends in infectious disease occurrence through time. This and similar methods should prove beneficial for future studies on temporal trends in emerging infectious diseases. Second, it is crucial to recognize that not all infectious diseases increase the likelihood of extinction. There is a growing need for rigorous scientific tests to determine whether an infectious disease identified in a threatened host causes significant pathology. Related to this is the need to assess whether impacts at the individual level scale up to the population or species level (Lafferty & Holt 2003). Theoretical and historical evidence suggests that infectious

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disease can drive populations temporarily or permanently to low numbers or densities, predisposing them to extinction by other forces (de Castro & Bolker 2005; Gerber et al. 2005). Infectious diseases that are host

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## **AT: Famine Module**

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### **Democracy doesn't stop hunger alone**

**Massing 2003** (Does Democracy Avert Famine? By MICHAEL MASSING  
March 1, 2003 Saturday)

To Mr. Sen, though, it is not the thesis that needs revision but the popular understanding of it. Yes, famines do not occur in democracies, he said in a phone interview, but "it would be a misapprehension to believe that democracy solves the problem of hunger." Mr. Sen, who is the master of Trinity College at Cambridge University, said his writings on famine frequently noted the problems India has had in feeding its people, and he was baffled by the amount of attention his comments about famine and democracy had received. The Nobel committee, in awarding its prize, did not even mention this aspect of his work, he said, adding, however, that many newspapers had seized on it and misrepresented it. Mr. Sen's views about famine and hunger have recently been put to the test by Dan Banik, an Indian-born political scientist at the University of Oslo. Mr. Banik has spent much of the last several years in India, studying the parched, desperate Kalandi region of Orissa. In that area alone, Mr. Banik said by phone from India, he found 300 starvation deaths in six months. And they are hardly unique. "I have collected newspaper reports on starvation for six years in Indian newspapers," he said, "and there's not a state where it hasn't happened. Starvation is widespread in India." He quickly added, however, that the toll was nowhere near the hundreds of thousands that constitute a famine. In fact, Mr. Sen's theory about famines not occurring in democracies "applies rather well to India," he said. "There has not been a large-scale loss of life since 1947." At the same time, he said, "there have been many incidents of large-scale food crises that, while not resulting in actual famines, have led to many, many deaths." While the Indian bureaucracy responds well to highly visible crises like famine threats, Mr. Banik observed, starvation "occurs in isolated areas and so isn't very visible." India has done an even poorer job of addressing the problem of chronic malnutrition, he said. "It's so shocking," Mr. Banik added. "There's so much food in the country, yet people are starving." India's huge food stocks reflect the power of the farm lobby. It has pressed the government to buy grain at ever higher prices, making bread and other staples more and more expensive. To help the hungry, the government has a national network of ration shops, but they have been undermined by widespread corruption and distribution bottlenecks. What's more, the government, under pressure from the World Bank and other institutions, has reduced its once-generous food subsidies.

### **All causes to famine other than Democracy**

**Devereux 90** (Democracy alone cannot free Africa from famine MR  
STEPHEN DEVEREUX July 6, 1990, Friday)

Sir: Professor Amartya Sen explains "How democracy can free the world of famine" (2 July), where "democracy" means an elected government, social security and a free press. Professor Sen does not claim that democracy is sufficient to eliminate famines (let alone poverty and hunger), which are the products of complex underlying causes and precipitating factors. Democracy may generate the political will to deal with food crises, but it does not provide the economic and structural capacity to do so. If a government is truly accountable to its electorate; if it has good and timely information about rainfall, food production, rural incomes, nutrition and health; if it has access to adequate cash and food resources; if transport infrastructure is sound; and if the affected population is not isolated (because of civil conflict, say, or floods); then - and only then - public action might prevent a threatened famine. In sub-Saharan Africa, famine is closely associated with drought and, increasingly, with war. During the 1980s, major famines in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad and Mozambique were all precipitated by this drought-war combination. True, none of these countries has a particularly democratic government, but nor did Zimbabwe and Botswana (described by Professor Sen as "relatively democratic" and famine-free) suffer major civil conflict during the decade. It is doubtful whether "public activism" within famine-prone



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countries can be credited with nudging governments into taking preventive actions, as Professor Sen implies. The vocal and articulate urban classes are usually too busy defending their own interests to care about their hungry country cousins, and most relief aid distributed in Africa comes from outside the continent. The political complexion of individual governments has much to do with who gets aid and who does not, but this is an argument for getting in the good books of the rich and powerful as a means of ending famine, not for democracy per se.¶ Drought, flood, grain hoarding, war - none of these causes famine in itself. Vulnerability causes famine, and vulnerability is caused by poverty and social disruption as much as by political marginalisation. Democracy, to the extent that it empowers poor people and protects their interests, reduces that vulnerability, but it is not a panacea. If famine is to be eliminated from Africa, war and poverty must end too.

### **Democracy does not have anything to do with famine**

**Polgreen 05** (A New Face of Hunger, Without the Old Excuses LYDIA POLGREEN July 31, 2005 Sunday)

THE pictures are wrenching. A nomad holds an infant aloft, its gaunt head lolling dangerously, its matchstick limbs akimbo. A father asks God to forgive him for weeping publicly; he has just buried his son. A child in an emergency clinic awakens from a hunger-induced stupor only to moan and weep from the pain of his starvation-induced skin sores.¶ These images of victims of a food crisis in the vast, landlocked West African nation of Niger, captured by a BBC television correspondent and shown around the world, look like something the world has seen before -- the famine in Ethiopia in the 1980's. That catastrophe prompted an extraordinary outpouring of generosity, along with a vow that the world would never again stand by as millions went hungry.¶ Yet here it is again, far smaller in scale, yet replete with images of stick-thin children with hunger-swollen bellies clinging to bony, flat-breasted mothers. Once again there is the question: what causes these calamities that invariably afflict the world's poorest corners?¶ The immediate cause is certainly known. Locust swarms and poor rains last year wiped out much of the nation's harvest and caused grain prices to triple. But when misfortunes strike other countries, they can help their people, with planning, with resources and by seeking aid from abroad. So what has gone so terribly wrong in Niger?¶ For decades famine was seen largely as a consequence of bad political leadership. Food scarcity in Ethiopia in the 1980's had natural causes, but its transformation into a deadly famine came to be understood as mostly man-made, the result of a Stalinist regime's collectivist ideology and its pursuit of victory over insurgents without regard to the well-being of its people. It seemed a neat illustration of the development the economist Amartya Sen's dictum: "No famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy."¶ But that does not explain Niger's problem. Niger is a democracy. It has been one since 1999, when it made the transition to multiparty democracy and constitutional rule after a decade of turmoil. It has also made, in part at least, the painful transition from a centralized, state-run economy to a market-driven one, earning praise and ultimately relief from about half of its estimated \$1.6 billion in foreign debt from the World Bank.¶ Yet Niger still earns a horrifically high score on the index of human misery compiled by the United Nations Development Program, which lists it as the second least developed nation in the world, just ahead of Sierra Leone.¶ More than 25 percent of its children die before their fifth birthdays. Those who survive go on to scrape a meager existence from a harsh, arid savanna that is just barely suitable for farming and cattle grazing, yet must feed 12 million people. Cyclical droughts and chronic hunger are a way of life. Life expectancy tops out at 46 years.¶ Nor is Niger alone in its troubles. Of the 25 countries at the bottom of the development list, all but two are in Africa. Niger's food crisis -- it is not, despite news

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reports, a famine yet -- is not even the worst on the continent. Similar problems, involving even larger numbers, exist in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Darfur and elsewhere.

### **Only FUNCTIONING democracies prevent famine**

**Polgreen 05** (A New Face of Hunger, Without the Old Excuses LYDIA  
POLGREEN July 31, 2005 Sunday)

Niger may be a democracy, but its government is weak and its tiny budget is almost entirely dependent on foreign aid. It may have a free press, but if literacy is at 17 percent and few can afford radios or televisions, how can a free press safeguard against famine? It may have elections, but if the government has put itself at the mercy of international donors in return for promises of aid, can it be held to account when the world does not live up to its end of the bargain?¶ In the end, the way out of misery for countries like Niger is neither democracy nor increased aid alone, but a blend of the two, said Stephen Devereux, an expert on famine at the University of Sussex in Britain. Mr. Sen's phrase about famine and poverty is often misquoted to leave out the word "functioning." Helping young democracies become functioning nations is probably the only way to inoculate countries like Niger against catastrophe.¶ "Niger appears to have done everything it could," Mr. Devereux said. "We have to ask ourselves, what do international donors owe Niger in return? If you accept the situation that a country is so poor that it will be dependent on assistance for a long time, the responsibility for preventing famine is shared."

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**AT: Econ. Module**

## **1NC AT: Trade**

### **Democracy is not key to a market economy**

#### **Sowell 3-25**

(Thomas Sowell, 3-25-15, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, "Western advocates of 'nation-building' should master recently deceased statesman's legacy of lessons", <http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell032515.php3>, Accessed 6-25-15, AA)

It is not often that the leader of a small city-state — in this case, Singapore — gets an international reputation. But no one deserved it more than Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore as an independent country in 1959, and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. With his death, he leaves behind a legacy valuable not only to Singapore but to the world. Born in Singapore in 1923, when it was a British colony, Lee Kuan Yew studied at Cambridge University after World War II, and was much impressed by the orderly, law-abiding England of that day. It was a great contrast with the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Singapore of that era. Today Singapore has a per capita Gross Domestic Product more than 50 percent higher than that of the United Kingdom and a crime rate a small fraction of that in England. A 2010 study showed more patents and patent applications from the small city-state of Singapore than from Russia. Few places in the world can match Singapore for cleanliness and orderliness. This remarkable transformation of Singapore took place under the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew for two decades as prime minister. And it happened despite some very serious handicaps that led to chaos and self-destruction in other countries. Singapore had little in the way of natural resources. It even had to import drinking water from neighboring Malaysia. Its population consisted of people of different races, languages and religions — the Chinese majority and the sizable Malay and Indian minorities. At a time when other Third World countries were setting up government-controlled economies and blaming their poverty on "exploitation" by more advanced industrial nations, Lee Kuan Yew promoted a market economy, welcomed foreign investments, and made Singapore's children learn English, to maximize the benefits from Singapore's position as a major port for international commerce. Singapore's schools also taught the separate native languages of its Chinese, Malay and Indian Tamil peoples. But everyone had to learn English, because it was the language of international commerce, on which the country's economic prosperity depended. In short, Lee Kuan Yew was pragmatic, rather than ideological. Many observers saw a contradiction between Singapore's free markets and its lack of democracy. But its long-serving prime minister did not deem its people ready for democracy. Instead, he offered a decent government with much less corruption than in other countries in that region of the world. His example was especially striking in view of many in the West who seem to think that democracy is something that can be exported to countries whose history and traditions are wholly different from those of Western nations that evolved democratic institutions over the centuries. Even such a champion of freedom as John Stuart Mill said in the 19th century: "The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization." In other words, democracy has prerequisites, and peoples and places without those prerequisites will not necessarily do well when democratic institutions are created. The most painful recent example of that is Iraq, where a democratically elected government, set up by expenditure of the blood and treasure of the United States, became one of the obstacles to a united people with the military strength to protect itself from international terrorists. In many parts of the Third World, post-colonial governments set up democratically made sure that there would be no more democracy that could replace its original leaders. This led to the cynical phrase, "one man, one vote — one time."

Democracy can be wonderful as a principle where it is viable, but disastrous as a fetish where it is not. Lee Kuan Yew understood the pitfalls and steered around them. If our Western advocates of "nation-building" in other countries would learn that lesson, it could be the most valuable legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

Consequentialism 21

## **AT: Environment Module**

## **AT: Warming Module**

**No spread of democracy will change the environmental situation, only direct policy making can solve**

**Fredriksson and Neumayer**, Department of Economics, University of Louisville, and London School of Economics, Department of Geography & Environment and Grantham Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, November **2013**

(Per G. and Eric, Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?, Ecological Economics)

This paper argues that democratic capital (long-term historical experience with democracy) is an important determinant of climate change policies. In fact, we find that the current level of democracy has no effect on environmental policy once democratic capital is introduced. Higher levels of democratic capital stock (in particular, the stock of historical experience of constraints on the executive) are associated with more stringent climate change policies. Thus, recent transitions to democracy are unlikely to have short-term positive effects on environmental policies addressing climate change. As democracy is consolidated over time, we expect such transitions to eventually have a positive environmental policy impact, however. The Arab Spring (and other democratization) can be considered an initial step in the right direction also for the environment. In the short run additional policy measures and international cooperation appear necessary to address climate change.

Consequentialism 23

## **AT: Genocide Module**

## **AT: Genocide**

### **Modern democracy empty and is a facade for ethnocracy - this justifies systemic genocide**

**Conversi 06**, (Daniele, Doctor in Sociology/European Studies from the London School of Economics, "Demo-skepticism and Genocide")

Mann (2005) convincingly demonstrates that majoritarian democracy may sustain genocide when the demos is associated with the ethnos.

Unfortunately the latter is the rule, rather than the exception. He begins by dealing with the country which, until recently, was heralded as the beacon of 'liberal democracy', the USA (Mann, 2005, ch. 2). The American Constitution is the oldest unchanged one in the world and remains an object of sacred veneration by most Americans from both the right and the left of the political spectrum. But the Constitution's opening sentence, 'We the people', lends itself to two opposite interpretations: one ethnic, the other civic. The 'people' can be either the ethnos, sharing putative descent, or the demos, simply sharing citizenship and hypothetically equal rights, irrespective of their descent. However, in a settler society that was built on pillage and destruction, and where the clearing of the conquered lands of its original inhabitants was legitimized in God's name, the ethnic variety tended to prevail, imbued with legalistic and ideological justifications (see Lieven, 2004). The importance of slavery for the functioning of the US capitalist system has been recognized by both Marxists and non-Marxist scholars alike.<sup>15</sup> Despite, or because of, an all-pervasive assimilationist culture, sharp cleavages in the labour market persist and have been abolished by neither the Civil War nor the Civil Rights movement. As a case study, the USA stands out as the litmus test, where democracy has repeatedly become an empty concept for larger and larger sections of its population.<sup>16</sup> Mann's core thesis about the democracy-genocide linkage becomes self-evident when applied to the case of Rwanda (Mann, 2005, chs 14 and 15). Possibly, this is the only case that fully substantiates the book's core argument: Hutu genocidal leaders always spoke in the name of majoritarian democracy against 'invaders' from the Tutsi minority (Mann, 2005, p. 443). In truth, Mann's vision of democracy could be better rendered by the more suitable concept of ethnocracy, a political framework in which only the dominant ethnic group has the faculty of governing itself through democratically elected institutions and laws (Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004).<sup>17</sup> Yet, this has been precisely the prevalent pattern, first emerging in the West and then exported elsewhere. The term 'ethnocracy', originally coined to describe the Israeli political system, could in fact be extended to most modern nation states, notably in Eastern Europe.



Consequentialism 25

## **AT: Human Rights Module**

## **AT: HR Module**

### **Human rights doesn't need democracy just freedom**

**New Nation 11**(Democracy, human rights and media, The New Nation (Bangladesh), January 10, 2011 Monday)

Dhaka, Jan. 10 -- In ancient Greece democracy meant direct rule of the people. The city states, where, democracy flourished, did not have more than ten thousand population. Democracy was not held in high esteem by the Greek scholar-philosophers. It was disliked by Socrates, considered as the rule of ignorant people by Plato and judged as dispensable by Aristotle. In the modern world about 29 democratic states emerged by 1926.¶ We have learnt the hard way in the past 37 years that democracy as a system of governance is difficult to practice. To prevent misuse of democracy and the dictatorship of the majority, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly. Human rights become integral with birth of humans. Human existence and human rights are inseparable unless laws or the constitution of a country provide to the contrary. Because of close linkage of freedom of speech and expression with freedom of press, the latter has been specifically mentioned in constitutions of many countries. While freedom of speech is important, freedom of press has been demanded on legal ground and in the interest of corporate entity.¶ In democracy, sovereign power rests with the people. The people exercise that power either directly or through their representatives. On the other hand, totalitarianism is a politico- economic system under which the production process, commodity and services are owned and controlled by the collective entity which is regarded as the society and the state. Freedom of action and choice as promoted under individualistic system are contrary to control by the collective organisation or the state.¶ Democracy can be very much like collectivism if actual political power is vested with a particular group and freedom of individuals is controlled by a public body or the elite. Democracy can act as a shield to persecution and repression just as it can protect human freedom. There are many countries where elections are held at regular intervals but people are systematically subjected to repression. Democracy alone cannot guarantee freedom. James Madison (1809-1817), the fourth president of America said:¶ "Democracy is always an example of unrest and violence and it always violates individual security and right of ownership of properties. It is short-lived and ends violently."¶ Politicians and the public media are never tired of saying that the oppressed people want democracy and that only democracy can make the world free and peaceful. It was to save democracy that America joined the Second World War.¶ We are more or less familiar with the deception used in recent times in the name of democracy. Nevertheless, people in the world frame constitutions, make declaration of human rights and champion freedom of press. Whatever virtues democracy may have, it is not the same as freedom. Democracy can be repressive like autocracy. Elected representatives are expected to be respectful of individual freedom. But it is not always true when it is said that democratic states are relatively peace-loving and conflict-averse.¶ Three imperial countries in the 19th and 20th century, Britain, France and America, were democratic states. In the 20th century though America was not threatened it became involved in more than 200 armed clashes. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people lost lives in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Granada, Columbia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia and Bosnia.¶ Is democracy indispensable for freedom? For many centuries, in most parts of the world, law and order were maintained without Parliament and people's representatives. According to many, for a free and peaceful world what is more necessary than democracy is freedom of individuals and emancipation of people.

Consequentialism 27

## **AT: Trade Module**

## **1NC AT: Trade**

### **Democracy is not key to a market economy**

#### **Sowell 3-25**

(Thomas Sowell, 3-25-15, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, “Western advocates of 'nation-building' should master recently deceased statesman's legacy of lessons”, <http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell032515.php3>, Accessed 6-25-15, AA)

It is not often that the leader of a small city-state — in this case, Singapore — gets an international reputation. But no one deserved it more than Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore as an independent country in 1959, and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. With his death, he leaves behind a legacy valuable not only to Singapore but to the world. Born in Singapore in 1923, when it was a British colony, Lee Kuan Yew studied at Cambridge University after World War II, and was much impressed by the orderly, law-abiding England of that day. It was a great contrast with the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Singapore of that era. Today Singapore has a per capita Gross Domestic Product more than 50 percent higher than that of the United Kingdom and a crime rate a small fraction of that in England. A 2010 study showed more patents and patent applications from the small city-state of Singapore than from Russia. Few places in the world can match Singapore for cleanliness and orderliness. This remarkable transformation of Singapore took place under the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew for two decades as prime minister. And it happened despite some very serious handicaps that led to chaos and self-destruction in other countries. Singapore had little in the way of natural resources. It even had to import drinking water from neighboring Malaysia. Its population consisted of people of different races, languages and religions — the Chinese majority and the sizable Malay and Indian minorities. At a time when other Third World countries were setting up government-controlled economies and blaming their poverty on “exploitation” by more advanced industrial nations, Lee Kuan Yew promoted a market economy, welcomed foreign investments, and made Singapore's children learn English, to maximize the benefits from Singapore's position as a major port for international commerce. Singapore's schools also taught the separate native languages of its Chinese, Malay and Indian Tamil peoples. But everyone had to learn English, because it was the language of international commerce, on which the country's economic prosperity depended. In short, Lee Kuan Yew was pragmatic, rather than ideological. Many observers saw a contradiction between Singapore's free markets and its lack of democracy. But its long-serving prime minister did not deem its people ready for democracy. Instead, he offered a decent government with much less corruption than in other countries in that region of the world. His example was especially striking in view of many in the West who seem to think that democracy is something that can be exported to countries whose history and traditions are wholly different from those of Western nations that evolved democratic institutions over the centuries. Even such a champion of freedom as John Stuart Mill said in the 19th century: “The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization.” In other words, democracy has prerequisites, and peoples and places without those prerequisites will not necessarily do well when democratic institutions are created. The most painful recent example of that is Iraq, where a democratically elected government, set up by expenditure of the blood and treasure of the United States, became one of the obstacles to a united people with the military strength to protect itself from international terrorists. In many parts of the Third World, post-colonial governments set up democratically made sure that there would be no more democracy that could replace its original leaders. This led to the cynical phrase, “one man, one vote — one time.” Democracy can be wonderful as a principle where it is viable, but disastrous as a fetish where it is not. Lee Kuan Yew understood the pitfalls and steered around them. If our Western advocates of “nation-building” in other countries would learn that lesson, it could be the most valuable legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

### **No long-term solvency – trade undermines democracy**

#### **Hickel 13**

(Dr. Jason Hickel, Lecturer at London School of Economics, 12-19-13, “Free Trade' and the death of democracy”,

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<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/trade-death-democracy-2013121812233660574.html>, Accessed 6-28-15, AA)

In this paradigm, democracy itself begins to appear as anti-democratic, inasmuch as it grants voters control over the economic policies that affect their lives. As this absurd logic moves steadily toward its ultimate conclusion, democracy becomes an obstacle that needs to be circumvented in the interests of "free" trade and investment. This may sound extreme, but it is exactly what is happening today. We can see it very clearly in two new "free trade" deals that are about to come into effect: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which will govern trade between the US and the European Union, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will govern trade between the US and a number of Pacific nations. We hear very little about these deals because they are shrouded in secrecy, and because six of the corporations leading the negotiations happen to control 90 percent of our media. Yet we need to pay attention, because these deals are set to form the blueprint for a new global order. The TTIP and the TPP go far beyond earlier trade deals like NAFTA, which seem almost quaint by comparison. In addition to battering down import tariffs and privatizing public services, they grant corporations the power to strike down the laws of sovereign nations. You read that right. If these deals come into effect, multinational corporations will be empowered to regulate democratic states, rather than the other way around. This is the most far-reaching assault on the ideas of sovereignty and democracy that has ever been attempted in history. And it is being conducted under the banner of "freedom".

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## **AT: War Module**

## 1NC AT: War

### **Democracy doesn't solve war – non-democracies and democracies go to war all the time**

**Abanes 08** (Menandro S Abanes Menandro S. Abanes is a researcher from the Philippines. He earned his PhD in Social Science from Radboud University Nijmegen. He teaches at Ateneo de Naga University in Bicol, Philippines., "Democracy and peace: an over-emphasized relationship" 8/29/08 [http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id\\_article=540](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=540)///CW)

Perhaps the most fundamental question that begs to be asked of the democratic-peace concept is: does democracy stop war from happening? Obviously it does not. Democratic states have initiated and engaged in plenty of wars. Just count the number of modern wars that the US and United Kingdom (UK), two known champions of democracy, have been involved in. I remember two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many others. Thus, democracy does not stop wars, and it does not offer us a way out of the Hobbesian state of nature.¶ Democracy and war¶ If democracy does not stop war, then does it go to war? I would say, yes! Even though democracies do not fight each other, "they fight and initiate wars about as often as non-democracies" (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p.49).¶

### **Trade, not democracy, solves war – democratization causes conflict**

**Pazienza 14** (Toni Ann Pazienza was writing a thesis for a MA in IR and Government from the University of South Florida. "Challenging Democratic Peace Theory – the Role of US-China Relationship" May <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6294&context=etd>///CW)

Democratic peace theory claims that democratic states are less likely to go to war with¶ other democracies, however, they are likely to go to war with nondemocracies. In all of the¶ literature and data bases there is little if no discussion of the U.S.-China relationship. The United¶ States is a democracy, and China is an autocratic state and they have never been to war with each¶ other. DPT, as we saw, is limited because it cannot explain this relationship and downplays the¶ influence of trade interdependence. I argued that in the absence of mutual democratic¶ constraints, the peaceful relationship between China and the United States is primarily the result¶ of economic interdependence.¶ The near absolute isolation of China before the 1970s is clearly over and China seeks its¶ place in the world as an equal with the United States. Participation has led Beijing to develop¶ more expertise on issues such as arms control and moderating some of its practices for fear of¶ jeopardizing its image. Clearly, China has reformed its economy from a command economy to a¶ development/laissez faire model. By adapting to capitalist practices, embracing¶ international organizations and standards, China appears to have made a commitment to reform.¶ The Office of the United States Trade Representative reported that in 2011, that United¶ States goods and services traded with China totaled \$539 billion, exports totaled \$129 billion;¶ and imports totaled \$411 billions. Post World War II, the United States emerged as the¶ preeminent trading partner, however, the United States Department of Commerce reported in ¶ 2011, that China sat at the number three position in all United States trade for total exports and¶ imports.¶ Strategic decisions made by both countries are greatly affected by their economic¶ connection, particularly the United States. The close interconnectivity amongst the two nations¶ means that they must take into account the other nation when making key strategy decisions. The¶ connection also means that one nation could not launch a cyber-attack on the other, without¶ damaging its own economy.¶ The uncertain benefits of a democratic peace, and the strong possibility that a transition¶ to democracy might cause instability also suggests that democratization may not eliminate¶ security concerns about China. History demonstrates that the democratization process can easily¶ turn violent and is often reversed.

## 2NC AT: War

**Data for peace theory is mainly based on allying countries and ignores interdependence and deterrence**

**Gleditsch 8**

(Nils Petter Gleditsch, International Peace Research Institute, 2008, Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), Chapter: Peace and Democracy, Pages: 1430-1437, AA)

The Limits of Democratic Peace The democratic peace thesis is one of the most promising findings to come out of the quantitative study of war and peace. Indeed, the observation that democracies do not fight one another is so simple and obvious that it is a little surprising that it was not made earlier. Of course, the idea that a single factor (a common dedication to democracy) could virtually eliminate the possibility of war between two countries may seem too

good to be true. The first systematic study was made by a criminologist, Dean Babst, and as an outsider he may have found it easier to spot the most obvious correlate of war, while the insiders were pursuing various more sophisticated and theoretically grounded but eventually less productive leads. There may also be political reasons for the initial reluctance of scholars in peace research and international relations to take the democratic peace thesis seriously. Virtually all systematic research on the causes of war was taking place in countries affected by the Cold War. Research attributing major importance to political democracy seemed propagandistic to many peace researchers and others who subscribed to a 'third way' between East and West and disliked anything that smacked of propaganda for 'the free world' (which included many non-free countries). The debate on imperialism in the 1970s focused on the belligerent nature of some of the leading democracies (notably France and the US) rather than on their peacefulness toward other democracies. On the other hand, the idea of a democratic peace seemed too 'soft' for many realists, who felt more

comfortable with the traditional ideas of bipolarity and deterrence. Of course, since the democratic peace offers no particular formula for peace between different regime types (short of converting the non-democracies to democracy) realist ideas were more relevant to the main dividing lines in the Cold War world. The emergence of zones of peace based on shared democracy among traditional enemies, for instance, in Western Europe, could be attributed to their common fear of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War ended not only the bipolar deterrence pattern, but also the hegemony of realist thought. The emergence of the idea of a democratic peace is part of a broader revival of liberal theories of international relations. Bruce Russett and John Oneal in particular have revived interest in the old idea that war does not pay for economically highly interdependent countries and have found new evidence for it. Most wars have taken place

between highly interdependent states, but that is now more commonly interpreted as an artifact of the relationship between contiguity and war, although relating economic interdependence to peace remains more controversial than the democratic peace. There is new optimism about the respect for international law and increased recognition of international organizations. However, the idea of the democratic peace remains politically controversial and is attacked both from 'the right' and 'the left'. As

noted, the realist counterattack is based mainly on the idea that the democratic peace is at best a temporary phenomenon arising during the Cold War and a spurious effect of the stable bipolar pattern of that period. Radical and liberal critics of the democratic

peace thesis, on the other hand, have focused on the use of covert action and overt military intervention against regimes that resisted the hegemonic world order. For instance, during the Cold War, the United States repeatedly tried to undermine radical regimes in Latin America. These types of confrontations do not reach the level of violence required to qualify as wars, but they do not exemplify a nonviolent system of conflict resolution either. The extensive colonialism

practiced by democratic countries is also difficult to reconcile with the idea of the peacefulness of democracies. The response of the proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis has usually been that at least

the more drastic forms of covert action and military intervention are morally impossible to justify for democracies when the opponent is fully democratic. Military interventions and covert action against regimes like Castro's Cuba or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua are brought within the realm of the politically feasible and morally quasidefensible precisely by the lack of democratic practice in these regimes. Most proponents of the democratic peace have strong reservations against increased interventionism in the service of democracy. State-sponsored massacres in Rwanda, Bosnia, and elsewhere helped to promote the idea of 'humanitarian intervention' as a

means to prevent the worst excesses of autocrats. The Clinton administration's 'strategy of enlargement' aimed at expanding the world community of democracies. Following the events of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush and his administration initiated major military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these invasions had several aims, both attempted to establish democratic regimes in the target countries. Many have questioned the wisdom and morality of such democratization by force. By the time of writing (end of 2006) the prospects for achieving stable democracy in Afghanistan



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and Iraq do not seem very bright. A peace-building strategy based on military intervention effectively has to be put into force by the major powers, who may be unable or unwilling to distinguish between global interests and their own. It is also questionable whether democracy is likely to take hold if countries are forced to democratize. Germany and Japan after World War II are the prime examples that such a strategy may be successful, but at great cost. Attempts to export democracy to Third World countries — whether by peaceful or not so peaceful means - have not been equally successful. During the Cold War many interventions by democratic countries led to the establishment or consolidation of authoritarian rather than democratic regimes, as in Iran in 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954. However, it is becoming increasingly rare for a major power to intervene without reference to the authority of an international organization. The major means for promoting the expansion of democracy will remain economic and political rather than military. These means of influence are slower and less dramatic, but they may also have a lower probability of backfiring. At the end of the day, democratization is probably mostly a matter of internal forces, and the outside world may have limited influence over this process. Only then can a worldwide democratic peace be built on a solid foundation.

### **Democracy doesn't solve war - democracy is an effect, not cause of peace**

**Gibler 7,** (Douglas M., "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict". Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama. Post-Doctoral Fellow, Stanford University)

By endogenizing the emergence of jointly democratic dyads to a series of factors that affect democracy and conflict behavior, my results suggest that what scholars know as the democratic peace is, in fact, a stable border peace. This is the first step toward looking at international conflict a little bit differently. Of course, even though the relationship between joint democracy and peace remains the core of the democratic peace literature, there still remain a host of empirical regularities generally considered supportive of democratic peace theory (see for example a partial list in Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 218–219). So, while space does not permit a full discussion of all these secondary relationships, I use this brief conclusion to reinterpret, in the context of a stable border peace, several of the more important, second-order democratic peace findings. A stable border peace implies that democratic states are more peaceful, but this is not due to any quality inherent in democratic government; rather, the development path necessary for democratization selects democracies into a group of states that have settled borders, few territorial issues, and thus, little reason for war against neighbors. With only minor, nonterritorial issues remaining for these states, mediation and arbitration become both easier and more likely for democracies, while the need for defensive alliances, military buildups, and aggressive crisis bargaining also decreases. Because borders are international institutions, they affect the development paths of both states in the dyad, and stabilized borders that decrease the need for militarization and centralization in one state also tend to demilitarize and decentralize the neighboring state. "Zones of peace" can thus be understood as the contagion effect of stabilized borders, as democracies cluster in time and space following the removal of territorial issues. This clustering of peaceful states should also affect the economic development of the states involved. With less money needed for guns, spending for butter increases, and trade across settled borders is always preferred to the risk of crossing militarized frontiers. A stable border peace does not necessarily imply that democracies will always be peaceful; the implication is only that democracies will have fewer conflicts relative to other types of governments. Should war occur, though, the war will likely be fought over far-flung territories since local borders have already been settled. This selection effect explains why the disagreements that democracies escalate are a matter of choice. The threat of conflict never directly affects the territorial homeland, so democratic leaders have the relative luxury of choosing their fights, or intervening when winning is easy. This renders democratic victories the product of peaceful local environments, not the result of domestic institutions that constrain leader choice or otherwise advantage democratic systems.

## **AT: Liberal Values Check**

### **Liberal values don't check – don't prevent wars and don't even apply internationally – empirics**

**Rosato 03** (Sebastian Rosato has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Political Science and a Masters in IR from Oxford. He is a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory" November 03, *The American Political Science Review*)

Norm Externalization. The historical record indicates that democracies have often failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context. This claim rests, first, on determining what democratic norms say about the international use of force and, second, on establishing whether democracies have generally adhered to these prescriptions. Liberal democratic norms narrowly circumscribe the range of situations in which democracies can justify the use of force. As Doyle (1997,25) notes, "Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes." This does not mean that they will go to war less often than other kinds of states: it only means that there are fewer reasons available to them for waging war. Democracies are certainly justified in fighting wars of self-defense. Locke ([1690] 1988), for example, argues that states, like men in the state of nature, have a right to destroy those who violate their rights to life, liberty, and property (269-72). There is considerable disagreement among liberal theorists regarding precisely what kinds of action constitute self-defense, but repulsing an invasion, preempting an impending military attack, and fighting in the face of unreasonable demands all plausibly fall under this heading. Waging war when the other party has not engaged in threatening behavior does not. In short, democracies should only go to war when "their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states" (Rawls 1999, 90-91). Another justification for the use of force is intervention in the affairs of other states or peoples, either to prevent blatant human rights violations or to bring about conditions in which liberal values can take root. For Rawls (1999,81), as for many liberals, human rights violators are "to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to intervention" (see also Doyle 1997,31-32, and Owen 1997, 34-35). Mill ([1859] (1984)) extends the scope of intervention, arguing that "barbarous" nations can be conquered, to civilize them for their own benefit (see also Mehta 1990). However, if external rule does not ensure freedom and equality, it will be as illiberal as the system it seeks to replace. Consequently, intervention can only be justified if it is likely to "promote the development of conditions in which appropriate principles of justice can be satisfied" (Beitz 1979,90). The imperialism of Europe's great powers between 1815 and 1975 provides good evidence that liberal democracies have often waged war for reasons other than self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values. Although there were only a handful of liberal democracies in the international system during this period, they were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset of extrasystemic wars (Singer and Small 1994). Of these 66 wars, 33 were "imperial," fought against previously independent peoples, and 33 were "colonial," waged against existing colonies. It is hard to justify the "imperial" wars in terms of self-defense. Several cases are clear-cut: The democracy faced no immediate threat and conquered simply for profit or to expand its sphere of influence. A second set of cases includes wars waged as a result of imperial competition: Liberal democracies conquered non-European peoples in order to create buffer states against other empires or to establish control over them before another imperial power could move in. Thus Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) in order to create a buffer state against Russia, and France invaded Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian occupation. Some commentators describe these wars as defensive because they aimed to secure sources of overseas wealth, thereby enhancing national power at the expense of other European powers. There are three reasons to dispute this assessment. First, these wars were often preventive rather than defensive: Russia had made no move to occupy Afghanistan and Italy had taken no action in Tunisia. A war designed to avert possible action in the future, but for which there is no current evidence, is not defensive. Second, there was frequently a liberal alternative to war. Rather than impose authoritarian rule, liberal great powers could have offered non-European peoples military assistance in case of attack or simply deterred other imperial powers. Finally, a substantial number of the preventive occupations were a product of competition between Britain and France, two liberal democracies that

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should have trusted one another and negotiated in good faith without compromising the rights of non-Europeans if democratic peace theory is correct.

## **AT: Trust and Respect**

### **Realism trumps trust and respect – empirics and studies prove**

**Rosato 03** (Sebastian Rosato has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Political Science and a Masters in IR from Oxford. He is a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” November 03, *The American Political Science Review*)

Three features of these cases deserve emphasis. First, all the regimes that the United States sought to undermine were democratic. In the cases of Guatemala, British Guyana, Brazil, and Chile democratic processes were fairly well established. Iran, Indonesia, and Nicaragua were fledgling democracies but Mossadeq, Sukarno, and the Sandinistas could legitimately claim to be the first proponents of democracy in their respective countries. Every government with the exception of the Sandinistas was replaced by a succession of American-backed dictatorial regimes. Second, in each case the clash of interests between Washington and the target governments was not particularly severe. These should, then, be easy cases for democratic peace theory since trust and respect are most likely to be determinative when the dispute is minor. None of the target governments were communist, and although some of them pursued leftist policies, there was no indication that they intended to impose a communist model or that they were actively courting the Soviet Union. In spite of the limited scope of disagreement, respect for democratic forms of government was consistently subordinated to an expanded conception of national security. Third, there is good evidence that support for democracy was often sacrificed in the name of American economic interests. At least some of the impetus for intervention in Iran came in response to the nationalization of the oil industry, the United Fruit Company pressed for action in Guatemala, International Telephone and Telegraph urged successive administrations to intervene in Brazil and Chile, and Allende's efforts to nationalize the copper industry fueled demands that the Nixon administration destabilize his government. In sum, the record of American interventions in the developing world suggests that democratic trust and respect has often been subordinated to security and economic interests. Democratic peace theorists generally agree that these interventions are examples of a democracy using force against other democracies, but they offer two reasons why covert interventions should not count against the normative logic. The first reason is that the target states were not democratic enough to be trusted and respected (Forsythe 1992; Russett 1993, 120-24). This claim is not entirely convincing. Although the target states may not have been fully democratic, they were more democratic than the regimes that preceded and succeeded them and were democratizing further. Indeed, in every case American action brought more autocratic regimes to power. The second reason is that these interventions were covert, a fact believed by democratic peace theorists to reveal the strength of their normative argument. It was precisely because these states were democratic that successive administrations had to act covertly rather than openly initiate military operations. Knowing that their actions were illegitimate, and fearing a public backlash, American officials decided on covert action (Forsythe 1992; Russett 1993, 120-24). This defense fails to address some important issues. To begin with, it ignores the fact that American public officials, that is, Vol. 97, No. 4 the individuals that democratic peace theory claims are most likely to abide by liberal norms, showed no respect for fellow democracies. Democratic peace theorists will respond that the logic holds, however, because these officials were restrained from using open and massive force by the liberal attitudes of the mass public. This is a debatable assertion; after all, officials may have opted for covert and limited force for a variety of reasons other than public opinion, such as operational costs and the expected international reaction. Simply because the use of force was covert and limited, this does not mean that its nature was determined by public opinion. But even if it is true that officials adopted a covert policy to shield themselves from a potential public backlash, the logic still has a crucial weakness: The fact remains that the United States did not treat fellow democracies with trust or respect. Ultimately, the logic stands or falls by its predictive power, that is, whether democracies treat each other with respect. If they do, it is powerful; if they do not, it is weakened. It does not matter why they do not treat each other with respect, nor does it matter if some or all of the population wants to treat the other state with respect; all that matters is whether respect is extended. To put it another way, we can come up with several reasons to explain why respect is not extended, and we can always find social groups that oppose the use of military force against another democracy, but whenever we find several

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examples of a democracy using military force against other democracies, the trust and respect mechanism, and therefore the normative logic, fails an important test.<sup>6</sup> Great Powers. Layne (1994) and Rock (1997) have found further evidence that democracies do not treat each other with trust and respect in their analyses of diplomatic crises involving Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Layne examines four prominent cases in which rival democracies almost went to war with one another and asks whether the crises were resolved because of mutual trust and respect. His conclusion offers scant support for the normative logic: "In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war. ... In each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the 'live and let live' spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory's core, but because of realist factors" (Layne 1994, 38).<sup>7</sup> Similarly, Rock finds little evidence that shared liberal values helped resolve any of the crises between Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century. In addition, his analyses of the turn-of-the-century "great rapprochement" and naval arms control during the 1920s show that even in cases where liberal states resolved potentially divisive issues in a spirit of accommodation, shared liberal values had only a limited effect. In both cases peace was overdetermined and "liberal values and democratic institutions were not the only factors inclining Britain and the United States toward peace, and perhaps not even the dominant ones" (Rock 1997, 146).<sup>8</sup> In sum, the trust and respect mechanism does not appear to work as specified. Shared democratic values provide no guarantee that states will both trust and respect one another. Instead, and contrary to the normative logic's claims, when serious conflicts of interest arise between democracies there is little evidence that they will be inclined to accommodate each other's demands or refrain from engaging in hard line policies.

## **AT: Institutional Constraints**

### **Institutional logic relies on logical fallacies and nationalism takes out all their args**

**Rosato 03** (Sebastian Rosato has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Political Science and a Masters in IR from Oxford. He is a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory" November 03, *The American Political Science Review*)

Accountability. Each variant of the institutional logic rests on the claim that democratic institutions make leaders accountable to various groups that may, for one reason or another, oppose the use of force. I do not dispute this claim but, instead, question whether democratic leaders are more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Since we know that democracies do not fight one another and autocracies do fight one another, democrats must be more accountable than autocrats if accountability is a key mechanism in explaining the separate peace between democracies. On the other hand, if autocrats and democrats are equally accountable or autocrats are more accountable than democrats, then there are good reasons to believe that accountability does not exert the effect that democratic peace theorists have suggested." Following Goemans (2000a) I assume that a leader's accountability is determined by the consequences as well as the probability of losing office for adopting an unpopular policy. This being the case, there is no a priori reason to believe that a leader who is likely to lose office for fighting a losing or costly war, but unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed in the process, should feel more accountable for his policy choices than a leader who is unlikely to lose office but can expect to be punished severely in the unlikely event that he is in fact removed. Therefore, determining whether autocrats or democrats are more accountable and, consequently, more cautious about going to war rests on answering three questions: Are losing democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be removed from power? Are losing democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be punished severely? and Are democrats or autocrats more likely to be removed and/or punished for involvement in costly wars, regardless of the outcome? To answer these questions I have used a modified version of Goemans's (2000b) dataset. Our analyses differ in one fundamental respect: While he counts the removal of leaders by foreign powers as examples of punishment, I do not. This decision is theoretically informed. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether leaders' decisions for war are affected by their domestic accountability, that is, if there is something about the domestic structure of states that affects their chances of being punished. Punishment by foreign powers offers no evidence for or against the claim that democrats or dictators have a higher or lower expectation of being punished by their citizens for unpopular policies, and these cases are therefore excluded. I have also made two minor changes to the data that do not affect the results: I have added 19 wars that appear in the COW dataset but not in Goemans's dataset and coded 11 regimes that Goemans excludes.<sup>12</sup> The results appear in Table 4. Although democratic losers are two times more likely to be removed from power than autocratic losers, this evidence is not strong. This is because there are only four cases of democratic losers in the entire dataset, making it impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the likelihood that losing democrats will be removed. Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, for example, resigned early in the Vietnam War, but his resignation may have had more to do with the fact that he was in his seventies than the expectation of defeat in South East Asia a decade later. If this case is recoded, as it probably should be, democratic losers have only been removed from power 50% of the time and the distinction between democrats and autocrats is small. Losing autocrats are more likely to suffer severe punishment than their democratic counterparts. None of the four losing democrats was punished, whereas 29% of autocratic losers were imprisoned, exiled, or killed. Thus, while democratic and autocratic losers have similar chances of being removed from office, autocrats seem to be more likely to suffer severe punishment in addition to removal. The evidence from costly wars, regardless of whether the leader was on the winning or losing side, confirms these findings. Costly wars are defined as wars in which a state suffered one battle fatality per 2,000 population, as the United States did in World War I.<sup>13</sup> Historically, autocrats have been more likely both to lose office and to be punished severely if they become involved in a costly war. Autocrats have been removed 35% of the time and punished 27% of the time. While democrats have only been removed 27% of the time and punished 7% of the time.<sup>14</sup> In short, there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs from fighting losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. This being the case, there is good

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reason to doubt each variant of the institutional logic. Public Constraint. Pacific public opinion does not appear to place a fundamental constraint on the willingness of democracies to go to war. If it did, then democracies would be more peaceful in their relations with all types of states, not just other democracies. However, instead of being more peaceful, on average democracies are just as likely to go to war as nondemocracies (Farber and Gowa 1995). There are three reasons why publics are unlikely to constrain democratic war proneness. First, the costs of war typically fall on a small subset of the population that will likely be unwilling to protest government policy. Excluding the two World Wars, democratic fatalities in war have exceeded 0.1% of the population in only 6% of cases. In 60% of cases, losses represented less than 0.01% of the population or one in 10,000 people. Most democratic citizens, then, will never be personally affected by war or know anyone affected by military conflict. Adding the many militarized disputes involving democracies strengthens this finding. Both the United States and Britain have suffered fewer than 100 battle casualties in approximately 97% of the militarized disputes in which they have been involved (Singer and Small 1994). Moreover, modern democracies have tended to have professional standing armies. Members of the military, then, join the armed forces voluntarily, accepting that they may die in the service of their countries. This in turn means that their families and friends, that is, those who are most likely to suffer the costs of war, are unlikely to speak out against a government that chooses to go to war or are at least less likely to do so than are the families and friends of conscripts. In short, the general public has little at stake in most wars and those most likely to suffer the costs of war have few incentives to organize dissent. Second, any public aversion to incurring the costs of war may be overwhelmed by the effects of nationalism. In addition to the growth of democracy, one of the most striking features of the modern period is that people have come to identify themselves, above all, with the nation state. This identification has been so powerful that ordinary citizens have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to fight and die for the continued existence of their state and the security of their co-nationals. There are, then, good reasons to believe that if the national interest is thought to be at stake, as it is in most interstate conflicts, calculations of costs will not figure prominently in the public's decision process. Third, democratic leaders are as likely to lead as to follow public opinion. Since nationalism imbues people with a powerful spirit of self-sacrifice, it is actively cultivated by political elites in the knowledge that only highly motivated armies and productive societies will prevail in modern warfare (e.g., Posen 1993). Democratically elected leaders are likely to be well placed to cultivate nationalism, especially because their governments are often perceived as more representative and legitimate than authoritarian regimes. Any call to defend or spread "our way of life," for example, is likely to have a strong resonance in democratic polities, and indeed the historical record suggests that wars have often given democratic leaders considerable freedom of action, allowing them to drum up nationalistic fervor, shape public opinion, and suppress dissent despite the obligation to allow free and open discussion. Events in the United States during both World Wars highlight the strength of nationalism and the ability of democratic elites to fan its flames. Kennedy (1980, 46) notes that during the First World War, President Wilson lacked "the disciplinary force of quick coming crisis or imminent peril of physical harm" but turned successfully to "the deliberate mobilization of emotions and ideas." At the same time his administration turned Vol. 97, No. 4 a blind eye to, or actively encouraged, the deliberate subversion of antiwar groups within the United States. The Roosevelt administration was equally successful at generating prowar sentiment during World War II. Early in the war the president spoke for the nation in asserting that the German firebombing of population centers had "shocked the conscience of humanity," and yet, remarkably, there was no sustained protest in the United States against the bombing of Japanese cities that killed almost a million civilians a few years later. This abrupt transformation, notes Dower (1986), was made possible by a massive propaganda campaign, condoned by the political elite, describing the Japanese as subhuman and untrustworthy "others." In stark contrast, America's allies were forgiven all their faults. "Russian Communists were transformed into agrarian reformers, Stalin into Uncle Joe . . ." (Ambrose 1997, 150).

**Democracy Promotion Bad**



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**China**

## 1NC Relations

### **Democracy promotion kills US-China relations**

**Larison 12** (Daniel Larison Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas. "As You Would Expect, US Democracy Promotion Increases International Distrust" 4/3/12 <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/as-you-would-expect-democracy-promotion-increases-international-distrust/>///CW

The new Brookings report on U.S.-China "strategic distrust" is interesting reading (via Drezner). The Chinese co-author, Wang Jisi, cites U.S.-led democracy promotion as one of the causes of Chinese distrust; American involvement in the "color revolutions" in Central Asian states and some other former Soviet states, as well as the American attitude toward the Arab Spring in 2011, have further solidified the notion that the United States would sabotage the rule of the CPC if it saw similar developments and opportunities in China. ¶ This is not an entirely far-fetched or unreasonable suspicion on their part. Let's remember that one of Mitt Romney's foreign policy advisers has written a book about the U.S.-Chinese "struggle for mastery in Asia" in which he made the following statement: ¶ Stripped of diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy [toward China] is to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away China's one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place. ¶ According to Friedberg, this is a description of U.S. strategy, not an argument for what it ought to be. As one of the causes of U.S.-Chinese distrust, U.S.-led democracy promotion seems to be an unnecessary irritant in an important bilateral relationship. Furthermore, it doesn't seem to serve any identifiable American interest to create additional mistrust between the U.S. and other countries, but this has been the effect of democracy promotion efforts in many other countries besides China. Robert Merry commented on this earlier this week: ¶ For anyone trying to understand why this anger is welling up in those countries, it might be helpful to contemplate how Americans would feel if similar organizations from China or Russia or India were to pop up in Washington, with hundreds of millions of dollars given to them by those governments, bent on influencing our politics.

### **US-Sino relations solve multiple scenarios for nuclear war and environmental destruction.**

**Desperes, 01** (John Desperes, Fellow, RAND Corporation. "China, the United States, and the Global Economy." p. 227-8)

Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan's relations with the mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive lives. What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America's prosperity. China's growing economy is a valuable market to many workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more valuable by opening its markets further. China also affects America's security. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South

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Asia, where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America's environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and currently endangered species.

## **1NC China-Russia Alliance**

### **US democracy promotion spurs a Russia-China alliance**

**Rachman 14** (Gideon Rachman became chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times in July 2006. He joined the FT after a 15-year career at The Economist, which included spells as a foreign correspondent in Brussels, Washington and Bangkok. He also edited The Economist's business and Asia sections. His particular interests include American foreign policy, the European Union and globalization. "China and Russia push back against the US" 11/19/14 <http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/11/china-and-russia-push-back-against-the-us/>///CW

The announcement of closer Russian-Chinese military co-operation is a striking sign of how geo-political competition is hotting up – as both Russia and China look to push back against a US-dominated world.<sup>¶</sup> Russia, in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine, is eager to show that it has alternatives to the West and a powerful new ally in China. China also has a strong motivation to push back against America. The Chinese greatly resent America's much-ballyhooed "pivot to Asia" – which includes stationing 60 per cent of the US navy in the Pacific. One of China's weaknesses in the contest with the US for dominance in the Asia-Pacific is that it has few clear allies in the region. By contrast, America has defence treaties with Japan and South Korea, and close ties with several South-East Asian nations. However, by getting closer to the Russians, the Chinese potentially set up a powerful nascent alliance of their own.<sup>¶</sup> It is yet to be seen how much substance there are to these ties. But two of the announcements made by the Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, are particularly eye-catching. First, his statement that Russia and China are intent on forming a "collective regional security system" suggests that this is potentially a very ambitious arrangement – that might go far beyond the occasional joint naval exercise. "Collective security" arrangements imply a Nato-like commitment to collective self-defence. Second, the suggestion that China and Russia will hold joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean next year is also slightly mind-boggling. If we see the Chinese navy on patrol in the Med, it really will feel like a new world.<sup>¶</sup> The attractions for the Chinese and Russians of all this – however – are clear. They both deeply resent America's global military reach. The fact that the US navy patrols off the Chinese coast, while Nato-nations are up against the Russian border is a source of grievance. By beginning to hold naval exercises in the West's backyard (although not quite the Caribbean, yet), the Russians and Chinese seem to be engaging in a very deliberate exercise in push-back.<sup>¶</sup> But it is premature to say that a Russia-China bloc is emerging that is now in a full-on confrontation with the West. On the contrary, China seems to be skilfully playing both sides. It is interesting that this tilt to Russia comes just a week after a relatively warm and productive summit between the US and Chinese presidents – that resulted in an important agreement on climate change.<sup>¶</sup> It is clear that Russia and China share some common resentments about the US. Specifically, both feel bitter about America's refusal to grant them dominance of their own neighbourhoods. Both feel internally threatened by US democracy promotion – hence the Russian defence minister's angry references to America's promotion of "colour revolutions". Both nations dislike US interventionism and the idea of a unipolar world, which is why they are spending a lot of money on weapons to try and close the military gap.<sup>¶</sup> But Russia is much weaker than China. Its economy is in bad shape, and Russia's relationship with the US is now so bad, that – unlike China – it no longer has an American option. As a result, Russia had to accept a disadvantageous gas price in the energy deal it negotiated with China in May. China is also now pressing Russia to sell it high-tech weaponry that the Russians formerly withheld.

### **Russia-China alliance kills heg and causes Russia expansionism**

**Sands 15** (David R. Sands has a masters from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He reports on politics, diplomacy, and trade for the Washington Times. "New Russia-China alliance latest diplomatic, strategic blow to Obama"

4/30/15 <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/30/china-russia-alliance-challenges-us-western-domina/?page=all>)

From the moon to the Mediterranean to the heart of Moscow, China and Russia in recent days have announced a striking number of moves to strengthen military, financial and political ties, raising the specter of a deeper alliance between the U.S. rivals.<sup>¶</sup> Adversaries during

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the long Cold War, Beijing and Moscow have increasingly found common cause in challenging the U.S. and Western-dominated order in Europe and Asia, finding ways both symbolic and concrete to challenge what they see as Washington's efforts to contain their rise.¶ The latest sign of closer ties emerged Thursday with the announcements of the first joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean and that Russia will be one of the biggest outside investors in China's proposed development bank, which the Obama administration tried to undercut.¶ "Russia and China are now becoming, as we wanted, not only neighbors but deeply integrated countries," Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told reporters on a trip to the eastern Chinese city of Hangzhou this week.¶ The two sides discussed making China the "main partner" in a Russian program to establish a scientific station on the moon by 2024. Russia has been trying to revive the space program carried out under the Soviet Union, and China has been gearing up its own manned lunar mission.¶ Analysts even see a budding "bromance," as the BBC recently put it, between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.¶ President Obama and virtually all other Western political leaders declined Mr. Putin's invitation to attend commemorations in Red Square next week to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, so Mr. Xi is perhaps the most prominent foreign leader who will be there.¶ The two men met five times last year and "will meet at least as many times this year," said Andrey Denisov, Russia's ambassador to Beijing.¶ "While the Russians and the Chinese expect the United States to continue to be the most powerful nation in the world for several more decades, they see its grip on the rest of the world rapidly loosening," Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in a lengthy analysis of the "Sino-Russian entente" in April.¶ "Both Moscow and Beijing see the world going through an epochal change away from U.S. domination and toward a freer global order that would give China more prominence and Russia more freedom of action," he wrote. "They also see the process of change gaining speed."

### **Continued Russian aggression triggers global nuclear war – deterrence is key**

**Fisher 9/3/14** (Max, Political Analyst @ Vox, "Obama's Russia paradox: Why he just threatened WWII in order to prevent it," <http://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/6101507/obama-just-committed-the-us-to-war-against-russia-if-it-invades>)

President Obama gave a speech on Wednesday, in a city most Americans have never heard of, committing the United States to possible war against Russia. He said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a Western military alliance better known as NATO, would fight to defend eastern European members like Estonia against any foreign aggression. In other words, if Russian President Vladimir Putin invades Estonia or Latvia as he invaded Ukraine, then Putin would trigger war with the US and most of Europe. Obama's speech from the Estonian capital of Tallinn, though just a speech, may well be America's most important and aggressive step yet against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. While the speech will do nothing for Ukraine, it is meant to stop Russia from invading, or perhaps from sponsoring rebellions in, other European countries — so long as those European countries are part of NATO, as most are. "We'll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania," President Obama said from the capital of Estonia, one of the three Baltic states that were once part of the Soviet Union but now are members of NATO. "You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again." Obama was making a promise, and a very public one meant to reverberate not just in European capitals but in Moscow as well: If Russia invades any member of NATO, even these small Baltic states on the alliance's far periphery, then it will be at war with all of them — including the United States. "The defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London," Obama said. To be really clear: that defense means war with Russia, which has the world's second-largest military and second-largest nuclear arsenal, a prospect so dangerous that even during the angriest moments of the Cold War, the world managed to avoid it. The idea, though, is not that Obama wants to go to war with

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Russia, it's that he wants to avoid war with Russia — this is also why the US and Europe are not intervening militarily in Ukraine to push back the Russian tanks — but that **avoiding war with Russia means deterring** Russian President Vladimir **Putin from invading these Baltic states in the first place** by scaring him off. The risk of **such an invasion**, by the way, is real: these countries are about one-quarter ethnic Russian, and Ukraine's own Russian minority which was Putin's excuse for invading Crimea in March. Putin also clearly sees former Soviet states as fair game; he has invaded Ukraine and Georgia, both marked in red on the above map. So the Baltic states are rightly terrified that they are next. Here is Obama's dilemma, and Europe's: They want to prove to Putin that they will definitely defend Estonia and Latvia and other eastern European NATO members as if they were American or British or German soil, so that Putin will not invade those countries as he did in Ukraine. But the entire world, including Putin, is suspicious as to whether or not this threat is a bluff. And the worst possible thing that could happen, the thing that **could legitimately lead to World War Three and global nuclear war** is for Putin to call Obama's bluff, invade Estonia, and have Obama's bluff turn out to not be a bluff.

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**2NC Heg Impact**

## **2NC Kills Heg**

Russian-Sino Alliance crushes the US and the US will always create enemies

**Kimberley 5-20**

(Margaret Kimberley, 5-20-15, Global Research Analyst, Global Research, "Russia Wins: Military, Economic and Political Alliance with China Will Fundamentally Alter the World", <http://www.globalresearch.ca/russia-wins-military-economic-and-political-alliance-with-china-will-fundamentally-alter-the-world/5450898>, Accessed 6-29-15, AA)

The leaders of the greatest land and people masses in Eurasia are forging a military, economic and political alliance that will fundamentally alter the world in both the near and long term. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains the bully that many fear, but no one trusts. "America will always turn friends to enemies and suddenly declare that enemies are friends because it is not a true friend to anyone."

Every year on May 9th millions of people throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics commemorate their victory over Germany in World War II. Foreign leaders attend the ceremonies in Red Square, as George W. Bush did in 2005.

This year western leaders did not but the significance of their absence is not what corporate media would have us believe. Barack Obama and David Cameron and Francois Hollande weren't in Red Square in 2015, but Chinese president Xi Jinping was and he never left Vladimir Putin's side.

While Americans suffer from government and media propaganda telling them that Russia is isolated, their country is isolated too because it insists on being the world's biggest bully.

The United States has woven a tangled web with its continued commitment to the imperial project.

Barack Obama may not have been in Red Square but just three days later secretary of state John Kerry met with Vladimir Putin in Sochi. That meeting is proof of at least a partial defeat for the United States. In 2014 Washington used Ukraine's internal crisis as an attempt to kill two birds with one stone. The western backed coup not only put a pro NATO president in office but sanctions enacted after Russia annexed Crimea were a blow to its position as a leading energy producer. The United States behaved like the schoolyard bully accustomed to stealing lunch money from the weaker kids. The sanctions and the removal of Russia from the G8 were meant to neuter the gas producing giant. Russia not only stood in the way of American energy producing supremacy but also speaks out against Washington's mischief carried out around the world. Russia used its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to prevent a "no fly zone" over Syria that could have meant defeat for president Assad. Western wishful thinking would have a compliant Russia doing their bidding and giving up its sovereignty and prerogatives. To quote an old saying, "Dream on."

The dream of an easy Russian smack down is at least partly over.

Kerry and foreign secretary Lavrov have met and spoken repeatedly since the Ukraine crisis began, but there haven't been any high level meetings with president Putin. The fact that Kerry wanted to speak with the president and that Putin agreed indicates that both sides know they need the other. Washington hasn't completely surrendered, as its attempted rapprochement with Iran proves. Obama is pushing to end sanctions with Iran in order to make it an energy supplier to Europe, supplanting Russia in the process.

But Putin has not been wringing his hands in the Kremlin, hoping for mercy from the United States. He has been forging new economic and military alliances with leaders all over the world. The Chinese haven't been passive either while Washington tries to make the whole world bend to its will. They have forged ahead with their Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to compete with the World Bank and IMF.

Washington has to watch as allies such as France and the United Kingdom are among the 57 founding members.

Xi Jinping and Putin were literally cheek to cheek during the Victory Day parade. While American media made fun of the paucity of people they considered important, Russia and China strengthen their alliance. The two nations are holding war games in the Mediterranean Sea and have announced energy partnerships while the United States props up the failed state of Ukraine with billions of dollars.

Russia has also announced pipeline deals with Turkey, another U.S. ally. Turkey may have joined in the effort to defeat Bashir al-Assad in Syria, but that doesn't mean it will be an American puppet in every circumstance.

The United States has worn out its welcome even among its friends.

Angela Merkel may have missed the parade but she met Putin the day after and repeated her belief that the only solution to the Ukraine crisis is a diplomatic one. America's bullying may have gotten the Europeans to agree to sanctions but they have harmed their own economies by doing so. Merkel and other Europeans are facing pressure to stand up to the Americans and stop cutting their own throats. President Obama is like a circus juggler with many balls in the air. He wants to hurt Russia by helping Iran but Israel and the Arab gulf states were all committed to regime change, something they could count on Washington to uphold. Now that Obama wants to make nice with Iran its other enemies are very unhappy. Of course King Salman of Saudi Arabia wouldn't show up for a meeting at Camp David. He sees no reason to go along with Washington's attempt to have its cake and eat it too. So while friends are angered about the move toward Iran,

nations like Russia and China act in their own interest and watch the United States with wary curiosity.

America will always turn friends to enemies and suddenly declare that enemies are friends because it is not a true friend to anyone else. One day destroying Iran is the top priority, then propping up the failed Ukrainian state, then destroying Syria, then making friends with Cuba but still imposing sanctions on Venezuela. It is a litany of deceit and dishonesty among thieves.

Putin and Xi prove that it is possible to stand up to the United States.

Even though Obama succeeded in keeping other leaders away from Moscow's celebration it didn't really matter.

When it counted they had to come and show their respect and that is a victory for the entire world.



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## **Interventionism**

## 1NC Interventionism

### **Democracy promotion causes interventionism and wars and fails to actually spread democracy**

**Scheuer 14** (Michael Scheuer is a professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, an ex-CIA officer, has a PhD in British Empire-U.S.-Canada-U.K. relations from the University of Manitoba. "Face facts, U.S. democracy-crusading causes wars — it's time for American neutrality" 7/23/14 <http://non-intervention.com/1277/face-facts-u-s-democracy-crusading-causes-wars-its-time-for-american-neutrality/>)/CW

This week, some of the world is engulfed in bloodshed that is playing out against the background music of Woodrow Wilson's howling madness. Wilson's "Making the World Safe for Democracy" symphony and "Self-Determination" nocturne have now been playing for almost 100 years, and few works by other men have caused more human costs or more unnecessary wars. Wilson's demented mind produced a product which, rather than spreading democracy as promised, has simply spread war. The equation is simple: spreading democracy causes war. This morning, for example:¶ -1.) Rival militias are fighting and killing each other near the international airport in Tripoli in another episode in the unrelenting economic and human disaster that has been caused by the Obama/McCain-led, NATO campaign to install democracy in Libya.¶ -2.) A Malaysian airliner and its passengers lie scattered across fields in eastern Ukraine in another racheting-up of the war started in that country by the ignorant but arrogant interventionists and the democracy crusaders of the EU and the Obama administration. This situation, of course, has led the Neocons to call for "stronger action" against Russia to protect what does not exist, Ukrainian democracy, and to stand up to that non-threat to the United States, Vladimir Putin and Russia. (NB: The culprit here is Malaysian Air — and any other airline — that flies passengers over war zones to save money on fuel.)¶ -3.) Iraq is disintegrating into sectarian civil war as the very predictable consequence of the Republican/Neocon removal of Saddam Hussein and a decade of democracy building in that country. We can look forward to the same situation after we and the West Europeans help the great democracy-loving Syrian resistance — better entitled the mujahedin — destroy Assad. Then, using Western-provided weapons and supplies, it will turn on and destroy the Jordanian regime.¶ -4.) The war in Gaza burns right along as always with Israelis and Palestinians merrily murdering each other. This war has gone on for 60-plus years because Washington and its European allies keep intervening, first in favor of Israel, then in favor of the Palestine, then back to Israel, and so on and so on. Now is the time to stand back and let the two sides fight it out to the finish. Democracy in Israel or Palestine is worthless to American interests. Let the better war-fighter win, and then let America have no ties to the winner.¶ All of these wars and near-wars have been brought to us by the contemporary American and European believers in Woodrow Wilson's academic theorizing and ignorance of the world outside the American South. Wilson also was a profound bigot who was as cock-sure as today's most ardent racists in Western capitals that he could and should force Slavs, Africans, Latinos, and Arabs to behave as he wanted them to behave, either through eloquent persuasion or gunboats and the Marines' bayoneted rifles.¶ The Founders did not create the United States to act as Wilson and his policies have acted; that is, as the catalyst that foments unnecessary wars. But a catalyst for war is exactly what our bipartisan political elite has been for the last thirty years and more. The sad truth is that many of our politicians, diplomats, generals, and religious leaders are war-causers. None will leave well enough alone; none trust foreigners to work out their own futures; and none seem to care how much the unnecessary wars they cause will cost Americans in lives, dollars, and affection/respect.¶ These men and women take it as their righteous mission to intervene in the affairs of others and work to make them into people just like themselves, whether in terms of worshiping secular democracy, self-determination, women's rights, religious tolerance, human rights, or some other one-size-fits-all abstraction that no young American man or woman should ever be called on to fight and die for overseas. This Wilsonian practice amounts to insanity and was long ago recognized as such by one of the greatest Americans. "The improvement of our way of life is more important than the spreading of it," Colonel Lindbergh told his countrymen. "If we make it satisfactory enough, it will spread automatically. If we do not, no strength of arms can permanently impose it."

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## **Democracy Promotion Fails**

## 1NC Fails

### **Democracy is not a universal system-cannot be applied everywhere**

#### **Sowell 3-25**

(Thomas Sowell, 3-25-15, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, "Western advocates of 'nation-building' should master recently deceased statesman's legacy of lessons", <http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell032515.php3>, Accessed 6-25-15, AA)

It is not often that the leader of a small city-state — in this case, Singapore — gets an international reputation. But no one deserved it more than Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore as an independent country in 1959, and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. With his death, he leaves behind a legacy valuable not only to Singapore but to the world. Born in Singapore in 1923, when it was a British colony, Lee Kuan Yew studied at Cambridge University after World War II, and was much impressed by the orderly, law-abiding England of that day. It was a great contrast with the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Singapore of that era. Today Singapore has a per capita Gross Domestic Product more than 50 percent higher than that of the United Kingdom and a crime rate a small fraction of that in England. A 2010 study showed more patents and patent applications from the small city-state of Singapore than from Russia. Few places in the world can match Singapore for cleanliness and orderliness. This remarkable transformation of Singapore took place under the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew for two decades as prime minister. And it happened despite some very serious handicaps that led to chaos and self-destruction in other countries. Singapore had little in the way of natural resources. It even had to import drinking water from neighboring Malaysia. Its population consisted of people of different races, languages and religions — the Chinese majority and the sizable Malay and Indian minorities. At a time when other Third World countries were setting up government-controlled economies and blaming their poverty on "exploitation" by more advanced industrial nations, Lee Kuan Yew promoted a market economy, welcomed foreign investments, and made Singapore's children learn English, to maximize the benefits from Singapore's position as a major port for international commerce. Singapore's schools also taught the separate native languages of its Chinese, Malay and Indian Tamil peoples. But everyone had to learn English, because it was the language of international commerce, on which the country's economic prosperity depended. In short, Lee Kuan Yew was pragmatic, rather than ideological. Many observers saw a contradiction between Singapore's free markets and its lack of democracy. But its long-serving prime minister did not deem its people ready for democracy. Instead, he offered a decent government with much less corruption than in other countries in that region of the world. His example was especially striking in view of many in the West who seem to think that democracy is something that can be exported to countries whose history and traditions are wholly different from those of Western nations that evolved democratic institutions over the centuries. Even such a champion of freedom as John Stuart Mill said in the 19th century: "The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization." In other words, democracy has prerequisites, and peoples and places without those prerequisites will not necessarily do well when democratic institutions are created. The most painful recent example of that is Iraq, where a democratically elected government, set up by expenditure of the blood and treasure of the United States, became one of the obstacles to a united people with the military strength to protect itself from international terrorists. In many parts of the Third World, post-colonial governments set up democratically made sure that there would be no more democracy that could replace its original leaders. This led to the cynical phrase, "one man, one vote — one time."  
Democracy can be wonderful as a principle where it is viable, but disastrous as a fetish where it is not. Lee Kuan Yew understood the pitfalls and steered around them. If our Western advocates of "nation-building" in other countries would learn that lesson, it could be the most valuable legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

## 2NC Fails

### **Democracy promotion is fundamentally impossible because it lies between disciplines and different approaches create irreconcilable contradictions**

**Jahn 12** (Beate Jahn is a professor of IR at the University of Sussex. She got a PhD in Political Science, Sociology, and German Studies at the University of Frankfurt “Rethinking democracy promotion” October 2012 *Review of International Studies*)

Despite these efforts, however, democracy promotion policies have, at best, ‘very modest’ SUCCESS.<sup>4</sup> Failures attended both major post-World War II periods of ‘democracy promotion’. Modernisation theories<sup>5</sup> informed the first such period and focused on ‘various national preconditions and deep structural factors’ such as ‘levels of socioeconomic development, degrees of socioeconomic equality and group polarization, patterns of land ownership or agricultural production, the prevalence of certain beliefs or cultural traits’ which modernisation policies then sought to manipulate through aid and assistance in the military, economic, and political fields.<sup>6</sup> These **policies largely failed to achieve their stated aims<sup>7</sup> and their failures**, in turn, **were widely blamed on the lack of a strong, coherent, and well-substantiated theoretical basis**:<sup>8</sup> on ‘our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside help to internal conditions to changes of regime’.<sup>9</sup> One of the weaknesses of democracy promotion has thus been identified as its tendency to focus on ‘impulses, strategies, impacts’,<sup>10</sup> that is, to frame the issue either as a matter of foreign policy on the part of liberal states or as a matter of domestic political and economic development in target states. What this framing leaves untheorised, however, are the relations between sponsors and targets, that is, its international dimension.<sup>11</sup> The second period of democracy promotion policies was triggered by ‘The Third Wave’ of democratisation<sup>12</sup> in which political factors seemed to play an important role and thus gave rise to a more optimistic assessment of the possibilities of influencing such developments from the outside. ‘As the 1990s progressed, however, the bloom came off the rose . . . Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars and countless hours of effort . . . most of the various democracy promotion efforts had little to show for themselves.’<sup>13</sup> While empirical studies of such failures identify a host of contributing factors, theoretical weaknesses remain a problem,<sup>14</sup> specifically the failure to link political institutions to the ‘social requisites of democracy’.<sup>15</sup> Policies of democracy promotion thus suffer from two conceptual weaknesses: the first consists in a tension between the political and economic dimensions of liberal democracy generating calls ‘to reconnect the socioeconomic and political spheres in both theory and practice’.<sup>16</sup> The second lies in the theoretical separation of the domestic and international dimensions of liberal democracy promotion.<sup>17</sup> These two weaknesses are interrelated, I will argue, and provide the basis for contradictory democracy promotion policies. The argument is based on the assumption that the theoretical fragmentation of contemporary conceptions of liberal democracy and its promotion is the product of historical development; specifically of the separation of politics and economics and of their domestic and international dimensions in modern liberal democratic societies which finds expression in the development of separate academic disciplines of Politics, Economics (or Development Studies) and International Relations (IR). The analysis of democracy promotion ‘sits awkwardly in between the disciplines of international relations, comparative politics, development studies, and law – related to all four but not finding a home in any one’.<sup>18</sup> As a product of the fragmentation of social scientific knowledge, each of these disciplines provides tools designed for the analysis of its respective domain – distinguishing it from, rather than relating it to, the others. Such shortcomings of disciplinary fragmentation are, of course, widely recognised and addressed by calls for, and support of, interdisciplinary research. And yet, combining the research methods or findings of different disciplines does not overcome the fundamental separation which is constitutive of these methods, and hence their results, in the first place. Instead, as the democracy promotion literature clearly shows, such combination frequently results in listing a variety of relevant factors generated by different approaches without establishing the nature of their relationship and/or in ‘master narratives’ based on one approach with others simply providing auxiliary material filling the theoretical gaps left by the former. In short, as products of such disciplinary fragmentation, contemporary analytical categories do not lend themselves to providing a

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holistic account of the development of liberal democracy. Instead, reading the history of the development of liberal democracy through the lenses of these analytical categories, as contemporary approaches to democracy promotion do, simply results in a fragmented narrative or account of that history. One solution to this problem lies in returning to a time prior to this fragmentation. Hence, I will use the work of John Locke to develop and assess a more holistic conception of the development of liberal democracy. Contemporary models of democracy promotion are generally derived from an interpretation of the historical development of liberal democracy in the West. In the first section I will show that these models fall into two broad categories – a political approach and an economic approach – in line with contemporary disciplinary divisions. The political approach fails to theorise the relationship between the political and economic dimensions of liberal democracy. The economic approach, in contrast, accounts for this relationship between politics and economics at the domestic level, but fails to theorise the relationship between the domestic and international dimensions of the development of liberal democracy. Theoretically, I will argue, these two approaches are ultimately incompatible and they give rise to potentially contradictory democracy promotion policies. In the second section I will turn to the work of John Locke whose reflections on, and advocacy of, liberal democracy apply to the same history, yet prior to the contemporary disciplinary fragmentation. Locke's work, I will show, provides a conception of the establishment and democratisation of liberalism based on an explicit theorisation of the relationship between politics and economy in which, moreover, the international sphere plays a constitutive role. Comparison with contemporary models shows, moreover, that despite its normative character, this Lockean conception accounts more accurately for the subsequent historical development of liberal democracy than either of the contemporary approaches and it provides explanations for the weaknesses of policies based on the latter. This alternative conception of democracy promotion, I will conclude, calls for a fundamental rethinking of democracy promotion in theory and practice. Specifically, it suggests that a realistic analysis of the history of liberal democracy and the prospects of its promotion requires the theoretical integration of its international dimension. And this in turn necessitates a shift away from the comparative method which stands in the way of such an integration.

## **AT: Africa**

### **America can't take responsibility for African democracy**

**Kenneth 95** (Is democracy taking root in sub-Saharan Africa? Kenneth Jost  
Jost, K. 1995, March

24<http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1995032400&type=hitlist&num=12>)

At least 18 countries of sub-Saharan Africa can be counted as functioning democracies today, according to Freedom House, the New York-based human rights organization.

The African-American Institute, a private development organization also based in New York, says as many as 35 countries are in some form of democratic transition. “We now have a fairly critical weight of countries that are moving in very positive directions,” says Steve McDonald, the institute's executive vice president. “We feel very strongly that there is a sea change of attitude in Africa.”<sup>¶</sup> The wave of democratization that some have called Africa's “second liberation” began cresting with the end of the Cold War. With the fading of geopolitical rivalries, the United States and other Western powers felt freer to urge autocratic regimes to adopt political reforms. But officials and experts agree that the African people themselves are the main force behind the movement toward democracy.<sup>¶</sup> “African populations are no longer patient with dictators,” says Ali Mazrui, a Kenyan who is director of the Institute for Global Cultural Studies at the State University of New York in Binghamton. “Dictatorships are definitely on notice and, in some cases, under siege.”<sup>¶</sup> Mazrui, who wrote and narrated the eight-part PBS series “The Africans,” says public discontent with autocratic regimes has both political and economic causes. “The disenchantment with African dictators is that they have not delivered,” Mazrui says. “You can tolerate loss of freedom if you get prosperity in return. But loss of freedom and deepening poverty is not a very good bargain. And the African people have decided that enough is enough.”<sup>¶</sup> Almost all of the African countries south of the Sahara have held elections since 1989. Typically, the elections have drawn good turnouts despite primitive conditions - paper ballots instead of voting machines, for example - and frequent political intimidation. Since 1992, three longtime presidents have given up power after being defeated for re-election - the first such peaceful transitions in the independence era.

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## **AT: China Module**



## 1NC China Module

### **East Asia Democratization inevitable- other country's pressure, and new opportunities**

**Diamond**, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, January 24 **2012**

(Larry, Why East Asia—Including China—Will Turn Democratic Within a Generation, The Atlantic)

If there is going to be a big new lift to global democratic prospects in this decade, the region from which it will emanate is most likely to be East Asia. With the eruption of mass movements for democratic change throughout the Arab world in 2011, hopeful analysts of global democratic prospects have focused attention on the Middle East. Three Arab autocracies (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) have fallen in the past year. At least two more (Yemen and Syria) also seem destined for demise soon, and pressures for real democratic change figure to mount in Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and perhaps Kuwait, and to persist in Bahrain. Yet among these and other countries in the Middle East (including Iraq and Iran), only Tunisia has a good chance of becoming a democracy in the relatively near future. Aspirations for more democratic and accountable government run deep throughout the Middle East, and for years to come the region will be a lively and contested terrain of possibilities for regime evolution. But if a new regional wave of transitions to democracy unfolds in the next five to ten years, it is more likely to come from East Asia--a region that has been strangely neglected in recent thinking about the near-term prospects for expansion of democracy. And East Asia is also better positioned to increase the number of liberal and sustainable democracies. Unlike the Arab world, East Asia already has a critical mass of democracies. Forty percent of East Asian states (seven of the seventeen) are democracies, a proportion slightly higher than in South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, though dramatically lower than in Latin America or Central and Eastern Europe, where most states are democracies. As a result of the third wave of global democratization, East Asia has gone from being the cradle and locus of "developmental authoritarianism," with Japan as its lone democracy--and a longstanding one-party-dominant system at that--to at least a mixed and progressing set of systems. Today, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all consolidated liberal democracies. East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines are at least electoral democracies with some resilience. Moreover, as I will explain, there are now significant prospects for democratic change in a number of the region's remaining authoritarian regimes. Thailand is progressing back toward democracy; Malaysia and Singapore show signs of entering a period of democratic transition; Burma, to the surprise of many, is liberalizing politically for the first time in twenty years; and China faces a looming crisis of authoritarianism that will generate a new opportunity for democratic transition in the next two decades and possibly much sooner. Moreover, all this has been happening during a five-year period when democracy has been in recession globally.

**China is moving towards a democracy- Lack of adaptability from CCP**

**Diamond**, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, January 24 **2012**

(Larry, Why East Asia—Including China—Will Turn Democratic Within a Generation, The Atlantic)

As Francis Fukuyama notes in an essay in the Journal of Democracy, the one flaw in the otherwise impressive institutionalization of Chinese Communist rule is **its lack of adaptability**. For a regime whose specialty is producing rapid economic change, such rigidity is a potentially fatal defect. With every month or year that ticks by while corruption, routine abuses of power, and stifling constraints on expression go unchecked, citizens' frustration mounts. Already, protests erupt with ominous frequency across tens of thousands of Chinese localities every year, while subversive and democratic ideas, images, and allusions proliferate online, despite the best efforts of fifty-thousand Internet police to keep Chinese cyberspace free of "harmful content." As Minxin Pei has been arguing for some time and as he asserts again in his essay here, the strength of the authoritarian regime in China is increasingly an illusion, and its resilience may not last much longer. As frustration with corruption, collusion, criminality, and constraints on free expression rise, so do the possibilities for a sudden crisis to turn into a political catastrophe for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

**Democracy Good/Bad\*\***

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**Democracy Good**

## **Demo Good: Topshelf**

**Assumptions about liberal democracy promotion are ill-informed-different countries promote democracy in different way while in different places-prefer empirical evidence over assumptions.**

**Hobson, and Kurk 9/20/11** (Professor in International Relations Theory. BA University of Hull MscEcon University of Wales, Aberystwyth PhD University of Wales/ Scholar of international political theory Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.) "The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion" accessed online 7/8/15 <https://books.google.com/books?id=seoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100&dq=Misunderstanding+the+maladies+of+liberal+democracy+promotion%E2%80%9D,&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UzOdVdbSB8WmgwTlslP4CQ&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Two commonly made assumptions rest on empirical ground that is not firm. The first of these is the assumption that Western powers are in essence over-promoting liberal democracy. The facts suggest instead that they are not doing much to promote democracy of any type, whether liberal or otherwise. This is the most notable policy trend of recent years. under-stressed if not entirely ignored by arguments that derive from critical theory. Second is the supposition that where they are active in democracy support, Western powers follow a rigidly liberal template that is inappropriate and inattentive to local demands and specificities. Of course, in places some such concerns are well founded and injustices are undoubtedly committed in the pursuit of political change. But this argument is far too sweeping when forwarded as a general critique of democracy promotion. Real-life policy formulation is much more ad hoc and varied in its conceptual bases. This is evident if one takes the trouble to look at the nitty-gritty substance of what democracy promoters are doing on the ground. In some cases Western powers assertively promote liberal democracy. But other combinations are also adopted. Sometimes policy favours illiberal democracy; sometimes it seeks advances in liberal rights without democracy; and sometimes it is active in supporting neither the 'liberal' nor the 'democracy' strands of liberal democracy. The precise nature and balance of such policy options varies across different democracy promoters, different 'target states and over different moments in time. Critical theory inspired approaches risks seeing a uniformity that simply does not exist in concrete democracy support strategies. It is if anything more straight jacketed than the policy-makers it mocks as rigidly simplistic in their conceptual understanding of democracy. This is not to suggest that all is well in the democracy promoters' house; but the renovations needed are more subtle in nature.

**US Democracy promotion inconsistency is vital to security, trade, and upholding international law-**

**Carothers, 99** (one of the most noted international experts on international democracy support, democratization, and U.S. foreign policy/Harvard Law)

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“Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve” accessed online 7/8/15  
<https://books.google.com/books?id=R7RGfnIL7LUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Aiding+Democracy+Abroad:+The+Learning+Curve,&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7C6dVcSlEorggwSLh5bICg&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22whenever%20I%20present%20an%20analysis%20of%20U.S.%20democracy%20assistance%22&f=false>

In the first place, there has been some evolution in U.S. foreign policy since the mid-1980s on the compatibility of democracy promotion with other U.S. interests. Democracy now is more often seen as a pragmatic interest that reinforces other interests than as a purely soft, idealistic interest. In some regions, particularly Latin America, Central Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa, Washington often approaches political, economic, and security interests as a mutually reinforcing set and applies a range of tools to promote democracy. Elsewhere, notably Asia, the United States has more varied interests that still conflict with one another fairly often, yet policy makers still pursue democracy goals in a number of countries. Second, that the United States fails to push democracy in some countries does not negate its democracy promotion efforts in others. **Policy on democracy is inconsistent, but the fact remains that in many countries the United States has genuinely tried in recent years to support democratic transitions. Just because the United States is not promoting democracy in Saudi Arabia does not automatically mean it is not serious when it opposes a coup in Paraguay.** Inconsistency detracts from democracy policies, depending on how close by and how similar counterexamples are **(U.S. support for a dictator in Peru, for example, would undercut a prodemocracy stance in Paraguay much more than support for a dictatorial regime in the Middle East).** **But inconsistency does not render such policies meaningless.** In denouncing the inconsistency of democracy policy it is easy to forget that all major areas of U.S. foreign policy—whether nuclear non-proliferation policy, trade policy, or support for international law—are inconsistent in important ways. And America is scarcely alone in this regard. One surveys the foreign policies of the major powers in vain for seamless policies on major subjects such as democracy and human rights.

## **Demo Good: Social Devp**

**Critics of liberal democracy are false-social development receives the largest amounts of funds out of all development programs.**

**Hobson, and Kurk 9/20/11** (Professor in International Relations Theory, BA University of Hull MscEcon University of Wales, Aberystwyth PhD University of Wales/ Scholar of international political theory Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.) "The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion" accessed online 7/8/15 <https://books.google.com/books?id=seoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100&dq=Misunderstanding+the+maladies+of+liberal+democracy+promotion%E2%80%9D,&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UzOdVdbSB8WmgwTlslP4CQ&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>

A first frequent criticism is that Western powers limit themselves to supporting a form of liberal political reform that excludes any interest in social democracy. The evidence demonstrates that this is not a convincing line of argument. The evidence made suggestion is that a key problem with the democracy support agenda is that donors do not realize that democracy must deliver for economic development' and help reduce poverty and inequality. Western governments can be criticized for many things. but this now standard accusation is wide of the mark. The argument (made in some places in this volume) that donors place such absolute priority on political liberty in their foreign policies that they are blind to economic development challenges and possibly alternative means of achieving these is not one that bears any close resemblance to reality. At the level of concrete funding initiatives the balance of priorities appears to be the very inverse. **Donors give significantly more resources for social development and efforts to reduce inequality than the channel to political aid aimed at 'imposing liberal democracy. By far the largest slices of funding are managed by development agencies. most of whom remain reluctant to let any engagement on political reform divert attention from core social development aims.** Of course. it would be fair to argue that on such issues still not enough is being done. and that trade policies often cut across the stated aims of enhancing social democracy. However: this is a problem more related to the prioritization of commercial self-interest and broader structural constraints of the international system than to a 'conceptual politics of democracy' that negates social democracy. What requires improvement is the linkage between democracy promotion policies and other aspects of Western foreign and commercial policies that relate to structural impediments and iniustices at the global level.

## **Demo Good: Rights/Liberty**

### **Liberal democracy promotion enhances the ability for rights and liberties to be obtained.**

**Mouffe, 09** (Centre for the Study of Democracy/ Prof. Dr. Chantal)

“Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism” accessed online 7/8/15  
[https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw\\_72.pdf](https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf)

Another point of convergence between the two versions of deliberative democracy is their common insistence on the possibility of grounding authority and legitimacy on some forms of public reasoning and their shared belief in a form of rationality which is not merely instrumental but that has a normative dimension, the “reasonable” for Rawls, “communicative rationality” for Habermas. In both cases a strong separation is established between “mere agreement” and “rational consensus” and the proper field of politics is identified with the exchange of arguments among reasonable persons guided by the principle of impartiality. Both Habermas and Rawls believe that we can find in the institutions of liberal democracy the idealized content of practical rationality. Where they diverge is in their elucidation of the form of practical reason embodied in democratic institutions. Rawls emphasises the role of principles of justice reached through the device of the “original position” that forces the participants to leave aside all their particularities and interests. His conception of “justice as fairness” – which states the priority of basic liberal principles – jointly with the “constitutional essentials” provides the framework for the exercise of “free public reason”. As far as

Habermas is concerned, he defends what he claims to be a strictly proceduralist approach in which no limits are put on the scope and content of the deliberation. It is the procedural constraints of the ideal speech situation that will eliminate the positions to which the participants in the moral discourse cannot agree. As recalled by Benhabib, the features of such a discourse are the following: 1) participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned topics of the conversation; and 3) all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rule of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied and carried out. They are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda of the conversation, or the identity of the participants, as long as any excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question.<sup>9</sup> From this perspective the basis of legitimacy of democratic institutions is derived from the fact that the instances which claim obligatory power do so on the presumption that their decisions represent an impartial standpoint which is equally in the interests of all. Cohen, after stating that democratic legitimacy arises from collective decisions among equal members, declares: “According to a deliberative conception, a decision is collective just in case it emerges from arrangements of binding collective choices that establish conditions of free public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions”.<sup>10</sup>



## **Demo Good: A2 “Patriarchy”**

**Democracy calls for equal human rights and respect for all persons-no correlation to patriarchy.**

**Richards, 3/12/15** (Professor of Law New York University/Global Professor of Law) “Liberal Democracy and the Problem of Patriarchy” accessed online 7/8/15 <http://www.uam.es/otros/afduam/documentos/richards.pdf>

If Sarah Hrdy is right, relationality and democracy held sway during much of human pre-history. Patriarchy, however, is inconsistent with democracy because it accords hierarchical authority to priest-fathers over women and other men and boys, rationalizing its authority on the basis of the repression of the moral voices of well over half the human species. In contrast, **democracy calls for equal care and respect for all persons, including their equal human rights to free conscience and voice. Accordingly, patriarchy, which is inconsistent with democracy, could only have achieved the power it did by attacking the relationality of the ethics of care and of democracy.** We argue that what makes this psychologically possible for our otherwise relational human natures is the ways in which patriarchy requires traumatic breaks in relationship in the initiation of both boys, quite early on, and girls, later on, into patriarchy. It is the experience of such traumatic loss that replaces real relationship with identification with the gender stereotypes and gender binary required by patriarchy. The psychological power of trauma is shown both in loss of voice and memory, rendering problematic our relational human natures, in effect, enacting and reenacting in our lives a false story of ourselves. The traumatic violence that patriarchy inflicts in turn gives rise to propensities to repressive violence directed at any challenge to the patriarchal gender binary. Since these challenges (in the form of resistance to injustice) arise from an ethical voice rooted in our relationality, patriarchy expresses itself in attitudes that rationalize the repression of this voice and thus our relationality. The aim of our argument here is to clarify how patriarchy has historically done this, focusing, in particular, on the patriarchal legacy of Western Christianity and the role it has played in rationalizing anti-Semitism. We use anti-Semitism as an illuminating model for a range of irrational prejudices (including not only extreme religious intolerance, but racism, sexism, and homophobia) that are, we argue, supported and rationalized by patriarchy. Our study includes the role of patriarchy in the 20th century totalitarianisms that almost brought civilization, as we know it, to an end.

## **Liberalism Good: Self-Correcting**

**Liberalism is self-correcting-allows for progressive action to take place.**

**Starr ,06** (is a Pulitzer Prize-winning professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton University) Paul Starr“Freedom's Power: The True Force of Liberalism” accessed online 7/9/15  
<http://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles07/Starr-Liberalism-Ch1.pdf>

In a different way, guarantees of religious toleration and freedom of conscience exemplify the logic of liberalism as a foundation for a stable polity. Internecine religious conflicts and wars of religion, like revenge feuds, deplete the powers of states and societies. Religious toleration serves not only to allow people to worship differently but also to reduce conflict, facilitate economic exchange, and create a wider pool of talent for productive work and the state itself. By dividing religion from law— that is, by excluding religion from any binding social consensus—states guaranteeing religious freedom allow people of different faiths to cooperate under a political order that does not threaten to extinguish any of the various theological doctrines they support. Religious toleration has also served as a paradigm for the state’s acceptance of pluralism in other cultural and moral controversies. Where divisions over the meaning of the good life are deep and irreconcilable, the state’s neutrality among competing perspectives furthers mutual forbearance, cooperation, and the growth of societal powers. The neutrality of the liberal state, however, does not apply to all matters of moral judgment. Liberalism not only regards people as worthy of being treated equally but holds that each individual life has positive value, and the laws and policies of a liberal state ought to embody that principle, though citizens may well disagree about how to interpret it. As each life has value, so do the health and well-being of the community: liberal policies in support of public health and a salubrious and sustainable environment stem from commitments that are moral in their inspiration. And because education necessarily cultivates character as well as intelligence, a liberal society will properly use its schools to pass on to the young such moral qualities as integrity, perseverance, empathy, and personal and civic responsibility. But just as liberalism excludes religion from a binding social consensus, so it accepts a diversity of cultural and moral practices that cause no harm to others. **The framework of a liberal society is only a framework—that is, it provides space for free development, allowing for differences and promoting cooperation. We may justify religious freedom and cultural diversity on the grounds of individual rights and autonomy or the equal respect due people of different faiths and values. But the potential of liberty to promote stable cooperation and state power helps to explain why states that adopted religious toleration continued to maintain it and why they have expanded the scope of pluralism.** These kinds of effects on societal power are crucial in accounting for liberalism’s historical rise. **The liberal hypothesis is not that each and every constraint on power serves the utilitarian purpose of enlarging societal powers, much less that every rule should be tested solely on that criterion. Rather, the hypothesis is that liberal constraints on power, when taken as a whole, have created stronger self-**

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**corrective political mechanisms, a more innovative and productive economy, broader societal cooperation, and other formidable advantages.**  
Mechanisms of this kind help to explain why liberal ideas became the basis of enduring liberal states.

## **Liberalism Good: General**

**Liberalism prevents exclusion of different groups of people, and promotes economic, and militaristic growth.**

**Starr, 07** (Paul Starr is a Pulitzer Prize-winning professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton University.) “Why Liberalism Works “ accessed online 7/8/15

<http://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles07/Starr.WhyLiberalismWorks.pdf>

Although I have described these ideas as a series of rights, they imply corresponding responsibilities that a liberal society expects of its members, individually and collectively. Inasmuch as individuals enjoy rights to civil liberty and freedom from arbitrary power, they are responsible for their own actions and what they make of their lives. Inasmuch as citizens enjoy a right to political liberty and a share of their government, they have the responsibilities of citizenship to make democracy work. And inasmuch as the members of a liberal society have a right to basic requirements of human development, such as education and a minimum standard of security, they have obligations to one another, mutually and through their government, to ensure that conditions exist enabling every person to have the opportunity for success in life. The liberal project may be defined as the effort to guarantee these freedoms and to create the institutions and forms of character that will lead a people to assume responsibility, not as an external burden imposed upon them but from a force within. This is only a preliminary definition, however, because liberties come into conflict with one another and with other interests, and there must be a way of adjudicating among them that is consistent with the deepest interests in freedom and the public good. Moreover, liberalism consists of principles not only for a just society but also for the design of a state capable of sustaining that society in a world that is far from ideal. This concern for creating a capable and effective state is critical to understanding how and why liberalism works. Constitutionalism itself, and even more so a liberal constitution with its emphasis on the protection of individual rights, is a system of enabling constraints. The constraints shield individuals from tyranny, but they also strengthen the state’s power to act on behalf of its citizens. Checks and balances, requirements for transparency in decision making, and public accountability for performance reduce the odds of capricious, reckless, or self-interested decisions by those in power. Public discussion invites ideas and information that autocrats do not receive or are unlikely to heed. A constitutional state that observes the rule of law is more likely to abide by its promises, pay its debts, and enjoy better credit and lower interest rates. Guarantees of rights, including property rights, enable individuals to make long-term plans and investments and create a more productive economy that redounds to general advantage. Guarantees of religious freedom allow people of different faiths to cooperate under a political order that does not threaten to extinguish any of the various theological doctrines they support. In short, it is an error to see guarantees of liberty as a source of state weakness. From its beginnings in 17th and 18th-century England and America, constitutional liberalism

contributed to the development of states that proved not only economically but also militarily successful, even when challenged by regimes more devoted to martial values.

**Liberalism promotes personal autonomy that directly leads to better economic prowess.**

John **Gray, 95** (is an English political philosopher with interests in analytic philosophy and the history of ideas. He retired as School Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics and Political Science.)  
“Liberalism”

<https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh7YGQQ4d7MC&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22liberalism%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=2MqeVd-WDIHS-QGZ6Y3IBQ&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=%22liberalism%22&f=false>

Finally, as one of the architects of the Soviet totalitarian state observed prophetically: 'In a country where the sole employer is the state, opposition means death by slow starvation. The old principle, who does not work shall not eat, has been replaced by a new one: who does not obey shall not eat.' The insight conveyed by these statements is that. though it is true that private property enhances the autonomy of its possessors, still the freedom that is generated by private property is not only that enjoyed or exercised by its holders. Those without substantial property in a private property society enjoy a degree of autonomy denied to any in a communal system in which no important decision can be taken without general agreement. Indeed, **even the worst off in a private property system is more autonomous than most in a collective system: the Vagabond is freer** than the conscript soldier, even if (dubiously enough, in real-world socialist systems) the latter is better fed. The defence I have sketched of private property in terms of its contribution to individual autonomy has a Humean beginning in competition for scarce resources, but it issues in a Kantian recognition that private property ensures personal independence. The two strands in the argument are distinct but not altogether unconnected. The Kantian strand insists that the individual must be conceived as author of his ends and goals, which he cannot be required to submit to the authority of any collective process beyond the rule of law, while the Humean argument invokes the scarcity of knowledge and of natural resources as permanent consideration in favour of private property. Taken together, these two strands of argument yield a powerful case for private property institutions. To be sure, they do not show that individuals living in a liberal state are in any way obliged to hold their property in the form of full liberal ownership: they may, if they so choose, vest their property in corporate bodies - cooperatives, monasteries, or whatever - and, in any real society, a host of such complex arrangements will be made. The basic juridical form of property right supported by the any real society, a host of such complex arrangements will be made. The basic juridical form of property right supported by the arguments I have advanced remains nonetheless full liberal ownership. It is worth recalling, at the same time, that (as Robert Nozick has noted') a society based on such property rights need not be a capitalist or

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market-based society in its economic aspects: there is always the possibility that individuals might choose to conduct economic life on communalist or socialist principles, as they are fully entitled to do in the liberal order. The possibility is remote in any modern society, however, that large numbers of people will opt out of market relations in favour of communal arrangements. **There Individual Liberty 67 are, in addition, strong positive reasons, akin to those which support the institution of private property, why the market process is likely to be dominant in the economic life of a liberal society.**

### **Liberalism is key to individualism, and equality.**

Will Kymlicka, 91 (a Canadian political philosopher best known for his work on multiculturalism) "Liberalism, Community, and Culture" accessed online 7/9/15

<https://books.google.com/books?id=yW5gYPgMIMYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22liberalism%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=2MqeVd-WDIHS-QGZ6Y3IBQ&ved=0CEgQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=%22liberalism%22&f=false>

THE claim that rights for minority cultures can be justified on liberal principles is likely to be met with scepticism by many critics and defenders of liberalism. For it is often said, by critics of liberalism, that what defines liberalism is its disregard for the context of choice, for the way that choices are situated in cultural communities. As Weaver says of the liberal response to Canada's Indian policy 'Because liberalism disregards the social system as the basis of society, the liberal concept of individual choice is frequently a fallacy. It fails to detect that choices are possible only under certain conditions' (Weaver 1981 p. 55). **And as we've seen, Taylor thinks that liberal atomism implies that individuals are not in need of any cultural context in order to make sense of their options or exercise their capacity for choice** (C. Taylor 1985 p. 197). Indeed, advocates of liberalism seem to play down the importance of membership in a cultural community as a context of choice. Thus Rawls says that in a just society our self-respect is secured by our recognition as equal citizens, not, apparently, by membership in a cultural community (Rawls 1971 pp. 544- 5). Porter says that 'the saliency of ethnic differences is a retreat from the liberal notions of the unity of mankind' (Porter p. 303). The 'egalitarianism' he sees underlying liberalism requires p. 303). The 'egalitarianism' he sees underlying liberalism requires treating individuals as equal citizens, without regard to race or ethnicity. Speaking, inter alia, about Inuit claims for collective rights, he says that **minority rights are not only 'regrettable', but 'regressive'** (Porter p. 298). So both critics and defenders of liberalism seem to say that the individualism and egalitarianism underlying liberalism require ignoring people's relationship to their cultural community. While Ponting and Gibbins criticize liberalism for being 'married' to the view that individuals ought to be incorporated into the state independently of cultural membership (Ponting and Gibbins 1980 p. 330), Schwartz considers it a virtue of liberalism that it refuses to see individuals as situated in any way in historical communities (Schwartz ch. 1). In the face of this evidence, it would seem that an endorsement of minority rights must involve a rejection of liberal values, rather than an improved spelling-out of them. But it is important to note that all of these advocates and critics are post-war writers.

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If we look at the writings of earlier liberals, especially Mill, Green, Hobhouse, and Dewey, a different picture emerges. They emphasized the importance of cultural membership for individual autonomy, and so had a different view about the salience of cultural membership. For example, Dewey stressed the importance of belonging to 'communities', which involve not only the interactions and interdependencies of civil society, but a consciousness of commonality. This commonality is based on cultural membership, and so requires that the young 'be brought up within the traditions, outlook and interests which characterize a community' (Dewey pp. 153-4). Green says that an important part of the unity necessary to a good society derives 'from a common dwelling-place with its associations, from common memories, traditions and customs, and from the common ways of feeling and thinking which a common language and still more a common literature embodies' (T. H. Green pp. 130-1). Likewise Hobhouse praised those 'higher communities' which have 'a common sentiment and a common interest' (Hobhouse 1966 p. 41), best exemplified by 'the sentiment of nationality' which is a composite effect of language, tradition, religion, and manners which makes certain people feel themselves at one with each other and apart from the rest of the world. Pride and self-respect are closely bound up with it, and to destroy a nationality is in a degree to wound the pride and lower the manhood of those who adhere to it. (Hobhouse 1928 p. 146) Mill emphasized the importance of 'the feeling of nationality', a feeling which is generated by many causes, of which 'the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents: the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; **But there needn't be any conflict here, for the kind of commonality involved-i.e. commonality of language and history, shared membership in a cultural community-doesn't constrain individuality. On the contrary, membership in a cultural structure is what enables individual freedom, what enables meaningful choices about how to lead one's life.** Indeed, Hobhouse said that 'true freedom' was possible only in such 'higher communities' (Hobhouse 1966 p. 35), and Dewey said that 'fraternity, liberty and equality' were 'hopeless abstractions' outside of such communities (Dewey p. 149). Likewise Mill saw no conflict between his belief that individuals should be not only free but encouraged to experiment with unfamiliar life-styles, and his belief that communities should be united by a feeling of nationality based on common sentiment. Mill was so concerned with the freedom of individuals to express their individuality in unusual and unexpected ways that Dewey thought Mill equated individuality with quirky eccentricity (Gaus p. 16); yet Mill also believed that such free individuality was 'next to impossible' in a country without commonality of language and heritage (Mill 1972 p. 361). For Mill, as for the others, **commonality of cultural membership wasn't in conflict with individual freedom, but rather was its precondition.**

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## **Democracy Bad**

## **Democracy Bad: War/Violence**

### **Democracy promotion masks current American imperialism.**

Mohammad A. **Mousavi, 11** (International Journal of Humanities and Social Science contributor, PhD) “The Nature of US Democracy Promotion Policy: Reality versus Illusion The Case of Iraq”  
[http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol\\_1\\_No\\_20\\_December\\_2011/11.pdf](http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_1_No_20_December_2011/11.pdf)

4. Democracy Promotion: A Multipurpose Tool of US Foreign Policy Countries try to expand their influence with myriad of tools in the global system and United States is not exception to the rule. Expansion can have two forms; they are territorial and ideological for the United States, though it may be argued that territorial expansion necessitates ideological one(Layne and Thayer, 2007). Expansion also requires some tools; set in its historical context, US expansion has two forms, via hard power and soft power and the tools being —Manifest Destiny|| and —democracy promotion,|| respectively. **Indeed, ‘Manifest Destiny’ originally meant westward expansionism, but later evolved into a campaign bent on spreading democracy to foreign cultures**(Hippel, 2004). It worked as a justification for US expansionist foreign policy including the conquest of northern Mexico and bringing Latin America into the US sphere of influence (Merk, 1963). Winston Churchill once aptly observed, —The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.|| Knowing Churchill’s account of future, it seems that American policymakers have changed their tactic and camouflaged manifest destiny with a less harsh face, military intervention but by the name of democracy promotion, humanitarian purposes, human rights, and defending democracy; a combination of the hard and soft power or what Joseph Nye called —Smart Power|| (see Figure 1) The Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science © Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA 115 Figure 1: Historical route of US expansion via different methods and tools, by the authors. As the Figure 1 illustrates, US expansion assumes two forms, territorial and ideological; two muscles of US expansion are hard and soft power. Manifest destiny or military attack/intervention and democracy promotion are the tactics of hard and soft power, respectively. Manifest destiny means annexing a territory (Indians Lands, northern Mexico), and military attack/intervention not necessarily means taking over a territory but a tool of paving the way for democracy promotion (Japan, Germany, Iraq, Panama and Haiti) and humanitarian purposes (Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia). Layne and Thayer (2007) argue that Americans have always tried to continue the policy of expansionism and primacy. They also argue that US expansion of influence has been crystalized in two strands; first, the appetite for territorial expansion which satisfied by 1900 and, the second, expansion via ideological influence. **History of the ideological expansion dates back to the inception of territorial expansion but its appetite has never yet been satisfied. Thus the United States no longer seeks to maintain control via other means such as —conquering territory and imposing colonial rule|| but through —expanding its ideology of democracy and free market economy;||** i. e., —It does not covet territory or resources. It covets ideas,|| what Churchill called —empire of the mind.|| (Layne and Thayer, 2007) According to the Figure 1, it can be said that today

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territorial expansion is no longer matters and military intervention and wars is meant to enlarge the scope of dominion. On the other hand, this can be achieved via the expansion of American ideology and culture. Hard power is meant to expand territorially and soft power to ideological expansion. However not exact in strict sense of the term, soft and hard powers have been used in parallel by the US as the manifestations of carrot and stick policy.

**“Liberal democracy” has established heirarchys that exclude any other state that doesn’t conform. Draws lines between different powers and otherizes non-conformers.**

**Hobson, 09** (Scholar of international political theory, Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.) “The Limits of Liberal-Democracy Promotion” accessed online 7/7/15  
<http://search.proquest.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/docview/198325395?pq-origsite=summon>

There are serious shortcomings and difficulties in the way liberaldemocracy promotion has developed, ones that extend well beyond the excesses of coercive democratization and the hubris of the Bush administration. Of particular significance is that these practices have essentially operated as part of a liberal movement away from the equality of states to a more hierarchical system, in which liberal democracies are identified as more legitimate. This is reflected in the way that contemporary democracy promotion practices are embedded within an ideational framework that judges states according to whether they are closer to, or further away from, the telos of liberal democracy. Furthermore, external actors that have reached this stage of liberal democracy identify themselves as having rights to intervene to help democracy elsewhere. With democracy promotion taken to be a "norm," reflecting die emerging "right" to democratic government in international law,<sup>45</sup> **states that oppose attempts by outsiders to influence the shape of domestic governance structures toward (liberal) democracy are at best tolerated, but increasingly identified as delinquent.** Resistance to external actors intervening to support democracy is equated with the self-interest of a narrow ruling elite, historical backwardness, a failure in reason and understanding, or more often than not, a combination of these. Discounted are justifiable concerns over the fact that democracy promotion remains a largely Western-driven project, driven - at least in part - by self-interested motives that may not be compatible with the needs and desires of local communities. Indeed, given the readily admitted strategic purposes for promoting democracy abroad, it is hardly surprising that many states have reacted with skepticism or outright opposition to these policies. Yet non-liberal-democratic states chafing at the prospect of external interference are regarded not only as impeding democratization in that specific context, but also as threatening "to the new democratic consensus within the

international system."<sup>46</sup> This is a reinforcement and extension of the logic of "rogue regimes": states are threatening because of what they are, and not what they do. In this context, democracy promotion operates within and reinforces this new kind of liberal international hierarchy, one that denies the equality of states, as established liberal democratic states are self-anointed as the most legitimate members of the international community.<sup>47</sup> The hierarchical dimension of this liberal worldview operates in part through establishing a specific (liberal) model of democracy as universal in scope and potential. The breadth of the third wave, in which liberal democracy was widely accepted as the desired telos of transitions, has been taken as a sign of its global appeal. This has been reinforced by opinion polls, such as the Pew Center and World Values surveys, which indicate that democracy is the preferred form of government across the world. These findings are used as evidence for democracy's universality, which then acts as a further justification for democracy promotion.<sup>48</sup> Lost in such interpretations is the cultural contingency of these survey results, where support for a general, abstract notion of democracy could mean something very different from the specific liberal version that is largely favored. **Yet the deeply embedded assumption that support for democracy naturally means the liberal variant, is highly problematic given that conceptions of democracy will always be mediated through local histories, cultures, and shared experiences.**<sup>49</sup> A certain pretense is maintained that the version being promoted is not Western centric. The manner in which (liberal) democracy is understood - its institutions, foundations, values, and so forth - suggests otherwise, however. Admittedly practice is noticeably different from the initial post-Cold War period, which was defined by a heady optimism and overconfidence. Democracy promoters now tend to work with a more nuanced view of democracy, but the overarching liberal template remains firmly in place. This can be seen through the shift from emphasizing elections - as was the case in the 1980s and early 1990s - to contemporary practice that focuses primarily on rule of law and civil-society building.<sup>50</sup> Yet one should be careful not to overstate the consequences of this development on the kind of democracy being promoted. In true technocratic fashion, this is primarily a change in implementation and delivery: The means have altered, the ends have not. Rule of law is emphasized as necessary for institutionalizing the constitutional structures liberal democracy requires, while civil society - understood in a specific manner, regularly according to the American experience - is meant to foster liberal democracy from below.<sup>51</sup> There have undoubtedly been developments in attempts to support democracy, yet there is much less evidence of serious change in the fundamental assumptions and beliefs underwriting these practices. The continuance of a liberal worldview informing and underwriting democracy promotion can further be seen through the reactions to the decidedly mixed outcomes of the third wave. The failure of many third-wave democratizers to transit successfully has led to a tendency to classify as incomplete regimes that may exhibit some democratic tendencies but fail to live up to the liberal democratic standard.<sup>52</sup> "Electoral," "illiberal," and other subtypes are portrayed as inferior and deviant, not as far advanced as liberal democracies, which remain the desired end point. This

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Whiggish reading, however, glosses over the contingency and violence that marked the foundings of many liberal democracies, and downplays the long, uneven, and tumultuous experience of democratization in the Western core. As Berman correctly notes, "the history of almost all democracies has been filled with turmoil, conflict, and even violence."<sup>53</sup> It may be reasonable to expect that these historical processes will now occur in a shorter timeframe, but the contemporary liberal account of democratization encourages the presumption that the more conflictual, and potentially illiberal, dimensions of democratization can be bypassed.

### **Turns the advantage-makes violence and otherization inevitable.**

**Hobson, 09** (Scholar of international political theory, Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.) "The Limits of Liberal-Democracy Promotion" accessed online 7/7/15  
<http://search.proquest.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/docview/198325395?pq-origsite=summon>

One consequence of this perceived phenomenon of incomplete democratization has been attempts to assess the "quality" of democracy,<sup>54</sup> which effectively works to reinforce the implicit teleology and hierarchy in thinking on democratic transitions. Unsurprisingly, what counts as a "high quality" democracy looks remarkably like an idealized version of the Anglo-American liberal model. This movement toward classifying democracies bears uncomfortable resemblances to the classical "standard of civilization," codified in international law from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, which distinguished "civilized," "semi-civilized," and "uncivilized" states, and operated to perpetuate practices of hierarchy, exclusion, and violence.<sup>55</sup> While certainly not equivalent, judging and classifying regimes by their "democraticness" treads a very slippery slope. Furthermore, it fails to take into account how different historical and cultural contexts interact with processes of democratization, which complicates attempts to ascertain objective, universal standards for judging the "quality" of democracy. For instance, within democracy there is an ongoing tension between the principles of equality and liberty, which is resolved differently by various democracies. If one regards equality as the supreme test of democracy's quality, the Anglo-American version of liberal democracy shows notable deficiencies, but if liberty is prioritized this model receives much higher marks. As well as reinforcing a relationship in which Western democracies are regarded as "superior," this prevailing logic has also constructed a dual standard where established democracies judge the democraticness of other states but not themselves. Whitehead notes that "this is not the way liberal internationalism is pictured in standard democratic theory . . . But it is the way Western democracy promotion has generally operated over the past 20 years."<sup>56</sup> Established democracies are excluded from the data sets of almost all scholarship on democratization, based on the presumption that

democratization and democracy promotion can only occur in transitional states. Little room is left for the possibility that established democracies suffer from similar problems.<sup>57</sup> This stems from a tendency by practitioners and scholars to regard democracy as a finished product, something that has been achieved in the West and is now ready to be exported elsewhere. Vaclav Havel expresses this with great clarity: "Democracy is seen less and less as an open system that is best able to respond to people's basic needs - that is, as a set of possibilities that continually must be sought, redefined, and brought into being. Instead, democracy is seen as something given, finished, and complete as is, something that can be exported like cars or television sets, something that the more enlightened purchase and the less enlightened do not."<sup>58</sup> What Havel points to is the virtue of understanding democracy in a more open manner, as an inherently incomplete and unfinished process. From this perspective, democratization is an ongoing process for all, democracies, not just transitional ones.

**Promotion of Liberal democratic discourse promotes modes of governmentality that make war inevitable.**

Mariela **Cuadro**, 4/5/15 (is the Middle East Department Coordinator, at the Institute of International Relations in the National University of La Plata, in Argentina.) "Democracy, intervention and liberal strategy" accessed online 7/8/15 <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/573cf5b9-d87f-432f-9ca1-4cd413200176.pdf>

It is insufficient when attempting to comprehend the nature of the relations between liberal regimes and war, to dismiss their commitments to the promotion of peace and the ideal of a common humanity simply as rhetorical devices for the disguise of ulterior, largely materially driven, strategic motivations<sup>14</sup> (Reid, 2006: 5). This is why discourse that frames wars is not merely rhetorical, ideological or superstructural. The epistemological conception of discourse assumed by this paper sustains that discourse is performative, that means that it is material and, therefore, has effects on "reality". Thereby, the explicit goal of establishing liberal democratic regimes in different parts of the world is not a mere rhetorical exercise that hides other (material) interests: it is constitutive of a liberal mode of government that works through the constitution of (self)governable individuals. Thus, the establishment of democracy is not conceived as a moral imperative, but as a technology of government. In short, **—(t)he discourses of war are perhaps as potent politically as war itself" (Jabri, 2010: 22). Indeed, discourse constitutes subjectivities and gives right to speak to some while excluding others.** In this regard, deployment of global liberalism worldwide does not have to be read from the liberal progressive perspective, which reads in the end of the Cold War "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1989: 6- 7), urging to put an end to "ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society" (Fukuyama, 1989: 23). **On the contrary, liberal deployment worldwide must be understood in its ability not only to present itself as the promoter of**

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**mankind's welfare, but also in its ability to constitute the prevailing conceptions about what does welfare mean, and to constitute the interests and desires of men and women that populate the world. And war, as organized exercise of violence, also works by constituting this discourse and, therefore, constituting subjectivities.**

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## **Democracy Bad: Totalitarianism/Util**

### **American democracy leads to totalitarian and utilitarian mindsets. Creates a never ending cycle of violence.**

Isabel **David, 15** (PhD School of Social and Political Sciences /Universidade de Lisboa) journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015 | UDC 327 | ISSN 1857-9760 Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies "RETHINKING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: PRELUDE TO TOTALITARIANISM" accessed online 7/8/15 [http://e-jlia.com/papers/1714608861\\_vol1\\_num1\\_pap1.pdf](http://e-jlia.com/papers/1714608861_vol1_num1_pap1.pdf)

Mass murder in the political sphere merely emulates mass production in the economic realm. People are judged by their market value. Reified, people become eventually obsolete and thus disposable. As things, human beings can be used and manipulated. In this utilitarian world, ideas, religions, ideologies are of interest "only insofar as they increase or decrease the survival prospects of the human species on the earth or within the universe" (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 185). In the end, the origins of such concepts must reside in the utilitarian formula that obliterates meaning and purpose and blurs the difference between means and ends. If "all of European history through many centuries had taught people to judge each political action by its *cui bono* and all political events by their particular underlying interests," (Arendt 1968, 46) in the absence of values, what can be the boundaries to political violence? A nihilist society, however committed to science, can only have totalitarianism as its final destination. Totalitarianism, then, does not proceed from ignorance. And from this cycle there seems to be no escape: "whatever the punishment, once a specific crime has appeared for the first time, its reappearance is more likely than its initial emergence could ever have been." (Arendt 2006b, 273) **There is indeed a strikingly frightening similarity between democracy and totalitarianism, in that the former paves the way for the latter.**<sup>6</sup> **One needs only to compare the brilliant studies conducted by Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt - Democracy in America and Totalitarianism - to understand the meaning of such an affirmation.** Once the difference between right and wrong is no more<sup>7</sup> – and then we will have attained what Plato saw as the cause of evil: ignorance –, men relapse into a Hobbesian state of nature since the instinct of selfpreservation prevails when each one of us does what he wants<sup>8</sup>, paving the way for the utmost perversity and fully demonstrating its consequences once such men reach government, as Plato (Book VIII) noticed. The ultimate perversion is the trivialisation of all feelings which ennoble and elevate the human condition - love, friendship, loyalty. And this development proves how easily modernity has destroyed both man's ability to think - and especially to reflect on himself - and his practical reason,<sup>9</sup> the one faculty on which Liberal philosophy rests, by trusting human nature. Hitler's election is the living proof. Action alone determines the nature of the moral person and not intention, as Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics, Book III, chapter IV) noted.



## **Democracy Bad: Patriarchy**

### **Liberalisms focus on a shift from public to private sector reinforces threats to women's liberty and equality.**

Tracy E. **Higgins, 04** (The Fordham Law Review is one of six well respected scholarly journals edited exclusively by Fordham Law students. Each issue explores significant legal issues and examines challenging questions in the law.) "Gender, Why Feminists Can 't (or Shouldn't) Be Liberals" accessed online 7/8/15

<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3966&context=flr>

Liberalism's core idea is a simultaneous commitment to equal citizenship in the public realm and the accommodation of competing conceptions of the good in the private realm. Liberals surely disagree about precisely where the boundary between public and private should be drawn, or about how robust our conceptions of freedom and equality must be in the public realm. But for a theory to be recognizable as "liberal," I suggest, this basic idea has got to be there. In any case, it is central to the work of John Rawls, who, in the introduction to Political Liberalism, states that "the problem of political liberalism is: How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" Feminist legal theorists, responding to liberalism, ask a different question: Can liberalism sustain a concept of equality that is sufficiently robust to eliminate women's subordination in both the public and private domains? Of course, feminists disagree on the answer.' Yet even feminist fans of liberalism concede that feminists have elaborated two key ideas that, at a minimum, call into question the usefulness of liberalism to feminist objectives.<sup>4</sup> First, feminists have argued repeatedly and persuasively that private power, in whatever context it is exercised, is highly regulatory. Here, consider power as it is wielded within the patriarchal nuclear family, as Okin elaborates in her essay, or within broader community structures such as religious institutions, as McClain discusses in her essay. Second, feminists have argued that liberal reliance on the concept of individual choice or voluntariness to define the boundary of the private sphere often leaves patriarchal power intact within that sphere. I shall explain each of these ideas briefly and then explore their implications for the feminist potential of Rawlsian liberalism. First, with respect to the public/private distinction, feminists have argued that the exercise of private power threatens women's liberty and equality, regardless of whether it mimics the exercise of power by the state. Indeed, accepting provisionally the liberal distinction between public and private power, feminists have argued that the latter constitutes the principal threat to women's liberty and equality.' For example, **some have argued that international human rights standards that forbid torture but regard domestic violence as outside the scope of international concern fail to address the central source of violent coercion in women's lives on a global scale.**<sup>6</sup> **The argument is not that the abusive husband acts under color of state law or to promote the interests of the state.**<sup>7</sup> **Rather, the argument is simply that a meaningful right to freedom, bodily integrity, and security for**

**women must include effective remedies against private violence.**<sup>8</sup> Feminists have made similar arguments in many other contexts ranging from pornography's silencing of women's speech<sup>9</sup> to the regulatory effects of stranger-violence on women's lives.<sup>10</sup> Although women are surely protected in certain respects by constraints on public power, these protections do not afford women the same degree of liberty and equality as men, nor do they address the most profound obstacles to equal citizenship for women.<sup>11</sup>

**Liberal autonomy undervalues care, and cultural constraints establishes a masculine agency that reinforces sexism.**

Tracy E. **Higgins, 04** (The Fordham Law Review is one of six well respected scholarly journals edited exclusively by Fordham Law students. Each issue explores significant legal issues and examines challenging questions in the law.) "Gender, Why Feminists Can 't (or Shouldn't) Be Liberals" accessed online 7/8/15  
<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3966&context=flr>

Second, feminists have done a lot of thinking about the way patriarchy creates gendered capacities for individual agency. In other words, recognizing that the exercise of individual choice is always constrained by culture and context, feminists have argued that under conditions of gender inequality, assumptions about choice and responsibility are not politically neutral. This critique has at least two distinct but related strands. The first and earliest strand emphasizes women's position in relationship with others-women as providers of care. According to this critique, liberal notions of autonomy posit an unrealistically unencumbered individual, or "atomistic man."<sup>12</sup> Beginning from this conception of liberal autonomy, some feminists have argued that liberalism undervalues care and connection and, as a result, is distinctly masculinist in its orientation. Both Okin and McClain in other contexts have defended Rawlsian liberalism against such critiques, insisting that Rawls's use of the heuristic device of the "veil of ignorance" compels the exercise of empathy in the original position. <sup>3</sup> Yet their defense does not respond fully to a more important relational feminist claim: that, by positing the self as unencumbered or atomistic, liberalism tends to treat the work of caring as voluntarily assumed, a private activity, <sup>4</sup> and, in so doing, renders it invisible.<sup>15</sup> This move, some feminists have argued, is convenient or even necessary for liberalism. As Wendy Brown explains, "the autonomous subject of liberalism requires a large population of nonautonomous subjects, a population that generates, tends, and avows the bonds, relations, dependencies, and connections that sustain and nourish human life."<sup>16</sup> The second, more recent, strand of the agency critique concerns itself less with the constraints of relationship-the bonds of family and emotional obligation-than with the more diffuse and subtle constraints of culture. This critique begins from the assumption that cultural norms, including language, law, custom, and moral norms, are not merely products of human will and action but define and limit the possibilities for human identity. <sup>7</sup> Feminists have argued that this social construction of identity is gender-differentiated, contributing to women's subordination. Thus, feminist social constructionists have been concerned not so much by the liberal preoccupation of state limits

on individuals (implying external constraints), but by the way a combination of forces creates or defines gendered individuals (implying both internal and external constraints). 8 **If women are socially constructed in ways that afford them less agency relative to men, then liberalism's tendency to regard liberty as the absence of external constraints (or, even more narrowly, the absence of statesponsored external constraints) leaves women less free than men in ways that are not legally cognizable.** a9

**Liberalism does nothing to solve inequality, in fact it perpetuates it by propping up agencies that are inherently dominant and subdural.**

Nancy Fraser, 9/10/13 (Nancy Fraser is an American critical theorist, currently the Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School in New York City) "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy" accessed online 7/8/15  
[http://my.ilstu.edu/~jkshapi/Fraser\\_Rethinking%20the%20Public%20Sphere.pdf](http://my.ilstu.edu/~jkshapi/Fraser_Rethinking%20the%20Public%20Sphere.pdf)

If we take these considerations seriously, then **we should be led to entertain serious doubts about a conception of the public sphere that purports to bracket, rather than to eliminate, structural social inequalities. We should question whether it is possible even in principle for interlocutors to deliberate as if they were social peers in specially designated discursive arenas, when these discursive arenas are situated in a larger societal context that is pervaded by structural relations of dominance and subordination.** What is at stake here is the autonomy of specifically political institutions vis-à-vis the surrounding societal context. Now, one salient feature that distinguishes liberalism from some other political-theoretical orientations is that liberalism assumes the autonomy of the political in a very strong form. Liberal political theory assumes that it is possible to organize a democratic form of political life on the basis of socio-economic and socio-sexual structures that generate systemic inequalities. For liberals, then, the problem of democracy becomes the problem of how to insulate political processes from what are considered to be non-political or pre-political processes, those characteristic, for example, of the economy, the family, and informal everyday life. The problem for liberals, thus, is how to strengthen the barriers separating political institutions that are supposed to instantiate relations of equality from economic, cultural, and socio-sexual institutions that are premised on systemic relations of inequality.'9 Yet the weight of circumstance suggests that in order to have a public sphere in which interlocutors can deliberate as peers, it is not sufficient merely to bracket social inequality. Instead, it is a necessary condition for participatory parity that systemic social inequalities be eliminated. This does not mean that everyone must have exactly the same income, but it does require the sort of rough equality that is inconsistent with systemically-generated relations of dominance and subordination. Pace liberalism, then, political democracy requires substantive social equality.20

## **Democracy Bad: Racism**

### **Liberal democracy pursues American exceptionalism that is deeply rooted in racism.**

Mariela **Cuadro, 11** (is the Middle East Department Coordinator, at the Institute of International Relations in the National University of La Plata, in Argentina.)” Universalisation of liberal democracy, American exceptionalism and racism” accessed online 7/8/15 [http://www2.hu-berlin.de/transcience/Vol2\\_Issue2\\_2011\\_30\\_43.pdf](http://www2.hu-berlin.de/transcience/Vol2_Issue2_2011_30_43.pdf)

Historically in international relations there has been a dispute between realists and liberalists based on the primacy of interests or values in international politics. Whereas the latter underscore the importance of giving a central place to values, the former insist that they should be put aside in the establishment of the Foreign Policy. When George W. Bush campaigned for the presidency of the United States (US), he did it based on a realist platform. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center changed this policy. The administration’s response took the form of a “Global War on Terror” (GWT) that made possible the intervention of US all over the world<sup>1</sup>. However, following Deleuze and Guattari, there is no de-territorialization without a consequent re-territorialization (2004). The GWT thus had its battlefields in the Middle East region. After invading Afghanistan to retaliate against those who had harbored the Al-Qaida suspects of the 9-11 terrorist acts, the US policy targeted Iraq. We will not analyze the reasons behind these two invasions, but we will use them as paradigms of the ultimate expression of a global liberal governance of which the US is its most steely bearer. Indeed, as Foucault argues, “American liberalism [. . . ] is not [. . . ] a mere economic and political election formed and formulated by the government or in the governmental circle. In America, liberalism is a whole way of being and thinking. It is much more a type of relationship between governors and governed than a technique of the former destined to the latter” (2007: 254). That is why we can hold that liberalism crosses the entire political spectrum of the US. Actually, we will study the questions of liberal democracy, US exceptionalism and racism, putting aside existing differences between Democrats and Republicans. Thus we intend to establish what we call cultural racism not as an ideological matter, but as a necessary mechanism of the liberal way of global government as “general framework of biopolitics” (Foucault, 2007: 40). What the Bush administration criticized about previous forms of power exercise in the Middle East region (including that of US) was the tolerance of authoritarian governments throughout history, favoring stability over freedom<sup>2</sup>. From this point of view, such a situation generated resentment and anger. Therefore, was identified as the root of terrorism, which – it was said – fed on the absence of democracy in the region. At this point, US’ interests and values coincided. Indeed, to put an end to terrorism, the expansion of freedom was a must (observe that this discourse homologated freedom and democracy). This was accompanied by a construction of the terrorist enemy not as a political enemy but instead as a danger to the population, excluding the terrorist subjects from the field of the political. The Bush administration thus established a linkage between security

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and freedom/democracy conflating interests and values and eliminating contradictions between the two. The US national interest would be achieved through the expansion of US values (constructed not as particular and historical, but as universal) This article will be based on the interventionist policies conducted by the Bush administration. We think, nevertheless, that its theoretical framework could be used to think the contemporary intervention in Libya as well. It is important to note that in the administration's speeches what was criticized was the tolerance, the acceptance of authoritarian regimes, eluding talking about the active participation of the US in the imposition of those governments. The clearest example of which is the coup organized by the CIA against the nationalist government of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. But we should add that the CIA participated actively in the coup that put Aref in power (in 1963) and finally led to Saddam Hussein's government, as well. Cuadro: Liberal democracy, American Exceptionalism and Racism. and necessary). Condoleezza Rice (National Security Advisor and Secretary of State) dubbed this the "uniquely American realism" (2008). The GWT thus appeared as a liberal war par excellence: a war based on values that were presented as universal, making them non particular, nor political; fought against absolute enemies posed as dangers for the (global) population; at the center of which were at the same time freedom and security. If, as said, liberalism is conceived as "general framework of biopolitics" and, following Foucault's thought, in a biopolitical technology of power, sovereign power, that is to say the power of making die, exerts itself through the inscription of racism in state's mechanisms, talking about some sort of liberal racism is actually possible. The unilateral and aggressive policy of the Bush administration -the demonstration of US absolute power- made possible its demonization. In fact, there was an attempt to construct it as an exception in the history of the US. **However, we affirm that the universalisation of particular values (e.g., liberal democracy) has deep roots in the idea of American exceptionalism and can be explained as a form of racism as a characteristic mechanism of the liberal way of global government.** If we have chosen the Bush administration as our empirical terrain that is because, even as we recognize its discontinuities with respect to previous administrations, it is our intention to point out regularities and return it to the history of liberal government.

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## **Demo Good: Econ**

## 1NC

**Democracy is found to have a positive effect on economy and studies aren't the only way to determine how each affects the other**

**Uslu 12**; HAKAN USLU works in the department of economics for Auburn University; 8/4/12; "Democracy and Economic Growth"; ([https://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handle/10415/3171/thesis\\_final\\_21May2012.pdf?sequence=2&ts=1436369546694](https://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handle/10415/3171/thesis_final_21May2012.pdf?sequence=2&ts=1436369546694))

In spite of the long and affluent dialogue on the correlation between democracy and economic growth, many of the central questions on the subject of the developmental consequences of political democracy remain, by and large, unresolved. According to the popular view, democracy has positive impact on economic developments but the relevant quantitative and cross-national researches are still disturbed by the conflicting findings. Together these theoretical and research associated issues have contributed to a good deal of confusion with respect to theories of how political democracies might affect economic development and with respect to the empirical position of testable claims implied by such theories (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990). There are two terminological convention of labeling these theoretical positions as the "Compatibility" and "Conflict" perspectives (Huntington, 1987). Below, these perspectives are 17 elaborated with respect to their implications for the effect of political democracy on economic growth. Later, some more channels showing how democracy influences economic growth will be provided. Today, democratic governance is built by more countries than ever before because they aspire to develop democratic institutions and forms that are more sensitive for the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor, and that promote development (UNDP: Democratic governance). Although, in the literature, there is no agreement on the notion that mentioned in previous sentence, many cases from real world strongly show that democracy has a positive effect on economic growth, for example, the most democratic countries of the world are the richest countries. Below, some studies which consistent with these real world evidences will be summarized. Many social scientists and economists agree with democratization is essential for economic growth. Claude (1976) argues that the consolidation and extension of fundamental freedoms and civil liberties are necessary in order to motivate citizens for prudential investments and to continue their business life. North (1990) follows the proponents of democratic view which says state autonomy is potential danger for economic performance and he argues that the state tend generally to put pressure on the society and only democratic institutions can force that type of states to act in the requisition of majority. According to his perspective, we can conclude that democracies are essential for efficient economic growth. 18 According to Goodin (1979) and Goodell and Powelson (1982) the social conditions that lead to economic development, such as economic pluralism, are generated by the implementation and existence of political rights and civil liberties and democratic forms. They argue that the concept of the economic pluralism which is critical for economic growth.



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Underlying the idea of economic pluralism is the notion that citizens can act freely to sell and buy products or distribute them within the marketplace in order to create most innovative and competitive technologies. In other words, economic pluralism composes of open competition and predictability. These two components of economic pluralism exist in a marketplace only when the form of government is organized based on democratic rules and institutions and the citizens have the security of expectations for the future. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) argue that the privilege and vested interests of minority is broken by the popular political participation. Moreover, political participation causes to existence of the participative mentality in the marketplace and also causes an increase in the flow of information which is critical to government. Consequently, it can be argued that the conditions conducive to change, entrepreneurial risk, and economic growth are created by the political participation. According to the proponents of compatibility perspective, authoritarian forms of governments may cause a more rapid economic growth in the short run, democratic forms of governments, however, are well suited for a sustained, balanced, and equitable growth in the long run (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990). Barro (1996) argue that democratic institutions work like a control mechanism on the power of government and they prevent the society from unpopular policies and the corruption among the public officials. In this view, more political rights tend to be growth enhancing. 19 Przeworski and Limongi (1993) seek a simple answer to the question whether democracy fosters or hinders economic development. First of all, they suggest that the effect of political participation is difficult to assess without considering a good economic model of the growth. In addition, they also suggest that scholars must consider politic regimes affect growth via policies. Lindauer and Velencik (1992) give an example of these types of policies in their paper as the size of government is negatively related to growth, but the increase of government expenditure has a positive effect on economic development. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) specifically focus on the issue whether democracies or authoritarian government structure better secure the property rights because today, the popular view seems to agree that these rights foster the growth. According to the result of the study of Przeworski and Limongi (1993), political institutions, in other words, policies are positively related to economic growth, but political regimes do not capture relevant differences. Olson (1991) approaches to the subject from a different perspective. In his study, he shows that democracies are more reliable than autocracies with respect to future investments and returns. He argues that “the autocrat has the problem that he cannot easily and straightforwardly make credible commitment. If he runs the society, there is no one who can force him to keep his commitments. The autocrat can promise that he will not impose any future taxes or confiscations that would make current investments unprofitable, but given his incentive to make that promise even if he intends to break it, the promise may not be credible.” The representative models for the mechanisms which specify how democratic governments promote economic growth have been introduced in the literature by the social scientist and economists. Although these models are seemingly different, they generate the same conclusion. The fundamental

assumption behind these models is that some productive role of 20 democratic governments is optimal for maximizing efficiency, growth, and welfare. According to the models of Przeworski (1990), Barro (1990) and Olson (1990), perpetuating a framework for individual operation and supplying inputs directly which are not efficiently supplied by the market are two ways that the states can participate in activities that support private production. In the marketplace, for instance, law and order are provided by government and keeping the contracts valid is under responsibility of the governments. In addition to the examples of the appropriate framework for private activities, governments defend private parties from the external threats (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). Helliwell (1994) assesses the effect of several measures of democracy and personal freedoms on economic development in a comparative framework. According to Helliwell's discussion, democracies tend to assist to establish the essential atmosphere that encourages higher levels of schooling and investment, and thereby economic growth is affected positively by these indirect mechanisms. Although Helliwell (1994) estimated the partial effect of democracy on subsequent economic growth is negative but statistically non-significant, this statistically insignificant negative effect is counterbalanced by the indirect positive effect such as investment and education. Consequently, the overall result of Helliwell's research is that democracy promotes economic growth by means of education and investment.

### **Economic stagnation causes global WMD conflict**

**Hutchinson 14** (Martin, Business and Economics Editor at United Press International, MBA from Harvard Business School, former international merchant banker, 1-3-14, "The chilling echoes of 1914, a century on" Wall Street Journal) <http://online.wsj.com/articles/william-galston-secular-stagnation-may-be-for-real-1409095263>,

The years before 1914 saw the formation of trade blocs separated by high tariff barriers. Back then, the world was dominated by several roughly equivalent powers, albeit with different strengths and weaknesses. Today, the world is similarly multi-polar. The United States is in a position of clear leadership, but China is coming up fast. Europe is weaker than it was, but is still a force to be reckoned with. Japan, Russia, Brazil, India are also too powerful to ignore. A hundred years ago, big international infrastructure projects such as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, and before it the Suez Canal, were built to protect favored trading. Today's equivalent may be the bilateral mining partnerships forged between, for instance, China and mineral-rich African states. Today, the World Trade Organization offers some defence against tariffs. But protectionism could be become entrenched if prolonged economic stagnation leads countries to pursue their own narrow interests. Germany, Austria, Russia and France lost between 20 and 35 percent of national output between 1913 and 1918, according to Angus Maddison's data used in Stephen Broadberry's "The Economics of World War One: A Comparative Analysis". British GDP declined in 1914 and 1915, but grew 15

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percent over the four years, as did the U.S. economy. The 37 million military and civilian casualties may tell a more accurate story but if history were to repeat itself, the global conflict could be both more universal and more destructive. **Nuclear weapons proliferate.** Warped diplomatic anger could lead to the deployment of **chemical and biological devices.** Electromagnetic pulses could wipe out our fragile electronic networks. Like the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that sparked World War One, the catalyst for cataclysm might be something quite surprising. A global run on bank and other investment assets or an outbreak of hyperinflation, maybe? These threats get more serious the more policymakers pump up equity, bond, property and banking bubbles. If global wealth evaporates, or is proven to be an illusion, today's largely cordial global entente could be **smashed with precipitous speed.**

## 2NC

**Democracy Helps the Economy. Our card sites studies and in addition talks about real world examples, which is a reason to prefer our evidence. Our author works in the Economic Department for a major university and goes in depth while citing other authors. The majority of studies have shown that democracy has a positive effect on the economy and this is backed up by the fact that some of the richest governments in the world are democratic. That's our Uslu 12.**

### **Democracy and economic growth reinforce each other especially in high income countries**

**Joe 6/15/15** SUM DEK JOE is a member of Malaysian Progressives in Australia (MPOZ) and currently studies Economics at the Australian National University (ANU); 6/15/15; "Democracy or economic development?"; (<http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/democracy-or-economic-development-sum-dek-joe>)

Oddly enough, when an economy achieves the required maturity stage and successfully experiences the democratisation transition, the initial economic development and newly-born democratic rules tends to create a unique dynamic by mutually reinforcing each other. Lipset (1960, p.31) argues "that the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." Firstly, economic development reinforces existing democracy by contributing to its legitimacy and stability. Furthermore, the risk for reverse transition back to authoritarianism is greatly minimised when the economic development precedes the democratic rules. This can be explained by Diamond (1989, p.150) that "if they (authoritarianism) do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to focus popular aspiration around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence." Therefore, the fundamental of economic development that was built prior to democratisation strongly reinforces the continuity of democratic rules. When most of the population is literate and generally wealthy for subsistence, the risk of class tension and radical political orientation is greatly diminished. Secondly, democracy fortifies economic development in an established economy by enabling people to participate in policy-making through voting so that the will of the population can be effectively conveyed to the leadership. Under democracy, individuals' rights and freedom were protected and rule of law is in place to ensure societal order. With the mature income level and economic stability that precedes full democracy, the economy is capable and strong enough to absorb the possible risk and uncertainty caused by election. Therefore, the combination of these two subjects fully enhances their usefulness by mutually reinforcing each other. The notion is supported by Helliwell's data (1992) that countries with higher income levels are more likely to have democratic form

of governments. As discussed above that authoritarianism is preferred to take place in a lower income country and generates economic growth in an agrarian economy, then gradually the developing country tends to democratise after reaching certain threshold of maturity in economy. In result, it leads to the mutual reconciliation and reinforcement between economic development and democracy. The trajectory of Singapore to its today's position as high income nation is the best example to illustrate the overall relationship of the subjects. This tiny island nation located in the aisle of the Malay Peninsula without any blessing of natural resources was ruled under the iron grip of Lee Kuan Yew from its independence in 1963 till 1990 and experienced unprecedented highest economic boom in the region. As the economy grows, it gradually embroiled into the third wave democratisation (Huntington, 1991). Although Singapore today's democracy status remains controversial among scholars, it is undeniable that with its current developed economy, many Singaporeans are now demanding full democracy and the political transition is still taking place. Thus, it accords to the argument that economic development that take place in democratisation tends to reinforce each other after the maturity stage.

### **Over 26 studies find that Democracy improves economic growth and development**

**Kurzman et al 11;** CHARLES KURZMAN is a professor of sociology at UNC Chapel; REGINA WERUM is a professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska and holds a combined Ph.D. in Sociology and American Studies; ROSS E. BUCKHART works in the department of Political Science at Boise State University and writes articles published in numerous books; June 2011; "Democracy's Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980"; ([http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman\\_Werum\\_Burkhart\\_SCID.pdf](http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Werum_Burkhart_SCID.pdf))

These findings illustrate the potential and the difficulties involved in using time-series data to solve methodological problems in the classic debate over democracy's effect on economic growth. This article identifies three areas for methodological improvement. First, we use a near-continuous measure of democracy, the Polity III scale, which allows for the conceptualization of semidemocracies and proves to be more sensitive to democracy's effect on growth than a categorical measure. Second, rather than using static indicators employed in cross-sectional studies, we employ pooled time-series data that account for the rise and fall of democracy during the period under study. However, this step imposes analytical constraints and may create misspecification problems because relatively few variables are available in annual time-series format. As a result of this limitation, the explanatory power of several of the models discussed in this article is less than it is sometimes observed in cross-sectional analyses of economic growth. Third, we distinguish between democracy's direct effect on growth and its indirect effects on growth via three mechanisms identified in the theoretical literature: economic (investment), political (state expenditure), and social

(social unrest). The direct-effects models using 30-year cross-sections find no long-term relationship between democracy and economic growth. As we scale down the time series into more finely grained units, taking account of year-to-year variations in democracy, significant effects emerge. Direct-effects MLE models using annual time-series data corrected for autocorrelation find a marginally statistically significant negative short-term relationship among the non-core countries—even this marginal finding, however, is not robust over fixed-effects and random-effects models corrected for autocorrelation, which are not shown here. (When core countries are included in the time series models along with the noncore, however, democracy has a significant negative direct effect on growth.) The marginal and non-robust significance of democracy's coefficients among non-core countries is theoretically significant, confirming econometric theories that deemphasize political factors in the economic development of poor countries. The indirect-effects models, by contrast, suggest that democracy may also have statistically significant and generally positive effects on economic growth, in both the full sample of market economies and in the non-core sample: 26 Studies in Comparative International Development / Spring 2002 Democracy has a marginally significant positive effect on investment, which in turn has a positive effect on economic growth, generating a positive but only marginally significant indirect effect via investment. This finding is not robust across fixed-effects and random-effects models. Democracy has a negative effect on government expenditure, which in turn has a negative effect on economic growth, combining to produce a small but robustly significant positive indirect effect of democracy on growth. Democracy has a robust non-linear, inverted-U effect on social unrest, which in turn has a negative effect on growth, producing an indirect effect of democracy on economic growth that is negative and significant at low levels of democracy (DEMAUT $\leq$ 5 in the non-core,  $\leq$ 2 in the full sample, on a scale of 0 to 20); positive and significant at high levels of democracy (DEMAUT $\geq$ 16 in the non-core,  $\geq$ 17 in the full sample); and close to zero and not significant in middle levels of democracy. Combining the statistically significant effects, we find opposite effects in the full sample and the non-core sample. In the full sample, the statistically significant effects combine to an overall effect that is negative at all levels of democracy. In the non-core sample, the statistically significant effects combine to an overall effect that is tiny but positive at all levels of democracy except the lowest (DEMAUT $\leq$ 5). In other words, democracy has more positive effects in the noncore than in market economies as a whole. This finding runs counter to “tradeoff” theories that call democracy a luxury that only wealthy countries can afford. These findings have interesting implications for the long debate on democracy's effect on economic growth. They show that democracy has its greatest effect in the short term, while economic growth is better understood in longer terms (as indicated by higher R<sup>2</sup> values). They suggest that the scale of democracy's short-term effects is relatively small: the net coefficient is on the order of 10<sup>-4</sup> (with a democracy scale that runs from 0 to 20), while mean logged growth is on the order of 10<sup>-2</sup>. Moreover, democracy has a variety of contradictory implications for economic growth that may contribute to the disparate

findings in the literature reviewed in Table 1. For example, the “win-win” perspective on democracy and growth is confirmed for middle and high levels of democracy in non-core countries (DEMAUT>5). A normative reading of this finding suggests that complete democratization has more favorable economic repercussions than partial democratization. Finally, where democracy has a negative overall effect on growth, the “trade-off” is greatest at the lowest levels of democracy. A normative interpretation might conclude that less and less growth is sacrificed as democratization proceeds. These complex findings do not settle the dispute over democracy’s effect on economic growth, though small “win-win” results predominate in non-core countries.

Democracy appears to have complex multiple effects on growth that will need to be further parsed as new variables become available in time-series format and new estimation procedures are developed for this work.

### **Autocracies hurt economy, military spending**

**Kurzman et al 11**; CHARLES KURZMAN is a professor of sociology at UNC Chapel; REGINA WERUM is a professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska and holds a combined Ph.D. in Sociology and American Studies; ROSS E. BUCKHART works in the department of Political Science at Boise State University and writes articles published in numerous books; June 2011; “Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980”;  
([http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman\\_Werum\\_Burkhart\\_SCID.pdf](http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Werum_Burkhart_SCID.pdf))

The “win-win” perspective, on the contrary, does not focus on social but on military spending. The economic literature is less critical of military spending than of redistributionist expenditures, arguing that military spending may have some positive side effects, such as research, employment, and infrastructure construction. On balance, however, the economic literature argues that the net effect of military spending on growth appears to be negative (Deger 1987; Gillis et al. 1992: 297). Autocracies, in this view, spend excessively on the military, raise taxes to pay for these expenditures, and thereby reduce economic growth; democracies, on the other hand, rely on lower tax rates because they spend less on the military, and thus stimulate economic growth, even accounting for the burden of redistributionist social spending (Olson 1991).<sup>2</sup>

### **Democracies allow outlets to express grievances meaning economic growth is affected positively**

**Kurzman et al 11**; CHARLES KURZMAN is a professor of sociology at UNC Chapel; REGINA WERUM is a professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska and holds a combined Ph.D. in Sociology and American Studies; ROSS E. BUCKHART works in the department of Political Science at Boise State University and writes articles published in numerous books; June 2011; “Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980”;

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([http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman\\_Werum\\_Burkhart\\_SCID.pdf](http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Werum_Burkhart_SCID.pdf)  
)

The “win-win” perspective, by contrast, argues that democracies are able to avoid unrest by providing formal channels for the expression of grievances, thus affecting economic growth positively. The literature on this position derives from two lineages: (1) the liberal tradition, which argues that democracy allows increased political participation and therefore channels grievances into non-confrontational forums (Hayek 1944), and (2) the recent Marxist literature on class compromise, which argues that democracy allows mutually beneficial deals to be struck between capital and labor (Przeworski 1985).



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## **Demo Bad: Econ**

## 1NC

### **Turn; democracy kills economic growth and trade**

**Garten 04;** JEFFERY E. GARTEN is the dean of the Yale School of Management and is the Chairman of a global consulting firm; "The Trouble With Freedom"; 5/9/04; (<http://www.newsweek.com/trouble-freedom-127945>)

In recent days, more than 170 million Indians have voted in a multistage national election that will conclude on May 10. On that day, Filipinos will cast final ballots for their president. In July Indonesians will do the same. Taiwan just re-elected its president. South Korea has given its leader's party a majority in Parliament, and Hong Kong citizens are protesting new restraints on their political freedom. The democratic ferment isn't confined to Asia. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has decided to make approval of the new EU Constitution subject to a popular referendum. Poland and other EU members may well follow suit. In Latin America, despite serious economic and political setbacks in Argentina and Venezuela, and notwithstanding widespread disillusionment with the failure of elected governments to deliver material benefits--the subject of a U.N. report released last week--democracy has clearly trumped military rule. South Africa last week celebrated 10 years of political freedom. While the global story of the 1990s was the opening of economies around the world, the bigger theme for this decade is the deepening and maturing of democratic movements. Both trends are cause for cheer, but the two may not reinforce one another, especially in the next several years. In fact, the flowering of democracy may slow economic globalization even as it makes it more inclusive and more equitable over time. The growth of democracy could, for example, slow the expansion of international trade. Reason: a democratic government cannot decree the dropping of barriers but must listen to the views of farmers, workers, manufacturers, nongovernmental organizations and others. In many countries, the voice of public opinion will play a larger role than ever before. At best, this is likely to delay international trade talks as governments attempt to reach delicate compromises among competing interests at home. At worst, it could lead to rising protectionism as anti-trade groups scream the loudest. Democracies also tend to favor easy money, even when it's not the technically correct prescription for sound economic policies; it's a sure way for politicians to curry favor with the masses. The danger is that when several countries do this, the world economy develops a bias toward inflation--which ultimately is destructive to long-term growth. It is therefore vital to establish fiercely independent central banks with governors strong enough to withstand political pressure. Right now, for example, the finance ministers from Germany and France are in a highly visible fight with Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, over his insistence that now is not the right time to lower interest rates in the eurozone. This kind of confrontation is sure to be played out in many countries over the next few years. Speaking of easy money, democracies like to open the spending spigot, even when they shouldn't. Case in point: Brazil's president, Luiz Inacio Lula da

Silva, is right now under intense public pressure to abandon his admirable fiscal conservatism in order to gun the economic engines. The temptation may be politically irresistible and even understandable, but international financial markets will not be pleased. **Even the most advanced democracies**, such as the United States, France and Germany, **have demonstrated an inability to build** the necessary **long-term safety nets to prosper in a** hypercompetitive **global economy**. Obviously, so too will less sophisticated democracies. Think about America's inability to rein in its enormous fiscal deficits, despite the certainty of massive upcoming expenses relating to Social Security and health care for its aging population. Or about the inability of major European nations to establish economically viable pension and unemployment compensation systems. The more voters are buffeted by the changing winds of an open world economy, the more they will resist change. While authoritarian governments may have done no better, there is still no mistaking that the short-termism of democracy is worrisome. I am not predicting that the spreading and deepening of democracy will throw a monkey wrench into the workings of the world economy. But there is a good chance that it will slow it down over the next decade or so. On balance, though, more people will be accorded the dignity of having a say in their future, so the costs of democracy in terms of foregone economic globalization will have been well worth the price. As Winston Churchill once said, "Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried."

### **Economic stagnation causes global WMD conflict**

**Hutchinson 14** (Martin, Business and Economics Editor at United Press International, MBA from Harvard Business School, former international merchant banker, 1-3-14, "The chilling echoes of 1914, a century on" Wall Street Journal) <http://online.wsj.com/articles/william-galston-secular-stagnation-may-be-for-real-1409095263>,

The years before 1914 saw the formation of trade blocs separated by high tariff barriers. Back then, the world was dominated by several roughly equivalent powers, albeit with different strengths and weaknesses. Today, the world is similarly multi-polar. The United States is in a position of clear leadership, but China is coming up fast. Europe is weaker than it was, but is still a force to be reckoned with. Japan, Russia, Brazil, India are also too powerful to ignore. A hundred years ago, big international infrastructure projects such as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, and before it the Suez Canal, were built to protect favored trading. Today's equivalent may be the bilateral mining partnerships forged between, for instance, China and mineral-rich African states. Today, the World Trade Organization offers some defence against tariffs. But protectionism could become entrenched if prolonged economic stagnation leads countries to pursue their own narrow interests. Germany, Austria, Russia and France lost between 20 and 35 percent of

## Consequentialism 100

national output between 1913 and 1918, according to Angus Maddison's data used in Stephen Broadberry's "The Economics of World War One: A Comparative Analysis". British GDP declined in 1914 and 1915, but grew 15 percent over the four years, as did the U.S. economy. The 37 million military and civilian casualties may tell a more accurate story but if history were to repeat itself, the global conflict could be both more universal and more destructive. **Nuclear weapons proliferate.** Warped diplomatic anger could lead to the deployment of **chemical and biological devices.** Electromagnetic pulses could wipe out our fragile electronic networks. Like the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that sparked World War One, the catalyst for cataclysm might be something quite surprising. A global run on bank and other investment assets or an outbreak of hyperinflation, maybe? These threats get more serious the more policymakers pump up equity, bond, property and banking bubbles. If global wealth evaporates, or is proven to be an illusion, today's largely cordial global entente could be **smashed with precipitous speed.**

## 2NC

**Our evidence cites how even the most advanced democracies in the world cannot sustain a prosperous long term economy. Even if democracy in its initial form brings short term boosts to its economy, in the long term that economy suffers and wither. That's our Garten 04.**

**Authoritarian rule allows economies to grow and prosper unlike democratic rule; China and the Philippines prove**

**Joe 6/15/15** SUM DEK JOE is a member of Malaysian Progressives in Australia (MPOZ) and currently studies Economics at the Australian National University (ANU); 6/15/15; "Democracy or economic development?"; (<http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/democracy-or-economic-development-sum-dek-joe>)

Democracy tends to undermine the expansion of an economy particularly in underdeveloped countries due to the inherent characteristics of democracy for accommodating the views of everyone, which in turn translates into populism. In the early stage of development, Bhagawati (1966, pp.203-24) argues that underdeveloped countries face a "cruel choice between rapid expansion and democratic processes". It is understood that everyone would vote in pursuit of self-interest to maximise utility without taking into account the maximum benefit of the overall population. According to Solow growth model (1994), high savings and investment are required to generate sufficient capital accumulation for long-run economic growth. However, the inherent behaviour of lower income groups would work against the objective as they have lower marginal propensity to save. Besides that, underdeveloped countries focuses more on labour-intensive production which results in higher opportunity for labour to form union. The formation of union in early stage of development is unhelpful to the economy as it fights for pay rise and labour's rights that eventually cause reduction in overall profit and investment. Haggard (1990) formulation explicitly argues that **authoritarianism could overcome these collective action dilemmas by restraining the self-interested behaviour of groups through sanction and command.** The dysfunctional consequence of early democracy in less developed countries is political instability and political institutions in developing countries are generally weak and fragile to begin with (Huntington, 2006). The enormous pressure on government rooted from the democratic mechanism eventually magnifies the drawback of democracy on economic development. Therefore, a strong and authoritarian rule is more preferred to ensure necessary economic coordination by the entire population without bounding to majority populist measures as occurred under a relatively weak democratic-elected government. Also, authoritarianism exerts the power and autonomy to political elites to extract and distributes resource to the economic agents more effectively. This argument is widespread with the evidence of the Asian miracle growth under their respective authoritarian regime. China, once

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labelled as the Asian sleeping giants with its majority rural populations and backward economy has experienced unprecedented economic growth with a one party rule under the Communist Party of China (CPC) since the economic reform launched by Deng XiaoPing in 1980s. Not only did China successfully reduce its poverty rate from 61.1 per cent in 1980 to 6 per cent in 2011, China has overtaken US as the largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity with its average income of \$970 skyrocketed to USD\$11850 in the same period. The massive growth in industrialisation and growth in China is attributed to its relatively small private ownership and well-managed state owned enterprise (SOE) that enables the state to improvise desired economic decision within an iron-grip rule (Rawski, 1999). On the contrary, Philippines, which once branded as the poster-boy for Asian democracy under the influence of America's rule, experienced poor performance in its early stage of development and eventually led to reverse transition to authoritarianism. Today, the Chinese has higher primary school enrolment rate (128 per cent) and lower poverty rate (6 per cent) as compared to the Filipino (106 per cent) and (19 per cent) respectively according to World Bank statistics. These examples are best described by Lee Kuan Yew (2000, pp.121) that "what most countries needed for development was the discipline, not democracy". It is also supported by Helliwell (1994)'s work that there is a significant negative partial effect of democracy on subsequent economic growth that would jeopardize economic development.

(Note: Jagdish Bhagawati is a professor of economics and law at Columbia University and is notable for his researches in international trade and for his advocacy of free trade. Lee Kuan Yew was the first Prime Minister of Singapore, governing for more than three decades from 1959 to 1990, including through Singapore's independence from Malaysia in 1965. John Helliwell is Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) and Professor Emeritus of Economics for the Vancouver School of Economics.)

### **Growth and democracy are fundamentally incompatible**

William **Ophuls**, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern, 1997, Requiem For Modern Politics, pp. 117-118

But money is the mother's milk of politics, and big enterprises have more of it than small ones. Hence the political power of successful corporations grew and grew. Naturally, this power was used to further entrench their economic position: why subject your enterprise to the vicissitudes of the market at all, when political influence and government programs will virtually guarantee profits year in and year out, almost without regard to competition and the business cycle? And the politicians were largely more than willing to cooperate. After all, the primary purpose of politics is to foster "prosperity" at all costs, since this is what "the people" want. Hence politicians have little choice but to make common cause with the corporate engines that generate

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it. The upshot is that politicians and corporate managers are partners, however uneasy, in a joint enterprise—so much so that the government now routinely bails out any major player in danger of sinking. Although big government has indeed tried to restrain the worst manifestations of corporate greed and to maintain minimal standards of fairness, as well as to make prosperity as general as possible, its good intentions have been subverted at every turn by its tacit partnership with big business. It is therefore hardly surprising that government measures ostensibly designed to benefit the common people would, like farm programs, turn into welfare for the rich—or, at the very least, for the professional and managerial classes. Little wonder, too, that regulators have become the creatures of the regulated, as several generations of political scientists and social critics have complained to no avail whatsoever. The line separating business and government has thus become increasingly hazy: more than a partnership, it is now a condominium. The global responsibilities assumed by the United States after World War II have made this condominium even more necessary and complete. Government is beholden to business not just for “prosperity” but for “national security,” because military might in our age depends critically on the ingenuity and productivity of one’s arsenal—on the “defense industry” or “military-industrial complex.” So it is an unequal alliance: big government cannot accomplish its aims without subsidizing big business, but subsidy does not mean control. On the contrary, even scholars basically friendly to the market paradigm of political economy, such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, see corporations as political rogues. The corporation, says Dahl, is a legal monstrosity born of an unwarranted extension of Lockean private property rights to corporate entities; this ‘extraordinary ideological sleight of hand’ gave corporations so many political, legal, economic, and social advantages that they could no longer be effectively controlled by government. In fact, quite the reverse: public policy in key areas—resource allocation and depletion, technological innovation, the location of enterprise, work organization, products and prices, and so on—is made by nonelected corporate executives, while elected officials and public servants merely react as best they can. Hence the large “private” corporations outflank and outmaneuver the government at every turn, forcing the latter to do their bidding. In effect, says Lindblom, the corporations have become the contemporary equivalent of an entrenched social class—like the landed gentry of old, but with vastly more power, particularly the amplified power of the media as an instrument of ideological control. Moreover, the ruling values of the corporation—hierarchy, status, power, control, and discipline—are intrinsically antidemocratic. In the end, concludes Lindblom, the large private corporation is at almost complete odds with democratic theory and practice.

**Investment, which is shown to be a huge economic predictor, suffers in democracies**

**Kurzman et al 11;** CHARLES KURZMAN is a professor of sociology at UNC Chapel; REGINA WERUM is a professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska and holds a combined Ph.D. in Sociology and American Studies; ROSS E. BUCKHART works in the department of Political Science at Boise State

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University and writes articles published in numerous books; June 2011; “Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980”; ([http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman\\_Werum\\_Burkhart\\_SCID.pdf](http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Werum_Burkhart_SCID.pdf))

Investment has long been seen as the crucial ingredient for economic development—at least since John Law’s advice to King Louis XIV of France in 1715 (Trintius 1950: 216). Following World War II, development economists began to view investment as a virtual panacea. Although this is no longer the case, “it is nonetheless clear that even mildly robust growth rates in incomes can be sustained over long periods only when societies are able to maintain investment at a sizable proportion of GDP” (Gillis et al. 1992: 269). Sensitivity analyses of economic growth models have identified investment as the single strongest predictor of economic growth (Levine and Renelt 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997). The “trade-off” perspective argues that investment suffers in democracies because people will not voluntarily curtail their consumption or increase their savings and investment. To do so would require a long-term vision and a willingness to sacrifice today in exchange for future benefits. Democracies, in this view, dare not impose unpopular measures to increase investment. Only an authoritarian regime will be able to do so: “The resources necessary for investment cannot be accumulated by democratic means” (Rao 1984-1985: 74-75). From this point of view, economic growth should suffer in democracies because investment suffers.

### **Democracies are less effective than autocracies when it comes to controlling social unrest**

**Kurzman et al 11;** CHARLES KURZMAN is a professor of sociology at UNC Chapel; REGINA WERUM is a professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska and holds a combined Ph.D. in Sociology and American Studies; ROSS E. BUCKHART works in the department of Political Science at Boise State University and writes articles published in numerous books; June 2011; “Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980”; ([http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman\\_Werum\\_Burkhart\\_SCID.pdf](http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Werum_Burkhart_SCID.pdf))

As for democracy’s effect on social unrest, there appear to be three prominent positions. The “trade-off” position holds that autocratic government facilitates growth through the forceful suppression of unrest. Hewlett’s (1980) study of Brazil is one of the most forthright statements of this argument. The title of Hewlett’s book, The Cruel Dilemmas of Development, reflects the proposition that economic progress requires the coercive subjugation of a large part of the population. Hewlett argues that Brazil’s military government in the 1960s was able to stabilize the economy and achieve considerable economic growth only because it prevented social unrest through autocratic repression. However distasteful one may consider such tactics, Hewlett concludes, the government achieved its developmental goals.



### **Democracies employ state expenditure which can lead to economic instability**

**Kurzman et al 11**; CHARLES KURZMAN is a professor of sociology at UNC Chapel; REGINA WERUM is a professor of sociology at the University of Nebraska and holds a combined Ph.D. in Sociology and American Studies; ROSS E. BUCKHART works in the department of Political Science at Boise State University and writes articles published in numerous books; June 2011; “Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980”; ([http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman\\_Werum\\_Burkhart\\_SCID.pdf](http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Werum_Burkhart_SCID.pdf))

A second widely discussed mechanism for democracy’s effect on economic growth is the role of state expenditure. As with under-investment, there is a near consensus among economists that overly high state spending imposes a heavy burden on economic growth. It reduces the national savings rate, diverts resources into interest payments, and if left unchecked may ultimately lead to debilitating debt crises (Gillis et al. 1992: 278, 297, 397). The “trade-off” perspective focuses on the need to limit state social spending to facilitate economic growth. Yet social programs may be popular, and recipient groups may be well organized to defend their benefits. Democracies, in this view, are vulnerable to pressure from such groups and find it difficult to bring social spending under control: “Since authoritarian political arrangements give political elites autonomy from distributionist pressures, they increase the government’s ability to extract resources, provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with efficient economic adjustment” (Haggard 1990: 262).

### **Democracy and Capitalism are incompatible; Greece proves**

**Phillips 7/5/15**; MATT PHILLIPS is a successful writer about finance and economics working at publications such as the Wall Street Journal; 7/5/15; “Europe doesn’t have a debt crisis—it has a democracy crisis”; (<http://qz.com/445694/europe-doesnt-have-a-debt-crisis-it-has-a-democracy-crisis/>)

Europe might be listening to the wrong Merkel. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is perhaps the most powerful figure among the constellation of European elites who now face an incredibly difficult series of decisions after Greece rejected the terms of yet another proposed bailout. But it’s not Angela Merkel, but Wolfgang Merkel, whose thinking really gets to the heart of what’s gone so terribly wrong with the European project. Wolfgang Merkel, a German academic who studies democracy, published a provocative essay last year titled “Is capitalism compatible with democracy?” In it, he argues, essentially, that the fragile post-World-War II peace between markets and democracy—both of which have grown rapidly—seems to to be fraying. In the aftermath of the global financial collapse of 2008, “the crisis of capitalism

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threatens to turn into a crisis of democracy.” That’s what’s happening to Greece. In a debt crisis that has already lasted a half decade, Greece has repeatedly ceded sovereignty in matters of economic-policy-making—very clearly territory of its own democratic institutions—to a group of institutions such as the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, which all have fairly tenuous links to democratic legitimacy. Tradeoff between membership in the European club and handing over some government functions to the European bureaucratic superstructure has always been part of the deal. But the difference is that for most of the early decades of its existence, the extension of European Union integration coincided with strong economic growth, allowing policymakers to pitch the European project as a win-win proposition. In Greece, the prescriptions of European policymakers have been a disaster. A quarter of the Greece economy has vaporized. Unemployment is 25%. **It’s the biggest economic disaster for an advanced economy since the Great Depression.** (Barring perhaps the collapse of the Soviet Union.) And all of that economic and social pain has done nothing to ease the country’s debt burden. It remains roughly 170% of GDP.

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## **Environment**

Consequentialism 108

**Demo Good: Evt**

**1NC**

**Democracy is best for the environment because the public can share their views in a political setting**

**Chen '13**

“Democracy and the Environment”, Vincent Chen, online @

The relationship between human institutions and the environment it inhabits has long interested social scientists. This paper asks the question of whether democratic governments bring about better environmental performance compared to their autocratic counterparts, and if so, what causal mechanisms might explain this relationship. Using a large-N empirical analysis, I observe a positive relationship between democracy and environmental performance when isolating the effects of other socio-economic measurements such as developmental level, population density, and industry structure. Furthermore, governance features associated with democracies are important conditional factors in realizing the environmental benefits brought about by democracy. In particular, democracy is most effective in addressing environmental issues with substantial human health implications because the environmental preferences of the public is more easily expressed in the political arena of a democratic society. The development of Taiwan’s environmental movement for the past three decades is a real world example that supports my empirical findings. The democratization of the island-nation has led to a more permissive environment for a vibrant and consistently evolving civil society. The focus of Taiwan’s environmental movement has transitioned from self-interested coalitions demanding damage compensation to nation-wide alliances aiming to prevent environmental degradation and promote institutional reform. The NEPA-inspired EIAA legislation in Taiwan successfully brought the public into agency decision-making, and contributed to the institutionalization of the environmental movement during Taiwan’s first party transition in the 2000s. This demonstrated the need of suitable institutional design in order for democracy to benefit the environment. The anti-Guoguang Petrochemical movement in 2011 also revealed conditional factors, such as the maturity of the civil society and fact-based decision making, that would help realize the causal link between democracy and environmental performance. Continuous institutional reform and investment in long-term environmental monitoring are crucial next steps for Taiwan to further bring the environmental benefits of its democratic regime to fruition.

**Environmental collapse risks extinction**

**Jackson 12** (Ross, PhD in operations research at Case Western, Masters in Industrial management at Purdue, Chairman of GAIA Trust, Ex-Independent IT consultant and software designer specializing in international finance. “Occupy World Street”

<http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YfpyNxdvu4IC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=occupy+wall+street+marxism+criticism&ots=VgS8nTrZ1B&sig=-ZkZnlymqND7x5Lb8UecwY1fcjM#v=onepage&q&f=false>

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A substantial majority of scientists agree that the world is currently undergoing the sixth known extinction of species, the most recent being when the dinosaurs were wiped out by a meteor crashing into the earth.<sup>1</sup> While the previous five extinctions were spurred by volcanic eruptions, meteor impacts, and other exogenous causes, the current one has been brought on by human actions. Species extinction is another example of ecosystem reaction to overload, and is potentially **fatal for humankind**, as we are dependent on other plant and animal species for our own survival. A number of biologists have predicted that up to one-fifth of all living species could disappear within 30 years, and that if present trends continue, one-half of all species of life on earth will be extinct in less than 100 years, including one-third of the mammal population as a result of habitat destruction, pollution, invasive species, and climate change. Daniel Simberloff, a University of Tennessee ecologist and prominent expert in biological diversity, says, "The speed at which species are being lost is much faster than any we've seen in the past— including those [extinctions] related to meteor collisions." One of the major direct causes is loss of habitat as humans take over more and more of the space previously occupied by other species as population grows. Hunting, logging, overfishing, and pollution have also caused significant losses. Many species of birds, frogs, and other animals sensitive to toxins have fallen to pollution. Other life-forms can be very sensitive to subtle changes caused by increasing CO<sub>2</sub> levels. For example, coral reefs are dying on account of a complex of factors, including small temperature and acidity changes in the oceans, while the polar bear's time is running out as the arctic ice melts. Many plants and insects are disappearing without us even noticing, as are many microorganisms in soils that are depleted by chemical agriculture. These extinctions are going to have serious consequences for humanity. It is impossible to predict specifically how this ongoing mass-extinction event will affect the human population other than to say that it will be severely negative. The problem is that natural systems are complex, deeply interconnected, and far beyond our capability to understand. **A species that disappears may have unpredictable effects on the whole food chain, all the way up to humans at the top.** Biodiversity is not just about pleasant experiences of humankind in nature, but is about resilience, robustness, and redundancy in the face of change—it is **nature's immune system.** When we weaken biodiversity, we increase the likelihood of some aspect of nature going off in an entirely unexpected direction that is potentially **fatal for humankind**, for example, mutations and cell crossovers leading to new kinds of dangerous bacteria and viruses, or perhaps fatal attacks on crops or domesticated animals that we are dependent upon for food.

## 2NC

### **Evidence shows that Democracies have much lower emission rates than other forms of governments**

#### **Policardo '11**

"Three Essays on Institutions, Environmental Quality, and Irreversibility of Pollution Accumulation Three Essays on Institutions, Environmental Quality, and Irreversibility of Pollution Accumulation", Laura Policardo, May, 2011, online @ <http://www.deps.unisi.it/sites/st02/files/allegatiparagrafo/13-12-2013/policardo.pdf>, University of Siena

Laura Policardo has a PhD in economics from the University of Siena, and graduated with an expertise in Development Economics, Computational Economics, and Collective Bargaining. She has previously published, "Democratization, Environmental and income inequality"

Does democracy really benefit environmental quality? Using a sample of 47 transition countries, I observe that during the period 1990-2002 the average concentration of PM10 recorded during spells of dictatorship is about 1.36 times bigger than the concentration recorded during democratic periods, despite the average level of GDP is 2.25 times bigger during democracy than during dictatorship spells. The average intensity of CO2 emissions produced per unit of GDP is 1.17 times larger in periods of dictatorship than in periods of democracy. Several countries show clearly a decrease in the intensity of emission per unit of GDP in proximity to the regime shift: for Colombia, South Africa, Spain and Bulgaria, the actual (dotted) and fitted (line) levels of intensity of emissions (expressed in tons of carbon per unit of GDP). The vertical line in each subfigure represents the date of the regime shift. All the four countries have experienced a transition to democracy after long periods of dictatorship. After the regime shift we observe a reverse pattern for emissions; while before democratisation the tendency is to increase the intensity of CO2 emissions in production, later we observe a decline, which is persistent through time.

Democracies delay environmental degradation in many different ways

#### **Li et al '06**

"Democracy and Environmental Degradation", Nov 13, 2006, Quan Li, Rafael Reuveny, online @ [http://people.tamu.edu/~quanli/papers/ISQ\\_2006\\_demenv.PDF](http://people.tamu.edu/~quanli/papers/ISQ_2006_demenv.PDF), cut July 8th, 2015

Quan Li is a professor at A&M University and has taught multiple graduate and undergraduate classes on the topic of regimes effects on the environment, Rafael Reuveny is a professor at the Indiana University Bloomington

The empirical results we report are consistent across the different types of environmental degradation. We find that a higher level of democracy leads to less CO2 emissions per capita, less NOx emissions per capita, less organic

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pollution in water, lower deforestation rates, and less land degradation. But such an effect appears discontinuous along the continuous scale of political regime types. We find that the difference between autocracy and nonautocracy significantly influences CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, NO<sub>x</sub> emissions, and organic pollution in water, while the difference between democracy and nondemocracy significantly affects land degradation. But the effect of democracy on the deforestation rate and the forested land area appears to be monotonic along the democracy scale. In sum, democracy reduces the extent of human activities that directly degrade the environment, and the nonmonotonic effects of democracy vary across the environmental indicators.

We also find that the effect of democracy on environmental degradation varies in size across degradation types. But in all cases, a rise in democracy produces a noticeable effect on environmental degradation. This also applies to CO<sub>2</sub> and organic water pollution when we take into account the long-run effect of democracy via the lagged-dependent variable. The sizes of effects are considerable for the rate of deforestation, the size of forested land, NO<sub>x</sub> emissions per capita, and land degradation. The immediate (annual) effects of a rise in democracy on organic pollution in water and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita appear to be small, but the cumulative effects of this rise in democracy over time are much larger. Yet, these two effects are still smaller than the effects of democracy on NO<sub>x</sub> emissions, rate of deforestation, forested land, and land degradation. Hence, democracy reduces some types of environmental degradation more than other types. it.



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## **Demo Bad: Evt**

## 1NC

**And past evidence surrounding democracies impact on the environment is misleading, prefer our evidence, democracies are bad for the environment**

**Scruggs '09**

“Democracy and Environmental Protection: An Empirical Analysis”, online @ <http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/mpsa09e.pdf>, Scruggs, Lyle, April 2009, cut July 7th 2015

Professor Scruggs received his BA from Wake Forest University in 1990 and his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1998. His specialties are comparative political economy, comparative welfare policy, comparative environmental politics and quantitative research methods. Professor Scruggs is a co-Director of the Comparative Entitlements Dataset Project (CWED), and the UConn Political Economy Workshop, an affiliate of the Center for Environmental Science and Engineering, a member of the Human Rights Institute's Economic and Social Rights Group.

As noted in the introduction, **an important limitation of existing empirical work on the effects of democracy on environmental quality is that it fails to address the question of whether democracies really are (or have been) any more effective at addressing environmental problems over time.** Existing evidence is based on empirical models estimating the level of pollution based on deviations from a conditional mean. Li and Reuveny (2006), for example, present estimated effects of democracy which suggested that the level of CO2 emissions per capita are noticeably lower in democracies. Yet mean **emissions per capita are in reality twice as high in democracies (7.5 versus 3.5 in 2000), and the difference has grown larger over time.** (They were 6.0 versus 4.8 in 1990.) Taking conditional effects the way that multiple regression does may lead scholars to overlook what is of interest to policy makers, e.g., **can we expect that having more democracies in the world will really lead to reduced pollution.** Many reported estimates turn out to be very sensitive to the precise specification of control variables, rendering them suspect, and practically useless. A good example of how the use of conditioning control variables can make a mockery of progress is official US climate change policy under the Bush administration. The stated policy was to reduce greenhouse gas emission intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of GDP) by 18% between 2002 and 2012. By that standard, the US has been quite successful over the years. Of course, **judging our emissions relative to the size of our economy is highly misleading. The temperature of the planet is not affected by the size of our economy, but by the size of our greenhouse gas emissions. Achieving lower GHG intensity only requires that economic growth rises faster than emissions rise.** Almost infinite emissions are acceptable under this standard as long as GDP reaches infinity. Even more shocking is that the stated US target for intensity reductions in the future is lower than historic trends. Furthermore, many of the predictions from existing results contain extrapolations from “thinly populated” areas of the parameter space. There are not many poor stable democracies or rich, stable autocracies, nor is there much historical depth in our time series of pollution around the world. **It is also undeniable that large increases in pollution have occurred within the last century, occurred among the now rich democracies as they were becoming rich (and often while they**

were democratic), and have occurred with technologies that were not available fifty or one hundred years ago. These facts make it more pressing to ask not whether democracies have higher or lower levels of pollution now (or in the recent past) or whether current democracies. Technically, one can make the same argument about our study since we are looking at emissions per person. However, unlike GDP, people do expect and advocate that human population stop growing in the near future. Virtually no policymakers suggest that we stop growing the economy. First, increase their emissions more slowly than non-democracies, but whether or not existing democracies are more likely to reduce emissions over time.

### **Environmental collapse risks extinction**

**Jackson 12** (Ross, PhD in operations research at Case Western, Masters in Industrial management at Purdue, Chairman of GAIA Trust, Ex-Independent IT consultant and software designer specializing in international finance. "Occupy World Street"

<http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YfpyNxdvu4IC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=occupy+wall+street+marxism+criticism&ots=VgS8nTrZ1B&sig=-ZkZnlymqND7x5Lb8UecwY1fcjM#v=onepage&q&f=false>

A substantial majority of scientists agree that the world is currently undergoing the sixth known extinction of species, the most recent being when the dinosaurs were wiped out by a meteor crashing into the earth. While the previous five extinctions were spurred by volcanic eruptions, meteor impacts, and other exogenous causes, the current one has been brought on by human actions. Species extinction is another example of ecosystem reaction to overload, and is potentially fatal for humankind, as we are dependent on other plant and animal species for our own survival. A number of biologists have predicted that up to one-fifth of all living species could disappear within 30 years, and that if present trends continue, one-half of all species of life on earth will be extinct in less than 100 years, including one-third of the mammal population as a result of habitat destruction, pollution, invasive species, and climate change. Daniel Simberloff, a University of Tennessee ecologist and prominent expert in biological diversity, says, "The speed at which species are being lost is much faster than any we've seen in the past— including those [extinctions] related to meteor collisions." One of the major direct causes is loss of habitat as humans take over more and more of the space previously occupied by other species as population grows. Hunting, logging, overfishing, and pollution have also caused significant losses. Many species of birds, frogs, and other animals sensitive to toxins have fallen to pollution. Other life-forms can be very sensitive to subtle changes caused by increasing CO<sub>2</sub> levels. For example, coral reefs are dying on account of a complex of factors, including small temperature and acidity changes in the oceans, while the polar bear's time is running out as the arctic ice melts. Many plants and insects are disappearing without us even noticing, as are many microorganisms in soils that are depleted by chemical agriculture. These extinctions are going to have serious consequences for humanity. It is impossible to predict specifically

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how this ongoing mass-extinction event will affect the human population other than to say that it will be severely negative. The problem is that natural systems are complex, deeply interconnected, and far beyond our capability to understand. **A species that disappears may have unpredictable effects on the whole food chain, all the way up to humans at the top.** Biodiversity is not just about pleasant experiences of humankind in nature, but is about resilience, robustness, and redundancy in the face of change—it is nature's immune system. When we weaken biodiversity, we increase the likelihood of some aspect of nature going off in an entirely unexpected direction that is potentially fatal for humankind, for example, mutations and cell crossovers leading to new kinds of dangerous bacteria and viruses, or perhaps fatal attacks on crops or domesticated animals that we are dependent upon for food.

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**Evidence backing the claims that democracies have a positive effect on the environment are weak and don't take into account many variables**

**Scruggs '09**

"Democracy and Environmental Protection: An Empirical Analysis", online @ <http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/mpsa09e.pdf>, Scruggs, Lyle, April 2009, cut July 7th 2015

Professor Scruggs received his BA from Wake Forest University in 1990 and his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1998. His specialties are comparative political economy, comparative welfare policy, comparative environmental politics and quantitative research methods. Professor Scruggs is a co-Director of the Comparative Entitlements Dataset Project (CWED), and the UConn Political Economy Workshop, an affiliate of the Center for Environmental Science and Engineering, a member of the Human Rights Institute's Economic and Social Rights Group.

The estimates in Table 4 suggest two things of note. First, **the evidence in support of a democracy effect is very weak. Controlling for income per capita reduces the estimated impact of democracy by one-third.** More importantly, **once we control for the influence of the collapse of the Communist economies, the estimated impact of democracy is reduced by another two-thirds.** Indeed, controlling for the collapse of communism explains considerably more variation in performance than the rest of this model. Moreover, only when we include this dummy variable can we trust the estimated parameter variances of all of the coefficients.

**And Reject negative evidence, research done supporting Democracies environmental positive impacts is misleading, prefer our evidence, we provide specific flawed studies, and why the studies are wrong**

**Scruggs '09**

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Science and Engineering, a member of the Human Rights Institute's Economic and Social Rights Group.

The literature on political determinants of environmental performance contains two shortcomings. First, since 1990, more than thirty studies that we located have used different environmental indicators to assess whether political factors contribute to better environmental performance. These indicators include: carbon monoxide (Neumayer, 2003); smoke (Torras and Boyce, 1998; Barret and Graddy, 2000; Binder and Neumayer, 2005); heavy particles (Torras and Boyce, 1998; Barret and Graddy, 2000; Binder and Neumayer, 2005; Esty and Porter, 2005); Chlorofluorocarbon (CFCs) (Congleton, 1992; Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Murdoch et al., 1997); sulfur dioxide (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Murdoch et al., 1997; Torras and Boyce, 1998; Barret and Graddy, 2000; Neumayer, 2003; Binder and Neumayer, 2005; Esty and Porter 2005); greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Midlarsky, 1998; Congleton, 1992; Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2003; Neumayer, 2003; Jorgenson, 2006; Li and Reuveny, 2006); biological and chemical oxygen concentration in water (Barret and Graddy, 2000; Li and Reuveny, 2006); fecal concentration in water (Torras and Boyce, 1998; Barret and Graddy, 2000); lead content of gasoline (Decon, 1999; Fredrikson et al., 2005); deforestation (Midlarsky, 1998; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2002; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Shandra, 2007); soil erosion (Midlarsky, 1998); and land protected from development (Midlarsky, 1998; Neumayer, 2002; Gates, et al., 2003). More recently, we have seen the development of multi-dimensional indicators of environmental protection. The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) relies on more than 20 "elements of environmental sustainability" (e.g., Esty and Porter, 2005; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Fredricksson and Wollscheid, 2007), while the Ecological Footprint Index (EF) (e.g., York et al., 2003) relies on bio-physical measures of sustainability (Wackernagel et al., 1999). A pervasive problem in comparing regime performance internationally is the "information gap" (Srebotnjak, 2007: 409). The amount of environmental data available is much greater in developed countries. Perhaps for this reason, most of the previous articles using larger samples rely on only one or two indicators of environmental performance. Two exceptions are Midlarsky (1998) and Li and Reuveny's (2006). Both of these studies use larger samples and a group of environmental indicators representing different aspects of environmental quality. Midlarsky (1998) finds no evidence of democracies improving soil erosion by chemicals, and freshwater availability, and even negative effects of democracies over CO<sub>2</sub>, deforestation, and soil erosion by water. The study only finds a positive effect of democracy on protected land. Li and Reuveny (2006), in turn, find a positive effect of democracies in reducing CO<sub>2</sub>, Nitrogen oxides and the level of organic pollution in water, and also a positive effect of democratic regimes in reducing rates of deforestation and reducing the share of degraded land. They also find a positive effect of democracy over the percentage of forested area.

## **Past evidence is greatly contradictory Scruggs '09**

“Democracy and Environmental Protection: An Empirical Analysis”, online @ <http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/mpsa09e.pdf>, Scruggs, Lyle, April 2009, cut July 7th 2015

Professor Scruggs received his BA from Wake Forest University in 1990 and his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1998. His specialties are comparative political economy, comparative welfare policy, comparative environmental politics and quantitative research methods. Professor Scruggs is a co-Director of the Comparative Entitlements Dataset Project (CWED), and the UConn Political Economy Workshop, an affiliate of the Center for Environmental Science and Engineering, a member of the Human Rights Institute’s Economic and Social Rights Group.

The results of this model suggest some apparent contradictions. First, long-standing democracies were not associated with improved environmental performance during the 1990s, but democratization is. All estimates suggest no positive effect of long-term democracy on the level of environmental performance in the 1990s. On the other hand, countries that liberalized politically in this period are expected to see considerable improvements. A country going from the least to the most democratic is expected to see improved performance on about 3 of the seven indicators, on average. Second, we see some contradictions with the economy as well. Countries with high income are consistently associated with better environmental performance, but countries with greater economic expansion tend to have worse environmental performance. A country with a higher income per capita of \$10,000 increases expected performance by one. On the other hand, a 4% annual expansion of the real economy between 1990 and 2000 reduces by approximately one the number of environmental indicators seeing improvement. Finally, the effect of economic liberalism and liberalization are consistent, but not definitive. Both greater market openness, and more liberalization are associated with better environmental performance. Both these estimates, however, are not statistically significant.

### **Defense: Demo Doesn't Solve**

**And democracy doesn't solve for the environment on a global scale, in many regions it's policies and environmental thinking are inapplicable**

**Beeson '10**

"The coming of environmental authoritarianism", Environmental Politics, online @  
[http://www.academia.edu/539179/The\\_coming\\_of\\_environmental\\_authoritarianism](http://www.academia.edu/539179/The_coming_of_environmental_authoritarianism), Mark Beeson, March 30th, 2010, cut July 7th 2015.

Mark Beeson is Professor of International Politics at the University of Western Australia. He is co-editor of Contemporary Politics. He is the author of more than 150 journal articles and book chapters, and the founding editor of Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific (Palgrave). Recent books include, Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond, (Routledge, 2009), Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform, (with Alex Bellamy, Routledge, 2008), Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development, (Palgrave, 2007), and edited collections Issues in 21st Century World Politics (with Nick Bisley, Palgrave), and The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, Routledge (with Richard Stubbs).

Although deliberative democracy has been described as 'the currently hegemonic approach to democracy within environmental thinking' (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 245), it has little obvious relevance to the situation in East Asia. While there is much that is admirable about the central precepts of deliberative democracy (see Bohman 1998), its underlying assumptions about Environmental Politics the circumstances in which political activity actually occur are strikingly at odds with the lived reality outside North America and Western Europe. This merits emphasis because for some writers rational, informed discourse is central to sustainable environmental management and the resolution of the competing interests that inevitably surround it (Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006). And yet, as the very limited number of studies that actually examine environmental politics under authoritarian rule demonstrate, the reality is very different and the prospects for the development of progressive politics are very limited (Doyle and Simpson 2006). Even if we assume that political circumstances do actually allow for a politically unconstrained and informed discussion of complex issues, as Arias-Maldonado (2007, p. 248) points out, 'the belief that citizens in a deliberative context will spontaneously acquire ecological enlightenment, and will push for greener decisions, relies too much on an optimistic, naive view of human nature' so frequently found in utopian political movements.



## **Studies show democracy doesn't work effectively on international environment issues**

### **Scruggs '09**

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Professor Scruggs received his BA from Wake Forest University in 1990 and his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1998. His specialties are comparative political economy, comparative welfare policy, comparative environmental politics and quantitative research methods. Professor Scruggs is a co-Director of the Comparative Entitlements Dataset Project (CWED), and the UConn Political Economy Workshop, an affiliate of the Center for Environmental Science and Engineering, a member of the Human Rights Institute's Economic and Social Rights Group.

As with more localized problems, the existing evidence for benign effects of democracy on international environmental problems is mixed. Midlarsky (1998) and Carlsson and Lundström (2003) found that democracies do not have a positive effect on emissions of carbon dioxide. However, Li and Reuveny (2006) do find such an effect. Regarding other greenhouse gasses, such as methane, Congleton (1992) showed that democracies have lower levels of methane emissions, but Jorgenson (2006) did not find any association.

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## **Terrorism**

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## **Demo Good: Terror**

## 1NC

### **Democracy prevents more people from joining terrorist groups**

**Hamid and Brooke 10** – 2-1-10 Shadi Hamid (A fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy. He served as director of research at the Brookings Doha Center until January 2014. Prior to joining Brookings, Hamid was director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.) and Steven Brooke (Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin). <https://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/graduate-program/student-profiles/profile.php?id=sb34222> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

Meanwhile, Michael Freeman, in a thought-provoking 2008 study that appeared in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, attempts to disaggregate the effects of democracy on the underlying factors he contends motivate al Qaeda and affiliated networks, one of them being frustration over illegitimate authoritarian regimes. The article is a step forward in attempting a more focused analysis of the relationship between democracy and global jihadism, but it contains a significant flaw in its rejection of the tyranny-terror link. Freeman argues that for jihadists, “their own governments are illegitimate because they are insufficiently religious; secular democratic governments would be even worse.” First of all, with mainstream Islamist parties likely to do well in free elections, democratically elected governments in the Middle East would almost certainly be more religiously-inclined rather than less. In any case, proponents of a link between autocracy and terror have never argued that progress on political reform will completely eradicate terrorism. Democracy, whether in its liberal or Islamist manifestations, will not convince al Qaeda to give up arms or channel its efforts into the political process. Those in the jihadist hardcore can only be defeated through military and law enforcement means. For them, it is too late. What democracy can do, though, is prevent those most susceptible to extremist recruitment — tens of millions of frustrated Arabs and Muslims throughout the Middle East — from turning to political violence, by giving them alternative outlets for peaceful political expression. This recognition is crucial to moving our counterterrorism strategy beyond crisis management and towards prevention. Polls have consistently shown widespread support for democratic ideals among Muslims worldwide. By choosing to focus specifically on the motivations of al Qaeda jihadists, Freeman neglects the Muslim population at large. It is true that among most doctrinaire Salafists, democracy is seen as an intrusion by man into God’s sacred domain. But neither these Salafists, nor al Qaeda, are representative of Islamists, let alone the broader Muslim community. Polls have consistently shown widespread support for democratic ideals among Muslims worldwide, while popular Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood have, in recent years, publicly committed to many of the foundational components of democratic life. The 2006 Pew global attitudes survey notes that: There is enduring belief in democracy among Muslim

publics, which contrasts sharply with the skepticism many Westerners express about whether democracy can take root in the Muslim world. Pluralities or majorities in every Muslim country surveyed say that democracy is not just for the West and can work in their countries. **This is America's audience**, not the jihadists who refuse to accept the legitimacy of anything other than the most restrictive interpretations of Sharia law.

### **WMD terror is likely and causes extinction**

Nathan **Myhrvold '13**, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our **military** and intelligence **capabilities** from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades

## 2NC

### **Non-democratic nations have twice as many terrorist incidents as democratic ones**

**Abrahms 08** – Max Abrahms, Postdoctoral fellow at Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, Associate at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "Why democracies make superior counterterrorists"

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636410701399424#.VZ1YiPIViko> Security Studies, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2007. Published online June 6 2007. Accessed 7-8-15 PL

The results did not, however, indicate a significant difference in the average number of terrorist incidents among the three regime types. 41 The average (SD) number of incidents was 55.7 (254.8), 30.8 (105.8), and 26.6 (116.8) for the Not Free, Partially Free, and Free countries, respectively (P = 0.11). There was also no significant difference in the average number of fatalities among the three regime types. The average (SD) number of fatalities was 161 (822), 53 (149), and 26 (134) for the Not Free, Partially Free, and Free countries, respectively (P = 0.068). According to Cohen, small, medium, and large effect sizes for a one-way ANOVA are  $f = 0.1$ ;  $f = 0.25$ ;  $f = 0.4$ , respectively. 42 The effect sizes for the average number of incidents ( $f = 0.08$ ) and fatalities (0.13) were thus small. Therefore, contrary to prevailing popular and scholarly opinion, when the universe of terrorist attacks was included in the analysis, I did not find sufficient evidence that Free countries were targeted more or suffered a greater number of fatalities than either Not Free or Partially Free countries. In fact, the data suggest the exact opposite trend: Not Free countries had on average more than twice as many incidents and six times as many fatalities as Free countries. The relative absence of fatalities in Free countries was most evident among the most fatality-ridden countries, as only two of the ten most dangerous countries were Free.

### **Democracies increase satisfaction and political participation of citizens, which discourages terror**

**Li 05** – Quan Li, Professor Li was the Director of the Program on International Conflict and Cooperation (PICC) in the department from 2008 to 2011 at Texas A&M. Before that he co-directed the Multidisciplinary Seminar Series on Globalization in the College of Liberal Arts and served on the inaugural Faculty Governing Council of the School of International Affairs at Pennsylvania State. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transitional Terrorist Incidents?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.491.3036&rep=rep1&type=pdf> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

In this article, I investigate the various mechanisms by which democracy affects transnational terrorism. New theoretical mechanisms are advanced that either complement or encompass existing arguments. First, democratic participation reduces transnational terrorism in ways in addition to those conceived in the literature. It increases satisfaction and political efficacy of

citizens, reduces their grievances, thwarts terrorist recruitment, and raises public tolerance of counterterrorist policies. Second, the institutional constraints over government play a fundamental role in shaping the positive relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. Institutional checks and balances create political deadlock, increase the frustration of marginal groups, impose on the democratic government the tough task of protecting the general citizenry against terrorist attacks, and weaken the government's ability to fight terrorism. The effect of civil liberties on terrorism popularized in the literature is more complex than commonly recognized. Finally, heterogeneous democratic systems have different implications for transnational terrorist activities. Effects of different aspects of democracy on transnational terrorism are assessed in a multivariate analysis for a sample of about 119 countries from 1975 to 1997. Results show that democratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a country. Government constraints, subsuming the effect of press freedom, increase the number of terrorist incidents in a country. The proportional representation system experiences fewer transnational terrorist incidents than either the majoritarian or the mixed system. Overall, democracy is demonstrated to encourage and reduce transnational terrorist incidents, albeit via different causal mechanisms. The findings suggest several important policy implications for the war on terrorism. Democracy does not have a singularly positive effect on terrorism as is often claimed and found. By improving citizen satisfaction, electoral participation, and political efficacy, democratic governments can reduce the number of terrorist incidents within their borders.

### **Democracy promotion is the most effective way to stop terrorism**

**Hamid and Brooke 10** – 2-1-10 Shadi Hamid (A fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy. He served as director of research at the Brookings Doha Center until January 2014. Prior to joining Brookings, Hamid was director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.) and Steven Brooke (Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin). <https://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/graduate-program/student-profiles/profile.php?id=sb34222> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

US democracy promotion in the Middle East has suffered a series of crippling defeats. Despite occasionally paying lip service to the idea, few politicians on either the left or right appear committed to supporting democratic reform as a central component of American policy in the region. Who can really blame them, given that democracy promotion has become toxic to a public with little patience left for various "missions" abroad? But as the Obama administration struggles to renew ties with the Muslim world, particularly in light of the June 2009 Cairo speech, it should resist the urge to abandon its predecessor's focus on promoting democracy in what remains the most

undemocratic region in the world. Promoting democratic reform, this time not just with rhetoric but with action, should be given higher priority in the current administration, even though early indications suggest the opposite may be happening. Despite all its bad press, democracy promotion remains, in the long run, the most effective way to undermine terrorism and political violence in the Middle East. This is not a very popular argument. Indeed, a key feature of the post-Bush debate over democratization is an insistence on separating support for democracy from any explicit national security rationale. This, however, would be a mistake with troubling consequences for American foreign policy. A post-Bush reassessment: The twilight of the Bush presidency and the start of Obama's ushered in an expansive discussion over the place of human rights and democracy in American foreign policy. An emerging consensus suggests that the U.S. approach must be fundamentally reassessed and "repositioned." This means, in part, a scaling down of scope and ambition and of avoiding the sweeping Wilsonian tones of recent years. That certainly sounds good. Anything, after all, would be better than the Bush administration's disconcerting mix of revolutionary pro-democracy rhetoric with time-honored realist policies of privileging "stable" pro-American dictators. This only managed to wring the worst out of both approaches. For its part, the Obama administration has made a strategic decision to shift the focus to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it sees, correctly, as a major source of Arab grievance. This, in turn, has led the administration to strengthen ties with autocratic regimes, such as Egypt and Jordan, which it sees as critical to the peace process. Some might see such developments as a welcome re-prioritization. However, by downgrading support of Middle East democracy to one among many policy priorities, we risk returning to a pre-9/11 status quo, where the promotion of democracy would neither be worn on our sleeve nor trump short-term hard interests. The "transformative" nature of any democracy promotion project would be replaced by a more sober, targeted focus on providing technical assistance to legislative and judicial branches and strengthening civil society organizations in the region. In many ways, this would be a welcome change from the ideological overload of the post-9/11 environment. But in other ways, it would not. Those who wish to avoid a piecemeal approach to reform and revive U.S. efforts to support democracy often come back to invocations of American exceptionalism and the argument that the United States, as the world's most powerful nation, has a responsibility to advance the very ideals which animated its founding. These arguments are attractive and admirable, but how durable can they be when translated into concrete policy initiatives? In the wake of a war ostensibly waged in the name of democracy, can a strategy resting on gauzy moral imperatives garner bipartisan support and therefore long-term policy stability? In an ideal world, there would not be a need to justify or rationalize supporting democracy abroad; the moral imperative would be enough. But in the world of politics and decision-making, it rarely is. Democracy and terrorism after 9/11: After the attacks of September 11th, a basic, intuitive proposition surfaced — that without basic democratic freedoms, citizens lack peaceful, constructive means to express their grievances and are thus more likely to resort to violence. Accordingly, 9/11 did not happen because the



terrorists hated our freedom, but, rather, because the Middle East's stifling political environment had bred frustration, anger, and, ultimately, violence. Many in the region saw us as complicit, in large part because we were actively supporting — to the tune of billions of dollars in economic and military aid — the region's most repressive regimes. The realization that our longstanding support of dictatorships had backfired, producing a Middle East rife with instability and political violence, was a sobering one, and grounded the policy debate in a way that has since been lost. The unfolding debate was interesting to watch, if only because it contradicted the popular perception that Republicans were uninterested in the "root causes" of terrorism. In fact, they were. And their somewhat novel ideas on how to address them would begin to figure prominently in the rhetoric and policies of the Bush administration.

### **Democracy promotion closes the US's credibility gap and reduces the appeal of violent extremism**

**Hamid and Brooke 10** – 2-1-10 Shadi Hamid (A fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy. He served as director of research at the Brookings Doha Center until January 2014. Prior to joining Brookings, Hamid was director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.) and Steven Brooke (Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin). <https://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/graduate-program/student-profiles/profile.php?id=sb34222> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

Dropping democracy down on the agenda would ignore the fact that our ideals coincide with those of the majority of Middle Easterners who are angry at us not for promoting democracy, but because we do not. When we say we want democracy but do very little about it, our credibility suffers and we are left open to charges of hypocrisy. This credibility gap should not be dismissed. Ultimately, the fight against terror is not simply about "connecting the dots," improving interagency coordination, and killing terrorists; it is just as important to have a broader vision that addresses the sources of political violence. Any long-term strategy must take into account an emerging body of evidence which shows that lack of democracy can be a key predictor of terrorism, and correlates with it more strongly than other commonly cited factors like poverty and unemployment. If understood and utilized correctly, democracy promotion can become a key component of a revitalized counterterrorism strategy that tackles the core problem of reducing the appeal of violent extremism in Muslim societies. It has the potential to succeed where the more traditional, hard power components of counterterrorism strategy have failed. The link between lack of democracy and terrorism also has consequences for American domestic politics. It provides a unifying theme for Democrats and Republicans alike, one that honors our ideals while helping keep us safe and secure. To the extent that politicians have had difficulty selling democracy promotion to the American

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people, the “tyranny-terror link” provides a promising narrative for U.S. policy in managing the immense challenges of today’s Middle East.

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## **Demo Bad: Terror**

## 1NC

### **Civil liberties, legal systems and freedom of the press that exist in democracies make it more difficult for democracies to constrain terrorists**

**Chenoweth 06** – Erica Chenoweth is a Research Fellow in the International Security Program (ISP) at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Colorado. November 2006. “The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence”. [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth\\_2006\\_06.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf) Accessed 7-8-15 PL

Those residing within democracies may be less likely to resort to terrorism, because democratic participation through elections improves the responsiveness of the government. The presence of civil liberties may also reduce terrorist violence due to a general sense of contentment among citizens.<sup>6</sup> In general, then, opportunities for political expression diminish the root causes of terrorism because citizens in democratic countries are more likely to be satisfied in the first place. The second argument expects the opposite that democracy will encourage terrorism. First, Ted Robert Gurr argues that terrorism in democracies occurs in the context of a wider violent conflict.<sup>7</sup> Ostensibly democratic transitions are particularly vulnerable events, as the fragile country attempts to overcome the potential backlash of internal and external actors opposing the transition or its implications. Indeed, some scholars have found that new democracies are particularly prone to internal conflict.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, most scholars in this camp have suggested that **democracy provides a permissive environment for terrorist growth** because of the necessity to adhere to certain civil liberties.<sup>9</sup> This perspective is in line with the political opportunity literature prevalent in sociology.<sup>10</sup> Democratic guarantees such as freedom of assembly reduce the costs of conducting terrorist activities. Moreover, legal systems are less able to quickly pursue and prosecute potential terrorists because of the constraints placed on them by civil rights. Political leaders in the United States, for instance, have expressed frustration about the constraining effects of civil liberties in conducting the war on terrorism: “[T]he spirited defense of civil liberties is a tactic that aids terrorists erodes our national unity diminishes our resolve [and] gives ammunition to America’s enemies.” Moreover, the specific civil liberty of press freedom may also increase terrorism through two distinct processes. First, and most bothersome to researchers, is the problem of reporting bias across different regime types. Autocracies have less incentive to report the existence of oppositional groups or oppositional violence, and therefore restrict the material printed by their media. In a democracy, however, the media has an incentive to report not only transparently, but also sensationally.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, the democratic government places fewer restrictions on media content.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, terrorist incidents are less likely to be reported in autocratic countries than in democracies. Reporting bias,

then, may lead researchers to the erroneous conclusion that civil liberties actually contribute to terrorist violence in the long run. Press freedom may have an additional positive causal effect on terrorism. Without media coverage, terrorist groups are essentially obsolete. Widespread fear and panic are fundamental elements of terrorist strategy. In fact, Margaret Thatcher called the press the "oxygen" for terrorists.<sup>14</sup> Because free press exists in most democracies, terrorists have increased incentives to grow in, move to, and conduct their violence within such countries. Sensational media coverage also serves the terrorists in their recruiting, teaching, and training techniques. The press, therefore, is inadvertently complicit in fulfilling terrorists' objectives.

### **WMD terror is likely and causes extinction**

Nathan **Myhrvold '13**, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation, July 2013, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades

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## **2NC**

### **Democracy causes more terror, terrorists perceive attempts to change their countries to democracies as foreign domination**

**Gause, 05** – F. Gregory Gause III, Professor of International Affairs and Head of the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2005-09-01/can-democracy-stop-terrorism>, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” September/October issue of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 7/7/15 PL

Given such incomplete information, only preliminary conclusions from the academic literature are possible. However, even these seem to discredit the supposedly close link between terrorism and authoritarianism that underlies the Bush administration's logic. In a widely cited study of terrorist events in the 1980s, the political scientists William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg demonstrate that most terrorist incidents occur in democracies and that generally both the victims and the perpetrators are citizens of democracies. Examining incidents from 1975 to 1997, Pennsylvania State University's Quan Li has found that although terrorist attacks are less frequent when democratic political participation is high, the kind of checks that liberal democracy typically places on executive power seems to encourage terrorist actions. In his recent book, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Robert Pape finds that the targets of suicide bombers are almost always democracies, but that the motivation of the groups behind those bombings is to fight against military occupation and for self-determination. Terrorists are not driven by a desire for democracy but by their opposition to what they see as foreign domination.

### **Democracies provide good environments for terrorists**

**Chenoweth 06** – Erica Chenoweth is a Research Fellow in the International Security Program (ISP) at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Colorado. November 2006. “The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence”. [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth\\_2006\\_06.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf) Accessed 7-8-15 PL

This project contributes to this debate by exploring the causal processes linking democracies to terrorist group activity. I argue that terrorist activities proliferate in democratic countries for two related reasons. First, democracies provide the permissive environment, or opportunity structure, wherein terrorist groups flourish. Second, the motivation for terrorist groups to escalate in democracies can be explained by intergroup dynamics, with terrorist groups of various ideologies competing with one another for limited agenda space. To test my hypotheses, I conduct a cross-national, longitudinal analysis of 119 countries for the period 1975-97, using agenda competition as

the key independent variable and the number of new terrorist groups as the dependent variable.

### **Democracies are most common sources and targets of terrorist activity**

**Chenoweth 11** – 9-29-11, Erica Chenoweth (A Research Fellow in the International Security Program (ISP) at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Colorado)  
<http://themonkeycage.org/2011/09/terrorism-in-democracies/> “Terrorism in Democracies” Accessed 7-8-15 PL

Yesterday the FBI arrested a Massachusetts man, who has been subsequently charged with a number of crimes related to terrorism. [1] This is the latest in a string of plots that the U.S. has successfully thwarted, yet it raises alarms for many Americans who have felt immune from Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism on U.S. soil. Erik Dahl, of the Naval Postgraduate School, has identified dozens of credible plots (as many as 45 by jihadist-inspired groups or individuals, according to John Avlon) since 9/11, all of which have been either botched by offenders or thwarted by the authorities. Americans should not be too surprised by this latest wave of domestic plots. After all, domestic attacks make up the vast majority of terrorist activity—jihadist or not. Neither should they be too surprised about homegrown AQ-inspired activity, which is simply part of the current wave of terrorist activity around the world, as Karen Rasler and William Thompson tell us. Some scholars have even argued that Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism is simply a “fad” that will eventually go the way of all other other fads. Nonetheless, this brings up three important questions: (1) Will the current wave of jihadist terrorism be replaced? (2) If so, by what kind of terrorism? (3) Where? My answers: (1) Probably. (2) Who knows? (3) Largely in democratic countries, most likely. One of the most important continuities during the past forty years is the fact that terrorism tends to occur much more in democratic countries than in nondemocratic ones—the subject of the book I am currently completing for Columbia University Press. Take a look at this chart, which shows the the number of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2008 according to the Global Terrorism Database, distributed by regime type. This chart shows that democracies remain the most frequent targets of terrorist attacks around the world [2]. Additional research confirms that despite all of the concern about terrorism in weak states, democracies also remain the most frequent sources of terrorist activity.



**Attempts to democratize Middle Eastern nations are irrational and produce more violence**

**Harsanyi 15** – David Harsanyi, 2-19-15, Harsanyi is a senior editor at The Federalist. Harsanyi is a nationally syndicated columnist and author of three books. His work has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Weekly Standard, National Review, Reason, New York Post, and numerous other publications. David has appeared on Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, NPR, ABC World News Tonight, NBC Nightly News and dozens of radio talk shows across the country, “Obama is wrong. Democracy is the Last Thing the Middle East Needs Right Now” <http://thefederalist.com/2015/02/19/obama-is-wrong-democracy-is-the-last-thing-the-middle-east-needs-right-now/> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

President Barack Obama gave a speech at White House’s “Countering Violent Extremism” summit yesterday crammed with predictable feel-good ideas for combating the imaginary root causes of Islamic extremism. And in the midst of arguing that radicalism was principally driven by anger over colonialism, illiteracy, and unemployment, Obama proposed an idea that we should have been abandoned trillions of dollars and many years ago: more democracy. Here’s how the president laid it out in the Los Angeles Times: “Efforts to counter violent extremism will only succeed if citizens can address legitimate grievances through the democratic process and express themselves through strong civil societies.” First of all, does Obama really believe that extremists have “legitimate grievances?” Are the disaffected youth recruited from the slums of Paris (but, curiously, not from the slums of Rio or Beijing) concerned that France doesn’t offer a strong enough civil society? Are the radicals beheading Christians in North Africa ticked off over a lack of women’s rights in Yemen? Are extremists who target Jews and free-speech enthusiasts in Copenhagen worried about the health of democratic institutions in Europe? **No, it’s the grievances themselves that are the root of the problem.** In most Arab countries, the authoritarian leadership is in some ways more liberal than the majority of the citizenry. As bad as these regimes are – and we coddle and enable many of them – **almost every time the democratic process has been tried** in the Islamic world, **it’s produced more extremism and factional violence.** So which nation does the president propose would benefit most from more democracy? Pakistan? Iraq? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? How would Christians and Alawites fare in a democratic Syria, do you think?

## **Demo Bad: Terror Defense**

### **Democracy has no effect on terrorists motives or ability to recruit**

**Gause, 05** – F. Gregory Gause III, Professor of International Affairs and Head of the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2005-09-01/can-democracy-stop-terrorism>, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" September/October issue of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 7/7/15 PL

But this begs a fundamental question: Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound premise? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Although what is known about terrorism is admittedly incomplete, the data available do not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization would end the current campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the Arab world would "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public and reducing the number of potential recruits for them.

### **Democracy has no effect on terrorism**

**Gause, 05** – F. Gregory Gause III, Professor of International Affairs and Head of the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2005-09-01/can-democracy-stop-terrorism>, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" September/October issue of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 7/7/15 PL

There is, in other words, no solid empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or any other regime type, and terrorism, in either a positive or a negative direction. In her highly praised post-September 11 study of religious militants, *Terror in the Name of God*, Jessica Stern argues that "democratization is not necessarily the best way to fight Islamic extremism," because the transition to democracy "has been found to be an especially vulnerable period for states across the board." Terrorism springs from sources other than the form of government of a state. There is no reason to believe that a more democratic Arab world will, simply by virtue of being more democratic, generate fewer terrorists.

## **Transition/Backsliding**

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## **Transition Wars Yes/No**

## Yes Transition Wars 1NC

**Democratization leads to war, countries undergoing democratization are more likely to indulge in war.**

**Mansfield and Snyder, 95** Edward D. Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and author of *Power, Trade, and War*. Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, is the author of *Myths of Empire*. A longer version of this article will appear in the Summer 1995 issue of *International Security*. Edward D. Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and author of *Power, Trade, and War*. Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, is the author of *Myths of Empire*. A longer version of this article will appear in the Summer 1995 issue of *International Security*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1995-05-01/democratization-and-war>

It is probably true that a world in which more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. But **countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition,** where **mass politics mixes** with authoritarian elite politics **in a volatile way. Statistical evidence** covering the past two centuries **shows** that **in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.** In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest **leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy--like contemporary Russia--are about twice as likely to fight wars** in the decade **after democratization** as are states that remain autocracies. This historical pattern of democratization, belligerent nationalism, and war is already emerging in some of today's new or partial democracies, especially some formerly communist states. Two pairs of states--**Serbia** and **Croatia,** and **Armenia and Azerbaijan--have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of electoral democracy.** The electorate of Russia's partial democracy cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Even mainstream Russian politicians have adopted an imperial tone in their dealings with neighboring former Soviet republics, and military force has been used ruthlessly in Chechnya.

**Because we view democratization as a gradual process, rather than a sudden change,** we test whether a **transition toward democracy occurring over one, five, and ten years is associated with** the subsequent **onset of war.** To assess the strength of the relationship between democratization and war, we construct a series of contingency tables. (Tables omitted) Based on those tables, we compare the probability that a **democratizing state** subsequently **goes to war with the probabilities of war for states in transition toward autocracy** and for states undergoing no regime change. The results of all of these tests show that **democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no change in regime.** This relationship is weakest one year into democratization and strongest at ten years. **During any given ten-year period, a state experiencing no regime change had about one chance in six of fighting a war** in the following decade. In the decade **following democratization, a state's chance of fighting a war was about one in four.** When we analyze the components of our measure of democratization

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separately, the results are similar. On average, an increase in the openness of the selection process for the chief executive doubled the likelihood of war. Increasing the competitiveness of political participation or increasing the constraints on a country's chief executive (both aspects of democratization) also made war more likely. On average, these changes increased the likelihood of war by about 60 percent and 35 percent respectively. The statistical results are even more dramatic when we analyze cases in which the process of democratization culminated in very high levels of mass participation in politics. States changing from a mixed regime to democracy were on average about 50 percent more likely to become engaged in war (and about two-thirds more likely to go to war with another nation-state) than states that remained mixed regimes.

### Yes Transition Wars 2NC

Democratization heightens the risk of wars.

**Snyder, 00** Jack Snyder (Ph.D., Columbia, 1981) is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia. His books include *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, co-authored with Edward D. Mansfield; *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*; *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*; *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*; and *Religion and International Relations Theory*, editor. His articles on such topics as crisis diplomacy ("The Cost of Empty Threats; A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review*, August 2011, co-authored <https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/snyder-voting.html>. October 13, 2000. "From Voting to Violence

Though surprising to liberal optimists, these developments of the 1990s actually echoed long-standing patterns in the history of nationalism, which I explore in subsequent chapters. Far from being an outmoded throwback, nationalism is largely a reaction to the social changes of the modern era. Western Europe went through these changes between the French Revolution and the Second World War, an age that saw the rise of modern nationalism and of popular warfare. During that period, democratization, economic development, and a revolution in the means of communication fueled nationalism, which often took a militant form. States being dragged by social change into a transition to democracy have been more likely to participate in wars and more likely to start them than have states whose regimes did not change. The end of the cold war increased the prevalence of nationalism by unleashing this dangerous transition toward democratic, market societies in the post-Communist states.

Though democratization heightens a state's risk of war, historical evidence shows that three out of four democratizing states nonetheless avoided war in the decade after their democratization. Moreover, once liberal democracy became entrenched, no mature democracies have ever fought wars against each other. In those countries where transitions to democracy were fully consolidated during the 1990s, the rights of ethnic minorities tended to improve, and ethnic conflicts were rare

### **Transition wars**

Jack **Snyder** (Ph.D., Columbia, 1981) is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia. His books include *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, co-authored with Edward D. Mansfield; *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*; *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International*

Ambition; The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914; and Religion and International Relations Theory, editor. His articles on such topics as crisis diplomacy ("The Cost of Empty Threats; A Penny, Not a Pound," American Political Science Review, August 2011, co-authored <https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/snyder-voting.html>. October 13, 2000. "From Voting to Violence"

The centerpiece of American foreign policy in the 1990s was the claim that **promoting the spread of democracy would also promote peace**. Noting that no two democracies have ever fought a war against each other, President Bill Clinton argued that support for democratization would be an antidote to international war and civil strife. Yet **paradoxically, the 1990s turned out to be a decade of both democratization and chronic nationalist conflict**.

**While the world would undoubtedly be more peaceful if all states became mature democracies, Clinton's conventional wisdom failed to anticipate the dangers of getting from here to there. Rocky transitions to democracy often give rise to warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflicts. Since the French Revolution, the earliest phases of democratization have triggered some of the world's bloodiest nationalist struggles.**

### **Democratization fuels nationalism which leads to civil conflict.**

**Mansfield and Snyder, 95** Edward D. Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and author of Power, Trade, and War. Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, is the author of Myths of Empire. A longer version of this article will appear in the Summer 1995 issue of International Security Edward D. Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and author of Power, Trade, and War. Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, is the author of Myths of Empire. A longer version of this article will appear in the Summer 1995 issue of International Security. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1995-05-01/democratization-and-war>

This concoction of **nationalism and incipient democratization has been an intoxicating brew, leading in case after case to ill-conceived wars of expansion. The earliest instance remains one of the most dramatic.** In the French Revolution, the radical Brissotin parliamentary faction polarized politics by harping on the king's slow response to the threat of war with other dynastic states. **In the ensuing wars of the French Revolution, citizens flocked to join the revolutionary armies to defend popular self-rule** and the French nation. Even after the revolution turned profoundly antidemocratic. **Napoleon was able to harness this popular nationalism to the task of conquering Europe, substituting the popularity of empire for the substance of democratic rule.** After this experience, **Europe's ruling elites decided to band together** in 1815 in the Concert of Europe to contain **the twin evils of nationalism and democratization.** In this scheme, Europe's crowned heads tried to unite in



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squelching demands for constitutions, electoral and social democracy, and national self-determination. For a time nationalism and democratization were both held back, and Europe enjoyed a period of relative peace. But in the long run, the strategy failed in the face of the economic changes strengthening popular forces in Western and Central Europe. **British and French politicians soon saw that they would have to rule by co-opting nationalist and democratic demands, rather than suppressing them.** Once the specter of revolution returned to Europe in 1848, this reversal of political tactics was complete, **and it led quickly to the Crimean War.** British Foreign Secretary Palmerston and French Emperor Napoleon III both tried to manage the clamor for a broader political arena by giving democrats what they wanted in foreign affairs—a "liberal" war to free imprisoned nations from autocratic rule and, incidentally, to expand commerce

## No Transition Wars

### **Democratization is a smooth transition .**

**Snyder, 00** Jack Snyder (Ph.D., Columbia, 1981) is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia. His books include *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, co-authored with Edward D. Mansfield; *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*; *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*; *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*; and *Religion and International Relations Theory*, editor. His articles on such topics as crisis diplomacy ("The Cost of Empty Threats; A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review*, August 2011, co-authored <https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/snyder-voting.html>. October 13, 2000. "From Voting to Violence"

Spreading the benefits of democracy worldwide is a worthy long-run goal. However, strategies for accomplishing this must be guided by a realistic understanding of the politics of the transition. Naively pressuring ethnically divided authoritarian states to hold instant elections can lead to disastrous results. For example, international financial donors forced free and fair elections on the leaders of the small central African country of Burundi in 1993, and within a year some 50,000 Hutu and Tutsi were killed in ethnic strife there. And yet many other democratic transitions succeed without triggering nationalist violence. Understanding the conditions that permit such successful transitions should be the first step toward designing policies to pave the way toward democracy. To that end, this book explains why democratization often causes nationalist conflict, and why it sometimes does not. Drawing on that analysis, I prescribe ways to make democratic transitions less dangerous.

### **Transition wars wrong: [5 reasons]**

Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Why the United States Could Spread Democracy," International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, March 1998, [www.ciaonet.org/wps/lys02/#note26](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/lys02/#note26)

Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. Taken to extremes, the Mansfield/Snyder argument would amount to a case for opposing all political change on the grounds that it might cause instability. Promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy. First, there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. Other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of Mansfield and Snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes. <sup>115</sup> In particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism

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and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars—the same causal mechanisms that Mansfield and Snyder claim are at work in democratizing states. Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization

itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies. 116 In addition, very few of the most recent additions to the ranks of democracies have engaged in wars.

In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia. 117 Russia has been involved in a number of small wars on or near its borders, but so far it has undergone a dramatic transition toward democracy without becoming very warlike. 118 There is little evidence of international war in Latin America, which also has witnessed a large-scale transition to democracy in recent years. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. The new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all. All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were

European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest. These factors will not lead today's new democracies into war.

Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies. Second, it is possible to control any risks

of war posed by democratization. Mansfield and Snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. Old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail. 119 New democracies also need external assistance to build up the journalistic infrastructure that will support a "marketplace of ideas" that can prevent manipulation of public opinion and

nationalistic mythmaking. 120 Finally, an international environment conducive to free trade can help to move new democracies in a benign direction.

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## **Backsliding Bad**

## **Backsliding Probable**

### **Weak democracies backslide into soft authoritarianism – Thailand proves**

**Kurlantzick 11** – Joshua Kurlantzick, Kurlantzick is a senior fellow for Southeast Asia Council on Foreign Relations, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Thailand: A democratic Failure and Its Lessons for the Middle East” <http://www.cfr.org/thailand/thailand-democratic-failure-its-lessons-middle-east/p24485> March 2011, Accessed 7-8-15 PL

Yet as the experience of many developing nations in East Asia shows, these initial, exuberant glimpses of democratic reform can prove a mirage, and toppling a dictator hardly guarantees a smooth path to consolidated democracy. In the 1980s and early 1990s, nations from Indonesia to the Philippines to Mongolia embarked on their own democratic transitions, often after large-scale street demonstrations similar to the Middle East’s “Days of Rage.” Among newly democratizing nations, Thailand, where hundreds of thousands of Thais came out into the streets of Bangkok in 1992 to bring down a military government, seemed perhaps the best prospect for stable democracy. Thailand boasted a large, educated middle class, one of the best-performing economies in the world, and a relatively robust civil society. By the late 1990s, Thailand had held several free elections and passed a reformist constitution that enshrined greater protections for civil liberties and created a wealth of new institutions designed to root out graft and ensure civil rights. In its 1999 report on freedom in the world, monitoring organization Freedom House ranked Thailand a “free” nation. **Today, however, Thailand looks less like a success story and more like an example of how democracy can fail.** Since a 2006 military coup, Thailand has reverted to a kind of soft authoritarianism: the military plays an enormous role in determining politics; the Thai middle class has become increasingly antidemocratic; and security forces have used threats, online filtering, arrests, and killings to intimidate opponents of a government sanctioned by the armed forces and Thailand’s monarchy. Freedom House recently ranked Thailand as only “partly free,” and the country has sunk near the bottom of all developing nations in rankings of press freedom. Thailand’s failures provide cautionary tales for reformers in the Arab world.

## **Weak Democracies Bad: Civil War**

**Weak or transitioning democracies, also called “anocracies” often have civil war**

**Lacina 04** – Bethany Lacina, (Bethany is an assistant professor at the University of Rochester Department of Political Science, research is on civil and ethnic conflict, especially separatist war and sons of the soil violence.) “From Side Show to Centre Stage: Civil Conflict after the Cold War” Security Dialogue Volume 34 No. 2, [http://www.bethanylacina.com/Lacina\\_sideshow.pdf](http://www.bethanylacina.com/Lacina_sideshow.pdf) June 2004, Accessed 7-8-15 PL

During the 1990s, the world both celebrated a series of democratic transitions in post-communist and developing nations, and worried that new, weak democracies would prove more likely to fall into conflict under the pressures of ethnic rivalries, demagogue politics, and the hardships of simultaneous political and economic transitions. Models of the relationship between democracy and civil violence have had, however, neither consistent nor readily interpretable results. Findings have differed widely, but there is a modest pool of evidence for an inverted U-curve relationship, in which consolidated autocracies and consolidated democracies are least prone to war (Hegre et al., 2001). Yet, it is unclear what it really means to suggest that states between autocracy and democracy are most at risk for civil war, because it is difficult to differentiate between nations that truly mix democratic and autocratic features in a single political system (a condition sometimes called ‘anocracy’), those that are passing through eras of political instability and transformation, and those that are simply weak states where would-be authoritarians cannot quite destroy the opposition. Thus, when researchers find disproportionate numbers of civil wars in anocracies, they are looking at some nations in which the government is democratizing or lies along a continuum of regime characteristics somewhere between democracy and autocracy, but also at cases in which the signal characteristic is tenuous or absent regime control. Civil war may have less to do with type of regime arrangements than with stable regime arrangements.

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**War**

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## **Demo Good: War**



## 1NC

### **Strong democracy maintains global peace – the best research proves**

**Cortright 13**, David Cortright is the director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Fourth Freedom Forum, and author of 17 books, Kristen Wall is a Researcher and Analyst at the Kroc Institute, Conor Seyle is Associate Director of One Earth Future, Governance, Democracy, and Peace How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence the Prospects of War and Peace, <http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/files//documents/publications/Cortright-Seyle-Wall-Paper.pdf>

Drawing from the **empirical literature**, this paper identifies two **underlying pathways** through which state **governance** systems help to **build peace**. These are: **State capacity**. If states lack the **ability to execute** their **policy goals or to maintain security** and public order **in the face of potentially violent groups**, **armed conflict is more likely**. **State capacity refers to two significant aspects: security capacity and social capacity**. **Security capacity includes the ability to control territory and resist armed incursion from other states and nonstate actors**. **Social capacity includes the ability to provide social services and public goods**. **Institutional quality**. **Research suggests that not all governance systems are equally effective or capable of supporting peace**. **Governance systems are seen as more credible and legitimate**, and are better at **supporting peace**, when they are **characterized by inclusiveness, representativeness, transparency, and accountability**. In particular, systems allowing citizens to voice concerns, participate politically, and hold elected leaders accountable are more stable and better able to avoid armed conflict. **Both dimensions—state capacity and quality—are crucial to the prevention of armed conflict** and are the focus of part one of this paper. Part two of the paper focuses on **democracy as the most common way of structuring state government to allow for inclusive systems while maintaining state capacity**. The two parts summarize **important research findings** on the **features of governance that are most strongly associated with prospects for peace**. **Our analysis, based on an extensive review of empirical literature**, seeks to identify the **specific dimensions of governance** that are **most strongly associated with peace**. **We show evidence of a direct link between peace and a state's capacity to both exert control over its territory and provide a full range of social services through effective governance institutions**. We apply a governance framework to examine three major factors associated with the outbreak of war—border disputes, ethnic conflict, and dependence on commodity exports—and emphasize the importance of inclusive and representative governance structures for the prevention of armed conflict.

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### **Democratic countries are less violent**

**Rummel '91** (Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University, BA and MA from the University of Hawaii, frequently nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, "The Democratic Peace: A New Idea?", 1991 <https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/POLSYS.ART.HTM#1> )

The organizers of this conference asked me write a taxonomic paper on the question: "Can the relative bellicosity of states be measured and predicted as a function of their internal political system?" The answer of most current empirical research is decidedly yes. Indeed, the empirical relationship is even more profound and comprehensive than the question implies. In theory and fact, the more democratic the political systems of two states, the less violence between them; and if they are both democratic violence is precluded altogether. That is, democratic states do not make war on each other. Moreover, the more democratic a political system, the less foreign and domestic collective violence; the more totalitarian, the more likely such violence. Perhaps the most surprising finding is that the less democratic a government, the more likely it will kill its own citizens in cold blood, independent of any foreign or domestic war. Now, war is not the most deadly form of violence. Indeed, while 36 million people have been killed in battle in all foreign and domestic wars in our century, at least 119 million more have been killed by government genocide, massacres, and other mass killing. And about 115 million of these were killed by totalitarian governments (as many as 95 million by communist ones). There is no case of democracies killing en masse their own citizens. The inverse relationship between democracy and foreign violence, collective domestic violence, or government genocide is not simply a correlation, but a cause and effect. In a nutshell, **democratic freedom promotes nonviolence.** These results are worthy of the greatest attention and analysis, for if true, which I am now convinced they are, then peace research has in fact defined a policy for minimizing collective violence and eliminating war: enhance and foster democratic institutions--civil liberties and political rights--here and abroad.

### **A positive relationship exists between democracy and peace**

**Tomz & Weeks '11** (Ph.D. from Harvard University, Professor of political science at Stanford University; Ph.D. from Stanford University, Professor of political science at University of Wisconsin Madison "The Democratic Peace: An Experimental Approach, January 2011 <https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/methods/papers/tomz.pdf>)

Few findings from the political science literature have received as much attention as the "democratic peace," the discovery that democracies almost never fight against other democracies. To some, the absence of military conflict among democracies is so consistent that it approaches the status of an "empirical law" (Levy 1988). Nonetheless, scholars continue to debate two fundamental aspects of the democratic peace. First, skeptics argue that the

apparent correlation between democracy and peace is spurious. They maintain that peace among democracies is not a consequence of democracy itself, but is instead a product of other factors that happen to coincide with democracy, such as military alliances (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997; Gowa 1999), economic interdependence (Gartzke 2007), American hegemony (Rosato 2003), or the absence of territorial disputes (Gibler 2007). The inter-democratic peace may, therefore, be a happy historical accident, rather than the result of a causal relationship between political institutions and international relations. Second, even among those who believe that democracy causes peace, disagreement remains over the mechanisms driving this relationship. For example, some attribute the democratic peace to institutional features of democracy, including elections through which voters can punish leaders for taking their country to war, or checks and balances that slow the pace of mobilization, thereby affording parties time to negotiate. Others emphasize democratic norms, such as the tendency to compromise with political opponents (Russett 1993), or the willingness of soldiers to fight harder because they view their democratically elected leaders as legitimate (Reiter and Stam 2002). But despite volumes of research about the democratic peace, little consensus has emerged about which causal mechanisms are most important (Lektzian and Souva 2009). Three obstacles have prevented previous researchers from resolving these controversies satisfactorily. The first obstacle, endogeneity, has vexed both proponents and opponents of the democratic peace. Although proponents contend that democracy causes peace, the relationship may (also) run in reverse: peace may contribute to the creation and maintenance of democratic regimes. And although critics attribute peace to shared interests, the alignment of economic and political interests among democracies is itself endogenous, and could well be the result of democracy. These and other problems of endogeneity have made it difficult to separate cause from effect, and therefore to answer fundamental questions about the democratic peace.

### **Democracies rarely engage in violence**

**Rosato '03** ( Ph.D. in political science from The University of Chicago, Professor in political science at The University of Notre Dame, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory", November 2003, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025/> )

According to the institutional logic, democratic institutions and processes make leaders accountable to a wide range of social groups that may, in a variety of circumstances, oppose war. Accountability derives from the fact that political elites want to remain in office, that there are opposition parties ready to capitalize on unpopular policies, and that there are regular opportunities for democratic publics to remove elites who have not acted in their best interests. Moreover, several features of democracies, such as freedom of speech and open political processes, make it fairly easy for voters to rate a government's performance. In short, monitoring and sanctioning democratic leaders is a relatively straightforward matter (e.g., Lake 1992, 25-26; Owen 1997, 41-43; Russett 1993, 38-40). Because they are conscious of their accountability, democratic leaders will only engage in large-scale

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violence if there is broad popular support for their actions. This support is essential both because they may be removed from office for engaging in an unpopular war and because society as a whole, or subsets of it, can be expected to oppose costly or losing wars. There are several social groups that may need to be mobilized to support a war including the general public, those groups that benefit from an open international economy, opposition political parties, and liberal opinion leaders. The idea that publics generally oppose wars because of the costs they impose can be traced back to Kant's Perpetual Peace and continues to inform democratic peace theorists today (Doyle 1997, 24-25; Russett 1993, 38- 39). Another established intellectual tradition argues that economic interdependence creates interest groups that are opposed to war because it imposes costs by disrupting international trade and investment (Doyle 1997, 26-27). Still other scholars have argued that opposition parties can choose to support a government if it is carrying out a popular policy or to oppose it for initiating domestically unpopular policies (Schultz 1998, 831-32). Finally, Owen has focused on the role of liberal opinion leaders in foreign policy decisions. These elites oppose violence against states they consider to be liberal and can expect the general public to share their views in times of crisis (Owen 1997, 19, 37-39, 45-47; see also Mintz and Geva 1993). In short, domestic groups may oppose war because it is costly, because they can gain politically from doing so, or simply because they deem it morally unacceptable. Five causal mechanisms, and therefore five variants of the institutional logic, flow from elite accountability and the need to mobilize social groups for war. Each outlines a different path to peace between democracies. Two of them claim that democracies will often be unwilling to resort to force in an international crisis.

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## **Demo Bad: War**

## 1NC

### **Autocratic peace is true, takes out DPT**

**Gartzke and Weisiger 12**; ERIK GARTZKE is the associate director for the department of Political Science for UC San Diego and frequently writes about war and peace; ALEX WEISIGER is the associate professor for international relations for the University of Pennsylvania and wrote several articles and a book about war and peace; “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace”; 1/15/12; ([http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\\_weisiger\\_isq\\_2013.pdf](http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke_weisiger_isq_2013.pdf))

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether democratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several studies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recognize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reciprocal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990). 6 However, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggressively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic – autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evaluate several data sets, finding that **autocracies are less war prone than democracy** – autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized economies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that **there is no empirically verifiable democratic peace.** Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that similarity of both political and economic institutions encourages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in contrast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support

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for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for democratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or consequences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical elegance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical arguments that spring from regime similarity in general.



## 2NC

### **Democracies are often quick to turn to war**

**Kurbjuweit '10** (Writer for Spiegel Online International,

Author; "Afghanistan and the West: The Difficult Relationship between Democracy and War", July 7, 2010

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/afghanistan-and-the-west-the-difficult-relationship-between-democracy-and-war-a-704884.html> )

Nowadays, democracy is the form of government that **struggles the most with war**. This is even true of the United States, where governments are often quick to deploy troops, whereas the public quickly becomes skeptical. This is not a flaw; war always involves the killing and mutilation of human beings and scruples are absolutely necessary. Of all democracies, it is perhaps Germany that struggles the most with war -- and that too is understandable. Germany started two world wars, the second of which was total war, an orgy of destruction and self-destruction. The phrase "No more wars," one of the guiding principles of modern-day Germany, is an obvious consequence of the country's history. But this phrase has been overtaken by reality, now that Germany has been embroiled in a war for the last eight years. Hardly anyone noticed at first, but since the bad news from Afghanistan has begun piling up, the war has triggered a new debate. Two thirds of Germans want to see the German military, the Bundeswehr, pull out of Afghanistan. But there are good arguments for the troops to stay. These arguments are the subject of this essay, as is the question of what it means for a democracy to wage a war, and why waging this war in particular can be the right thing for the German democracy.

### **The U.S. model of democracy leads to conflict**

**Odintsov '15** (Writer for New Eastern Outlook, Is 'American-style Democracy' of Any Good to Anyone?', March 5, 2015 <http://journal-neo.org/2015/05/03/rus-demokratiya-po-amerikanski/> )

Last decades have been marked by countless Washington's efforts to impose its idea of democracy on the world. This trend has manifested itself in a wave of "color revolutions" and the active support of various non-governmental organizations that are designed to promote "the values of American-style democracy". However, there are cases when the export of "democracy" cannot be achieved by non-violent means, that's where US intelligence services step in with a wide variety of covert operations being carried out all across the world. Should they fail, the White House will be quick to use its so-called "coalition" that would eagerly bomb any country back to the Stone Age with total disregard for international norms and institutions. One could easily recall the examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, the wave of "Arab Spring" revolutions and the Balkanization of Eastern Europe. In all those cases

Washington is hiding behind its favorite excuse – the doctrine that was proclaimed by Harry Truman in the US Congress in March 1947, that constitutes that “US must support free people who are resisting the command of armed minorities or the external pressure.” But back then it all came to countering communist influence that was reflected later in the beginning of the “Cold War”, but now the White House is desperate to apply this very “external pressure” all across the world. But despite all these efforts, recent years have highlighted a growing opposition movement on different continents that is reinforced by the spread of anti-American sentiments. The reasons are a plenty, but the most serious among them is a common understanding that the “American-style democracy” that is being pushed down the throats of the people around the globe can not be regarded as a role model, since even the population of the United States doesn’t seem to like it all that much.

#### **Trade unconditionally prevents conflict and does so better than democracy – democracy can also increase war**

**Weede 4** (Erich. Erich Weede is a professor of sociology at the University of Bonn in Germany, as well as an author and journalist. Fall 2004. “The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization”. The Independent Review (The Independent Review, v. IX, n. 2, Fall 2004, ISSN 1086-1653, Copyright © 2004, pp. 165–186).

[http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\\_09\\_2\\_1\\_weede.pdf](http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf). Accessed 7-8-2015. KC)

Fourth, bilateral trade reduces the risk of war between dyads of nations (Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). As to why trade contributes to the prevention of war, two ideas come to mind. First, war is likely to disrupt trade. The higher the level of trade in a pair (dyad) of nations is, the greater the costs of trade disruption are likely to be. Second, commerce might contribute to the establishment or maintenance of moral capital (Ratnapala 2003), which has a civilizing and pacifying effect on citizens and statesmen. In the context of this article, however, answering the question of why trade affects conflict-proneness or providing the answer with some microfoundation is less important than establishing the effect itself in empirical research. Although some writers have questioned or even rejected the “peace by trade” proposition, their criticisms are not convincing. Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) raised the serious technical issue of time dependence in the time-series cross-section data, but Russett and Oneal (2001; see also Oneal 2003 and Oneal and Russett 2003b) responded to the objections raised against their earlier work and demonstrated that those objections do not affect their substantive conclusions. For a while, Hegre’s (2000) study seemed to necessitate a qualification of the “peace by trade” proposition. He found that the pacifying effect of trade is stronger among developed countries than among less-developed countries. More recently, however, Mousseau, Hegre,

and O Neal corrected this earlier finding and reported: “Whereas economically important trade has important pacifying benefits for all dyads, the conflict-reducing effect of democracy is conditional on states’ economic development” (2003, 300). Gelpi and Grieco (2003) suggested another qualification. In their view, trade no longer pacifies relations between autocratic states. According to Mansfield and Pevehouse (2003), another modification of the “peace by trade” proposition might be required. The institutional setting, such as preferential trade agreements, matters. It is even conceivable that other forms of economic interdependence, such as crossborder investments, exercise some pacifying impact. Foreign direct investment (FDI) certainly promotes prosperity, growth, and democracy (de Soysa and O Neal 1999; de Soysa 2003), but the conceivable pacifying impact of FDI still lacks sufficient empirical investigation. The most radical criticism comes from Barbieri (2002), according to whom bilateral trade increases the risk of conflict. As outlined by O Neal and Russett (2003a, 2003b; O Neal 2003; Russett 2003), her conclusion results from disregarding the military power of nations—that is, their different capabilities to wage war across considerable distances. Should we really proceed on the presumption that war between Argentina and Iraq is as conceivable as between the United States and Iraq or between Iran and Iraq? Of course, trade has no pacifying effect on international relations wherever the risk of conflict is extremely close to zero to begin with. Even this inadequate. Russett and O Neal (2001) refer instead to a Kantian peace, which is composed of three components: the democratic peace, peace by trade, and peace by collaboration in international governmental organizations (IGOs). In their research, the IGO element of the Kantian tripod is the weakest and least robust one. I do not know who invented the term capitalist peace. I have heard it spoken more frequently than I have seen it in print, but in any event it is a felicitous term. Handling of the power and distance issue by itself does not suffice to support her conclusions. If the military-conflict variable is restricted to those conflicts that resulted in at least one fatality, then trade is pacifying, whether power and distance are adequately controlled or not. Moreover, Barbieri (2003) herself found some pacifying effect of economic freedom and openness to trade on the war involvement of nations. In spite of the attempted criticism of Russett and O Neal’s findings, the “peace by trade” proposition stands and enjoys powerful empirical support. Another issue also must be considered. Barbieri’s (2002) measures are based on dyadic trade shares relative to national trade, whereas Russett and O Neal’s measures are based on dyadic trade shares relative to the size of national economies. Gartzke and Li (2003) have demonstrated—arithmetically as well as empirically—that trade shares relative to national trade may rise when nations are disconnected from world trade. Nations may concentrate most of their trade on a few partners and remain rather closed economies. If Barbieri’s and O Neal and Russett’s measures of bilateral trade and their effects are simultaneously considered, then Barbieri’s trade shares exert a conflict-enhancing effect and O Neal and Russett’s trade dependence exerts a conflict-reducing effect. This finding of Gartzke and Li’s study not only replicates the substantive findings of both main contenders in the debate about trade and conflict, but it remains robust

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whether one relies on the O Neal and Russett data or on the Barbieri data, whether one includes all dyads or only dyads for which there is some risk of military conflict to begin with. If one is interested in finding out whether more trade is better or worse for the avoidance of military conflict, then it seems more meaningful to focus on a measure that is related to openness at the national level of analysis, as O Neal and Russett (1997, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Russett and O Neal 2001) have done, than on a measure that may be high for fairly closed economies, as Barbieri (2002) has done. Actually, the pacifying effect of trade might be even stronger than the pacifying effect of democracy (O Neal and Russett 1999, 29, and 2003a, 160; Gartzke 2000, 209), especially among contiguous pairs of nations, where conflict-proneness is greater than elsewhere. Moreover, trade seems to play a pivotal role in the prevention of war because it exerts direct and indirect pacifying effects. In addition to the direct effect, there is the indirect effect of free trade as the consequent growth, prosperity, and democracy reduce the risk of militarized disputes and war. Because the exploitation of gains from trade is the essence or purpose of capitalism and free markets, I label the sum of the direct and indirect international security benefits “the capitalist peace,” of which “the democratic peace” is merely a component.<sup>1</sup> Even if the direct “peace by trade” effect were discredited by future research, economic freedom and globalization would still retain their crucial role in overcoming mass poverty and in establishing the prerequisites of the democratic peace. For that reason, I (Weede 1996, chap. 8) advocated a capitalist-peace strategy even before O Neal and Russett (1997, 1999) convinced me of the existence of a directly pacifying effect of trade. An Asian statesman understood the capitalist peace intuitively even before it was scientifically documented and established. According to Lee Kuan Yew, “The most enduring lesson of history is that ambitious growing countries can expand either by grabbing territory, people or resources, or by trading with other countries. The alternative to free trade is not just poverty, it is war” (qtd. in “Survey: Asia” 1993, 24).

## **DPT Wrong**

### **Democratic peace theory does not take into account considerations that democracies have and the idea of it is simply rubbish**

**Larson 12**; DANIEL LARSON is the senior editor of The Conservative American and has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago; 4/17/15; “Democratic Peace Theory is False”; (<http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/>)

Fabio Rojas invokes democratic peace theory in his comment on Rachel Maddow’s new book, (via Wilkinson): The idea is simple – for whatever reason, democracies almost never fight each other. Of course, democracies go to war against non-democracies. But for some reason, democracies just don’t fight each other. What’s the policy implication of all this? First, the sorts of rules that Maddow proposes are useless. People will just ignore the rules when they want to when they want war. Second, you have to reduce the population of non-democracies. Thus, if the Federal government wants to protect the United States by preventing war, the best, and cheapest, way to do it is to provide support and assistance for indigenous movements for democracy and tolerance. Once people have a genuine democracy at work, they just don’t want to fight with each other. They just don’t. Rojas’ claim depends entirely on the meaning of “genuine democracy.” Even though there are numerous examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably don’t qualify as “genuine” democracies and so can’t be used as counter-examples. Regardless, democratic peace theory draws broad conclusions from a short period in modern history with very few cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I understand it is that democratic governments are more accountable to their populations, and because the people will bear the costs of the war they are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This supposedly keeps democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional checks on government power. **One small problem with this is that it is rubbish.** Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality and voting do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing states. Democratic peace theory doesn’t account for the effects of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic nations think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for them are often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that waged the South African War (against two states with elected governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a huge majority in the “Khaki” election that followed. As long as it goes well and doesn’t have too many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is costly it may still be popular if it is fought for nationalist reasons that appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking that there is an intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their country can gain something at relatively low cost by going

to war, the type of government they have really is irrelevant. Unless a democratic public believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to welcome the outbreak of a war that they expect to win. Setting aside the flaws and failures of U.S.-led democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy. Clashing interests between states aren't going away, and the more democratic states there are in the world the more likely it is that two or more of them will eventually fight one another.

### **Democracies are not peaceful, and are regular participants in wars**

**Gautreaux 12** (M.A. in International from Webster University, current international consultant; 'Examining the Democratic Peace Hypothesis: A Neorealist Critique', April 24 2012,

<http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/26/examining-the-democratic-peace-hypothesis-a-neorealist-critique/>)

While the Polity Index measures the spread of democracy from the year 1800 onwards, the data omits participation as a key attribute in its determination of democratic states. By omitting such a basic, yet vital, component of democracy and failing to properly conceptualize democracy, the very question of what it means to be a democratic state, bent on avoiding dyadic conflict, is called into question. Despite this conceptual flaw, most states listed as democratic by Russett and the Polity I-IV data do, in fact, promote universal suffrage (at least in theory) in the twenty-first century and would meet Dahl's 1971 requirements (though Russett's blanket assertion and inclusion of states without universal suffrage remains a point of contention for the emerging democracies). With this in mind, the second error in the logic of the democratic peace theory is with Russett's "cultural/normative" model. The model assumes that a culture of peace is the standard across all democratic societies. While few would disagree that a Western liberal state such as the Netherlands is more peaceful than the various war-torn countries that comprise the very undemocratic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, the same comparison cannot be made between all democratic and autocratic societies. Studying the post-World War II era, in which numerous former colonies gained their independence and empires were systematically disbanded, one will find that the emerging democracies during this era, struggling with the formation of civil society structures and the demands posed by the market economy, had substantially higher crime rates than the ardently non-democratic societies. In addition, homicide rates for so-called "full democracies" – that is, states with a long-established history of democracy (e.g. Western Europe and the United States) – increased at an alarmingly higher rate than their non-democratic counterparts during this same time period. To use a specific example, the world's current hegemon and most powerful democracy, the United States, regularly experiences

violent civil unrest, has the tenth highest homicide rate per 100,000 people (just behind the Republic of Moldova and ahead of Uruguay), and experienced a violent civil war that claimed the lives of 650,000 Americans just a century and a half ago. Moreover, if democratic decision-makers did actually employ their society's supposed culture of peace into their policy formation when faced with international conflict escalation, they would do so at all stages and in all instances, including when faced with a hostile challenge from a non-democratic state. History, however, shows that is not the case. During the years 1899-1999, five of the world's current most powerful (expressed in terms of military potential; determined using quantitative troop, aircraft, and nuclear arms levels) democracies – the United States, India, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel – engaged in interstate conflict on no less than twenty-five occasions. Furthermore, in twenty-nine of the recent intrastate conflicts, twenty-three of the prevailing regimes were either democratic throughout the dispute or at certain times during the dispute. Such realities call into question the assertion that democratic societies have a culture of peace that pervades decision-making. The third and final logical flaw of the democratic peace is that the theory itself is a myth, as democracies have gone to war with each other numerous times throughout history when it was in their interest to do so or when their sovereignty was threatened by another. From the time of the Greek wars of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, there have been at least 14 conflicts involving states that would be listed in the "democratic" category of the Polity I-IV indexes. When one alters the already contentious definition of "war," the number of conflicts increases to at least twenty-three and includes such international disputes as the long-running American-Indian War of the 19th century (the Iroquois tribe had a complex but recognizable system of democracy), the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by the French, and the Allied (British) bombings of Finland during the Second World War. By using the very same conceptualizations that Bruce Russett and other liberal theorists use to categorize democracies, one is able to determine that their very argument – that democratic states never go to war with one another – is simply wrong.

### **The more democracies there are, the less DPT holds true**

**Gartzke and Weisiger 12;** ERIK GARTZKE is the associate director for the department of Political Science for UC San Diego and frequently writes about war and peace; ALEX WEISIGER is the associate professor for international relations for the University of Pennsylvania and wrote several articles and a book about war and peace; "Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace"; 1/15/12;

([http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\\_weisiger\\_isq\\_2013.pdf](http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke_weisiger_isq_2013.pdf))

We can go farther in assessing implications of regime similarity in varied circumstances. As with any cue or motive for cooperation, regime type relies on the presence of a threat to align against. When a cue becomes ubiquitous,

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it loses much of its informational value. The proliferation of democracy means that democracy is less of a distinguishing characteristic, even as other cues, identities, or actual determinants of preference variability tend to increase in salience. One can no longer be sure that democracies will cooperate when there is a diminishing "other." As democratization progresses, this logic implies that some democracies will form alignments that exclude other democracies, or even that some democratic coalitions will come into conflict with other democratic coalitions. Combining the affinity of regime types, the dynamic nature of natural allies, and the demand for security, we must imagine that the impact of regime type on conflict and cooperation could change over time. Initially, the scarcity of democracies in the world meant that there were few opportunities for direct conflict. Even more important, in a world full of threats, democracies had enough in common that cooperating, or at least not opposing one another, was prudent. As democracy has proliferated, however, preferred policies of democratic countries have become more diverse even as the threat from nondemocracies has declined. While autocratic threats remain, many of the most powerful countries are democracies. Differences that were patched over, or over-looked, in fighting fascism and communism have now begun to surface. Perhaps most notable in the last decade has been a basic tension among developed democracies over both means and ends in "the war on terror." There is also a rising sense that there exists a two-tiered system of democracy, in which elected leadership is not sufficient to qualify as "liberal." 18 Finally, inroads of democracy into the Middle East and elsewhere have begun to reveal what popular rule might mean in societies with profoundly different traditions and interests than those of the West. At least initially, the chief beneficiaries of the "Arab Spring" may prove to be Islamist parties, which is unlikely to prove popular in London, Paris, Berlin, Tel Aviv, or Washington DC. These differences are certainly not yet sufficient to lead to democratic warfare, but tensions appear more salient than in the past. In the absence of a common foe, nations with similar regime types but different preferences may increasingly find that they are unable to justify glossing over their differences.



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## **Democracy Misc**

## Iran Transition Fails

**Iranian transition to democracy is on the way and will ultimately fail, and it would become a state of elected authoritarianism**

**Zahedi 10** – Dariush Zahedi, Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley; Zirve University. “Prospects for Democratization in Iran: Policy Implications” Insight Turkey, Vol 12 Issue 2, [http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight\\_turkey\\_vol\\_12\\_no\\_2\\_2010\\_zahedi.pdf](http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_12_no_2_2010_zahedi.pdf) Accessed 7-8-15 PL

This strategic vision operates on two assumptions: First, that the breakdown or modification of the Islamic Republic, though not imminent, may finally be appearing on the horizon. Second, that the eventual modification or annihilation of the Islamic Republic could result (as in the scenario touted for Iraq prior to the invasion) in the establishment and consolidation of a democratic partner for the United States in Iran. Upon closer examination, the first assumption turns out to be probable, while the validity of the second appears to be more tenuous. Indeed, in the event that the regime were to fall, Iran is bereft of many of the social and economic requisites for a stable democracy. **About 80% of the Iranian economy is in the hands of the state, the private sector is dependent and feeble, and the 70% of Iranians under the age of 30 are neither propertied nor middle class**. In the meantime, the state is becoming even more powerful as it tightens its stranglehold over the Iranian economy and an increasing number of the middle class becomes a client to the state. Moreover, a political culture of consensus and compromise has not as yet become ingrained, even among the elite. In what follows, it will be argued that in the event of regime change or modification, these structural impediments to democracy are more likely to lead to the kind of elected authoritarianism we see today in Russia rather than a transition to liberal democracy. This has implications for US policy, ones made all the more urgent by the time line imposed by the looming nuclear issue, which threatens to overwhelm prospects for cooperation and reconciliation between the Islamic Republic and the West. The point is not that a transition to democracy would be impossible (indeed like most other analysts I believe it eventually to be highly likely), but rather that several of the structural conditions favoring the consolidation and institutionalization of democracy do not currently exist, and thus crude attempts at confrontation and regime change may actually impede urgently needed progress towards this goal. Rather than experiment with ineffectual and counterproductive attempts at democracy promotion, this study suggests that a policy of long-term international diplomatic and economic engagement is the best available tool for transforming Iranian society and politics in such a way that a transition to sustained and stable democracy and, by implication, resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue, becomes more likely.

## **Iran Deal Good: Democracy**

**Status quo nuclear tension between the West and Iran hamper democratization. A nuclear deal would help set the stage for democratization.**

**Hashemi 15** – Nader Hashemi, 6-28-2015, Hashemi is an associate professor of Middle East and Islamic politics and director of the Center for Middle East Studies in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. “How a Nuclear Deals Helps Democracy in Iran”  
<http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/Cairoreview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=835> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

Secondly, Iran’s ruling oligarchy has successfully deployed a nationalist narrative to justify its nuclear policy internally. Tensions with the West are portrayed through the long history of foreign invention in Iran. Iranians have been told by their rulers that once again Western powers are bullying Iran, threatening to bomb them, and applying a double standard in attempting to dictate Iran’s internal energy policy. These arguments have resonated across the ideological spectrum. Today many secular Iranians who wouldn’t ordinarily support the Islamic Republic, make an exception when comes the nuclear impasse with the West for reasons of national pride. Thus, by casting itself as the defender of national sovereignty, Iran’s leadership has benefited from the nuclear standoff with the West. In the aftermath of a nuclear agreement, the manipulation of this issue to boost the regime’s legitimacy will be a far more difficult task. This point has been indirectly acknowledged by the editor of Shargh, a leading reformist newspaper, who has noted that if “there’s less tension internationally, there’ll be more stability internally,” implying that a nuclear deal would help create better social conditions for democratization.

## **Turkey Democracy Weak**

### **Weak democracy in Turkey means Prime Minister Erdogan acts as a monarch, which citizens don't like**

**Berlinski 13** - Claire Berlinski, 6-29-2013, Claire Berlinski graduated from University of Oxford. "Tear gas is a symptom of Turkey's weak democracy," Globe and Mail, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/tear-gas-is-a-symptom-of-turkeys-weak-democracy/article12886286/> Accessed 7-8-15 PL

The tear gas, however, is the symptom. The "democratic deficits" are the disease. The conventional wisdom is that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not understand the full meaning of "democracy," believing that having won several elections, he is now a monarch. Partly correct. But the problems are deeper still, and even Mr. Erdogan's megalomania is just a symptom of this disease. Consider this: In what kind of democracy does the prime minister decide where to build a shopping mall, particularly when the courts have already halted the project? To grasp the explosion over Gezi Park, you need to understand the details of Turkey's "democratic deficits." The most economical way to explain them is how Cem Tokar, the secretary of Turkey's very-minority Liberal Democratic Party, put it to me: "Democracy doesn't exist in any shape or form here, so there are no problems with democracy in Turkey – kinda like no car, no engine problems." He is exaggerating only slightly. Yes, Turkey holds regular elections. But the rest of the institutions we associate with "democracy" are so weak that everyone living here knew this car was going to crash. Aengus Collins, a thoughtful observer of Turkey, suggests a deeper way to consider this. He uses Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino's markers of "high quality" democracy: rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness. These phrases may sound academic, but to people who daily experience their absence, the path from these terms to tear gas is a straight line. Behind these protests are bitter grievances. Among the most bitter is the dysfunctional Turkish legal system – in particular, the government's use of it against opponents. Mr. Erdogan has introduced constitutional referendums enabling him to pack the courts with his supporters, and used the courts to shut down hostile media on technical grounds or through punitive taxation. The courts have imprisoned dissenters. Potentially dangerous challengers have fled the country to evade arrest. As for "participation," this too has been gravely undermined, particularly for the generation that grew up in the wake of the 1980 coup. In Turkey's very recent past, forms of organization, assembly and protest that healthy participatory democracies require have not only been discouraged, but met with consequences so terrible that parents teach their children that they cannot win, so don't even try. Anyone who thinks this has changed since Mr. Erdogan came to power is gravely mistaken: Consider the case (one among thousands) of students Ferhat Tüzer and Berna Yılmaz, arrested for holding up a banner that read, "We want free education and we will get it." They were sentenced to 8.5 years.

## **ME Likes Democracy**

### **A majority of Arabs support democracy – prefer large study**

**Bishara 12** – Marwan Bishara, 3-8-12, Bishara was previously a professor of International Relations at the American University of Paris. “Gauging Arab Public Opinion”

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123793355501965.html>, Accessed 7-9-15 PL

The first of its kind - a poll conducted in 12 Arab countries, representing 84 per cent of the population of the Arab world, in an attempt to gauge the region's political mood - has arrived at some interesting results. Organised by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), face-to-face interviews by Arab surveyors with 16,731 individuals in the first half of 2011 revealed majority support for the goals of the Arab revolutions and notably, for a democratic system of government. The countries surveyed included Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, with the help of local institutions and research centres. While people seem generally split on the question of separation of state and religion, a majority supports the non-interference of religious authorities in politics. And by a 15-1 ratio, Israel and the US are seen as more threatening than Iran. However, this ratio is lower among those living in proximity to Iran. Opinions differ on certain issues from country to country and region to region, but there's clearly a trans-national, trans-border public consensus when it comes to questions of identity and national priorities. The data generated by the poll, the largest conducted so far in the region, is a treasure trove for those looking to better understand the political environment in the Arab world. Main conclusions: Awaiting the publication of the report in English, here are the poll's main conclusions: A majority describe themselves as religious, but they mostly don't support the interference of religious authorities in citizens' political choices. 71 per cent say they don't distinguish between religious and non-religious people in their economic and social relations. 77 per cent trust their military, half trust their police, 47 per cent trust their governments and 36 per cent trust their local councils before the revolutions. A high 83 per cent believe corruption is widespread in their countries. Only 19 per cent see their states implement the law equally among its citizens. Three quarters of those polled believe that Arab states should take measures to bring their nations closer. An equal percentage believes that states should lift restrictions on free travel and 67 per cent are not satisfied with Arab-Arab co-operation. Contrary to mainstream global media coverage, 73 per cent of those polled see Israel and the US as the two most threatening countries. Five per cent see Iran as the most threatening, a percentage that varies between countries and regions. A high 84 per cent believe the Palestinian question is the cause of all Arabs and not the Palestinians only. A high 84 per cent reject the notion of their state's recognition of Israel and only 21 per cent support, to a certain degree, the peace agreement signed between Egypt, Jordan and the PLO with Israel. Less than a third agree with their government's foreign policy. When it comes to WMD, 55 per cent support a region free of nuclear weapons and 55 per cent see Israel's

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possession of nuclear weapons as justifying their possession by other countries in the region. Moreover, a majority of Arabs support the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, and believe revolution came about because of corruption, dictatorship and lack of justice and equality. A majority also believe they belong to one Arab nation. Nuances and caveats: **The majority doesn't approach democracy as merely a Western notion.** Rather, it provides a clear definition of a democratic system that includes political plurality, freedom of expression, rule of law, et cetera. When it comes to specifics, a rather slim majority of 57 per cent supports the rule of a political party they disagree with. While **people are generally supportive of democracy,** a minority doesn't truly understand or accept its main tenets.

## **Civil Liberties Key to Democracy**

### **Achieving democracy**

**Clark, 10** Agatha Clark is from Portland, Ore., and has been writing about culture since 2001. She specializes in intercultural communication and is completing a Bachelor Arts at the University of Oregon with double majors in linguistics and Spanish. Clark is fascinated by expressions of human psychology and culture. Before refocusing her educational path toward language, she originally went to school to become an artist.

<http://classroom.synonym.com/benefits-democracy-government-6037.html>, May17, 2010.

The United States, a type of representative democracy known as a republic, has three branches of government: the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches. **No branch is able to obtain more power than the other two because each is legally restricted with a series of checks and balances. Checks and balances** are a critical part of any democratic system because they spread power among multiple groups and thus **prevent a dictatorship from forming.** This **balance of power helps to ensure** that **the will of a country's citizens is enforced rather than the will of a small group of political leaders**

In the early 2000s, the U.N. organization then known as the Commission on Human Rights determined that no society without basic civil liberties can be classified as a democracy. **Freedoms of association, speech, voting and media access are all protected by democracy** in addition to other basic human rights. **Civil liberties are necessary** to democracy because **without them, the citizens of a country cannot govern themselves. Speech and uncensored media access are critical to** the dissemination of new ideas and the process of **consensus-building through debate.**

## Chinese Model Tradeoff STARTER

### **Western Democracy trades off with the Chinese model—key to growth**

The **Economist 14**, “What’s Gone Wrong With Democracy?”, 01/03/14, <http://www.economist.com/printedition/2014-03-01>, 7/9/15

THE two main reasons are the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the rise of China. The damage the crisis did was psychological as well as financial. It revealed fundamental weaknesses in the West’s political systems, undermining the self-confidence that had been one of their great assets. Governments had steadily extended entitlements over decades, allowing dangerous levels of debt to develop, and politicians came to believe that they had abolished boom-bust cycles and tamed risk. Many people became disillusioned with the workings of their political systems—particularly when governments bailed out bankers with taxpayers’ money and then stood by impotently as financiers continued to pay themselves huge bonuses. The crisis turned the Washington consensus into a term of reproach across the emerging world.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party has broken the democratic world’s monopoly on economic progress. Larry Summers, of Harvard University, observes that when America was growing fastest, it doubled living standards roughly every 30 years. China has been doubling living standards roughly every decade for the past 30 years. The Chinese elite argue that their model—tight control by the Communist Party, coupled with a relentless effort to recruit talented people into its upper ranks—is more efficient than democracy and less susceptible to gridlock. The political leadership changes every decade or so, and there is a constant supply of fresh talent as party cadres are promoted based on their ability to hit targets.

China says its model is **more efficient than democracy** and less susceptible to gridlock

China’s critics rightly condemn the government for controlling public opinion in all sorts of ways, from imprisoning dissidents to censoring Internet discussions. Yet the regime’s obsession with control paradoxically means it pays close attention to public opinion. At the same time China’s leaders have been able to tackle some of the big problems of state-building that can take decades to deal with in a democracy. In just two years China has extended pension coverage to an extra 240m rural dwellers, for example—far more than the total number of people covered by America’s public-pension system.

Many Chinese are prepared to put up with their system if it delivers growth. The 2013 Pew Survey of Global Attitudes showed that 85% of Chinese were “very satisfied” with their country’s direction, compared with 31% of Americans. Some Chinese intellectuals have become positively boastful. Zhang Weiwei of Fudan University argues that democracy is destroying the West, and particularly America, because it institutionalises gridlock, trivialises decision-making and throws up second-rate presidents like George Bush



junior. Yu Keping of Beijing University argues that democracy makes simple things “overly complicated and frivolous” and allows “certain sweet-talking politicians to mislead the people”. Wang Jisi, also of Beijing University, has observed that “many developing countries that have introduced Western values and political systems are experiencing disorder and chaos” and that China offers an alternative model. Countries from Africa (Rwanda) to the Middle East (Dubai) to South-East Asia (Vietnam) are taking this advice seriously.

### **Authoritarian China’s Government model beats the US’s in terms of effectiveness and efficiency**

**Li 12;** ERIC X. LI is a venture capitalist in Shanghai who frequently writes articles for publications such as *The Huffington Post* and *The New York Times*, he also serves on the board of directors for the China Europe International Business School; “Why China’s Political Model Is Superior”; 2/16/12; ([http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/opinion/why-chinas-political-model-is-superior.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/opinion/why-chinas-political-model-is-superior.html?_r=0))

THIS week the Obama administration is playing host to Xi Jinping, China’s vice president and heir apparent. The world’s most powerful electoral democracy and its largest one-party state are meeting at a time of political transition for both. Many have characterized the competition between these two giants as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. But this is false. America and China view their political systems in fundamentally different ways: whereas America sees democratic government as an end in itself, China sees its current form of government, or any political system for that matter, merely as a means to achieving larger national ends. In the history of human governance, spanning thousands of years, there have been two major experiments in democracy. The first was Athens, which lasted a century and a half; the second is the modern West. If one defines democracy as one citizen one vote, American democracy is only 92 years old. In practice it is only 47 years old, if one begins counting after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 — far more ephemeral than all but a handful of China’s dynasties. Why, then, do so many boldly claim they have discovered the ideal political system for all mankind and that its success is forever assured? The answer lies in the source of the current democratic experiment. It began with the European Enlightenment. Two fundamental ideas were at its core: the individual is rational, and the individual is endowed with inalienable rights. These two beliefs formed the basis of a secular faith in modernity, of which the ultimate political manifestation is democracy. In its early days, democratic ideas in political governance facilitated the industrial revolution and ushered in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity and military power in the Western world. Yet at the very beginning, some of those who led this drive were aware of the fatal flaw embedded in this experiment and sought to contain it. The American Federalists made it clear they were establishing a republic, not a democracy, and designed myriad means to constrain the popular will. But as in any religion, faith would prove stronger than rules. The

political franchise expanded, resulting in a greater number of people participating in more and more decisions. As they say in America, “California is the future.” And the future means endless referendums, paralysis and insolvency. In Athens, ever-increasing popular participation in politics led to rule by demagogy. And in today’s America, money is now the great enabler of demagogy. As the Nobel-winning economist A. Michael Spence has put it, America has gone from “one propertied man, one vote; to one man, one vote; to one person, one vote; trending to one dollar, one vote.” By any measure, the United States is a constitutional republic in name only. Elected representatives have no minds of their own and respond only to the whims of public opinion as they seek re-election; special interests manipulate the people into voting for ever-lower taxes and higher government spending, sometimes even supporting self-destructive wars. The West’s current competition with China is therefore not a face-off between democracy and authoritarianism, but rather the clash of two fundamentally different political outlooks. The modern West sees democracy and human rights as the pinnacle of human development. It is a belief premised on an absolute faith. China is on a different path. Its leaders are prepared to allow greater popular participation in political decisions if and when it is conducive to economic development and favorable to the country’s national interests, as they have done in the past 10 years. However, China’s leaders would not hesitate to curtail those freedoms if the conditions and the needs of the nation changed. The 1980s were a time of expanding popular participation in the country’s politics that helped loosen the ideological shackles of the destructive Cultural Revolution. But it went too far and led to a vast rebellion at Tiananmen Square. That uprising was decisively put down on June 4, 1989. The Chinese nation paid a heavy price for that violent event, but the alternatives would have been far worse. The resulting stability ushered in a generation of growth and prosperity that propelled China’s economy to its position as the second largest in the world. The fundamental difference between Washington’s view and Beijing’s is whether political rights are considered God-given and therefore absolute or whether they should be seen as privileges to be negotiated based on the needs and conditions of the nation. The West seems incapable of becoming less democratic even when its survival may depend on such a shift. In this sense, America today is similar to the old Soviet Union, which also viewed its political system as the ultimate end. **History does not bode well for the American way.** Indeed, faith-based ideological hubris may soon drive democracy over the cliff.

### **The Chinese model is more adaptive and attractive to corporations compared to the US**

**Karon 11**; TONY KARON is a former senior editor for *TIME.com*; 1/20/11; “Why China Does Capitalism Better than the U.S.”; (<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2043235,00.html>)

One of the great ironies revealed by the global recession that began in 2008 is that Communist Party–ruled China may be doing a better job managing capitalism’s crisis than the democratically elected U.S. government. Beijing’s stimulus spending was larger, infinitely more effective at overcoming the

slowdown and directed at laying the infrastructural tracks for further economic expansion. As Western democracies shuffle wheezily forward, China's economy roars along at a steady clip, having lifted some half a billion people out of poverty over the past three decades and rapidly created the world's largest middle class to provide an engine for long-term domestic consumer demand. Sure, there's massive social inequality, but there always is in a capitalist system. (Income inequality rates in the U.S. are some of the worst in the industrialized world, and more Americans are falling into poverty than are being raised out of it. The number of Americans officially designated as living in poverty in 2009 — 43 million — was the highest in the 51 years that records have been kept.) Beijing is also doing a far more effective job than Washington of tooling its economy to meet future challenges — at least according to historian Francis Fukuyama, erstwhile neoconservative intellectual heavyweight. "President Hu Jintao's rare state visit to Washington this week comes at a time when many Chinese see their weathering of the financial crisis as a vindication of their own system, and the beginning of an era in which U.S.-style liberal ideas will no longer be dominant," wrote Fukuyama in Monday's *Financial Times* under a headline stating that the U.S. had little to teach China. "State-owned enterprises are back in vogue, and were the chosen mechanism through which Beijing administered its massive stimulus." Today Chinese leaders are more inclined to scold the U.S. — its debtor to the tune of close to a trillion dollars — than to emulate it, and Fukuyama noted that polls show that a larger percentage of Chinese believe their country is headed in the right direction, compared with Americans. China's success in navigating the economic crisis, wrote Fukuyama, was based on the ability of its authoritarian political system to "make large, complex decisions quickly, and ... make them relatively well, at least in economic policy." These are startling observations from a writer who, 19 years ago, famously proclaimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded "the end of history as such ... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Fukuyama has had the good grace and intellectual honesty to admit he was wrong. And he's no apologist for Chinese authoritarianism, calling out its abuses and corruption, and making clear that he believes the absence of democracy will eventually hobble China's progress. Still, as he noted in the *Financial Times*, while they don't hold elections, China's communist leaders are nonetheless responsive to public opinion. (Of course they are! A party brought to power by a peasant rebellion knows full well the destructive potential of the rage of working people.) But the regime claims solid support from the Chinese middle class, and hedges against social explosion by directing resources and investment to more marginal parts of the country. China's leaders, of course, never subscribed to Fukuyama's "end of history" maxim; the Marxism on which they were reared would have taught them that there is no contingent relationship between capitalism and democracy, and they only had to look at neighbors such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore to see economic success stories under authoritarian rule — although the prosperity thus achieved played a major role in transforming Taiwan and South Korea into the noisy democracies they are today. Nor were

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Beijing's leaders under any illusions that the free market could take care of such basic needs as education, health care and infrastructure necessary to keep the system as a whole growing. But Fukuyama also made a point about the comparative inability of the U.S. system to respond decisively to a long-term crisis. "China adapts quickly, making difficult decisions and implementing them effectively," Fukuyama wrote. "Americans pride themselves on constitutional checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and ideologically rigid. At present it shows little appetite for dealing with the long-term fiscal challenges the U.S. faces. Democracy in America may have an inherent legitimacy that the Chinese system lacks, but it will not be much of a model to anyone if the government is divided against itself and cannot govern." Money has emerged as the electoral trump card in the U.S. political system, and corporations have a Supreme Court-recognized right to use their considerable financial muscle to promote candidates and policies favorable to their business operations and to resist policies and shut out candidates deemed inimical to their business interests. So whether it's health reform or the stimulus package, the power of special interests in the U.S. system invariably produces either gridlock or mishmash legislation crafted to please the narrow interests of a variety of competing interests rather than the aggregated interests of the economy and society as a whole. Efficient and rational decisionmaking it's not. Nor does it appear capable of tackling long-term problems. China is the extreme opposite, of course. It can ride roughshod over the lives of its citizens (e.g., building a dam that requires the forced relocation of 1.5 million people who have no channels through which to protest). But China's system is unlikely to give corporations the power to veto or shape government decisionmaking to suit their bottom lines at the expense of the needs of the system as a whole in the way that, to choose but one example, U.S. pharmaceutical companies are able to wield political influence to deny the government the right to negotiate drug prices for the public health system. Fukuyama seems to be warning that, in Darwinian terms, the Chinese system may be more adaptive than the land of the free.

## **Pakistan DA STARTER**

**There is overwhelming dislike for the US in Pakistan, the public doesn't want to work with us, if Pakistan became a democracy, it would assuredly cut ties with the US**

**Pew 12** – Pew Research Center, 6/27/15, “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.” <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/> Accessed 7/9/15 PL

Following a year of tensions between their country and the United States, Pakistanis continue to hold highly unfavorable views of the U.S. and offer bleak assessments of the relationship between the two nations. Roughly three-in-four Pakistanis (74%) consider the U.S. an enemy, up from 69% last year and 64% three years ago. And President Obama is held in exceedingly low regard. Indeed, among the 15 nations surveyed in both 2008 and 2012 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pakistan is the only country where ratings for Obama are no better than the ratings President George W. Bush received during his final year in office (for more, see “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” released June 13, 2012). Only 13% of Pakistanis think relations with the U.S. have improved in recent years, down 16 percentage points from 2011. Strengthening the bilateral relationship is also becoming less of a priority for Pakistanis. While 45% still say it is important to improve relations with the U.S., this is down from 60% last year. Moreover, roughly four-in-ten believe that American economic and military aid is actually having a negative impact on their country, while only about one-in-ten think the impact is positive. Additionally, over the last few years, Pakistanis have become less willing to work with the U.S. on efforts to combat extremist groups. While 50% still want the U.S. to provide financial and humanitarian aid to areas where extremists operate, this is down from 72% in 2009. Similarly, fewer Pakistanis now want intelligence and logistical support from the U.S. than they did three years ago. And only 17% back American drone strikes against leaders of extremist groups, even if they are conducted in conjunction with the Pakistani government.

## **Saudi Arabia DA STARTER**

### **There is an overwhelming dislike for the US in Saudi Arabia**

**Nazer 13** - Fahad Nazer, Fahad Nazer is an analyst at JTG, Inc and a former political analyst at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. His writing has appeared in The New York Times, CNN, Foreign Policy, Yaleglobal Online and Al Monitor, among others. 4-18-2013, "'Do Saudis Really Hate the US?'," Al-Monitor, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/saudi-arabia-boston-bombings-condelences.html> Accessed 7-9-15 PL

Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to say that no Saudis harbor ill will toward the United States. And that's where things get complicated. Those of us who know the Middle East are familiar with a dominant narrative that strongly influences the political socialization process that many — though not all — Arabs undergo across much of the region. It portrays the United States as a violent empire founded on the remains of native Americans and with the sweat and blood of African slaves. It also characterizes the US as the main benefactor of Israel, which stole the land from Palestinians, expelled them from their homes and has subjugated them ever since. It is this element in particular that colors how many Arabs — not just Saudis — see the United States. This line of thinking has been modified recently, and now maintains that the US took the lead in a global war against Muslims when it attacked Afghanistan and Iraq. If that was not enough, youths are led to believe that the US also props up their oppressive regimes, which are beholden to Washington and over whom it has complete control. Successive generations of Arabs have been inculcated with this narrative through the media, various social circles, literature, music, movies and even schools. If it was not part of the official curriculum, teachers often took it upon themselves to let the students in on the ugly "truth" about America. Ironically, this disposition is not as deeply entrenched in Saudi Arabia as it is in places like Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories.

### **Saudi's like to send their kids to the US for college – proves public opinion of the US isn't bad**

**Song 13** – Jason Song, 11-24-13, Song is was part of the Los Angeles Times team that won the Scripps Howard Award for Public Service in 2011 and the Philip Meyer Award from the Investigative Reporters and Editors organization. "More Saudi Arabians Studying in the US", <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/24/local/la-me-saudi-student-20131125> Accessed 7-9-15 PL (brackets in first line are mine, previous few paragraphs specify that it's students)

But the numbers [of Saudi student studying in the US] have grown steadily since 2005 and doubled from the 2010 to 2012 academic years, according to a recent survey. The number of Saudi students in the U.S. last year grew to 44,566 — a nearly 30% increase from 2011. The country ranked behind only China, India and South Korea in the number of students studying in U.S. colleges and universities. Experts say the change is largely fueled by a new

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Saudi Arabian scholarship program that encourages students to study abroad. Other countries have adopted similar programs. Of the four nations that made the biggest percentage gains in the recent survey, Kuwait and Brazil also offered government-sponsored scholarship programs. "Countries that are trying to leap from their population into a 21st century economy need to do that very rapidly and they don't have the capacity in their own universities," said Peggy Blumenthal, senior counselor to the president of the Institute of International Education, which conducted the recent survey in partnership with the U.S. State Department. When King Abdullah assumed the Saudi Arabian crown in 2005, he began to emphasize science education and foreign travel as a way to modernize the country. The scholarship program offers qualified students free tuition, travel funding and expenses, according to media reports and students, and has made it possible for middle-class students to go abroad. Traditionally, only children from wealthy Saudi families moved out of the country for college. Osama bin Laden's father, a billionaire construction magnate, sent more than a quarter of his 54 children to study in America and other foreign countries, according to "The Bin Ladens," a history of the family.

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**Other Misc**



## Heg Bad

### **US hegemony creates animosity towards US interests, creating a wide spread rhetoric of hatred towards the US**

**Brooks and Wohlforth 03** Brooks is an Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. American Primacy in Perspective. July 2002.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2002-07-01/american-primacy-perspective>. 7/8/15

Balancing rhetoric is obviously partly the reflection of genuine sentiment. The world finds it unfair, undemocratic, annoying, and sometimes downright frightening to have so much power concentrated in the hands of one state, especially when the United States aggressively goes its own way. But given the weight and prominence of U.S. power on the world stage, some unease among other countries is inevitable no matter what Washington does. Foreign governments frequently rail against what they regard as excessive U.S. involvement in their affairs. Yet inflated expectations about what the United States can do to solve global problems (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) can lead to frustration with supposed U.S. underengagement as well. Nothing the United States could do short of abdicating its power would solve the problem completely. Local and regional politics also contribute to balancing rhetoric, although not to its substance. **Even nondemagogic leaders face incentives to play on anti-American resentment for domestic audiences.** And simple math dictates the need for more regional cooperation today than previously, much of which can take on an anti-American coloring. The nineteenth-century international system featured six to eight poles among roughly 30 states. In the early Cold War, there were two poles, but the number of states had doubled to just over 70. Today there is one pole in a system in which the population has trebled to nearly 200. Inevitably, therefore, much activity will take place at a regional level, and it can often be in the interests of the parties involved to use balancing rhetoric as a rallying point for stimulating cooperation, even if that is not the chief driver of their actions. Such maneuvering has the potential to backfire, however, by reinforcing the perception that the countries in question are too weak to act individually, something that can have harmful consequences at home and abroad. Thus, other powers have to find a way of reminding Washington that they have somewhere else to turn, but without talking down their own capabilities or foreclosing promising bilateral arrangements with the United States. The result -- balancing that is rhetorically grand but substantively weak -- is politics as usual in a unipolar world.

### **In growing multipolar world, US and Western model loose primacy.**

**Borger 08** Julian Borger is the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans. His book on the pursuit and capture of the Balkan war criminals,

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The Butcher's Trail, will be published by Other Press (NY) in January 2016,  
2025: the end of US dominance, 11/20/08,  
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/20/barack-obama-president-intelligence-agency>, 7/9/15

The United States' leading intelligence organization has warned that **the world is entering an increasingly unstable and unpredictable period in which the advance of western-style democracy is no longer assured**, and some states are in danger of being "taken over and run by criminal networks". The global trends review, produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) every four years, represents sobering reading in Barack Obama's intray as he prepares to take office in January. The country he inherits, the report warns, will no longer be able to "call the shots" alone, as its power over an increasingly multipolar world begins to wane. Looking ahead to 2025, the NIC (which coordinates analysis from all the US intelligence agencies), foresees a fragmented world, where conflict over scarce resources is on the rise, poorly contained by "ramshackle" international institutions, while nuclear proliferation, particularly in the Middle East, and even nuclear conflict grow more likely. "Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed" warns that the spread of western democratic capitalism cannot be taken for granted, as it was by George Bush and America's neoconservatives. "No single outcome seems preordained: the Western model of economic liberalism, democracy and secularism, for example, which many assumed to be inevitable, may lose its luster— at least in the medium term," the report warns. It adds: "Today wealth is moving not just from West to East but is concentrating more under state control," giving the examples of China and Russia. "In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the state's role in the economy may be gaining more appeal throughout the world." At the same time, **the US will become "less dominant" in the world – no longer the unrivalled superpower it has been** since the end of the Cold War, but a "first among equals" in a more fluid and evenly balanced world, making the unilateralism of the Bush era no longer tenable.

## Warming Impact

**Carbon Dioxide is the root cause of warming**

### **Prothero 12**

(Donald R. Prothero, Professor of Geology at Occidental College and Lecturer in Geobiology at the California Institute of Technology, 3-1-2012, "How We Know Global Warming is Real and Human Caused," Skeptic, 17.2, EBSCO)

How do we know that global warming is real and primarily human caused? There are numerous lines of evidence that converge toward this conclusion. 1. Carbon Dioxide Increase **Carbon dioxide** in our atmosphere **has increased at an unprecedented rate** in the past 200 years. **Not one data set** collected over a long enough span of time **shows otherwise**. Mann et al. (1999) compiled the past 900 years' worth of temperature data from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and direct measurements in the past few centuries, and the sudden increase of temperature of the past century stands out like a sore thumb. This famous graph is now known as the "hockey stick" because it is long and straight through most of its length, then bends sharply upward at the end like the blade of a hockey stick. Other graphs show that climate was very stable within a narrow range of variation through the past 1000, 2000, or even 10,000 years since the end of the last Ice Age. There were minor warming events during the Climatic Optimum about 7000 years ago, the Medieval Warm Period, and the slight cooling of the Little Ice Age in the 1700s and 1800s. But the magnitude and rapidity of the warming represented by the last 200 years is simply unmatched in all of human history. More revealing, the timing of this warming coincides with the Industrial Revolution, when humans first began massive deforestation and released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by burning an unprecedented amount of coal, gas, and oil. 2. Melting Polar Ice Caps The polar icecaps are thinning and breaking up at an alarming rate. In 2000, my former graduate advisor Malcolm McKenna was one of the first humans to fly over the North Pole in summer time and see no ice, just open water. The Arctic ice cap has been frozen solid for at least the past 3 million years (and maybe longer), [ 4] but now the entire ice sheet is breaking up so fast that by 2030 (and possibly sooner) less than half of the Arctic will be ice covered in the summer. [ 5] As one can see from watching the news, this is an ecological disaster for everything that lives up there, from the polar bears to the seals and walrus to the animals they feed upon, to the 4 million people whose world is melting beneath their feet. The Antarctic is thawing even faster. In February-March 2002, the Larsen B ice shelf -- over 3000 square km (the size of Rhode Island) and 220 m (700 feet) thick -- broke up in just a few months, a story -typical of nearly all the ice shelves in Antarctica. The Larsen B shelf had survived all the previous ice ages and interglacial warming episodes over the past 3 million years, and even the warmest periods of the last 10,000 years -- yet it and nearly all the other thick ice sheets on the Arctic, Greenland, and Antarctic are vanishing at a rate never before seen in geologic history. 3. Melting Glaciers Glaciers are all retreating at the highest rates ever documented. Many of those glaciers, along with snow melt, especially in the Himalayas, Andes, Alps, and Sierras, provide most of the freshwater that the populations below the mountains depend upon -- yet this fresh water supply is vanishing. Just think about the percentage of world's population in southern Asia (especially India) that depend on Himalayan snowmelt for their fresh water. The implications are staggering. The permafrost that once remained solidly frozen even in the summer has now thawed, damaging the Inuit villages on the Arctic coast and threatening all our pipelines to the North Slope of Alaska. This is catastrophic not only for life on the permafrost, but as it thaws, the permafrost releases huge amounts of greenhouse gases which are one of the major contributors to global warming. Not only is the ice vanishing, but we have seen record heat waves over and over again, killing thousands of people, as each year joins the list of the hottest years on record. (2010 just topped that list as the hottest year, surpassing the previous record in 2009, and we shall know about 2011 soon enough). Natural animal and plant populations are being devastated all over the globe as their environments change. [ 6] Many animals respond by moving their ranges to formerly cold climates, so now places that once did not have to worry about disease-bearing mosquitoes are infested as the climate warms and allows them to breed further north. 4. Sea Level Rise All that melted ice eventually ends up in the ocean, causing sea levels to rise, as it has many times in the geologic past. At present, the sea level is rising about 3-4 mm per year, more than ten times the rate of 0.1-0.2 mm/year that has occurred over the past 3000 years. Geological data show that the sea level was virtually unchanged over the past 10,000 years since the present interglacial began. A few mm here or there doesn't impress people, until you consider that the rate is accelerating and that most scientists predict sea levels will rise 80-130 cm in just the next century. A sea level rise of 1.3 m (almost 4 feet) would drown many of the world's low-elevation cities, such as Venice and New Orleans, and low-lying countries such as the Netherlands or Bangladesh. A number of tiny island nations such as Vanuatu and the Maldives, which barely poke out above the ocean now, are already vanishing beneath the waves. Eventually their entire population will have to move someplace else. [ 7] Even a small sea level rise might not drown all these areas, but they are much more vulnerable to the large waves of a storm surge (as happened with Hurricane Katrina), which could do much more damage than sea level rise alone. If sea level rose by 6 m (20 feet), most of the world's coastal plains and low-lying areas (such as the Louisiana bayous, Florida, and most of the world's river deltas) would be drowned. Most of the world's population lives in low-elevation coastal cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Miami, and Shanghai. All of those cities would be partially or completely under water with such a sea level rise. If all the

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glacial ice caps melted completely (as they have several times before during past greenhouse episodes in the geologic past), sea level would rise by 65 m (215 feet)! The entire Mississippi Valley would flood, so you could dock an ocean liner in Cairo, Illinois. Such a sea level rise would drown nearly every coastal region under hundreds of feet of water, and inundate New York City, London and Paris. All that would remain would be the tall landmarks such as the Empire State Building, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower. You could tie your boats to these pinnacles, but the rest of these drowned cities would lie deep underwater. Climate Change Critic's Arguments and Scientists' Rebuttals Despite the overwhelming evidence there are many people who remain skeptical. One reason is that they have been fed distortions and misstatements by the global warming denialists who cloud or confuse the issue. Let's examine some of these claims in detail: \* "It's just natural climatic variability." No, it is not. As I detailed in my 2009 book, Greenhouse of the Dinosaurs, geologists and paleoclimatologists know a lot about past greenhouse worlds, and the icehouse planet that has existed for the past 33 million years. We have a good understanding of how and why the Antarctic ice sheet first appeared at that time, and how the Arctic froze over about 3.5 million years ago, beginning the 24 glacial and interglacial episodes of the "Ice Ages" that have occurred since then. We know how variations in the earth's orbit (the Milankovitch cycles) controls the amount of solar radiation the earth receives, triggering the shifts between glacial and interglacial periods. Our current warm interglacial has already lasted 10,000 years, the duration of most previous interglacials, so if it were not for global warming, we would be headed into the next glacial in the next 1000 years or so. Instead, our pumping greenhouse gases into our atmosphere after they were long trapped in the earth's crust has pushed the planet into a "super-interglacial," already warmer than any previous warming period. We can see the "big picture" of climate variability most clearly in ice cores from the EPICA (European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica), which show the details of the last 650,000 years of glacial-interglacial cycles (Fig. 2). At no time during any previous interglacial did the carbon dioxide levels exceed 300 ppm, even at their very warmest. Our atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are already close to 400 ppm today. The atmosphere is headed to 600 ppm within a few decades, even if we stopped releasing greenhouse gases immediately. This is decidedly not within the normal range of "climatic variability," but clearly unprecedented in human history. Anyone who says this is "normal variability" has never seen the huge amount of paleoclimatic data that show otherwise. \* "It's just another warming episode, like the Medieval Warm Period, or the Holocene Climatic Optimum or the end of the Little Ice Age." Untrue. There were numerous small fluctuations of warming and cooling over the last 10,000 years of the Holocene. But in the case of the Medieval Warm Period (about 950-1250 A.D.), the temperatures increased only 1°C, much less than we have seen in the current episode of global warming (Fig. 1). This episode was also only a local warming in the North Atlantic and northern Europe. Global temperatures over this interval did not warm at all, and actually cooled by more than 1°C. Likewise, the warmest period of the last 10,000 years was the Holocene Climatic Optimum (5,000-9,000 B.C.E.) when warmer and wetter conditions in Eurasia contributed to the rise of the first great civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, and China. This was largely a Northern Hemisphere-Eurasian phenomenon, with 2-3°C warming in the Arctic and northern Europe. But there was almost no warming in the tropics, and cooling or no change in the Southern Hemisphere. [ 8] From a Eurocentric viewpoint, these warming events seemed important, but on a global scale the effect was negligible. In addition, neither of these warming episodes is related to increasing greenhouse gases. The Holocene Climatic Optimum, in fact, is predicted by the Milankovitch cycles, since at that time the axial tilt of the earth was 24°, its steepest value, meaning the Northern Hemisphere got more solar radiation than normal -- but the Southern Hemisphere less, so the two balanced. By contrast, not only is the warming observed in the last 200 years much greater than during these previous episodes, but it is also global and bipolar, so it is not a purely local effect. The warming that ended the Little Ice Age (from the mid-1700s to the late 1800s) was due to increased solar radiation prior to 1940. Since 1940, however, the amount of solar radiation has been dropping, so the only candidate remaining for the post-1940 warming is carbon dioxide. [ 9] "It's just the sun, or cosmic rays, or volcanic activity or methane." Nope, sorry. The amount of heat that the sun provides has been decreasing since 1940, [ 10] just the opposite of the critics' claims (Fig. 3). There is no evidence of an increase in cosmic ray particles during the past century. [ 11] Nor is there any clear evidence that large-scale volcanic events (such as the 1815 eruption of Tambora in Indonesia, which changed global climate for about a year) have any long-term effects that would explain 200 years of warming and carbon dioxide increase. Volcanoes erupt only 0.3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year, but humans emit over 29 billion tonnes a year, [ 12] roughly 100 times as much. Clearly, we have a bigger effect. Methane is a more powerful greenhouse gas, but there is 200 times more carbon dioxide than methane, so carbon dioxide is still the most important agent. [ 13] Every other alternative has been looked at and can be ruled out. The only clear-cut relationship is between human-caused carbon dioxide increase and global warming. \* "The climate records since 1995 (or 1998) show cooling." That's simply untrue. The only way to support this argument is to cherry-pick the data. [ 14] Over the short term, there was a slight cooling trend from 1998-2000, but only because 1998 was a record-breaking El Niño year, so the next few years look cooler by comparison (Fig. 4). But since 2002, the overall long-term trend of warming is unequivocal. All of the 16 hottest years ever recorded on a global scale have occurred in the

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last 20 years. They are (in order of hottest first): 2010, 2009, 1998, 2005, 2003, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2001, 1997, 2008, 1995, 1999, 1990, and 2000.[ 15] In other words, every year since 2000 has been on the Top Ten hottest years list. The rest of the top 16 include 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. Only 1996 failed to make the list (because of the short-term cooling mentioned already). \* "We had record snows in the winter of 2009-2010, and also in 2010-2011." So what? This is nothing more than the difference between weather (short-term seasonal changes) and climate (the long-term average of weather over decades and centuries and longer). Our local weather tells us nothing about another continent, or the global average; it is only a local effect, determined by short-term atmospheric and oceanographic conditions.[ 16] In fact, warmer global temperatures mean more moisture in the atmosphere, which increases the intensity of normal winter snowstorms. In this particular case, the climate change critics forget that the early winter of November-December 2009 was actually very mild and warm, and then only later in January and February did it get cold and snow heavily. That warm spell in early winter helped bring more moisture into the system, so that when cold weather occurred, the snows were worse. In addition, the snows were unusually heavy only in North America; the rest of the world had different weather, and the global climate was warmer than average. Also, the summer of 2010 was the hottest on record, breaking the previous record set in 2009. \* "Carbon dioxide is good for plants, so the world will be better off." Who do they think they're kidding? The Competitive Enterprise Institute (funded by oil and coal companies and conservative foundations[ 17]) has run a series of shockingly stupid ads concluding with the tag line "Carbon dioxide: they call it pollution, we call it life." Anyone who knows the basic science of earth's atmosphere can spot the gross inaccuracies in this ad.[ 18] True, plants take in carbon dioxide that animals exhale, as they have for millions of years. But the whole point of the global warming evidence (as shown from ice cores) is that the delicate natural balance of carbon dioxide has been thrown off balance by our production of too much of it, way in excess of what plants or the oceans can handle. As a consequence, the oceans are warming[ 19, 20] and absorbing excess carbon dioxide making them more acidic. Already we are seeing a shocking decline in coral reefs ("bleaching") and extinctions in many marine ecosystems that can't handle too much of a good thing. Meanwhile, humans are busy cutting down huge areas of temperate and tropical forests, which not only means there are fewer plants to absorb the gas, but the slash and burn practices are releasing more carbon dioxide than plants can keep up with. There is much debate as to whether increased carbon dioxide might help agriculture in some parts of the world, but that has to be measured against the fact that other traditional "breadbasket" regions (such as the American Great Plains) are expected to get too hot to be as productive as they are today. The latest research[ 21] actually shows that increased carbon dioxide inhibits the absorption of nitrogen into plants, so plants (at least those that we depend upon today) are not going to flourish in a greenhouse world. It is difficult to know if those who tell the public otherwise are ignorant of basic atmospheric science and global geochemistry, or if they are being cynically disingenuous. \* "I agree that climate is changing, but I'm skeptical that humans are the main cause, so we shouldn't do anything." This is just fence sitting. A lot of reasonable skeptics deplore the right wing's rejection of the reality of climate change, but still want to be skeptical about the cause. If they want proof, they can examine the huge array of data that points directly to human caused global warming.[ 22] We can directly measure the amount of carbon dioxide humans are producing, and it tracks exactly with the amount of increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide. **Through carbon isotope analysis, we can show that this carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is coming directly from our burning of fossil fuels,** not from natural sources. We can also measure the drop in oxygen as it combines with the increased carbon levels to produce carbon dioxide. We have satellites in space that are measuring the heat released from the planet and can actually see the atmosphere getting warmer. The most crucial evidence emerged only within the past few years: climate models of the greenhouse effect predict that there should be cooling in the stratosphere (the upper layer of the atmosphere above 10 km or 6 miles in elevation), but warming in the troposphere (the bottom layer below 10 km or 6 miles), and that's exactly what our space probes have measured. Finally, we can rule out any other suspects (see above): solar heat is decreasing since 1940, not increasing, and there are no measurable increases in cosmic rays, methane, volcanic gases, or any other potential cause. Face it -- it's our problem. Why Do People Continue to Question the Reality of Climate Change? Thanks to all the noise and confusion over climate change, the general public has only a vague idea of what the debate is really about, and only about half of Americans think global warming is real or that we are to blame.[ 23] As in the evolution/creationism debate, the scientific community is virtually unanimous on what the data demonstrate about anthropogenic global warming. This has been true for over a decade. When science historian Naomi Oreskes[ 24] surveyed all peer-reviewed papers on climate change published between 1993 and 2003 in the world's leading scientific journal, *Science*, she found that there were 980 supporting the idea of human-induced global warming and none opposing it. In 2009, Doran and Kendall Zimmerman[ 25] surveyed all the climate scientists who were familiar with the data. They found that **99% agreed that global warming is real and human caused.** In 2010, the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published a study that showed that 98% of the scientists who actually do research in climate change are in agreement over anthropogenic global warming.[ 26] Every major scientific organization in the world has endorsed the conclusion of anthropogenic climate change as well. This is a rare degree of agreement within such an independent and cantankerous group as the world's top scientists. This is the same degree of scientific consensus that scientists have achieved over most major ideas, including gravity, evolution, and relativity. These and only a few other topics in science can claim this degree of agreement among nearly all the world's leading scientists, especially among everyone who is close to the scientific data and knows the problem intimately. If it were not such a controversial topic politically, there would be almost no interest in debating it since the evidence is so clear-cut. If the climate science community speaks with one voice (as in the 2007 IPCC report, and every report since then), why is there still any debate at all? The answer has been revealed by a number of investigations by diligent reporters who got past the PR machinery denying global warming, and uncovered the money trail. Originally, there were no real "dissenters" to the idea of global warming by scientists who are actually involved with climate research. Instead, the forces with vested interests in denying global climate change (the energy companies, and the "free-market" advocates) followed the strategy of tobacco companies: create a smokescreen of confusion and prevent the American public from recognizing scientific consensus. As the famous memo[ 27] from the tobacco lobbyists said "Doubt is our product." The denialists

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generated an anti-science movement entirely out of thin air and PR. The evidence for this PR conspiracy has been well documented in numerous sources. For example, Oreskes and Conway revealed from memos leaked to the press that in April 1998 the right-wing Marshall Institute, SEPP (Fred Seitz's lobby that aids tobacco companies and polluters), and ExxonMobil, met in secret at the American Petroleum Institute's headquarters in Washington, D.C. There they planned a \$20 million campaign to get "respected scientists" to cast doubt on climate change, get major PR efforts going, and lobby Congress that global warming isn't real and is not a threat. The right-wing institutes and the energy lobby beat the bushes to find scientists -- any scientists -- who might disagree with the scientific consensus. As investigative journalists and scientists have documented over and over again,[ 28] the denialist conspiracy essentially paid for the testimony of anyone who could be useful to them. The day that the 2007 IPCC report was released (Feb. 2, 2007), the British newspaper The Guardian reported that the conservative American Enterprise Institute (funded largely by oil companies and conservative think tanks) had offered \$10,000 plus travel expenses to scientists who would write negatively about the IPCC report.[ 29] In February 2012, leaks of documents from the denialist Heartland Institute revealed that they were trying to influence science education, suppress the work of scientists, and had paid off many prominent climate deniers, such as Anthony Watts, all in an effort to circumvent the scientific consensus by doing an "end run" of PR and political pressure. Other leaks have shown 9 out of 10 major climate deniers are paid by ExxonMobil. [ 30] We are accustomed to hired-gun "experts" paid by lawyers to muddy up the evidence in the case they are fighting, but this is extraordinary -- buying scientists outright to act as shells for organizations trying to deny scientific reality. With this kind of money, however, you can always find a fringe scientist or crank or someone with no relevant credentials who will do what they're paid to do. Fishing around to find anyone with some science background who will agree with you and dispute a scientific consensus is a tactic employed by the creationists to sound "scientific". The NCSE created a satirical "Project Steve,"[ 31] which demonstrated that there were more scientists who accept evolution named "Steve" than the total number of "scientists who dispute evolution". It may generate lots of PR and a smokescreen to confuse the public, but it doesn't change the fact that scientists who actually do research in climate change are unanimous in their insistence that anthropogenic global warming is a real threat. Most scientists I know and respect work very hard for little pay, yet they still cannot be paid to endorse some scientific idea they know to be false. The climate deniers have a lot of other things in common with creationists and other anti-science movements. They too like to quote someone out of context ("quote mining"), finding a short phrase in the work of legitimate scientists that seems to support their position. But when you read the full quote in context, it is obvious that they have used the quote inappropriately. The original author meant something that does not support their goals. The "Climategate scandal" is a classic case of this. It started with a few stolen emails from the Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia. If you read the complete text of the actual emails[ 32] and comprehend the scientific shorthand of climate scientists who are talking casually to each other, it is clear that there was no great "conspiracy" or that they were faking data. All six subsequent investigations have cleared Philip Jones and the other scientists of the University of East Anglia of any wrongdoing or conspiracy.[ 33] Even if there had been some conspiracy on the part of these few scientists, there is no reason to believe that the entire climate science community is secretly working together to generate false information and mislead the public. If there's one thing that is clear about science, it's about competition and criticism, not conspiracy and collusion. Most labs are competing with each other, not conspiring together. If one lab publishes a result that is not clearly defensible, other labs will quickly correct it. As James Lawrence Powell wrote: Scientists...show no evidence of being more interested in politics or ideology than the average American. Does it make sense to believe that tens of thousands of scientists would be so deeply and secretly committed to bringing down capitalism and the American way of life that they would spend years beyond their undergraduate degrees working to receive master's and Ph.D. degrees, then go to work in a government laboratory or university, plying the deep oceans, forbidding deserts, icy poles, and torrid jungles, all for far less money than they could have made in industry, all the while biding their time like a Russian sleeper agent in an old spy novel? Scientists tend to be independent and resist authority. That is why you are apt to find them in the laboratory or in the field, as far as possible from the prying eyes of a supervisor. Anyone who believes he could organize thousands of scientists into a conspiracy has never attended a single faculty meeting.[ 34] There are many more traits that the climate deniers share with the creationists and Holocaust deniers and others who distort the truth. They pick on small disagreements between different labs as if scientists can't get their story straight, when in reality there is always a fair amount of give and take between competing labs as they try to get the answer right before the other lab can do so. The key point here is that when all these competing labs around the world have reached a consensus and get the same answer, there is no longer any reason to doubt their common conclusion. The anti-scientists of climate denialism will also point to small errors by individuals in an effort to argue that the entire enterprise cannot be trusted. It is true that scientists are human, and do make mistakes, but the great power of the scientific method is that peer review weeds these out, so that when scientists speak with consensus, there is no doubt that their data are checked carefully. Finally, a powerful line of evidence that this is a purely political controversy, rather than a scientific debate, is that the membership lists of the creationists and the climate deniers are highly overlapping. Both anti-scientific dogmas are fed to their overlapping audiences through right-wing media such as Fox News, Glenn Beck, and Rush Limbaugh. Just take a look at the "Intelligent-design" creationism website for the Discovery Institute. Most of the daily news items lately have nothing to do with creationism at all, but are focused on climate denial and other right-wing causes.[ 35] If the data about global climate change are indeed valid and robust, any qualified scientist should be able to look at them and see if the prevailing scientific interpretation holds up. Indeed, such a test took place. Starting in 2010, a group led by U.C. Berkeley physicist Richard Muller re-examined all the temperature data from the NOAA, East Anglia Hadley Climate Research Unit, and the Goddard Institute of Space Science sources. Even though Muller started out as a skeptic of the temperature data, and was funded by the Koch brothers and other oil company sources, he carefully checked and re-checked

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the research himself. When the GOP leaders called him to testify before the House Science and Technology Committee in spring 2011, they were expecting him to discredit the temperature data. Instead, Muller shocked his GOP sponsors by demonstrating his scientific integrity and telling the truth: the temperature increase is real, and the scientists who have demonstrated that the climate is changing are right (Fig. 5). In the fall of 2011, his study was published, and the conclusions were clear: global warming is real, even to a right-wing skeptical scientist. Unlike the hired-gun scientists who play political games, Muller did what a true scientist should do: if the data go against your biases and preconceptions, then do the right thing and admit it -- even if you've been paid by sponsors who want to discredit global warming. Muller is a shining example of a scientist whose integrity and honesty came first, and did not sell out to the highest bidder.[ 36] \* Science and Anti-Science The conclusion is clear: there's science, and then there's the anti-science of global warming denial. As we have seen, there is a nearly unanimous consensus among climate scientists that anthropogenic global warming is real and that we must do something about it. Yet the smokescreen, bluster and lies of the deniers has created enough doubt so that only half of the American public is convinced the problem requires action. Ironically, the U.S. is almost alone in questioning its scientific reality. International polls taken of 33,000 people in 33 nations in 2006 and 2007 show that 90% of their citizens regard climate change as a serious problem[ 37] and 80% realize that humans are the cause of it.[ 38] Just as in the case of creationism, the U.S. is out of step with much of the rest of the world in accepting scientific reality. It is not just the liberals and environmentalists who are taking climate change seriously. Historically conservative institutions (big corporations such as General Electric and many others such as insurance companies and the military) are already planning on how to deal with global warming. Many of my friends high in the oil companies tell me of the efforts by those companies to get into other forms of energy, because they know that cheap oil will be running out soon and that the effects of burning oil will make their business less popular. BP officially stands for "British Petroleum," but in one of their ad campaigns about 5 years ago, it stood for "Beyond Petroleum." [ 39] Although they still spend relatively little of their total budgets on alternative forms of energy, the oil companies still see the handwriting on the wall about the eventual exhaustion of oil -- and they are acting like any company that wants to survive by getting into a new business when the old one is dying. The Pentagon (normally not a left-wing institution) is also making contingency plans for how to fight wars in an era of global climate change, and analyzing what kinds of strategic threats might occur when climate change alters the kinds of enemies we might be fighting, and water becomes a scarce commodity. The New York Times reported[ 40] that in December 2008, the National Defense University outlined plans for military strategy in a greenhouse world. To the Pentagon, the big issue is global chaos and the potential of even nuclear conflict. The world must "prepare for the inevitable effects of abrupt climate change -- which will likely come [the only question is when] regardless of human activity." Insurance companies have no political axe to grind. If anything, they tend to be on the conservative side. They are simply in the business of assessing risk in a realistic fashion so they can accurately gauge their future insurance policies and what to charge for them. Yet they are all investing heavily in research on the disasters and risks posed by climatic change. In 2005, a study commissioned by the re-insurer Swiss Re said, "Climate change will significantly affect the health of humans and ecosystems and these impacts will have economic consequences." [ 41] Some people may still try to deny scientific reality, but big businesses like oil and insurance and conservative institutions like the military cannot afford to be blinded or deluded by ideology. They must plan for the real world that we will be seeing in the next few decades. They do not want to be caught unprepared and harmed by global climatic change when it threatens their survival. Neither can we as a society.

### **And, CO2 emissions will destroy the ocean - causes extinction** **Sify 10**

Citing Professors @ University of Queensland and North Carolina, (Sify News, Citing Ove Hoegh-Gulberg, Professor @ University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute AND Citing John Bruno, Associate Professor of Marine Science @ UNC, "Could unbridled climate changes lead to human extinction?," June 19th, <http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html>)

Sydney: Scientists have sounded alarm bells about how **growing concentrations of greenhouse gases are driving irreversible and dramatic changes in the way the oceans function, providing evidence that humankind could well be on the way to the next great extinction.** **The findings** of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' **emerged from a synthesis of recent research** on the world's oceans, **carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists.** One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). **We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for** the overall well-being of humans, including **the capacity of the planet to support people.** This is further evidence that **we are well on the way to the next great**

**extinction event**, says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly **if the trend continues**. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!', he added. 'We are entering a period in which **the ocean services upon which humanity depends are beginning to fail**', he added.

**Reducing emissions now prevents extinction---it's not too late to solve**

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Dana, environmental scientist at a private environmental consulting firm in Sacramento and has a Bachelor's Degree in astrophysics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Master's Degree in physics from the University of California at Davis, 2012, "Realistically What Might The Future Climate Look Like?", <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/09/01/784931/realistically-what-might-the-future-climate-look-like/>

This is Why **Reducing Emissions is Critical**. We're not yet committed to surpassing 2°C global warming, but as Watson noted, we are quickly running out of time to realistically give ourselves a chance to stay below that 'danger limit'. However, 2°C is not a do-or-die threshold. **Every bit of CO2 emissions we can reduce means that much avoided future warming, which means that much avoided climate change impacts**. As Lonnie Thompson noted, the more global warming we manage to mitigate, the less adaption and suffering we will be forced to cope with in the future. Realistically, based on the current political climate (which we will explore in another post next week), limiting global warming to 2°C is probably the best we can do. However, there is a big difference between 2°C and 3°C, between 3°C and 4°C, and **anything greater than 4°C can probably accurately be described as catastrophic**, since various tipping points are expected to be triggered at this level. **Right now, we are on track for the catastrophic consequences (widespread coral mortality, mass extinctions, hundreds of millions of people adversely impacted by droughts, floods, heat waves, etc.). But we're not stuck on that track just yet, and we need to move ourselves as far off of it as possible by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions as soon and as much as possible.** There are of course many people who believe that the planet will not warm as much, or that the impacts of the associated climate change will be as bad as the body of scientific evidence suggests. That is certainly a possibility, and we very much hope that their optimistic view is correct. However, what we have presented here is the best summary of scientific evidence available, and it paints a very



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bleak picture if we fail to rapidly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. **If we continue forward on our current path, catastrophe is not just a possible outcome, it is the most probable outcome.** And an intelligent risk management approach would involve taking steps to prevent a catastrophic scenario if it were a mere possibility, let alone the most probable outcome. This is especially true since the most important component of the solution – carbon pricing – can be implemented at a relatively low cost, and a far lower cost than trying to adapt to the climate change consequences we have discussed here (Figure 4). Climate contrarians will often mock ‘CAGW’ (catastrophic anthropogenic global warming), but the sad reality is that CAGW is looking more and more likely every day. But **it’s critical that we don’t give up, that we keep doing everything we can do to reduce our emissions as much as possible in order to avoid as many catastrophic consequences as possible, for the sake of future generations and all species on Earth.** The future climate will probably be much more challenging for life on Earth than today’s, but **we still can and must limit the damage.**

## Biodiversity Impact

### **Warming causes mass extinctions, hurts Biod Baird '14**

(Jim, B.S. Chemistry, Owner at Global Warming Mitigation Method, "The Existential Imperative: Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion II", The energy collective, Jan 6<sup>th</sup>, 2014 <http://theenergycollective.com/jim-baird/324161/existential-imperative-ocean-thermal-energy-conversion-ii-wcp>)

The fourth IPCC assessment report projects that **40 to 70 percent of species could go extinct if Earth warms by 3.5°C.** Ominously, in the light of this projection, a recent study by Australian and French scientists published in Nature, Spread in model climate sensitivity traced to atmospheric convective mixing, predicts that unless greenhouse gas emissions are cut, the planet will heat up by a minimum of 4°C by 2100 and by more than 8°C by 2200. Compounding the bad news, two German scientists have confirmed the earlier work of a U.S.-led group that found reducing sunlight by geoengineering – the most widely assumed last line of defence in the face of climate change - will not cool the planet. It will however disrupt global rainfall patterns. The Australian/French research indicates that fewer clouds form as the planet warms, meaning less sunlight is reflected back into space, driving temperatures up further. The way clouds affect global warming has been the biggest mystery surrounding future climate change and the main reason why a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration is reflected in various climate models as a rise in temperature ranging between 1.5 to 5 degrees Celsius are unlikely to succeed in restoring the original climatic conditions. If you make the atmosphere warmer, but keep the sunlight the same, evaporation increases by 2 percent per degree of warming. If you keep the atmosphere the same, but increase the level of sunlight, evaporation increases by 3 percent per degree of warming. Water is a more powerful greenhouse gas than CO<sub>2</sub>. Kleidon used the analogy of a saucepan on a kitchen stove. "The temperature in the pot is increased by putting on a lid, or by turning up the heat – but these two cases differ by how much energy flows through the pot." While in the kitchen you can reduce your energy bill by putting the lid on, with Earth's system this slows down the water cycle with wide-ranging potential consequences.

### **Loss of biodiversity means extinction Sielen '13**

ALAN B. SIELEN is Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, "The Devolution of the Seas," Foreign Affairs, November/December, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas>

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Of all the threats looming over the planet today, one of the most alarming is the seemingly inexorable descent of the world's oceans into ecological perdition. Over the last several decades, human activities have so altered the basic chemistry of the seas that they are now experiencing evolution in reverse: a return to the barren primeval waters of hundreds of millions of years ago.¶ A visitor to the oceans at the dawn of time would have found an underwater world that was mostly lifeless. Eventually, around 3.5 billion years ago, basic organisms began to emerge from the primordial ooze. This microbial soup of algae and bacteria needed little oxygen to survive. Worms, jellyfish, and toxic fireweed ruled the deep. In time, these simple organisms began to evolve into higher life forms, resulting in the wondrously rich diversity of fish, corals, whales, and other sea life one associates with the oceans today.¶ Yet that sea life is now in peril. Over the last 50 years -- a mere blink in geologic time -- humanity has come perilously close to reversing the almost miraculous biological abundance of the deep. Pollution, overfishing, the destruction of habitats, and climate change are emptying the oceans and enabling the lowest forms of life to regain their dominance. The oceanographer Jeremy Jackson calls it "the rise of slime": the transformation of once complex oceanic ecosystems featuring intricate food webs with large animals into simplistic systems dominated by microbes, jellyfish, and disease. In effect, humans are eliminating the lions and tigers of the seas to make room for the cockroaches and rats.¶ The prospect of vanishing whales, polar bears, bluefin tuna, sea turtles, and wild coasts should be worrying enough on its own. But the disruption of entire ecosystems threatens our very survival, since it is the healthy functioning of these diverse systems that sustains life on earth. Destruction on this level will cost humans dearly in terms of food, jobs, health, and quality of life. It also violates the unspoken promise passed from one generation to the next of a better future.

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**\*\*Growth Bad\*\***

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## **Growth Bad – Topshelf**

## Growth Bad – 1NC

**Growth is unsustainable and inevitably results in environmental collapse and extinction—catastrophic tipping points are coming soon. Only immediately putting the brakes on economic growth can solve**

**Smith, UCLA history PhD, 2013** (Richard, “‘Sleepwalking to Extinction’: Capitalism and the Destruction of Life and Earth,” Common Dreams, 11/15/13, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2013/11/15/sleepwalking-extinction-capitalism-and-destruction-life-and-earth>, IC)

For all the climate summits, promises of “voluntary restraint,” carbon trading and carbon taxes, the growth of CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations have not just been unceasing, they have been accelerating in what scientists have dubbed the “Keeling Curve.” In the early 1960s, CO2 ppm concentrations in the atmosphere grew by 0.7ppm per year. In recent decades, especially as China has industrialized, the growth rate has tripled to 2.1 ppm per year. In just the first 17 weeks of 2013, CO2 levels jumped by 2.74 ppm compared to last year. Carbon concentrations have not been this high since the Pliocene period, between 3m and 5m years ago, when global average temperatures were 3°C or 4°C hotter than today, the Arctic was ice-free, sea levels were about 40m higher and jungles covered northern Canada; Florida, meanwhile, was under water along with other coastal locations we now call New York, London, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Sydney and many others. Crossing this threshold has fuelled fears that we are fast approaching converging “tipping points” — melting of the subarctic tundra or the thawing and releasing of the vast quantities of methane in the Arctic sea bottom — that will accelerate global warming beyond any human capacity to stop it. “I wish it weren’t true, but it looks like the world is going to blow through the 400 ppm level without losing a beat,” said Scripps Institute geochemist Ralph Keeling, son of Charles Keeling. “At this pace, we’ll hit 450 ppm within a few decades.” “It feels like the inevitable march toward disaster,” said Maureen E. Raymo, a scientist at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, a unit of Columbia University. Why are we marching toward disaster, “sleepwalking to extinction” as the Guardian’s George Monbiot once put it? Why can’t we slam on the brakes before we ride off the cliff to collapse? I’m going to argue here that the problem is rooted in the requirement of capitalist production. Large corporations can’t help themselves; they can’t change or change very much. So long as we live under this corporate capitalist system we have little choice but to go along in this destruction, to keep pouring on the gas instead of slamming on the brakes, and that the only alternative — impossible as this may seem right now — is to overthrow this global economic system and all of the governments of the 1% that prop it up and replace them with a global economic democracy, a radical bottom-up political democracy, an eco-socialist civilization. Although we are fast approaching the precipice of

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ecological collapse, the means to derail this train wreck are in the making as, around the world we are witnessing a near simultaneous global mass democratic “awakening” — as the Brazilians call it — from Tahir Square to Zucotti Park, from Athens to Istanbul to Beijing and beyond such as the world has never seen. To be sure, like Occupy Wall Street, these movements are still inchoate, are still mainly protesting what’s wrong rather than fighting for an alternative social order. Like Occupy, they have yet to clearly and robustly answer that crucial question: “Don’t like capitalism, what’s your alternative?” Yet they are working on it, and they are for the most part instinctively and radically democratic; in this lies our hope. Capitalism is, overwhelmingly, the main driver of planetary ecological collapse. From climate change to natural resource overconsumption to pollution, the engine that has powered three centuries of accelerating economic development, revolutionizing technology, science, culture and human life itself is, today, a roaring out-of-control locomotive mowing down continents of forests, sweeping oceans of life, clawing out mountains of minerals, pumping out lakes of fuels, devouring the planet’s last accessible natural resources to turn them into “product,” while destroying fragile global ecologies built up over eons of time. Between 1950 and 2000 the global human population more than doubled from 2.5 to 6 billion. But in these same decades, consumption of major natural resources soared more than sixfold on average, some much more. Natural gas consumption grew nearly twelvefold, bauxite (aluminum ore) fifteenfold. And so on. At current rates, Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson says that “half the world’s great forests have already been leveled and half the world’s plant and animal species may be gone by the end of this century.” Corporations aren’t necessarily evil, though plenty are diabolically evil, but they can’t help themselves. They’re just doing what they’re supposed to do for the benefit of their shareholders. Shell Oil can’t help but loot Nigeria and the Arctic and cook the climate. That’s what shareholders demand. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and other mining giants can’t resist mining Australia’s abundant coal and exporting it to China and India. Mining accounts for 19% of Australia’s GDP and substantial employment even as coal combustion is the single worst driver of global warming. IKEA can’t help but level the forests of Siberia and Malaysia to feed the Chinese mills building their flimsy disposable furniture (IKEA is the third largest consumer of lumber in the world). Apple can’t help it if the cost of extracting the “rare earths” it needs to make millions of new iThings each year is the destruction of the eastern Congo — violence, rape, slavery, forced induction of child soldiers, along with poisoning local waterways. Monsanto and DuPont and Syngenta and Bayer Crop Science have no choice but to wipe out bees, butterflies, birds, small farmers and extinguish crop diversity to secure their grip on the world’s food supply while drenching the planet in their Roundups and Atrazines and neonicotinoids. This is how giant corporations are wiping out life on earth in the course of a routine business day. And the bigger the corporations grow, the worse the problems become. In Adam Smith’s day, when the first factories and mills produced hat pins and iron tools and rolls of cloth by the thousands, capitalist freedom to make whatever they wanted didn’t much matter because they didn’t have much impact on the global environment. But today, when everything is produced in the millions and billions, then trashed today and reproduced all over again tomorrow, when the planet is looted and polluted to support all this frantic and senseless growth, it matters — a lot. The world’s climate scientists tell us we’re facing a planetary emergency. They’ve been telling us since the 1990s that if we don’t cut global fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions by 80-90% below 1990 levels by 2050 we will cross critical tipping points and global warming will accelerate beyond any human power to contain it. Yet despite all the ringing alarm bells, no corporation and no government can oppose growth and, instead, every capitalist government in the world is putting pedal to the metal to accelerate growth, to drive us full throttle off the cliff to collapse. Marxists have never had a better argument against capitalism than this inescapable and apocalyptic “contradiction.” Solutions to the ecological crisis are blindingly obvious but we can’t take the necessary steps to prevent ecological collapse because, so long as we live under capitalism, economic growth has to take priority over ecological concerns. We all know what we have to do: suppress greenhouse gas emissions. Stop over-consuming natural resources. Stop the senseless pollution of the earth, waters, and atmosphere with toxic chemicals. Stop producing waste that can’t be recycled by nature. Stop the destruction of biological diversity and ensure the rights of other species to flourish. We don’t need any new technological breakthroughs to solve these problems. Mostly, we just stop doing what we’re doing. But we can’t stop because we’re all locked into an economic system in which companies have to grow to compete and

reward their shareholders and because we all need the jobs. James Hansen, the world’s preeminent climate scientist, has argued that to save the humans: “Coal emissions must be phased out as rapidly as possible or global climate disasters will be a dead certainty ... Yes, [coal, oil, gas] most of the fossil fuels must be left in the ground. That is the explicit message that the science provides. [...] Humanity treads today on a slippery slope. As we continue to pump greenhouse gases in the air, we move onto a steeper, even more slippery incline. We seem oblivious to the danger — unaware of how close we may be to a situation in which a catastrophic slip becomes practically unavoidable, a slip where we suddenly lose all control and are pulled into a torrential stream that hurls us over a precipice to our demise.” But how can we do this under capitalism? After his climate negotiators stonewalled calls for binding limits on CO2 emissions at Copenhagen, Cancun, Cape Town and Doha, President Obama is now trying to salvage his environmental “legacy” by ordering his EPA to impose “tough” new emissions limits on existing

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power plants, especially coal-fired plants. But this won't salvage his legacy or, more importantly, his daughters' futures because how much difference would it make, really, if every coal-fired power plant in the U.S. shut down tomorrow when U.S. coal producers are free to export their coal to China, which they are doing, and when China is building another coal-fired power plant every week? The atmosphere doesn't care where the coal is burned. It only cares how much is burned. Yet how could Obama tell American mining companies to stop mining coal? This would be tantamount to socialism. But if we do not stop mining and burning coal, capitalist freedom and private property is the least we'll have to worry about. Same with Obama's "tough" new fuel economy standards. In August 2012 Obama boasted that his new Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards would "double fuel efficiency" over the next 13 years to 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, up from 28.6 mpg at present — cutting vehicle CO2 emissions in half, so helping enormously to "save the planet." But as the Center for Biological Diversity and other critics have noted, Obama was lying, as usual. First, his so-called "tough" new CAFE standards were so full of loopholes, negotiated with Detroit, that they actually encourage more gas-guzzling, not less. That's because the standards are based on a sliding scale according to "vehicle footprints" — the bigger the car, the less mileage it has to get to meet its "standard." So in fact Obama's "tough" standards are (surprise) custom designed to promote what Detroit does best — produce giant Sequoias, mountainous Denalis, Sierras, Yukons, Tundras and Ticonderogas, Ram Chargers and Ford F series luxury trucks, grossly obese Cadillac Escalades, soccer-kid Suburbans, even 8,000 (!) pound Ford Excursions — and let these gross gas hogs meet the "fleet standard." These cars and "light" trucks are among the biggest selling vehicles in America today (GM's Sierra is #1) and they get worse gas mileage than American cars and trucks half a century ago. Cadillac's current Escalade gets worse mileage than its chrome bedecked tail fin-festooned land yachts of the mid-1950s! Little wonder Detroit applauded Obama's new CAFE standards instead of damning them as usual. Secondly, what would it matter even if Obama's new CAFE standards actually did double fleet mileage — when American and global vehicle fleets are growing exponentially? In 1950 Americans had one car for every three people. Today we have 1.2 cars for every American. In 1950 when there were about 2.6 billion humans on the planet, there were 53 million cars on the world's roads — about one for every 50 persons. Today, there are 7 billion people but more than 1 billion cars and industry forecasters expect there will be 2 to 2.5 billion cars on the world's roads by mid-century. China alone is expected to have a billion. So, at the end of the day, incremental half measures like CAFE standards can't stop rising GHG emissions. Barring some technical miracle, the only way to cut vehicle emissions is to just stop making them — drastically suppress vehicle production, especially of the worst gas hogs. In theory, Obama could simply order GM to stop building its humongous gas guzzlers and switch to producing small economy cars. After all, the federal government owns the company! But of course, how could he do any such thing? Detroit lives by the mantra "big car big profit, small car small profit." Since Detroit has never been able to compete against the Japanese and Germans in the small car market, which is already glutted and nearly profitless everywhere, such an order would only doom GM to failure, if not bankruptcy (again) and throw masses of workers onto the unemployment lines. So given capitalism, Obama is, in fact, powerless. He's locked in to promoting the endless growth of vehicle production, even of the worst polluters — and lying about it all to the public to try to patch up his pathetic "legacy." And yet, if we don't suppress vehicle production, how can we stop rising CO2 emissions? In the wake of the failure of climate negotiators from Kyoto to Doha to agree on binding

limits on GHG emissions, exasperated British climate scientists Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows at the Tyndall Centre, Britain's leading climate change research center, wrote in September 2012 that we need an entirely new paradigm: Government policies must "radically change" if "dangerous" climate change is to be avoided "We urgently need to acknowledge that the development needs of many countries leave the rich western nations with little choice but to immediately and severely curb their greenhouse gas emissions... [The] misguided belief that commitments to avoid warming of 2°C can still be realized with incremental adjustments to economic incentives. A carbon tax here, a little emissions trading there and the odd voluntary agreement thrown in for good measure will not be sufficient ... long-term end-point targets (for example, 80% by 2050) have no scientific basis. What governs future global temperatures and other adverse climate impacts are the emissions from yesterday, today and those released in the next few years." And not just scientists. In its latest world energy forecast released on November 12, 2012, the International Energy Agency (IEA) warns that despite the bonanza of fossil fuels now made possible by fracking, horizontal and deepwater drilling, we can't consume them if we want to save the humans: "The climate goal of limiting global warming to 2°C is becoming more difficult and costly with each year that passes... no more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050 if the world is to achieve the 2°C goal..." Of course the science could be wrong about this. But so far climate scientists have consistently underestimated the speed and ferocity of global warming, and even prominent climate change deniers have folded their cards. Still, it's one thing for James Hansen or Bill McKibben to say we need to "leave the coal in the hole, the oil in the soil, the gas under the grass," to call for "severe curbs" in GHG emissions — in the abstract. But think about what this means in our capitalist economy. Most of us, even passionate environmental activists, don't really want to face up to the economic implications of the science we defend. That's why, if you listen to environmentalists like Bill McKibben for example, you will get the impression that global warming is mainly driven by fossil-fuel-powered electric power plants, so if we just



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“switch to renewables” this will solve the main problem and we can carry on with life more or less as we do now. Indeed, “green capitalism” enthusiasts like Thomas Friedman and the union-backed “green jobs” lobby look to renewable energy, electric cars and such as “the next great engine of industrial growth” — the perfect win-win solution. This is a not a solution. This is a delusion: greenhouse gasses are produced across the economy not just by power plants. Globally, fossil-fuel-powered electricity generation accounts for 17% of GHG emissions, heating accounts for 5%, miscellaneous “other” fuel combustion 8.6%, industry 14.7%, industrial processes another 4.3%, transportation 14.3%, agriculture 13.6%, land use changes (mainly deforestation) 12.2%. This means, for a start, that even if we immediately replaced every fossil-fuel-powered electric generating plant on the planet with 100% renewable solar, wind and water power, this would only reduce global GHG emissions by around 17%. What this means is that, far from launching a new green-energy-powered “industrial growth” boom, barring some tech-fix miracle, the only way to impose “immediate and severe curbs” on fossil fuel production/consumption would be to impose an EMERGENCY CONTRACTION in the industrialized countries: **drastically retrench and** in some cases **shut down industries**, even entire sectors, **across the economy** and around the planet — not just fossil fuel producers but all the industries that consume them and produce GHG emissions — autos, trucking, aircraft, airlines, shipping and cruise lines, construction, chemicals, plastics, synthetic fabrics, cosmetics, synthetic fiber and fabrics, synthetic fertilizer and agribusiness CAFO operations. Of course, no one wants to hear this because, given capitalism, this would unavoidably mean mass bankruptcies, **global economic collapse**, depression and mass unemployment around the world. That’s why in April 2013, in laying the political groundwork for his approval of the XL pipeline in some form, President Obama said “the politics of this are tough.” The earth’s temperature probably isn’t the “number one concern” for workers who haven’t seen a raise in a decade; have an underwater mortgage; are spending \$40 to fill their gas tank, can’t afford a hybrid car; and face other challenges.” Obama wants to save the planet but given capitalism his “number one concern” has to be growing the economy, growing jobs. Given capitalism — today, tomorrow, next year and every year — economic growth will always be the overriding priority ... till we barrel right off the cliff to collapse.

**Collapse is necessary to result in radical transition—tech can’t make the system sustainable because that tech will never be effectively used under capitalism—only crisis can spur democratic impulses to replace the global economic system**

**Adler, USC professor, 2015** (Paul S., “Book Review Essay: The Environmental Crisis and Its Capitalist Roots: Reading Naomi Klein with Karl Polanyi,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 3/17/2015, <http://asq.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/03/17/0001839215579183.full>, IC)

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This diagnosis leads to no easy remedies, clearly. But it does point to two criteria, one negative and the other positive, that might guide our way. Negatively, it is important that we not encourage the illusion that firms will do better competitively if they exercise more environmental stewardship. In reality, sometimes greater stewardship will help the firm's bottom line, and sometimes it will not, and if we hinge our hopes on market competition driving firms toward such stewardship, we will be inadvertently accelerating, not decelerating, the unfolding crisis. While applauding the goodwill demonstrated by more enlightened corporate leaders, we should be clear that their efforts are not the path to a solution. Similarly, when governments take modest steps to encourage solar or recycling or water conservation, we should be clear that these are woefully inadequate, rather than applauding them as "a good start." When the patient has cancer and needs major surgery, dieting is nice but not a cure, and it is dangerous to encourage the patient to think otherwise. Negatively too, we should not indulge the facile assumption that technological innovation will allow capitalism to adapt to the looming environmental challenges. Many economists have argued that the market will be able to deal with these challenges because the growing demand for energy-efficient equipment and buildings, for weather-resistant structures, for pest- and drought-resistant seeds, and so forth will incentivize private-sector R&D efforts in those directions. Indeed, I see no reason to believe that technological innovation could not allow a projected 10 billion people or more to live in comfort on this planet. But it defies credibility to imagine that the competitive market process, even aided by government subsidies and regulations, could mobilize the massive, sustained R&D effort that would be required, and could drive the resulting new technologies into widespread use, and could get industry to abandon the huge accumulated capital assets thus rendered obsolete, and could achieve all this in time to avert the collapse of numerous ecological and social systems. Technology can probably save us, but it surely cannot save capitalism. Positively, we need to celebrate instances in which we see the market being effectively reembedded—where investment and production decisions are being driven by social needs rather than private-profit considerations. Where city governments team up with local credit unions, pension funds, and unions to support the emergence of local cooperatives, where these cooperatives join together in planning processes that involve the local community, where these cooperatives' products respond to real economic, social, and environmental needs as determined by the people involved—here, even if the experiments are local in nature and far from the global scale we so urgently need, people can at least begin to see the contours of the kind of world we need to create. There is an impressive range of such new democratic institutions and institutional ecologies that have been quietly developing just below the surface of public awareness in recent years. They presage various ways of reembedding the economy, not as a return to pre-capitalist modes of embeddedness, but as the creation of a new form of society in which economic decisions are made under norms of democratic dialogue. Such institutions, however, will need to find social movements powerful enough to propel their global diffusion. It is here that our disempowerment is most

frustrating. At the moment, and sadly, **the best hope for the emergence of such movements lies in the chaos that we are likely to see** over the coming few decades as the environmental crises deepen. If current predictions are even approximately accurate, **that chaos will involve a** combination of widespread **economic collapse**, massive population transfers, intensifying tensions over fresh water and arable land, and proliferating epidemics. Such chaos may well galvanize mass movements powerful enough to reshape the economy on a national and indeed international scale. The turmoil of the Great Depression in the 1930s provoked the emergence of new mass movements that prompted important changes in the economic system. By comparison, the chaos likely to emerge in the near future will be far more disruptive, and the movements it provokes will therefore probably articulate far more radical goals. Like the Great Depression, however, the looming chaos will represent a very dangerous period, as it will confront us with very stark choices between despotism or autocracy on the one hand—benefitting from a well-oiled arsenal of ideological as well as military weapons—and on the other hand, a highly uncertain path of social experimentation toward a radical deepening and broadening of democracy.

**No transition wars – economic collapse results in military budget cuts – but growth increases the propensity for conflict**

**Clary, 4/21/15- PHD candidate at MIT**

(Christopher, Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, MIT Political Science Department, p.4, [//WB">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2597712\)//WB](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)

Economic Crisis Leads to Austerity **Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish.**

Planning almost invariably assumes growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. **When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures.**

This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, **intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure.**

These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.<sup>6</sup> As Paul Pierson has argued, **“The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”**<sup>7</sup>

Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending **At a minimum, the political costs of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures alone make such a path unappealing.** In practice, **this can spur policymakers to curtail national security spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil.** There is often

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more discretion over defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so **defense expenditures are doubly costly since they both take up valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas**, rather than constituencies at home. **Pursuing defense cuts may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector**, which shows a strong aversion to military conflict even if that means policies of appeasement and conciliation.<sup>8</sup> **During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs associated with defense expenditure**—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—**are real but acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different types of spending**. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and arms industries, but **even in militarized economies this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller than those that favor social and economic expenditures** over military ones. Defense Cutbacks Encourage Rapprochement **An interest in defense cutbacks can lead to conciliatory behavior through two paths. First, the cutbacks themselves serve as a concrete signal to adversaries that the military threat** posed by the economically distressed state **is declining. This permits the other state to halt that portion of defense spending dedicated to keeping up**, breaking the back of ongoing arms races through reciprocated, but non-negotiated moves. Unilateral conventional **force reductions were a major element of Gorbachev's foreign policy in the late 1980s**, alongside negotiated strategic arms control, and diplomatic efforts to achieve political understandings with the United States.<sup>9</sup> Gorbachev similarly used force reductions in Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Far East to signal to China in 1987 that he was serious about political negotiations.<sup>10</sup> Elsewhere, non-negotiated, tit-for-tat military redeployments facilitated Argentina-Brazil rapprochement.<sup>11</sup> **Second, leaders may believe cutbacks are necessary, but would be dangerous in the absence of negotiated improvements with traditional foes. Economic downturns can serve as motivation to pursue arms control or political settlement.** During periods of normalcy, such outcomes would be positives, but are viewed as “too hard” by political leaders that move from one urgent problem to the next. **During periods of economic crisis**, however, **arms control or political improvements might allow for much needed cuts in defense spending, and are pursued with greater vigor. The Johnson administration attempted both unilateral and negotiated arms limitations because of budgetary concerns** as President Johnson and Secretary McNamara struggled to pay for the “Great Society” domestic programs and the increasingly costly Vietnam War. They first attempted unilateral “caps” on costly nuclear forces and anti-ballistic missile defenses and when this failed to lead to a reciprocal Soviet response they engaged in formal arms control talks. Détente continued in the Nixon administration, accelerating in 1971 and 1972, simultaneous with rising budget deficits and inflation so serious that Nixon instituted price controls. **Nixon's decision to sharply limit anti-ballistic missile defenses to enable arms control talks was contrary to his strategic views, but necessitated by a difficult budgetary environment that made paying for more missile defense emplacements unrealistic.**<sup>12</sup> As Nixon told his national security advisor Kissinger in an April 1972 discussion of ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile developments: “You know **we've got a hell of a budget problem. We've got to cut it down, we've got to cut 5 billion dollars off next year's defense budget**.” So, I don't want to [inaudible: do it?] unless we've got some settlement with the Russians.”<sup>13</sup> In practice, **unilateral defense cuts and force reductions are frequently combined with negotiated political agreements in a sequential, iterative fashion, where a unilateral reduction will signal seriousness that opens the way for political agreement, which in turn permits even deeper reductions.** Defense cuts and force reductions are not only a means to achieve rivalry termination, but also a goal in and of themselves that rivalry termination helps secure. Leaders are seeking resources from defense they can use elsewhere. Thus when Argentine leader Raul Alfonsín campaigned for the need for drastic budgetary austerity, his specific “platform was the reduction of military spending to use it for the other ministries, connected with the concept of eliminating the hypothesis of conflict” with Argentinian rivals, according to Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, who served in Alfonsín's ministry of defense (and later was Argentina's foreign minister).<sup>14</sup> Similarly, **Gorbachev was motivated to reduce arms in the late 1980s because he determined it was necessary to cut Soviet defense spending and defense production**, and repurpose part of the defense industry to make consumer and civilian capital goods, according to contemporary U.S. Central Intelligence Agency classified assessments.<sup>15</sup> Thus the “main reason” why strategic arms control breakthroughs occurred from 1986 to 1988 and the Soviet Afghan intervention concluded in 1989 was a realization within the Politburo of “excessively high expenditures on defense,” according to Nikolai Ryzhkov, Gorbachev's prime minister.<sup>16</sup>

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## **Growth Unsustainable**

## Unsustainable – Topshelf 2NC

### **The system is unsustainable – nothing short of full economic transition solves**

**Smith, UCLA history PhD, 2013** (Richard, “‘Sleepwalking to Extinction’: Capitalism and the Destruction of Life and Earth,” Common Dreams, 11/15/13, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2013/11/15/sleepwalking-extinction-capitalism-and-destruction-life-and-earth>, IC)

There’s no technical solution to this problem and no market solution either. In a very few cases — electricity generation is the main one — a broad shift to renewables could indeed sharply reduce fossil fuel emissions in that sector. But if we just use “clean” “green” energy to power more growth, consume ever more natural resources, then we solve nothing and would still be headed to collapse. Producing millions of electric cars instead of millions of gasoline-powered cars, as I explained elsewhere, would be just as ecologically destructive and polluting, if in somewhat different ways, even if they were all run on solar power. Substituting biofuels for fossil fuels in transportation just creates different but no less environmentally-destructive problems: converting farm land to raise biofuel feedstock pits food production against fuels. Converting rainforests, peatlands, savannas or grasslands to produce biofuels releases more CO2 into the atmosphere than the fossil fuels they replace and accelerates species extinction. More industrial farming means more demand for water, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. And so on. Cap and trade schemes can’t cut fossil fuel emissions because business understands, even if some environmentalists do not, that “dematerialization” is a fantasy, that there’s no win-win tech solution, that capping emissions means cutting growth. Since cutting growth is unacceptable to business, labor and governments, cap and trade has been abandoned everywhere. Carbon taxes can’t stop global warming either because they do not cap emissions. That’s why fossil fuel execs like Rex Tillerson, CEO of ExxonMobil (the largest private oil company in the world) and Paul Anderson, CEO of Duke Energy (the largest electric utility in the U.S.) support carbon taxes. They understand that carbon taxes would add something to the cost of doing business, like other taxes, but they pose no limit, no “cap” on growth. ExxonMobil predicts that, carbon tax or no carbon tax, by 2040 global demand for energy is going to grow by 35%, 65% in the developing world and nearly all of this is going to be supplied by fossil fuels. ExxonMobil is not looking to “leave the oil in the soil” as a favor to Bill McKibben and the humans. ExxonMobil is looking to pump it and burn it all as fast as possible to enrich its shareholders. Hansen, McKibben, Obama — and most of us really — don’t want to face up to the economic implications of the need to put the brakes on growth and fossil fuel-based overconsumption. We all “need” to live in denial, and believe in delusions that carbon taxes or some tech fix will save us because we all know that capitalism has to grow or we’ll all be out of work. And the thought of replacing capitalism seems so impossible, especially given the powers arrayed

against change. But what's the alternative? In the not-so-distant future, **this is all going to come to a screeching halt one way or another — either we seize hold of this out-of-control locomotive, or we ride this train right off the cliff to collapse.** Emergency Contraction or Global Ecological Collapse? If there's no market mechanism to stop plundering the planet then, again, what alternative is there but to impose an emergency contraction on resource consumption? This doesn't mean we would have to de-industrialize and go back to riding horses and living in log cabins. But it does mean that we would have to abandon the "consumer economy" — shut down all kinds of unnecessary, wasteful and polluting industries from junkfood to cruise ships, disposable Pampers to disposable H&M clothes, disposable IKEA furniture, endless new model cars, phones, electronic games, the lot. Plus all the banking, advertising, junk mail, most retail, etc. We would have completely redesign production to replace "fast junk food" with healthy, nutritious, fresh "slow food," replace "fast fashion" with "slow fashion," bring back mending, alterations and local tailors and shoe repairmen. We would have to completely redesign production of appliances, electronics, housewares, furniture and so on to be as durable and long-lived as possible. Bring back appliance repairmen and such. We would have to abolish the throwaway disposables industries, the packaging and plastic bag industrial complex, bring back refillable bottles and the like. We would have to design and build housing to last for centuries, to be as energy efficient as possible, to be reconfigurable, and shareable. We would have to vastly expand public transportation to curb vehicle use but also build those we do need to last and be shareable like Zipcar or Paris' municipally-owned "Autolib" shared electric cars. These are the sorts of things we would have to do if we really want to stop overconsumption and save the world. All these changes are simple, self-evident, no great technical challenge. They just require a completely different kind of economy, an economy geared to producing what we need while conserving resources for future generations of humans and for other species with which we share this planet.

**Every resource is past its peak or will be in the next century, global decline is coming in less than a decade**

**Ahmed 14**

(Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, and taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, 6/4/2014, The Guardian, "Exhaustion of cheap mineral resources is terraforming Earth – scientific report", [//WB](http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/04/mineral-resource-fossil-fuel-depletion-terraform-earth-collapse-civilisation)



**A new landmark scientific report drawing on the work of the world's leading mineral experts forecasts that industrial civilisation's extraction of critical minerals and fossil fuel resources is reaching the limits of economic feasibility, and could lead to a collapse of key infrastructures** unless new ways to manage resources are implemented. **The peer-reviewed study – the 33rd Report to the Club of Rome – is authored by Prof Ugo Bardi of the Department of Earth Sciences at the University of Florence, where he teaches physical chemistry. It includes specialist contributions from fifteen senior scientists and experts across the fields of geology, agriculture, energy, physics, economics, geography, transport, ecology, industrial ecology, and biology, among others.** The Club of Rome is a Swiss-based global think tank founded in 1968 consisting of current and former heads of state, UN bureaucrats, government officials, diplomats, scientists, economists and business leaders. **Its latest report**, to be released on 12th June, **conducts a comprehensive overview of the history and evolution of mining, and argues that the increasing costs of mineral extraction due to pollution, waste, and depletion of low-cost sources will eventually make the present structure of industrial civilisation unsustainable.** Much of the report's focus is on the concept of Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI), which measures the amount of energy needed to extract resources. While making clear that "we are not running out of any mineral," **the report finds that "extraction is becoming more and more difficult as the easy ores are depleted. More energy is needed to maintain past production rates, and even more is needed to increase them."** As a consequence, despite large quantities of remaining mineral reserves: "The production of many mineral commodities appears to be on the verge of decline... we may be going through a century-long cycle that will lead to the disappearance of mining as we know it." **The last decade has seen the world shift to more expensive and difficult to extract fossil fuel resources, in the form of unconventional forms of oil and gas, which have much lower levels of EROEI than conventional oil. Even with technological breakthroughs in fracking and associated drilling techniques, this trend is unlikely to reverse significantly.** Advertisement A former senior executive in Australia's oil, gas and coal industry, Ian Dunlop, describes in the report how **fracking can rise production "rapidly to a peak, but it then declines rapidly, too**, often by 80 to 95 percent over the first three years." This means that often "several thousand wells" are needed for a single shale play to provide "a return on investment." The average EROEI to run "industrial society as we know it" is about 8 to 10. Shale oil and gas, tar sands, and coal seam gas are all "at, or below, that level if their full costs are accounted for... Thus **fracking**, in energy terms, **will not provide a source on which to develop sustainable global society."** The Club of Rome report also applies the EROEI analysis to extraction of coal and uranium. **World coal production will peak by 2050 latest, and could peak as early as 2020.** US coal production has already peaked, and future production will be determined largely by China. But rising domestic demand from the latter, and from India, could generate higher prices and shortages in the near future: **"Therefore, there is definitely no scope for substituting for oil and gas with coal."** **As for global uranium supplies**, the report says that current uranium **production from mines is already insufficient to fuel existing nuclear reactors**, a gap being filled by recovery of uranium military stockpiles and old nuclear warheads. While the production gap could be closed at current levels of demand, a worldwide expansion of nuclear power would be unsustainable due to "gigantic investments" needed. Report contributor Michael Dittmar, a nuclear physicist at CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research, argues that **despite large quantities of uranium** in the Earth's crust, **only a "limited numbers of deposits" are "concentrated enough to be profitably mined."** Mining less concentrated deposits would require "far more energy than the mined uranium could ultimately produce." The rising costs of uranium mining, among other costs, has meant that nuclear power investment is tapering off. **Proposals to extract uranium from seawater are** currently **"useless" because "the energy needed to extract and process** uranium from seawater **would be about the same as the energy that could be obtained by the same uranium** using the current nuclear technology." Therefore within this decade, the report forecasts an "unavoidable" production decline from existing uranium mines. US Geological Survey data analysed by the report shows that **chromium, molybdenum, tungsten, nickel, platinum-palladium, copper, zinc, cadmium, titanium, and tin will face peak production followed by declines w**ithin this century. This is because declared reserves are often "more hypothetical than measured", meaning the "assumption of mineral bonanzas... are far removed from reality." In particular, **the report highlights the fate of copper, lithium, nickel and zinc. Physicist Prof Rui Namorado Rosa projects an "imminent slowdown of copper availability"** in the report. Although production has grown exponentially, the grade of the minerals mined is steadily declining, lifting mining costs.

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'Peak copper' is likely to hit by 2040, but could even occur within the next decade. Production of **lithium production**, presently used for batteries electric cars, **would also be strained under a large-scale electrification** of transport infrastructure and vehicles, according to contributor Emilia Suomalainen, an industrial ecologist of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. Sustainable lithium production requires 80-100% recycling – currently this stands at less than 1%. **Nickel and zinc**, which are used to combat iron and steel corrosion and for electricity storage in batteries, **also could face production peaks in just "a few decades"** – though nickel might be extended some 80 years – according to engineer and metals specialist Philippe Bihoux: "**The easily exploited part of the reserves has been already removed**, and so it will be increasingly difficult and expensive to invest in and exploit nickel and zinc mines." While substitution could help in many cases, it would also be costly and uncertain, requiring considerable investment. Perhaps **the most alarming trend in mineral depletion concerns phosphorus, which is critical to fertilise soil and sustain agriculture**. While phosphorus reserves are not running out, physical, energy and economic factors mean **only a small percentage of it can be mined**. Crop yield on 40 percent of the world's arable land is already limited by economical phosphorus availability. In the Club of Rome study, physicist Patrick Dery says that several major regions of **rock phosphate production** – such as the island of Nauru and the US, which is the world's second largest producer – **are post-peak and now declining**, with global phosphorus supplies potentially becoming insufficient to meet agricultural demand within 30-40 years. The problem can potentially be solved as phosphorus can be recycled. A parallel trend documented in the report by Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) agronomist Toufic El Asmar is **an accelerating decline in land productivity due to industrial agricultural methods, which are degrading the soil by as much as 50%** in some areas. Prof Rajendra K. Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), said that the report is "an effective piece of work" to assess the planet's mineral wealth "within the framework of sustainability." Its findings offer a "valuable basis for discussions on mineral policy." But the window for meaningful policy action is closing rapidly. "The main alarm bell is the trend in the prices of mineral commodities," Prof Bardi told me. **Prices have gone up by a factor 3-5 and have remained at these level for the past 5-6 years. They are not going to go down again**, because they are caused by irreversible increases in production costs. **These prices are already causing the decline of the less efficient economies** (say, Italy, Greece, Spain, etc.). **We are** not at the inversion point yet, but **close - less than a decade?"**

**At the current rate of growth resources will not keep up, a decline is coming**

**Gates, Trauger and Czech 14-** Professor of Wildlife Ecology, professor in natural resources management, PHD

(J. Edward, David L., and Brian, Peak Oil, "Envisioning an Alternative Future", Economic Growth, and Wildlife Conservation, Chapter 15, p.317, 21 Nov 2014 [//WB">http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3\\_15">//WB](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3_15)

**The pursuit of economic growth is prevalent** in all world economies [11]. In the USA, gross domestic product (GDP) is used as a measure of economic growth. It is made up of four major components, whose percentage contributions vary from quarter to quarter and year to year. It is comprised of approximately 68% (greater than 70% in 2012) personal consumption expenditures, 22% (12.8% in 2012) business investment, 3% (-3% in 2012) net exports of goods and services, and 8% (19.5% in 2012) government spending [4]. **GDP is often criticized as a poor measure of well-being**, as wars and natural disasters both contribute to higher GDP [33]. **"It [also] ignores social costs, environmental impacts, and income inequality"** [10], **and treats the depletion of natural capital as income**. On the other hand, GDP is a solid indicator of biodiversity loss; and, for that reason alone, it is a worthwhile metric [11, 13]. For many in the USA, growth in GDP equates to growth in personal income, business, and jobs. But, **growth in GDP does not necessarily result in greater progress or happiness**. Other

metrics have been suggested as a means of addressing these shortcomings, for example, Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), Happy Planet Index (HPI), and Gross National Happiness (GNH; [1, 42]; <http://genuineprogress.net/about/>, accessed 27 September 2013; <http://www.green.maryland.gov/mdgpi/otherindexes.asp>, accessed 27 September 2013); but, few governments have actually made one their 322 J. E. Gates et al. societal or economic goal (<http://www.green.maryland.gov/mdgpi/>, accessed 27 September 2013). US citizens, or “American consumers” as they are often called, are the major drivers of the American economy from the demand side [11]. **If consumers do not buy on credit and pay back loans with interest, growth in GDP is jeopardized.** Perfect GDP growth is neither too fast to create inflation nor too slow to create recession. If GDP were growing at the rate of 2–3% per year, most conventional economists would consider it ideal. Annual economic growth of about 3% is needed to create enough jobs to keep up with a growing population, whereas growth of 4% or more is needed to reduce the unemployment rate significantly. A stable or declining population or workforce, or declining per capita consumption, are an anathema to economic growth [11]. Needless to say, **since we live on a finite planet, there has to be a limit to economic growth. The natural world provides the raw materials and energy needed by our economy; therefore, our economy is a subset of the environment. Since there is a finite amount of natural resources available, growth will ultimately be constrained** by whatever essential resource is least available (à la Justus von Liebig’s Law of the Minimum). Recycling and using energy more efficiently can sustain the rates of consumption for a time, enabling further economic growth; but, **if we do not deal with the reality of limits, the outcome will be systematic collapse or long-running decline.** On a finite planet, **positive economic growth rates are unsustainable;** a 3% growth rate would result in a doubling of economic activity every 23.3 years, whereas a 4% rate would have a doubling time of 17.5 years. These doublings would be the equivalent of cloning the existing economy and plunking the new one on top of the old one. **These rates of growth cannot continue forever. In fact, global climate change and loss of biodiversity are indications that our economic activities have exceeded the capacity of the planet to recycle our wastes and maintain the diversity of “life on Earth.”**

**Collapse is coming—best data concludes neg  
Turner, University of Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute  
fellow and PhD, and Alexander, journalist, 2014** (Graham and Cathy, “Limits to Growth was right. New research shows we’re nearing collapse,” The Guardian, 9/1/14, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/02/limits-to-growth-was-right-new-research-shows-were-nearing-collapse>, IC)

The 1972 book Limits to Growth, which predicted our civilisation would probably collapse some time this century, has been criticised as doomsday

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fantasy since it was published. Back in 2002, self-styled environmental expert Bjorn Lomborg consigned it to the “dustbin of history”. It doesn’t belong there. Research from the University of Melbourne has found the book’s forecasts are accurate, 40 years on. If we continue to track in line with the book’s scenario, expect the early stages of global collapse to start appearing soon. Limits to Growth was commissioned by a think tank called the Club of Rome. Researchers working out of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, including husband-and-wife team Donella and Dennis Meadows, built a computer model to track the world’s economy and environment. Called World3, this computer model was cutting edge. The task was very ambitious. The team tracked industrialisation, population, food, use of resources, and pollution. They modelled data up to 1970, then developed a range of scenarios out to 2100, depending on whether humanity took serious action on environmental and resource issues. If that didn’t happen, the model predicted “overshoot and collapse” – in the economy, environment and population – before 2070. This was called the “business-as-usual” scenario. The book’s central point, much criticised since, is that “the earth is finite” and the quest for unlimited growth in population, material goods etc would eventually lead to a crash. So were they right? We decided to check in with those scenarios after 40 years. Dr Graham Turner gathered data from the UN (its department of economic and social affairs, Unesco, the food and agriculture organisation, and the UN statistics yearbook). He also checked in with the US national oceanic and atmospheric administration, the BP statistical review, and elsewhere. That data was plotted alongside the Limits to Growth scenarios. The results show that the world is tracking pretty closely to the Limits to Growth “business-as-usual” scenario. The data doesn’t match up with other scenarios. These graphs show real-world data (first from the MIT work, then from our research), plotted in a solid line. The dotted line shows the Limits to Growth “business-as-usual” scenario out to 2100. Up to 2010, the data is strikingly similar to the book’s forecasts. As the MIT researchers explained in 1972, under the scenario, growing population and demands for material wealth would lead to more industrial output and pollution. The graphs show this is indeed happening. Resources are being used up at a rapid rate, pollution is rising, industrial output and food per capita is rising. The population is rising quickly. So far, Limits to Growth checks out with reality. So what happens next? According to the book, to feed the continued growth in industrial output there must be ever-increasing use of resources. But resources become more expensive to obtain as they are used up. As more and more capital goes towards resource extraction, industrial output per capita starts to fall – in the book, from about 2015. As pollution mounts and industrial input into agriculture falls, food production per capita falls. Health and education services are cut back, and that combines to bring about a rise in the death rate from about 2020. Global population begins to fall from about 2030, by about half a billion people per decade. Living conditions fall to levels similar to the early 1900s. It’s essentially resource constraints that bring about global collapse in the book. However, Limits to Growth does factor in the fallout from increasing pollution, including climate

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change. The book warned carbon dioxide emissions would have a “climatological effect” via “warming the atmosphere”.

## Unsustainable – Complexity

### **Complex systems kill sustainability of growth patterns**

**MacKenzie**, reporter of the new scientist, 10 January 2012

(Debra, “Boom and Doom: Revisiting Prophecies of Collapse”,  
<http://www.countercurrents.org/mackenzie100112.htm>)

The first thing you might ask is, why look back at a model devised in the days when computers were bigger than your fridge but less powerful than your phone? Surely we now have far more advanced models? In fact, in many ways we have yet to improve on World3, the relatively simple model on which Limits was based. “When you think of the change in both scientific and computational capabilities since 1972, it is astounding there has been so little effort to improve upon their work,” says Yaneer Bar-Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It hasn’t happened in part because of the storm of controversy the book provoked. “Researchers lost their appetite for global modelling,” says Robert Hoffman of company WhatIf Technologies in Ottawa, Canada, which models resources for companies and governments. “Now, with peak oil, climate change and the failure of conventional economics, there is a renewed interest.” The other problem is that as models get bigger, it becomes harder to see why they produce certain outcomes and whether they are too sensitive to particular inputs, especially with complex systems. Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, who studies global systems and has used World3, thinks it may have been the best possible compromise between over-simplification and unmanageable complexity. But Hoffman and Bar-Yam’s groups are now trying to do better. Assuming that business continued as usual, World3 projected that population and industry would grow exponentially at first. Eventually, however, growth would begin to slow and would soon stop altogether as resources grew scarce, pollution soared and food became limited. “The Limits to Growth said that the human ecological footprint cannot continue to grow indefinitely, because planet Earth is physically limited,” says Jørgen Randers of the Norwegian School of Management in Oslo, one of the book’s original authors. What’s more, instead of stabilising at the peak levels, or oscillating around them, in almost all model runs population and industry go into a sharp decline once they peak. “If present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 100 years. The most probable result will be a sudden and rather uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity,” the book warned. This was unexpected and shocking. Why should the world’s economy collapse rather than stabilise? In World3, it happened because of the complex feedbacks between different global subsystems such as industry, health and agriculture. More industrial output meant more money to spend on agriculture and healthcare, but also more pollution, which could damage health and food production

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## Unsustainable – Debt

The reliance on debt in the squo means that an economic decline is inevitable

### Jones et al 13

(Aled, Irma Allen, Nick Silver, Catherine Cameron, Candice Howarth & Ben Caldecott, “Resource constraints: sharing a finite world Implications of Limits to Growth for the Actuarial Profession”, 1/17/13, The Actuarial Profession, represents business professionals in the UK, p.4, <http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/documents/research-report-resource-constraints-sharing-finite-world-implicati//WB>

Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Lucas famously said “Once you start thinking about (growth), it's hard to think about anything else.” This reflects a general belief in the necessity of economic growth. There are 3 main reasons for this. Firstly, **modern economies contain large amounts of debt**. They therefore need to grow to pay back this debt<sup>17</sup>, **as if economies decline the debt would increase in relation to the size of economy and would ultimately become unsustainable. This is the position we are in now where growth is required in order to at least service debt.** In China official government debt is low at some 30% of GDP but the debt of companies and households is some 130% of GDP, among the highest levels in emerging markets. This is partly because Beijing ordered banks to issue a huge expanse in credit in response to the 2008 crisis. If shadow banking<sup>18</sup> is included the ratio of debt: GDP rises to 200% - ‘levels unseen before, fueling a consumption boom.’ In the UK public sector net debt more than doubled in 8 years, from 32.5% of GDP in 2003 to 42.8% in 2008 to 65.7% in 2011.<sup>19</sup> **Secondly with technological progress, the economy becomes more productive, so, employment would fall over time without growth. Thirdly growth is one way of dealing with inequality, since if the economy did not grow some people would remain, or end up, worse off and this may lead to social problems. Thus growth avoids the need for redistribution, which would be strongly resisted by some.** The heavy reliance on debt has been highlighted by Coyle<sup>20</sup> who suggests that **in mature (developed) economies, economic policy has “borrowed from the future on a significant scale, both through the accumulation of debt in order to finance consumption now, or through the depletion of natural resources and social capital”.** The 2008 financial crash was ‘an indication of a system wide failure.’ She highlights that **market economies are unstable’ with ‘constant vulnerability to boom and bust’.**<sup>17</sup> Of course if debt is taken on due to an immediate crisis, such as war, and not an ongoing way to provide additional public finance, then it is possible to pay debt through subsequent budget surplus. However, we note **that debt has increasingly been used to fund ‘normal’ government spending.**<sup>18</sup> Non bank finance intermediaries such as hedge funds and structured investment vehicles. <sup>19</sup> Measuring National Well-being: Life in the UK , 2012, ONS, Self, Thomas and Randall <sup>20</sup> Coyle D. The Economics of Enough, 2011 <sup>21</sup> **An additional instability is the super interconnectedness of the global system, with fragile highly leveraged economies having a concomitant vulnerability to market crises of confidence, as we are witnessing now in the Eurozone.** Reinhart and Rogoff suggest that we are now in ‘the Second Great Contraction. <sup>21</sup> **In times of uncertainty, globalised highly efficient and standardised economic systems are vulnerable to shocks with high risk of contagion due to interconnectedness of systems.**



## Unsustainable – Energy

**It's unsustainable—energy increases alone as a result of growth lead to extinction, even if they somehow solve carbon dioxide**

**Buchanan, physicist and science writer, 2014** (Mark, "Economists Are Blind to the Limits of Growth," Bloomberg View, 8/5/14, <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-10-05/economists-are-blind-to-the-limits-of-growth>, IC)

Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, for example, chides natural scientists for thinking of growth as a "crude, physical thing, a matter simply of producing more stuff." They fail to appreciate, he suggests, that growth is about innovation and deciding which technologies and resources to use.

Allow me to explain why I am one of those scientists who are preoccupied with the physical. Economists are correct in saying that growth doesn't necessarily require more pollution, more carbon pumped into the atmosphere or more deforestation, even though we're getting all of the above today. Humans can learn, and we might figure out how to grow differently in the future, separating the benefits from the environmental costs.

There's just one crucial exception: energy.

Growth inevitably entails doing more stuff of one kind or another, whether it's manufacturing things or transporting people or feeding electricity to Facebook server farms or providing legal services. All this activity requires energy. We are getting more efficient in using it: The available data suggest that the U.S. uses about half as much per dollar of economic output as it did 30 years ago. Still, the total amount of energy we consume increases every year.

Data from more than 200 nations from 1980 to 2003 fit a consistent pattern: On average, energy use increases about 70 percent every time economic output doubles. This is consistent with other things we know from biology. Bigger organisms as a rule use energy more efficiently than small ones do, yet they use more energy overall. The same goes for cities. Efficiencies of scale are never powerful enough to make bigger things use less energy.

I have yet to see an economist present a coherent argument as to how humans will somehow break free from such physical constraints. Standard economics doesn't even discuss how energy is tied into growth, which it sees as the outcome of interactions between capital and labor.

Why does using ever more energy matter? For one, it feeds directly into all the bad things we're trying to stop doing -- polluting, destroying forests, wiping out habitats, covering the planet with an ever-denser network of roads. Our energy use -- either by design or by accident -- always ends up changing the environment in one way or another.

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Then there's the issue of climate change. Even if by some miracle we act to fix carbon-dioxide levels soon, that won't actually be a lasting solution. If energy consumption follows the historical trend, by 2150 or so the waste heat alone will warm the Earth as much as carbon dioxide is doing now. We'll have yet another global warming problem.

I'm not sure how economics broke free from the laws of physics and biology. Maybe we'll eventually leave the planet and live among the stars, escaping the limits of our Earth. Those dreams aside, the physical limits to growth apply as much to us as they would to a colony of bacteria expanding into a jar of sugar water.

The irony is that economists love to talk about trade-offs and constraints. There are no free lunches, they like to say. Yet when it looks as if the unbridled optimism of economic growth itself is running into a wall, they prefer to look the other way.

## Unsustainable – Heat

**The planet cannot sustain economic growth at the rate we are continuing at, the oceans will literally boil due to energy consumption, not just because of CO2**

**Leggett**, Business correspondent, 13 March 2015

(Theo, Can the world get richer for ever?,  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31868506>

Since the dawn of the industrial age, the world has been steadily getting wealthier, despite setbacks such as the Great Depression and the more recent global financial crisis. We make more, sell more and consume more than ever before. Yet, according to the United Nations, nearly three billion people still live on less than \$2.50 (£1.70) per day. So, how can we raise living standards for those who still live in poverty? The answer, according to most governments, is rapid economic growth. Growth is seen as a panacea for a great many ills. It creates jobs, erodes debts and raises living standards. For politicians, it also generates votes. It is almost universally seen as a Good Thing. Journalists are complicit in this. We frequently describe rapid growth as "robust". Slower growth is "anaemic" and an economy in recession is often portrayed as "sick" or "ailing". 'Boiling the oceans' Yet there's a problem here. We live on a finite planet, but growth is exponential. So an annual increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of 3% might not sound like much - but it means an economy will double in size every 23 years. Continued growth could cause long-term damage to the planet So does this matter? According to Tom Murphy, professor of physics at the University of California San Diego, it definitely does, as economic growth goes hand in hand with increasing energy consumption. "From a physical point of view, if we grew at 3% a year, in about 400 years' time we would actually be boiling the oceans - not because of global warming and CO2, but just because of the heat that is a natural by-product of the energy that we use," he says. These physical constraints, Prof Murphy says, will start to have an impact - for example, by creating cycles of boom and bust - and will make long-term growth impossible.

## Unsustainable – K-Waves

**The next K-Wave is coming now, by 2050 there will be an overpopulation crisis that will outpace technological innovation, causing it to cease and leading the recession of the global economy- we need to dedevelop before the global crisis now**

**Wileniusa AND John**, University of Turku, Turku School of Business, and the Center for Complex Systems and Enterprise, Stevens Institute of Technology, 12 December **2014**

(Markku and Castib, Seizing the X-events. The sixth K-wave and the shocks that may upend it, pg 1,

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162514003783>)

**The next K-wave, which will now be truly global for the first time in human history, will eventually be about raising the level of awareness concerning key human predicaments and then searching for and implementing measures that can really make a difference.** We envision here things like new

smart and decentralised power grids, and new welfare models that stand up to scrutiny. This is a massive learning challenge for societies, which need to wake up and recognize that they are in great trouble unless old attitudes and policies change. In this emerging sixth wave, the next big race to which the principal thrust of our technological development, economic growth, social cohesion, and even our cultural and spiritual activities will be devoted, has to do with making our systems more intelligent. A lot of this intelligence must come from understanding how we can use our natural resources more efficiently. **As social and individual awareness concerning the limits of our fragile planet grows, new innovations will be forced to create a technological and social infrastructure that helps us live more meaningful lives.** As always, human intention is what will lead the way. The information revolution has occurred in two ways. First, scientific evidence abounds that the present industrial model of development will not take us to the kind of future we want. Second, we now have novel channels for networking. There are over six billion mobile phones in the world. A whole new digitised space has been created, and the number of active Facebook users has hit the magical one billion mark. Moreover, there are new technologies, such as nano- and biotechnologies, moving on to the stage. Nanoparticles are used everywhere, from helping to filter fresh water to providing self-cleaning windows. Biomaterials will eliminate the excessive use of non-renewable materials in many fields, such as in the construction, insulation and packaging industries, as new products based on natural woven products will begin to substitute for existing products. In terms of price and industrial scale, new renewable energy technologies are fast approaching market entry. There are thus two fundamental factors at work here: first, needs arising from the observed limitations of existing ways of producing and consuming, and second, a new awareness concerning the innovative ways by which we can make society smarter and more human through the use of various technologies. Today we are in a situation in which new breakthroughs are taking us onto a new level in the interaction between humanity and

technology. Futurist Ray Kurzweil, who with an astonishing rate of success has forecast the rise of a new high-tech paradigm, recently pointed out how the operations of the human mind and brain can be tracked and this knowledge can be “ported” into vastly intelligent human machines (Kurzweil, 2012). Not only are we seeing the birth of new super-intelligence through the application of our know-how of technology, we are also witnessing totally new possibilities for extending the powers of our own minds. To summarise, thus far we have claimed that **the world is increasingly becoming a place where surprises can lurk around any corner**. At the same time, we know that certain developments in our societies unfold in patterns. We also know that bio-, nano- and ICT technologies will play a role in the future, probably converging into something totally new and unexpected. In what follows, we shall explore four different disruptions; developments that can take a radically different direction from what is now taking place. We call this de-trending, as the idea is to show how various triggers can push the trend off its current course, resulting in a major shift in our perception about the future. 3. Four shocks to shake the world At first glance, a reader seeing the shocks we present below that could undo the trend of the Sixth K-wave might well say that these shocks themselves are trends. So how can they be a “shock” or “X-event”? The answer is simply a question of timescale. Every event, X- or otherwise, has a certain unfolding time. Maybe it's very short on an absolute scale like an asteroid impact or an earthquake. But generally the unfolding time is much longer, as with a pandemic or a technological innovation. The point is that the unfolding time of the event is still much shorter than that of the process/trend that the X-event changes. So the four “shocks” presented below should be seen in this light. From the viewpoint of the timescale of the K-wave, they are short, in essence “points”. But they are still trends on their own timescale. With this point in mind, let's now turn to the shocks. 3.1. Shock #1: the decline and fall of populations 3.1.1. Current trend Driven by the fact that the global population increased by nearly 140% during the second half of the twentieth century, seers of the future envision population levels soaring onward and upward for the next 50–100 years along a similar, although not necessarily identical trajectory. Conventional wisdom has it that this population growth will be concentrated in Africa and Asia, as shown in the graphic below from the UN Population Division. Here we see the population (measured in billions) at three points in time. The picture that emerges from this projection is one of population decline in Europe, along with fairly moderate growth in Latin America and North America. The action, though, resides in Asia and especially Africa, where the growth rate exceeds 100% in Africa and over 40% in Asia. The overall picture here is clear: a global population increase of about 2 billion people, almost all of it concentrated in Africa and Asia (Fig. 3). 3.1.2. Implications The picture just painted above has it that extrapolation of the above population picture suggests a world of 2050 involving a dramatically increased focus on financial services for pensions and healthcare services and facilities for the aged world, accompanied by major shifts in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals in the developed world. Let us look at an X-event whose occurrence would cast serious doubt upon parts of the standard picture. 3.1.3. X-event To begin this story, consider the chart

below showing the fifty-year percentage change in the total global population. This chart should be read as follows: Pick a year, say 2000, and read the percentage change from the chart, which in this instance is 140%. This means that in the half century preceding the chosen year, global population increased by 140%, which happens to be the largest half-century change on the entire chart. What's immensely revealing about this figure is that in the year 2050, the global population will have increased by only about 20% from its level in 2000 (a nominal increase of around 1.4 billion), and should actually begin to decline in about 2070 from its level in 2020. So the enormous increase seen in the second half of the twentieth century was not the beginning of a trend, but rather the end of one, an anomaly, and in the second part of this century, the population will actually start falling dramatically ( Fig. 4). It is well worth asking the question: Why can we expect to see a worldwide population decline in the second part of this century, at an even faster rate than it rose during the last century? The primary driving force is decreased fertility rates. This phenomenon has already been taking place in most of the developed world for at least the past couple of decades or more, most prominently in the countries of Western Europe. Prime examples include Italy and Germany at a rate of 1.4, the Netherlands, with a rate of 1.8, and a rate of 1.9 in the UK, all well below the replacement level of 2.1. The graph below shows the global situation, along with the fact that the rapid decline in fertility is not something confined to developed countries — it is now being seen in many Muslim countries around the world as well, with the fertility decline in Iran, Turkey and Pakistan even exceeding the global rate. Many reasons have been put forward for this fertility decline, ranging from family planning policies in China and India to the widespread availability of contraceptives and even partnership instability. No doubt all these things make their contribution, but by far the most convincing explanation is the dramatic worldwide increase in literacy ( Fig. 5).

### **K waves are made up of patterns of technological innovation characterized by periods of growth and recession**

**Wileniusa AND John**, University of Turku, Turku School of Business, and the Center for Complex Systems and Enterprise, Stevens Institute of Technology, 12 December **2014**

(Markku and Castib, Seizing the X-events. The sixth K-wave and the shocks that may upend it, pg 1,  
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162514003783>)

**One of the most popular explanations to the existence of the K-waves has been that of looking at the clusters of technological innovation.** This causal hypothesis comes originally from Joseph Schumpeter, whose main question was how innovation and technology influence economic growth. In his early work Schumpeter approached this by investigating the long-term economic growth patterns and their relationship to innovation. The Schumpeterian framework became thus based on the idea that temporal clusters of major

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innovations create new opportunities that in turn accelerate economic growth (Schumpeter, 1939b). Later, many of the interesting K-wave theories have built on this by trying to explain historical growth patterns by changes in key areas, such as communications, energy, production, or transport technologies. To complement Schumpeter's original theory, Gerhard Mensch has added the idea that the reason major innovations occur during recessions relates to investment behaviour: Mensch argues that during prosperity investors tend to invest in less risky ventures, and in stagnation or recession fewer low-risk investment opportunities are available. Together the Schumpeter–Mensch theory of technological innovation as the key to the waves has inspired the main body of literature related to the Kondratieff waves.

## Unsustainable – Models

### **Simulations prove there is no situation leads to sustainability and tech**

**MacKenzie**, reporter of the new scientist, 10 January 2012

(Debora, “Boom and Doom: Revisiting Prophecies of Collapse”,  
<http://www.countercurrents.org/mackenzie100112.htm>)

The crucial point is that overshoot and collapse usually happened sooner or later in World3 even if very optimistic assumptions were made about, say, oil reserves. “The general behaviour of overshoot and collapse persists, even when large changes to numerous parameters are made,” says Graham Turner of the CSIRO Ecosystem Sciences lab in Crace, Australia. This did not convince those who thought technology could fix every problem. And with so much criticism, the idea took hold that Limits had been disproved. **That mantra has been repeated so often that it became the received wisdom,** says Ugo Bardi of the University of Florence in Italy, author of a recent book about Limits. “The common perception is that the work was discredited scientifically. I heard it again at a meeting last April,” says Homer-Dixon. “It wasn’t.”



## Unsustainable – Peak Oil

### **Growth is unsustainable- peak oil prices can no longer satisfy economic surplus**

**Udland**, Business Insider's Markets Editor and graduate of the University of Connecticut, 18 November **2014**

(Miles, GRANTHAM: The World Doesn't Have Enough Stuff To Make It As Great As We Want It To Be, <http://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-grantham-on-oil-economic-growth-2014-11>)

Our potential for economic growth is limited by the world's finite resources. Most forecasting models incorrectly assume endless growth. However, the laws of physics will not be defied by economics. These are the main takeaways from the latest investor letter by GMO's Jeremy Grantham. Over the last few months, the price of oil has tumbled from well north of \$100 to below \$80. Some would say this is likely to result in cheaper gas prices, serving as a boon for the US consumer and potentially US corporations. However, these forecasts are short-sighted. Grantham looks at oil from a far broader perspective, unpacking the commodity's role in the last 150 or so years of economic development and arguing that the serial mispricing and misallocation of oil has led us to a place where oil's cost has, and will, continue to hamper potential economic growth. "We assume the oil or coal, our finite and amazing inheritance, is free and price it just at its extraction cost plus a profit margin," Grantham writes. And by treating this finite resource as something infinite, Grantham says we have ignored the second law of thermodynamics: that entropy increases over time as the energy in a system dissipates. And so under this framework, Grantham sees the increasingly globalized economy not as a system that is compounding to become more potent, but that is, rather, converging towards increased impotency. "We owe almost everything we have had in the way of scientific and economic progress and the growth of the world's food supplies and population to fossil fuels," Grantham writes. "And not simply to the availability of these fuels, but more precisely to the availability of those fossil resources that could be captured extremely cheaply." For about 100 years, from 1870 to 1970, the price of oil was roughly pegged at about \$16 a barrel in today's currency. Over this period, though, Americans became six times richer and therefore could handle the very substantial increases in energy witnessed over the last 30 or 40 years, driving up the size and complexity of our economic system. This is what Grantham refers to as the "economic surplus" we enjoyed with respect to oil: since oil costs remained so low as a percentage of our earnings we failed to realize how much we'd come depend on that benefit. As Grantham writes: "If it's true that oil's economic surplus has accounted for so much of our growth, then what we should have seen since about 2004 as the price of oil began to break out way over its long-term trend was some grinding of the economy's gears: a persistent seeming reluctance on the part of the economy to live up to expectations. And this, in my opinion, is precisely what we have seen: a broad and increasing tendency

for all countries to disappoint compared to their earlier growth rates." And Grantham doesn't see these expected productivity rates coming back.

### **Times have changed- the amount of oil the average worker can buy with the average wage has killed productive**

**Udland**, Business Insider's Markets Editor and graduate of the University of Connecticut, 18 November **2014**

(Miles, GRANTHAM: The World Doesn't Have Enough Stuff To Make It As Great As We Want It To Be, <http://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-grantham-on-oil-economic-growth-2014-11>)

We do not affirm the gendered language of this author

When Grantham writes about the amount of oil the American worker can buy with one hour's wages, this is the chart he references. This is a somewhat convoluted chart, and again, the text that accompanies it is only more dense, but the idea that Grantham is driving at here is that **the more expensive oil becomes relative to our earnings, the less oil benefits us economically.** And **so currently, the average worker's earnings buy about 20% of a barrel of oil, roughly what they did in 1940 before the huge manufacturing boom that made the US the global economic superpower of the 20th century.** For Grantham, this chart shows, **"a remarkable round trip and what a lot it says about the preeminence of oil in our economy. When oil was becoming more affordable up to 1972 and oil intensity per person was still increasing, productivity per man person hour grew at an unprecedented rate of 3.1% a year. "From then until now as affordability fell and oil usage per person fell, productivity per man hour fell with it to 1.1%. This is not a small shift! 3.1% will take \$1 to \$21 in 100 years, where 1.1% will make it to barely \$3. But to rub this point in, the productivity from 2000 to now has fallen to 0.8% a year at which rate \$1 just about doubles in 100 years."** And so the upshot here is that as oil got more expensive not just in nominal but also real terms, this cost ate into our productivity not just in the near-term but over the long-term.

### **Fracking won't change economic sustainability- fracking fields can only sustain competition for up to two years**

**Udland**, Business Insider's Markets Editor and graduate of the University of Connecticut, 18 November **2014**

(Miles, GRANTHAM: The World Doesn't Have Enough Stuff To Make It As Great As We Want It To Be, <http://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-grantham-on-oil-economic-growth-2014-11>)

In the last ten years, the US has enjoyed an "energy renaissance" courtesy of the fracking boom that has taken hold in places like Texas and North Dakota.

But Grantham isn't sold on this "boom's" robustness. "First, let us quickly admit that U.S. **fracking is a very large herring**," Grantham writes "Its development has been remarkable. It will surely be seen in the future as a real testimonial to the sheer energy of American engineering at its best, employing rapid trials and errors – with all of the risk-taking that approach involves – that the rest of the world finds so hard to emulate. Similarly, it will always stand out as remarkable proof that, so late in the realization of the risks of climate change and environmental damage, the U.S. could expressly deregulate such a rapidly growing and potentially dangerous activity." Grantham writes that there are few regulations regarding fracking, which has given the US an advantage over other potential projects, and **nearly 100% of the global oil production over the last eight years has been due to fracking**. But for Grantham, the "red herring-ness" of fracking comes in what it hasn't done. "It has not prevented the underlying costs of traditional oil from continuing to rise rapidly or the cash flow available to oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and especially Venezuela from getting squeezed from both ends (rising costs and falling prices)... Yes, they have been drilling more wells that chew up money, but not that many more, and good operations have lowered the costs per well by over a third. On the other hand they have drilled, as always, the best parts of the best fields first, and because **the first two years of flow are basically all we get in fracking**, we should have expected considerably better financial results by now. The aggregate financial results allow for the possibility that fracking costs have been underestimated by corporations and understated in the press."

### **Peak oil is still a thing and it will collapse the econ while driving us towards ecological disaster**

**Gates, Trauger and Czech 14**- Professor of Wildlife Ecology, professor in natural resources management, PHD

(J. Edward, David L., and Brian, Peak Oil, "Envisioning an Alternative Future", Economic Growth, and Wildlife Conservation, Chapter 15, p.317, 21 Nov 2014 [//WB">http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3\\_15\)//WB](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3_15)

Although **the best net energy reserves disappeared 70 years ago**, there have been a plethora of recent news releases heralding that the USA is on the cusp of a second oil boom and that Peak Oil is nothing to worry about. This **optimistic news is not based on recent or sudden discoveries of new oil fields**. These newly tapped US oil reserves have been known to exist for many years. What changed are recent innovations facilitating recovery of oil bound tightly in shale rock formations in the Great Plains. **This "oil boom" conclusion is based on the assumption that innovation and higher prices have changed the economically recoverable oil supply and that higher prices automatically will cut demand for oil products. Peak Oil is not about running out of oil**, as there will be plenty of oil left following the peak; **but, whether or not it can be produced at low enough costs and high enough rates to satisfy the current global economy. Production of cheap conventional oil peaked a few years ago** [15]. Exploration is currently focused on formerly ignored regions, for example, deep water and arctic environments,

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as well as development of unconventional sources, such as tar or oil sands and tight oil plays. These **sources are more expensive to produce, both in energy** (energy return on investment, EROI) **and in dollars** (Chap. 2). Because of the high cost of production, **oil is currently trading around \$ 100 per barrel in spite of the so-called oil boom**. Furthermore, even if oil and other fossil fuels were still cheap and abundant, it is in our best interests to stop using them, as their combustion is leading to catastrophic global climate change and disruption [27]. An across-the-board rising fee on carbon emissions as well as other incentives, such as a high carbon tax rate at the mine-mouth and wellhead, would begin the process of curbing their use; but, it needs to happen rapidly, as continued delays in implementing such action will only result in worsening climate catastrophes and damage to the biosphere [11]. Furthermore, **exponential growth of our fossil-fuel-driven economy is accelerating biodiversity loss, and potentially contributing to irreversible planetary state shifts** [2, 7, 11, 26, 27].

## Unsustainable – Population

### **Growth is unsustainable- overpopulation and increased consumption**

**Meltzer, Steven, and Langley**, professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, associate Director at CIC, where he works on development policy and the post-2015 agenda, rector of Policy and Research at Climate Advisers, February **2013**

(Joshua, David, Claire, THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION: THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH , pg 16-17,  
<http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=317112116088088090095116120006096004053017063051087026113098068127097026102127074024053029061030029060000114120126115023013073053061042009079098019126123071020069100059050000007072080068080107022104065079030097089011105065126124074091116029111017081&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2> )

America's population growth will be confined to its towns and cities as rural areas continue to lose population. By 2050, the U.S. urban population will have grown by more than 100 million (roughly the same size as the entire American population at the beginning of World War I).<sup>131</sup> This growth will be driven mainly by first- and second-generation immigrants, as the United States continues to have significantly higher rates of net migration than any other G-20 country. As a result, the country's cultural makeup will continue to change rapidly, with non-Hispanic whites expected to be a minority of the population before 2050. These demographic changes have the following implications:

- Cities will be critical to rates and patterns of economic growth. Urban centers that have high concentrations of educated workers, especially those with scientific and technological skills, will account for a growing share of American GDP.<sup>132</sup> Cities that create jobs will thrive and see their populations grow, while the poorest-performing ones will see their populations shrink. This evolutionary dynamic will enhance the ability of the United States to adapt to new economic forces and to make a smoother exit from legacy industrial sectors.
- **A growing population will consume more.** Developed countries with stable populations can expect demand for resources to fall, possibly significantly, if efficiency gains also accelerate. The United States, however, is emphatically not in this group. **The U.S. government will be under significant pressure to provide tens of millions more people with high standards of living. Such a large number of additional American consumers will inevitably have a significant impact on the global economy and environment.**
- Consumptions patterns may shift. Changes in the configuration of American cities and in the preferences of city dwellers could have a pronounced impact on consumption patterns. Will American cities become more densely populated over time and therefore efficient in their use of resources?<sup>133</sup> Will the United States' long love affair with the automobile begin to dwindle with the trend continuing whereby young

Americans drive less than previous generations did at the same age?134 And will there be an ongoing dematerialization of the economy as consumers switch from physical goods to virtual services?

### **Increasing population limitations will result in collapse**

**MacKenzie**, reporter of the new scientist, 10 January 2012

(Debra, "Boom and Doom: Revisiting Prophecies of Collapse",  
<http://www.countercurrents.org/mackenzie100112.htm>)

We already know the future will be different from the standard run in one respect, says Bar-Yam. Although the actual world population up to 2000 has been similar, in the scenario the rate of population growth increases with time – one of the exponential drivers of collapse. Although Limits took account of the fact that birth rates fall as prosperity rises, in reality they have fallen much faster than was expected when the book was written. "It is reasonable to be concerned about resource limitations in fifty years," Bar-Yam says, "but the population is not even close to growing [the way Limits projected in 1972]." The book itself may be partly responsible. Bar-Yam thinks some of the efforts in the 1970s to cut population growth were at least partly due to Limits. "If it helped do that, it bought us more time, and it's a very important work in the history of humanity," he says. Yet World3 still suggests we'll hit the buffers eventually. The original Limits team put out an updated study using World3 in 2005, which included faster-falling birth rates. Except in the stabilising scenario, World3 still collapsed.

## Unsustainable – Resources

**Resources are decreasing now, soil quality, fossil fuels, metals, and the environment as a whole**

### Jones et al 13

(Aled, Irma Allen, Nick Silver, Catherine Cameron, Candice Howarth & Ben Caldecott, “Resource constraints: sharing a finite world Implications of Limits to Growth for the Actuarial Profession”, 1/17/13, The Actuarial Profession, represents business professionals in the UK, p.4, <http://www.actuaries.org.uk/research-and-resources/documents/research-report-resource-constraints-sharing-finite-world-implicati//WB>

**The evidence for resource constraints is compelling. Particular resources constraints will have direct local impacts (such as water), and could impact globally through supply chains and through second order effects such as increased food prices and instability, while others will have direct global impacts (such as oil).** Here we briefly highlight some of the constraints the global economy faces. The accompanying evidence report<sup>6</sup> brings together a more detailed review of these resource constraints. **For every resource examined the overall trend is one of more expensive extraction and increasing prices. In addition the environmental damage caused by the use of these resources is becoming more expensive** – in particular through the impact of increased extreme weather events driven by climate change. Figure 2 is an example of a local resource constraint – namely **soil degradation. While agricultural productivity has increased, competition over land is increasingly driven by growing populations, non food crop production, urbanisation, desertification, salination and soil erosion. Land availability and quality will have global consequences through food availability and prices.** There is an increasing trend for large scale land purchases globally and **average global soil quality is lowering due to a number of factors including over farming and changes in weather patterns.** Figure 3 highlights the approximate number of years left for globally traded resources including **fossil fuels and metals** based on current consumption. **The overall trend for all of these resources is increasingly difficult extraction, lower quality ores and higher demand. Therefore, the increases in prices** seen over the past decade for these resources **is likely to remain and projections for the future would indicate further rises are likely**<sup>7</sup>. If demand for these resources were to increase (as is projected for the majority) then there would be further stress placed on availability. Figure 4 explores **environmental loading** as another resource constraint. **The ability of the environment and the atmosphere to absorb and process society’s waste** (whether solid waste, pollution or carbon dioxide emissions) **is reducing and key ‘sinks’ are already projected to cause significant impacts on human society** over the next century including changes to the nitrogen cycle. While the analysis of planetary boundaries does not directly link to economic risks and includes both local and global issues **there is already evidence of the increasing cost of environmental damage (in particular associated with climate change).**

**Growth is unsustainable and causes extinction because of physical demands on space, water, forests, and habitat---tech can't solve because collapse of ecosystem services is irreversible**

David **Shearman 7**, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, *The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy*, p. 153-156

**Hundreds of scientists** writing in Millennium Assessment and other scientific reports **pronounce** that **humanity is in peril from environmental damage**. If liberal democracy is to survive it will need to offer leadership, resolve, and sacrifice to address the problem. To date there is not a shred of evidence that these will be provided nor could they be delivered by those at the right hand of American power. **Some liberal democracies that recognize** that global **warming** is a dire problem **are trying but** nevertheless **failing to have an impact** on greenhouse emissions. To arrest climate change, greenhouse reductions of 60 to 80 percent are required during the next few decades. By contrast the Kyoto Protocol prescribes reductions of only a few percent. **The magnitude of the problem** seems overwhelming, and indeed it is. So much so, it **is still denied by many because it cannot be resolved without cataclysmic changes to society**. **Refuge from necessary change is being sought in technological advances** that will allow fossil fuels to be used with impunity, **but this ignores** the kernel of **the issue**. **If all humanity had the ecological footprint of the average citizen of Australia or the United States, at least another three planets would be needed to support the present population of the world.**<sup>2</sup> **The ecological services of the world cannot be saved under a regime of attrition by growth economies that each year use more land, water, forests, natural resources, and habitat. Technological advances cannot retrieve dead ecological services.** The measures required have been discussed and documented for several decades. None of them are revolutionary new ideas. We will discuss the main themes of a number of important issues such as the limits to growth, the separation of corporatism and governance, the control of the issue of credit (i.e., financial reform), legal reform, and the reclaiming of the commons. Each of these issues has been discussed in great depth in the literature, and a multitude of reform movements have been spawned. Unfortunately, given the multitude of these problems and the limited resources and vision of the reformers, each of the issues tends to be treated in isolation. From an ecological perspective, which is a vision seeking wholeness and integration, this is a mistake. These areas of reform are closely interrelated and must be tackled as a coherent whole to bring about change. Banking and financial reform is, for example, closely related to the issue of control and limitation of corporate power, because finance capital is the engine of corporate expansion. The issue of reclaiming the commons and protecting the natural environment from corporate plunder is also intimately connected to the issue of the regulation of corporate power. In turn this is a legal question, and in turn legal structures are highly influenced by political and economic factors. Finally, the issue of whether there are ecological limits to growth underlies all these issues. Only if an ecologically sustainable



solution can be given to this totality of problems can we see the beginnings of a hope for reform of liberal democracy. And even then, there still remains a host of cultural and intellectual problems that will need to be solved. The prospects for reform are daunting, but let us now explore what in principle is needed. THE LIMITS TO GROWTH **Our loving marriage to economic growth has to be dissolved.** The dollar value of all goods and services made in an economy in one year is expressed as the gross domestic product (GDP). It is a flawed measurement in that it does not measure the true economic and social advance of a society,<sup>3</sup> but it is relevant to our discussion here for most of the activities it measures consume energy. **Each country aims for economic growth,** for every economy needs this for its success in maintaining employment and **for the perceived ever-expanding needs of its populace.** Politicians salivate about economic growth, it is their testosterone boost. Most would be satisfied with 3 percent per annum and recognize that this means that the size of the economy is 3 percent greater than the previous year. On this basis **the size of the economy doubles every 23 years.** In 43 years it has quadrupled. Now in 23 years let us suppose that energy needs will also double in order to run this economy. Therefore **if greenhouse emissions are to remain at today's level, then approximately half the energy requirements in 23 years' time will have to be alternative energy.** The **burgeoning energy requirements of the developing countries have not yet been included in these considerations.** To date, **these countries have been reluctant to consider greenhouse reductions** saying that they have a right to develop without hindrance, and in any case the developed countries are responsible for most of the present burden of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It is not difficult to calculate therefore that **there is no future for civilization in the present cultural maladaptation to the growth economy.** **Sustainable economic growth is an oxymoron.** These **arguments about doubling time apply to all other environmental calculations.** Other forms of pollution that arise from the consumer society will also increase proportionally to growth, the human and animal wastes, mercury, the persistent organic pollutants, and so on. And even if some of these are ameliorated, others will arise from the activities of the burgeoning population. Science tells us that we have already exceeded the capacity of the earth to detoxify these. In advocating a no-growth economy it has been shown in many studies that beyond the basic needs of health, nutrition, shelter, and cultural activity, which can be provided with much less income than Westerners presently enjoy, there is little correlation between wealth and happiness or well-being. **A no-growth economy<sup>4</sup> would supply the essentials for life and happiness.** Human and economic activity fuelling the consumer market would be severely curtailed and the resources redeployed to truly sustainable enterprises, basic care and repair of the environment, conservation of energy, and the manufacture of items and systems that support these needs. **The standard of living as measured at present (again by flawed criteria) will fall, but there may be no alternative.** The fundamental question is how can a transition be made under a liberal democracy that has consumerism and a free market as its lifeblood?

**Collapse is inevitable—laundry list of reasons  
Garcia-Olivares, Physics PhD, and Sole, Spanish National  
Research Council, Madrid, and PhD specializing in**

**Oceanography, Climatology, and Ecology, 2015** (Antonio and Jordi, “End of growth and the structural instability of capitalism—From capitalism to a Symbiotic Economy,” *Futures*, Vol. 68, April 2015, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328714001529>, IC)

As the present crisis shows, zero or slow growth is a serious problem for capitalism since, as noticed by Heinberg (2011), “in a system in which money is created through bank loans, there is never enough money in existence to pay back all debts with interest. The system only continues to function as long as it is growing.” If this growth slows down and no structural change is implemented on the economy the consequence is a destruction of wealth and debt, unemployment, deflation in the short-term and inflation in the long term (except if government spending equilibrate both processes in the short term) (Heinberg, 2011, chap. 2).

Is it possible to overcome this situation by means of a new Kondratieff cycle of economic expansion? García-Olivares and Ballabrera-Poy (2014) showed that a massive investment in renewable energy and electrification of the economy would allow for a continued expansion of energy production until 2070, making it possible to start a new cycle of economic expansion.

### 3.2. Three challenges to growth

The expansion would not be indefinite, however, since the economy may enter into a steady state soon after a renewable installation of about 12 TW due to limitations of copper, lithium and nickel minerals (García-Olivares and Ballabrera-Poy, 2014 and García-Olivares et al., 2012). Substitution of aluminum, graphene and high-temperature super-conductors for copper could be tried after that date, but we do not currently know if that can be made at rates high enough to sustain further exponential growth.

Converging with this process, another two processes could produce, by themselves, an end to growth even before 2070. The first is a set of internal economic factors which have symptoms of exhaustion, and that leads Ayres (2006) to conclude that growth of the US economy – and potentially other developed economies – may come to an end in the second half of this century, which would have indeed global impact. Essentially, these factors are: decreasing returns of labor specialization; peak in the scale of international trade; monetization of services made by women and farmers is now largely complete in urbanized countries; borrowing from the future to increase consumption in the present seems unable to feed a lasting and sustainable growth; and technological efficiency to convert raw materials and fuels into useful work has slowed down its rate of increase since 1970 and is constrained in the long term by thermodynamic limits.

The second process is decreasing returns to scale due to pollution (Kümmel, 1989) and degradation of natural capital (García-Olivares and Ballabrera-Poy,

2014 and Wetzel, 1995). Regarding degradation of “natural capital”, Barnosky et al. (2012) warn that 43% of the global ecosystems are now seriously perturbed and that a perturbation of about 50% of them will probably be a tipping point for a critical shift in the biosphere, with biological ‘surprises’ on global and local scales. The period suggested by Barnosky et al. (2012) for this general crisis of ecosystems (2025–2045) is close to one predicted for the peak (and beginning of decay) of fossil fuels production (2028 ± 8.5) (Leggett & Ball, 2012).

All environmental impacts together make likely that the period 2025–2045 may be considered the start of a “period of consequences” with regard to the natural capital degradation and its effects, which will produce decreasing returns to scale in the economic output. Decreasing returns to scale are able to force a steady state in the GDP only with a relative minor decrease of the factor productivities (2%) for every doubling of the GDP (García-Olivares & Ballabrera-Poy, 2014).

### 3.3. Rising pressures on the public economy and government

While the private economy will face an increasingly slower growth by energy and environmental reasons, the pressure of a rising population adds new economic and social threats that will press on the public sectors of developing and developed countries: (i) incapacity to end hunger crises, despite the huge increase in agricultural production, mainly due to the incapacity of market to distribute food equitably, (ii) increased energy consumption in agriculture, (iii) increasing land degradation and, (iv) degradation of freshwater.

As stated by Grantham (2012): “The general assumption is that we need to increase food production by 60–100% by 2050 to provide at least a modest amount of calories to all 9 billion people plus to deliver much more meat to the rapidly increasing middle classes of the developing world. It is also widely assumed that at least the lower end of this target will be achieved.” This view seems very optimistic, given that there are too many factors that will make growth in food output increasingly difficult (Grantham, 2012):

1.

Grain productivity increase has fallen since 1970 from 3.5% to 1.5%. The most efficient grain producers are approaching a “glass ceiling” of about 7–8 tonnes/ha for wheat and 7 tonnes/ha for rice. Further increases in productivity per acre are close to zero at the grain species’ limit (Food Outlook, 2012). Incremental returns from increasing fertilizer use will steadily decline on the margin for global grain production, since the easy pickings are behind us (McLaughlin et al., 2000 and Smil, 2005).

2.

Due to degradation of freshwater, the crop irrigated worldwide peaked in 1978 (surface irrigated per person was 0.48 Ha), and decreased 10% since then (Pfeiffer, 2006). Water problems are increasing to a point where gains from increased irrigation are being offset by the loss of underground water and salinization of soils. About 125 million Chinese, 175 million Indians and

30% of the US population (Berg, 2011), to mention just three cases, are now fed through the use of declining aquifers. Reviewing other authors, Leng (2009) concludes that annual overpumping of aquifers is  $160 \times 10^{12}$  tonnes, which is equivalent to 160 million tonnes of grain that will not be produced when the pumping have to be stationary, or around 10% of total world grain production, and more importantly, 66% of the world's currently traded grain.

There is a solution – desalination. But the only energetically sustainable solution for its high cost seems to be a global deployment of thermo-solar power in the coasts of subtropical deserts (García-Olivares et al., 2012). And this implies to implement the kind of renewable stationary solution that we have discussed in the Introduction.

3.

Persistent bad farming practices perpetuate land degradation, which will continue to undermine our long-term sustainable productive capacity. Each year 10 million hectares (ha) of productive and arable land are abandoned due to land degradation (Pfeiffer, 2006).

4.

Climate change will probably increase weather extremes, such as floods and droughts. By the end of the century, the expected rise in temperature globally is projected by the IPCC to reduce the productivity of grain by 20–40% (IPCC, 2012).

Finally, increasing oil prices will probably cause high food prices and increasing social instability. In Supplementary Material we show a model to estimate oil price rises as a function of the extracted fraction of its Ultimate Recoverable Resource (URR). Our conclusion is that oil prices may reach \$ 325 per barrel at 2050. This estimation is only illustrative of what might happen, because of the uncertainties commented on in Supplementary Material. Bassi, Powers, and Schoenberg (2010), with a system dynamics model predict an oil price of \$ 300 by 2050, which is close to our projection. Lutz, Lehr, and Wiebe (2012) project an even faster price rise.

Given that the FAO food price index evolves in high correlation with the oil price (Tverberg, 2011) an increase in oil price between 2020 and 2040 of 116% (Supplementary Material) would produce a similar rise of basic food prices. Thus, even if we could produce enough food globally, increasing numbers could not be able to afford the marketed food. The impacts are hitting hardest in the developing world, where fuel price rises make the difference between poverty and extreme vulnerability (Ebenhack and Martinez, 2008 and House of Commons and RESET, 2008) and because they have in many cases a large population to feed. Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam (2011) have observed a strong correlation between periods where the FAO food index is above \$190 (dollars of 2004) and periods of social unrest in Africa and Middle East. These periods will probably increase in number in the future.

Food price increases will probably have deep inflationary effects which will increase social instability, enhance poverty in both developing and developed countries, erode real GDP, and increase public spending in mitigation. This latter effect may even erode real GDP since heavy-handed reliance on “demand management” policies can distort market prices, generate major inefficiencies, and destroy production incentives (Anderson, 2014).

Heinberg (2011), as well as Morgan (2013), with similar arguments to those used in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, conclude that the end of growth may be a matter of a few decades rather than the 60 years that the optimistic model studied in García-Olivares and Ballabrera-Poy (2014) predicts.

Our conclusion is that the end of growth seems highly probable in this century due to three independent causes: Ayres’ internal economic factors; resources (fossil-fuel and metal) limitations; and decreasing returns to scale due to degradation of natural capital. Markets are not able to solve by themselves these three families of problems, which must be considered “externalities” and “market failures”. They will put the capitalist system under increasing pressure. To that, will be added increased pressure on the public sector, and rising social unrest, which will be especially visible in developing countries (House of Commons & RESET, 2008). The next section discusses the probable responses of the economic and social systems to these multiple challenges.

## A2 “Krugman”

**Krugman doesn't refute the core thesis that growth is unsustainable. He's also wrong—tar-sands oil, coal mining, and fracking all prove emissions will necessarily increase with growth**

**Czech, Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy President, 2014** (Brian, “Paul Krugman on Limits to Growth: Beware the Bathwater,” Huffington Post, 12/15/14, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-czech/paul-krugman-on-limits-to\\_b\\_5988532.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-czech/paul-krugman-on-limits-to_b_5988532.html), IC)

Next, in Krugman's lead-in paragraph he laments the "unholy alliance on behalf of the proposition that reducing greenhouse gas emissions is incompatible with growing real GDP." Already we have two more problems. First, the argument alluded to in the title -- that is, refuting limits to growth -- is reduced to refuting just one negative impact of growth (that is, climate change). What about all the other impacts and limitations of economic growth: liquidation of natural resources, pollution at large, habitat loss, biodiversity decline, and social side effects such as noise, congestion, and stress?

Second, in a maxed-out, over-stimulated, 90 percent fossil-fueled economy, Krugman wants us to believe we can grow the economy even more while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. No need to worry about little trends such as tar-sands mining in Canada, coal mining in China, and fracking in the USA. "Slower steaming" will save the day on climate change, and presumably for the rest of the planetary ecosystem.

Let's not let Krugman delude ourselves. "Growing real GDP" isn't about an efficiency gain here and there. It means increasing production and consumption of goods and services in the aggregate. It entails a growing human population and/or per capita consumption. It means growing the whole, integrated economy: agriculture, extraction, manufacturing, services, and infrastructure. From the tailpipe of all this activity comes pollution.

**Krugman's only warrant for the larger claim that growth is sustainable is flawed—prefer material evidence to their abstract theorizing**

**Bardi, University of Florence physical chemistry teacher and author of ‘The Limits to Growth Revisited’, 2014** (Ugo, “Paul Krugman and The Tortoise: Why the Limits to Growth Are Real,” CommonDreams, 11/7/14, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/11/07/paul-krugman-and-tortoise-why-limits-growth-are-real>, IC)

Krugman's article is not merely about juggling resources from one place to another, but it takes a broad sweep at the very concept that there exist limits to the growth of the GDP (see also a previous article of his), for instance asserting that Bill Nordhaus (his old mentor) had effectively demolished forty years ago the book on limits by Jay Forrester that had preceded the more famous 1972 study titled "The Limits to Growth." Alas, I am afraid that this is not the case. It is true that, in 1973, William Nordhaus claimed to have found fundamental flaws in Forrester's model. However, Forrester could show in his rebuttal that Nordhaus had simply made a mistake in interpreting the equations of the model. Nordhaus himself appeared to backtrack on his previous interpretation in an article on the same subject that he published in 1992; since he never mentioned these supposed flaws again. The story of this debate is told in some detail in my book *The Limits to Growth Revisited* (Springer 2012). All this doesn't mean that the "Limits to Growth" does not have limits in its approach, but simply that it cannot be dismissed so easily, especially considering that it is becoming clearer and clearer that it has been able to correctly describe reality, up to now.

In the abstract realm of philosophy, Achilles can never overtake the tortoise; in the real world, it is not so. In the abstract realm of economics, the GDP can grow without natural resources; in the real world, it is not so. In the end, we need to be wary of abstract theories and remember that the limits to growth are real.

**Energy is key—Krugman fails to recognize physical limitations that necessarily prevent economic growth—perfect efficiency is impossible**

**Heinberg, Post Carbon Institute senior fellow and author of twelve books, 2014** (Richard, "Paul Krugman and the Limits of Hubris," Post Carbon Institute, 10/10/14, <http://www.postcarbon.org/paul-krugman-and-the-limits-of-hubris/>, IC)

Mr. Buchanan's pithy piece zeros in on energy as the most important limit to endless economic expansion. But even though he carefully explains that we are getting more efficient at using energy (and balances that recognition with evidence that, despite this, economic growth implies using more energy overall), Mr. Krugman pretends that physicists have never heard of energy efficiency. He spends most of his op-ed explaining one instance (ocean-going freighters reducing their speed to use less fuel) as if this were proof of a new and pivotal principle that no hard scientist had previously noticed. Are there instances where we can use less energy while achieving the same effect? Of course! A better, though more shop-worn, example would be lighting: as a result of the introduction of compact fluorescent and LED lights, we've seen dramatic reductions in the amount of energy used to banish darkness from cities and homes.

But Mr. Krugman doesn't follow through on his argument. If he is implying that there are no limits to growth because energy use can be made more efficient, then logically he must also argue that energy efficiency can be

improved endlessly—at least to the point at which no energy at all is needed in order to run the economy (I say “at least,” because presumably even then further growth would be needed in order to prove the non-existence of limits). But of course that’s pure fantasy, as every physicist knows. Energy is defined as the ability to do work, and the ability to do work is what generates GDP. Energy efficiency can often be improved, but such improvements are subject to the law of diminishing returns: the first five percent of improvement is cheap, the next five percent costs more, and so on. Perfect efficiency in any process is either impossible to achieve, or infinitely expensive (depending on how you prefer to look at it).

My guess is that if and when Mr. Krugman honestly confronts the logical impossibility of infinite growth within a finite system, and the similar impossibility of infinite improvements in energy efficiency, he will retreat to saying something along the lines of, “Yes, but even if there are theoretical limits to growth, we’re very far from reaching them, so they’re practically irrelevant for the time being.” However, once one acknowledges that there are indeed theoretical limits to expansion, one must then ask, “What would be the likely signs that we are approaching those limits?”

I’ll suggest some: overall rising energy costs (indeed, energy production consumes a larger proportion of global GDP today than it did a decade ago); falling yields of minerals per unit of energy applied to mining and refining (this is now true almost across the board, from antimony to zinc); rising environmental costs and risks from industrial processes (see “climate change”)

### **Substitution or efficiency gains are still subject to limits**

**Heinberg, Post Carbon Institute senior fellow and author of twelve books, 2014** (Richard, “Paul Krugman and the Limits of Hubris,” Post Carbon Institute, 10/10/14, <http://www.postcarbon.org/paul-krugman-and-the-limits-of-hubris/>, IC)

Mr. Krugman writes: “So where does the notion that energy is somehow special come from? Mainly, I’d say, from not thinking about concrete examples . . . because if you think about actual economic activities even briefly, it becomes obvious that there are tradeoffs that could let you produce more while using less energy.” Again, that’s a statement no one would argue with. But Krugman’s own example of energy efficiency highlights the fact that there are often hidden costs to efficiency efforts. He writes that “After 2008, when oil prices rose sharply, shipping companies . . . responded by reducing the speed of their ships. It turns out that steaming more slowly reduces fuel consumption more than proportionately to the reduction in speed.” But moving ships slower meant deploying more ships to in order move the same amount of freight—thus substituting capital and labor for energy. This strategy didn’t require the development of new technology; the shippers were “just using the same ships differently.”

In the comments to Mr. Krugman’s op-ed on the New York Times website, Ken White (one of my colleagues at Post Carbon Institute) points out that all



those extra ships represent plenty of embodied energy, which was expended in extracting and refining ores and in other aspects of ship construction. When we look at many (not all) efficiency gains this way—that is, from a systems perspective—much of the advantage tends to disappear. Does the added cost of embodied energy in this case equal the energy of the fuel saved? I don't have the data and haven't done the calculations, but even if there are some net savings they are probably much smaller than Krugman assumes. You can substitute capital and labor for energy in some instances and up to a point, but there is literally nothing that anyone can do without some expenditure of energy. Substitution itself is subject to limits.

### **Krugman's efficiency argument is fallacious**

#### **Czech, Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy**

**President, 2014** (Brian, "Paul Krugman on Limits to Growth: Beware the Bathwater," Huffington Post, 12/15/14, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-czech/paul-krugman-on-limits-to\\_b\\_5988532.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-czech/paul-krugman-on-limits-to_b_5988532.html), IC)

But only for so long, because those of us who recognize limits to growth have sound science, common sense, and burgeoning evidence on our side. The same cannot be said for Krugman's opinion.

Krugman got off to a shaky start with the very title of his column. No matter what he could say about "slow steaming," this was bound to be an article wrong-headed in using one sector (shipping) for drawing broad conclusions about a macroeconomic issue (economic growth). To extend a conclusion from the part to the whole is to commit the fallacy of composition. In this case it's a bit like Krugman saying, "Your fingernails keep growing; why not the rest of you too?"

The mistake is common and destructive. When this mistake is made by a highly acclaimed economist in a widely-read opinion, the potential for destruction is multiplied. Politicians hide behind such Pollyannaish opinions to pull out all the stops -- fiscal and monetary -- for economic growth. The casualties include not only environmental protection but the future economy and ultimately national security.

### **Increasing efficiency doesn't solve—substituting energy with capital fails because other materials are still limited**

#### **Bardi, University of Florence physical chemistry teacher and**

**author of 'The Limits to Growth Revisited', 2014** (Ugo, "Paul Krugman and The Tortoise: Why the Limits to Growth Are Real," CommonDreams, 11/7/14, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/11/07/paul-krugman-and-tortoise-why-limits-growth-are-real>, IC)

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Paul Krugman seems to have created some kind of a similar paradox with a recent New York Times article (“Slow Steaming and the Limits to Growth”) where he sets out to demonstrate that the world's gross domestic product (GDP) can continue growing even while reducing energy production. He does that by means of the example of “slow steaming.” Noting that the energy consumption of ships grows more than linearly as a function of speed, Krugman states that you can always save energy by slowing ships down and increasing their number. If the relation of speed to energy consumed is, let's say, quadratic, then by doubling the number of ships and halving their speed you reduce the energy consumed to a half. So, it is possible to maintain a constant economic throughput while reducing the input of energy to the system. Q.E.D.? Well, unfortunately things are not so simple.

The story of these slow steaming ships looks suspiciously like one of Zeno's paradoxes in the sense that you could keep forever doubling the ships and forever reducing the energy consumed – just as Achilles can keep running forever without ever reaching the turtle. It just doesn't sound right for the real world and, indeed, if we look carefully into Krugman's argument, we see that there is something important that he has overlooked. The trick works if – and only if – the cost of ships remains constant while you increase their number. That's far from being obvious.

A freight ship is not just an empty hull that stores containers; it needs metals, ceramics, and semiconductors for its electronics, its engines, its control system, and more. Making more ships means that more minerals have to be produced and utilized. But minerals are limited resources, in the sense that the high-grade ores from which we mine them exist in limited amounts. An extensive attempt to substitute energy with capital in the world's economy would result in a severe strain on the mining industry that would be forced to produce at high costs from low-grade ores. The consequence is that the prices of mineral commodities would go up (this is not just theory, it is exactly what's happening in the real world, owing to the gradual depletion of high grade ores). But, if prices go up, demand is destroyed and, as a result, the GDP goes down, not up, as Krugman maintains.

So, Krugman's argument may to be indeed a paradox in the sense that the attempt to increase the GDP by saving energy may well backfire; creating the opposite effect. But why is Krugman (and many others) so concerned about energy and so cavalier about mineral resources? It is because it is generally understood that today energy is mainly obtained from fossil fuels and it is also commonly understood that fossil fuels exist in limited and non-replaceable amounts that we are gradually consuming. So, it is generally understood that we have a depletion problem with fossil fuels. What is not so commonly understood is that the situation is the same for all mineral commodities. So, switching from a limited mineral resource (fossil fuels) to other limited mineral resources (metals and others) merely amounts to shifting the problem to one sector of the economy to another. Energy saving is a good thing, but we don't have to take it as the miracle that keeps GDP growing forever.

**Growth is unsustainable—default to empirical analysis—even if Krugman’s argument is theoretically true, it’s not historically and there’s no justification for why now is different**

**Buchanan, physicist and science writer, 2014** (Mark, “Steaming slowly toward the limits of growth,” Medium, 10/10/14, <https://medium.com/bull-market/steaming-slowly-toward-the-limits-of-growth-cc455dccd829>, IC)

Which is fine. And obvious. No sane person would argue against this. History is full of technological advances or just clever ways of using things differently which let us do more with less energy; there are many more to come in the future. We now have better light bulbs and LEDs, more fuel-efficient engines, etc. We could, conceivably, produce more of lots of things while actually reducing our use of energy. Could.

But what “could, conceivably” happen in an ideal theoretical world isn’t the issue. When we look at our world, and the way economic growth has always worked in the past, we find that increases in energy efficiency don’t ultimately lead to less energy being used, but to more. The main point of my article was about what has happened, and what is continuing to happen in the real world, not what might happen in the nirvana of abstract economic theory. We’re getting ever more efficient in using energy, but we’re still using more and more of it. As I wrote:

Data from more than 200 nations from 1980 to 2003 fit a consistent pattern: On average, energy use increases about 70 percent every time economic output doubles. This is consistent with other things we know from biology. Bigger organisms as a rule use energy more efficiently than small ones do, yet they use more energy overall. The same goes for cities. Efficiencies of scale are never powerful enough to make bigger things use less energy.

In retrospect, I now see that the final sentence is the thing Krugman jumped on to make his (misleading) point. I intended the sentence in the spirit of “this has never happened yet and we have no decent reason to expect it will in the future” rather than “and I have a theorem to prove it never can.”

In my Bloomberg piece I also mentioned, very briefly, that there are reasons to think this trend might be quite difficult to break out of, as it arises from basic natural processes. There’s a well known relationship in biology known as Kleiber’s Law which describes an empirical (and now theoretically understood) relationship between an organism’s metabolic rate and total mass. It turns out that for a huge number of organisms, total energy use scales as mass raised to the ¾ power — virtually identical to the pattern noted above for total energy use and GDP for nations. A fluke? Maybe.

But something like this pattern doesn’t hold only for nations of various sizes, it extends down to individual cities as well. You can look at how various quantities scale with city size — length of transport networks, speed of individual movement, total energy use, etc.—and the results are quite regular across a huge range of scales and cities in different geographical settings and

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nations. From this (now somewhat old) talk by Luis Bettencourt, a leader in this field, you find that Metropolitan GDP grows as city population to about the 1.1–1.3 power, while total use of electrical energy and petroleum grows more slowly, roughly in direct proportion to population. Put them together and you get — very crudely, I admit—a similar trend: as cities grow they get ever more efficient at generating GDP, but also increase their use of energy (more slowly).

So, I can't PROVE that higher GDP will always necessarily mean more energy used, but that's the way it's been so far, and even in the very recent past. Of course, I'd be surprised if a determined search through history couldn't dig up a few special cases, especially over short periods of time, where GDP up and yet energy consumption went down. The point is that this doesn't typically happen, especially for economic activity on national or global scales. Make things more energy efficient and we end up using them to consume more energy overall. That's a broad empirical reality. One of the people commenting on Krugman's New York Times piece put it quite well:

... if you look at Krugman's own graph, you can see that there is a LIMIT to slow steaming. Marginal fuel savings decrease at slower speeds — the curve flattens out at low speeds. And of course there is a zero lower bound of zero knots. Ships can't go negative speeds and magically produce fuel while doing so. So we can play these games for a while, until the LIMIT is reached.

And don't forget, this all assumes we are moving the same amount of stuff around year in and year out. But Krugman wants growth, so we will be moving ever more stuff around as the years pass. More stuff means more ships means more fuel. This is why economic growth has always lead to greater energy and resource consumption despite efficiency gains.

Krugman says it can be different. He might be right, but it seems to me the burden of proof is on those claiming the future will be different from the past, and if Krugman has made such a case, I missed it.

So did I.

I'll end with one more thought — and an irony. Yesterday the New York Times happened to run an essay by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus (where have I heard that surname?) examining the potential for the rapid global spread of energy-efficient LED technologies to lead to vast energy savings. This year's physics Nobel Prize went to three physicists who helped develop this wonderful technology, and, as the Institute of Physics noted, "With 20 percent of the world's electricity used for lighting, it's been calculated that optimal use of LED lighting could reduce this to 4 percent."

Schellenberger and Nordhaus aren't so hopeful:

... it would be a mistake to assume that LEDs will significantly reduce overall energy consumption.

LED's are but the latest breakthrough in lighting efficiency. Consider the series of accelerated lighting revolutions ushered in by the Industrial Revolution. In

the early and mid-1800s, for instance, “town gas” made from coal was developed and used to illuminate streetlights. Whale oil became the preferred indoor lighting fuel for upper-income Americans until it was replaced by more efficient kerosene lamps. And then, finally, in the late 19th century, the electric light bulb emerged.

Along the way, demand would rise for these new technologies and increase as new ways were found to use them. This led to more overall energy consumption.

From outer space, you can see the results of this long progression of illumination. More and more of the planet is dotted with clusters of lights.

There is no reason to think that the trend lines for demand for LED lighting will be any different, especially as incomes rise and the desire for this cheaper technology takes hold in huge, emerging economies like China, India and Nigeria, where the sheer volume of the demand will be likely to trump the efficiency gains.

... The growing evidence that low-cost efficiency often leads to faster energy growth was recently considered by both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the International Energy Agency. They concluded that energy savings associated with new, more energy efficient technologies were likely to result in significant “rebounds,” or increases, in energy consumption....

The I.E.A. and I.P.C.C. estimate that the rebound could be over 50 percent globally. ... lower energy costs because of higher efficiency may in fact result in higher energy consumption than there would have been without those technologies.

In fact, it wouldn't be surprising; just a continuation of past trends.

**Krugman's argument is internally inconsistent and is motivated by an optimistic political agenda in order to persuade politicians to attempt piecemeal climate protection policies—he functionally acknowledged the limits to growth**

**Heinberg, Post Carbon Institute senior fellow and author of twelve books, 2014** (Richard, “Paul Krugman and the Limits of Hubris,” Post Carbon Institute, 10/10/14, <http://www.postcarbon.org/paul-krugman-and-the-limits-of-hubris/>, IC)

Why is Mr. Krugman leading a crusade against the idea of environmental limits to economic growth? I believe there's a political agenda at work here, and that it's driven by laudable sentiments. I normally hesitate to guess at other people's motives, but in this instance they are rather plainly implied in Krugman's two opinion pieces cited above. He evidently is deeply concerned about climate change and wants to see humanity avert the worst likely impacts, but he believes that policy makers can never be persuaded to adopt climate protection policies if that requires reining in economic growth. He writes: “[T]here's a lot of room to reduce emissions without killing economic

growth.” Yes, there’s room. According to a study Krugman himself cited in his previous op-ed, the first 10 percent of emissions cuts can be achieved without much pain. But beyond that, they’re all at a net cost to the economy.

Like Paul Krugman, we at Post Carbon Institute are deeply concerned about climate change and want officials to adopt policies to avert it. It’s true: if informed opinion leaders pretend that full climate protection can be achieved without any real cost, politicians are more likely to sign on to available no-cost policies. But they’ll only be agreeing to weak pledges that will fail to achieve the levels of emissions cuts that are actually required. By misleading policy makers and the general public this way, we merely waste time and opportunity.

By acknowledging that climate change is a serious threat to humanity’s future, Mr. Krugman is in effect acknowledging the existence of environmental limits to economic expansion. He would probably object that climate change is merely a limit to a fossil-fueled economy, and that a renewably-energized economy could happily expand forever. But once we open the limits box and peer inside, a long series of other critical boundaries quickly comes to light.

Let’s get real. The Earth is a bounded sphere, and the human economy is an engine that extracts raw materials and produces waste. If we keep that engine’s operation within the bounds of what our planet can absorb or replenish through its normal ecosystem functions, all is well. But if the economy continues to grow year after year, at some point the planet’s systems will be overwhelmed—even if we’re using renewable energy to extract and transform raw materials. Our uses of energy and materials can be made somewhat more efficient, but only up to a point. If the Earth itself were expanding at an ever-increasing rate, perpetual economic growth would pose no problem. Yet last time I checked, the planet hadn’t gotten any bigger—while our demands upon it continue to increase.

In his latest op-ed, Mr. Krugman derides “hard scientists who think they are smarter than economists.” I can think of several snide responses to that characterization, but actually I don’t think one is required. The phrase speaks volumes about economists’ own hubris.

## A2 “Renewables”

### **Squon not ready for a renewable shift**

**Heinberg**, Senior Fellow-in-Residence of the Post Carbon Institute and is widely regarded as one of the world’s foremost Peak Oil educators, 5 June 2015

(Richard, “Renewable Energy Will Not Support Economic Growth”, <http://www.postcarbon.org/renewable-energy-will-not-support-economic-growth/>)

The issues surrounding the renewable energy transition are complicated and technical. And there are far too many of them to be fully addressed in a short article like this. But **the preponderance of research literature supports the conclusion that the all-renewable industrial economy of the future will be less mobile and will produce fewer and more expensive goods.** The 20th century industrial world was built on fossil fuels—and in some ways it was built for fossil fuels (as anyone who spends time in American suburban communities can attest). High mobility and the capacity for ever-expanding volumes of industrial production were hallmarks of that waning era. The latter decades of the current century will be shaped by entirely different energy sources, and society will be forced to change in profound ways. That doesn’t have to be a bad thing. The globalized consumer society was always unsustainable anyway, and we might be happier without it. But unless we plan for the post-growth renewable future, **existing economic institutions may tend to shatter rather than adapt smoothly.** The fossil fuel and nuclear industries have an understandable interest in disparaging renewable energy, but their days are numbered. We are headed toward a renewable future, whether we plan intelligently for it or not. Clearly, intelligent planning will offer the better path forward. One way to hasten the energy transition is simply to build more wind turbines and solar panels, as many climate scientists recommend. But equally important to the transition will be our deliberate transformation of the ways we use energy. And that implies a nearly complete rethinking of the economy—both its means and its ends. Growth must no longer be the economy’s goal; rather, we must aim for the satisfaction of basic human needs within a shrinking budget of energy and materials. Meanwhile, to ensure the ongoing buy-in of the public in this vast collaborative project, our economic means must include the promotion of activities that increase human happiness and well being.

### **Renewables can’t solve- too many barriers**

**Heinberg**, Senior Fellow-in-Residence of the Post Carbon Institute and is widely regarded as one of the world’s foremost Peak Oil educators, 5 June 2015

(Richard, “Renewable Energy Will Not Support Economic Growth”, <http://www.postcarbon.org/renewable-energy-will-not-support-economic-growth/>)

The electricity sector: Solar and wind produce electricity, and the fuel is free. Moreover, the cost of electricity from these sources is declining. These are encouraging trends. However, intermittency (the sun doesn't always shine, the wind doesn't always blow) still poses barriers to high levels of solar-wind electricity market share. Grid managers can easily integrate small variable inputs; but eventually storage, capacity redundancy, and major grid overhauls will be necessary to balance inputs with loads as higher proportions of electricity come from uncontrollable sources. All of this will be expensive—increasingly so as solar-wind market penetration levels exceed roughly 60 percent. Some of the problems associated with integrating variable renewables into the grid are being worked out over time. But even if all these problems are eventually resolved, **only about one-fifth of all final energy is consumed in the form of electricity**; how about other forms and ways in which we use energy—will they be easier or harder to transition? The transport sector: **Electric cars are becoming more common. But electric trucks and other heavy vehicles will pose more of a challenge due to the low energy density of battery storage** (gasoline stores vastly more energy per kilogram). Ships could use kite sails, but that would only somewhat improve their fuel efficiency; otherwise there is no good replacement for oil in this key transport mode. The situation is similar, though even bleaker, for airplanes. Biofuels have been an energy fiasco, as the European Parliament has now admitted. And the construction of all of our vehicles, and the infrastructure they rely upon (including roads and runways), also depends upon industrial processes that currently require fossil fuels. That brings us to . . . The industrial sector: Making pig iron—the main ingredient in steel—requires blast furnaces. Making cement requires 100-meter-long kilns that operate at 1500 degrees C. In principle it is possible to produce high heat for these purposes with electricity or giant solar collectors, but nobody does it that way now because it would be much more expensive than burning coal or natural gas. Crucially, current manufacturing processes for building solar panels and wind turbines also depend upon high-temperature industrial processes fueled by oil, coal, and natural gas. Again, alternative ways of producing this heat are feasible in principle—but the result would probably be significantly higher-cost solar and wind power. And there are no demonstration projects to show us just how easy or hard this would be. The food sector: Nitrogen fertilizer is currently produced cheaply from natural gas; it could be made using solar or wind-sourced electricity, but that would again entail higher costs. Food products—and the chemical inputs to farming—are currently transported long distances using oil, and farm machinery runs on refined petroleum. It would be possible to grow food without chemical inputs and to re-localize food systems, but this would probably require more farm labor and might result in higher-priced food. Consumers would need to eat more seasonally and reduce their consumption of exotic foods.



### **Data shows that renewable energy cannot maintain growth models**

**Sebri**, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Sousse, Tunisia,  
8 November **2014**

(Maamar, "Use renewables to be cleaner: Meta-analysis of the renewable energy consumption–economic growth nexus",  
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032114008673>)

As for the model specification, examining the causal linkage between renewable energy consumption and economic growth within a bivariate model (not including control variables) tends to significantly increase (decrease) the probability of finding the growth and neutrality (feedback) hypotheses. Nevertheless, when the causal relationship is investigated within a multivariate framework, particularly when the CO<sub>2</sub> variable is controlled for, substantial changes occur to the last findings. **There is a little chance to maintain the growth hypothesis, while supporting the feedback hypothesis is insensitive to consideration of the environmental dimension within the causal dynamics.** On the other side, investigating the stability of empirical results by taking into account the structural breaks in the datasets seems to have also a significant effect on the probability of maintaining any hypothesis (except the growth hypothesis). Relatively to studies employing per capita data series, those using data at the aggregate level appear to have a lower (greater) probability of getting both the conservation and neutrality (growth) hypotheses. Regarding the nature of data series, the probability of getting unidirectional causality from economic growth to renewable energy consumption (conservation), unidirectional causality from renewable energy consumption to economic growth (growth) and bidirectional causality (feedback) is insensitive to whether the study uses time series or panel data techniques. Contrarily, **the probability of finding an absence of causality (neutrality) significantly decreases when using panel data.** This is expected, since many studies use a heterogeneous group of countries that have different and sometimes opposite economic patterns and energy policies, which may lead to find no causal relationship between energy and growth.

## **A2 “Tech Solves”**

**Prefer our models—they’re key to effectively analyzing the environment. Their tech-optimist lens fails to recognize the fundamental uncertainty, irreversibility, and path-independency of ecological systems—default to a precautionary principle**

**Althouse, Masters in economics, 2015** (Jeffrey, with advisors Carloes Young, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro economics associate professor, Dany Lang, University of Paris 13 associate professor, and Eckhard Hein, Berlin School of Economics and Law professor, “Post-Keynesian Ecological Economics: Towards Greener Pastures,” EPOG Master’s Thesis, defended 6/23/15, p. 8-9, IC)

Neoclassical economics, however, has tended to perceive these ecological theories as masked neomalthusianism, arguing that the creative capacity of entrepreneurs to find substitutes or create more efficient technology is virtually unlimited. Their analysis builds upon microeconomic foundations which necessarily separate the economy from the social and environmental spheres. Individuals are seen as perfectly forwardlooking, boundlessly rational, and possessing perfect information within perfectly free and competitive markets. As such, price signals coordinate market actors to avoid potential environmental threats and achieve “equilibrium” (Douai, et al. 2012). Essentially, the neoclassical paradigm skirts past normative issues related to the environment because the market equilibrium is considered the social optimum. Market efficiency is turned from a socially constructed value into mathematical truism by assuming current individual preferences always trump collective (future) needs. At the core of Robert Solow’s (1973; 1974) neoclassical growth model, for example, lies the assumption that non-renewable material inputs could be easily replaced by labor or capital, thus allowing environmental concerns to fall by the wayside (Holt 2005). According to Solow (1974, p. 11) himself, through new technological capabilities and factor substitution, even complete destruction of natural resources could be rendered “an event, not a catastrophe”. The concept of sustainability becomes useful, therefore, only in as far as people protect what they value now as essential for wellbeing for future generations (Solow 1993), even if those values are incommensurate with their true nature (Norton 1995). In this view of sustainability, all goods are essentially fungible and replaceable with substitutes and natural elements are decontextualized from the systems upon which they depend and which depend on them, in turn. Concern for optimization and reliance on Say’s law have impacted some of the most influential climate models, distorting policy priorities by allowing smooth returns to equilibrium without significant social costs. Nordhaus (2008), for example, developed a model that is widely used in US policy discussions, finding that even without any abatement efforts, a social optimum is achieved. Increasing funding for climate mitigation merely means shifting spending currently destined for consumption, with no effect on investment expenditures and unemployment (Rezai et al 2012, p. 3). 2.2 The Benefits of the PostKeynesian Paradigm While neoclassical economists have been stuck

publishing under old dogmas, heterodox economists and especially post-Keynesians are particularly suited to understanding the intricacies of ecological problems. The postKeynesian focus on historical time, path dependence, irreversibility, uncertainty and effective demand are particularly apt for environmental analysis. Furthermore, while there exists no universally accepted set of principles within the camp, postKeynesians have also adopted more realistic set of microeconomic fundamentals that can similarly help to shed light on environmental issues (Lavoie 2009b).

2.2.1 Historical time, Path Dependence, and Irreversibility One of the most important aspects of the postKeynesian lens for ecological economics is its understanding of time as a historical process. With historical time, present actions are endogenously determined through complex and organic processes which occurred in the past. This view is favored over “neo-Walrasian” or “logical time” found in neoclassical models, in which all considerations are made instantaneously by market actors. As Harcourt and Kriesler (2012) point out, the recognition of historical time may actually be the foundational principle upon which post-Keynesian economics rests, opening up the field of vision to political, institutional, and environmental variables that intervene. The authors quote Joan Robinson, who defines postKeynesian theory as “a method of analysis which takes account of the difference between the future and the past” (p. 1). Because of the focus on historical time, the conceptual “long run” is understood as a collection of short runs, which creates path dependency (Kalecki 1968, p. 263). Though long-run equilibriums can exist, they are dependent upon past events and subject to both positive and negative shocks that do not necessarily bring the system back to its original starting point. Historical time therefore leads postKeynesians to similarly focus on the irreversibility of time and actions in hysteretic systems. Hysteresis in post-Keynesian analysis is a particularly strong form of path dependency because, rather than converging to a single equilibrium, 1) multiple equilibria are achievable for different variables while 2) paths are dependent on previous cumulative outcomes from other time periods (Kronenberg 2010b, p. 4; Holt 2005, p. 6).

2 From an environmental standpoint, growth can therefore be limited in the future either by pollutants released presently, industrial lock-in of resource use, or gradual degradation achieving critical thresholds. The sustainable development path of an economy away from a scarce resource today (eg. fossil fuels) may make it all the more susceptible to environmental shocks from something else further down the road (eg. scarce minerals used in solar panels). For this reason, some heterodox economists have adopted evolutionary parameters into their models to demonstrate path dependency even along environmental lines. Van den Bergh et al. (2006) demonstrate the microeconomic foundations of evolutionary economics as they apply to technological development in the context of resource scarcity. They cite the need to focus on structural changes which underlie growth, and the coevolution of systems which lead to innovation and selection of technologies, with some resources being over- or under- utilized by the market because of bounded rationality and path dependence. Some of these same principles may even stand in the way of lasting positive environmental change. A number of climate mitigation policies, for example, subsidies of

clean energy, reliance on technical standards, support of public transport and even local solutions to climate change all can bring about a number of unintended rebound effects (so-called “escape routes”) that lead to further structural shifts which may even worsen CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the long run (Van den Bergh 2012).

2.2.2 Fundamental uncertainty Because of historical time and the irreversibility of actions, Keynesian “Knightian” uncertainty is adopted over probabilistic risk. As Keynes puts it, one must “...distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.” (Keynes 1937, p. 11314) Not only does fundamental uncertainty in the Keynesian sense preclude the capacity for individual “optimizations” and rational expectation found in neoclassical analysis, but also muddies the water for policy recommendations related to how best direct environmental mitigation efforts on either the collective or individual scale (Aldred 2012). Indeed, ecological disasters are uncertain because the complex systems in which they develop serve to either reinforce their vigor in some cases (as in the “butterfly effect”) or blunt it in others. Nonlinearity is the rule, rather than the exception, in matters of the environment and serves to amplify the importance of uncertainty (Rockström, et al. 2009, p. 12). In many cases fundamental changes can occur almost instantaneously in natural systems where problems were nearly imperceptible for extended periods (Arrow et al. 2004). Reaching certain thresholds, in the case ocean acidification, for example, can cause whole colonies of organisms to collapse, with additional effects for other biomes. The full effects of warmer weather from climate change are even more unimaginable reversal of tidal forces and currents, animal extinctions/relocations/evolutions, soil degradation, weather changes, etc. and any attempt to fully calculate the risk of any one of these, let alone understanding their interconnectedness, would be bewildering. In essence, climate change is both the result and cause of Keynesian uncertainty about the future. It is partially a result of uncertainty because easily identifiable probabilities about its effects and the potential benefits of mitigation policies would likely spur coordinated action. Instead, leaders have tended to buckle down on “business as usual”, hoping that the best guesses of scientists about catastrophic fat tail scenarios have been incorrect (Gifford 2011). Climate change is a cause of uncertainty because the way in which it manifests, and will continue to manifest itself, is constantly modified by any number of environmental and economic variables, which themselves are altered by climate change, thus again transforming its ongoing effects, ad infinitum. The complexity of environmental interactions and general uncertainty about the future have led postKeynesians to adopt a “strong sustainability” approach based on the precautionary principle and fixed factor proportions (Aldred

2012). That is, labor and human made capital do not easily replace each other in the short-run, and generally serve as complements to, rather than substitutes of, natural capital. At its base, the precautionary principle requires either positive action if faced with threat of harm, and inaction if there is potential for that effort to cause harm. As such, Holt (2005, p. 184) has suggested that postKeynesians adopt a model of sustainability that natural capital should never be depleted beyond sustainable yields, unless clear substitutes are available. This allows the desired stock of natural capital to be altered over time, along with the “buffer” level of sustainability to absorb shocks.

**Growth causes ecological collapse—tech can’t solve  
Brown, Clark University environmental science and policy  
professor, and Vergragt, Clark University senior research  
scientist with a PhD in Chemistry from Leiden University, 2015**

(Halina Szejnwald and Philip J., “From Consumerism to Wellbeing: Toward a Cultural Transition?” *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 5/12/2015, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652615004825>, p. 2, IC)

Since the end of the Second World War the USA has been transformed into a society where the national economy depends to a large extent on private consumption; and where mass acquisition and use of material goods is the dominant lifestyle, the centerpiece of social practices, leisure time, cultural rituals and celebrations. We refer to it as consumer society.

The ecological costs of this transformation have been high. While technological improvements in resource efficiency have slowed down the relentless growth in demand for materials, water and energy, they have not kept up with the growing demand, much less attain radical reductions in demand. It is becoming increasingly apparent that technology alone will not solve the ecological unsustainability problem. The returns on energy investments in producing useful energy sources – both fossil-based and others – are much lower than in the past (Zehner 2011; Gupta and Hall 2011; Murphy 2013). The rebound effects of various types are now a widely acknowledged and quantified phenomenon (Owen 2011; Jenkins et al. 2011; IRGS 2013). And the institutional and organizational barriers for rapid technological changes are formidable (Sterman 2014a). Reductions in consumption levels are necessary as well.

Consumer society is a complex system of technology, culture, institutions, markets, and dominant business models. It is driven by the ideology of neoliberalism and infinite growth. It has evolved through a sophisticated exploitation of the fundamental human quest for a meaningful life and wellbeing (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012; Sterman 2014b; Speth 2008; Lorek and Fuchs 2013). To consider reducing its ecological costs is to question this entire complex system, and especially consumerism as the organizing principle for the economy, culture, and political process. In essence, a

transition beyond consumerism would entail a society-wide evolution toward different lifestyles and conceptions of wellbeing, as well as a transformation of the system.

### **Technological innovations are failing to sustain growth in the squo**

**Laeven, et. al**, Haas School of Business University of California, 21 April 2014

(Luc, Ross Levinec, Stelios Michalopoulose, Financial innovation and endogenous growth,

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957314000229>)

The core implications of the theory are that (1) technological and financial innovation will be positively correlated and (2) economic growth will eventually stagnate unless financiers innovate. In terms of positive synergies between technological and financial innovation, first note that technological change increases the returns to financial innovation. As **technology advances, any given screening technology becomes less and less effective at identifying capable technological innovators as informational asymmetries grow.** Thus, the benefits – and hence profits – from improving the screening of entrepreneurs grow with technological advances. The synergies work in the other direction too. Better screening boosts the expected profits from technological innovation, because the expected returns from investing in technological innovation grow when financiers are better at identifying the most promising projects (innovators). **In terms of stagnation, the model stresses that existing screening methods become increasingly inadequate at identifying promising technological innovations as the world's technological frontier advances. Consequently, unless financiers innovate and improve screening technologies in tandem, the probability of finding successful entrepreneurs declines, slowing growth.** With appropriate policies, laws, and regulations, however, the drive for profits by financial and technological entrepreneurs alike can produce a continuing stream of financial and technological innovations that sustain growth.

### **Market adaptations cannot solve the rapidly expanding globalized economy from destroying the environments, they just get caught up in profits to care about the environment**

**Robbins, Hintz, and Moore.** Paul Robbins is the director of the Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Hintz got his Ph.D. in Geography at University of Kentucky, Sarah A. Moore got her PhD in geography at University of Kentucky and an Assistant Professor at University of Wisconsin-Madison, **2013**

(Paul, John, Sarah A., Sarah A. Critical Introductions to Geography : Environment and Society : A Critical Introduction (2nd Edition), pg 149)

Carbon's common role in a fully globalized economy also makes it a difficult problem to solve. One country might impose limits on carbon, forcing entrepreneurs to develop ingenious but expensive methods to make products that emit less carbon. But **these products compete on a global market where the firms of the inactive nation market their cheaper carbon-dependent products for far less.** One country acts aggressively, while the other "free-rides," enjoying both the benefits of the first country's reduced emissions and the better market position from having not imposed carbon limits. At the same time, not all countries start their bargaining from the same point. The industrial revolution that occurred in Europe and the United States turned these regions into major carbon emitters for hundreds of years. Over that time, Europeans and Americans enjoyed greatly increased standards of living but at tremendous costs in terms of atmospheric change. Poorer countries may have large and/or more rapidly growing populations but their per capita carbon emissions are a tiny fraction of those of their counterparts in wealthy nations (Chapter 2). **Why should a poorer nation, with its low per capita carbon emissions, agree to stringent controls when they have not yet enjoyed the fruits of a carbon economy?** Why should a richer nation sacrifice its economy to reduce emissions while poorer nations, with their larger populations, stand to become the largest emitters over the medium or long term? Carbon's mobility exacerbates this conflict since it disconnects its places of emission from its locations of impacts: one person in the United States enjoys the benefits of emitting carbon through daily car commuting, while the costs are borne in a failed crop harvest among farmers and countries in West Africa, a half-world away. One country has an incentive to act, the other does not (Figure 9.5). Finally, add to this the fact that there is no effective higher authority than the individual nations themselves to enforce any agreement: a de facto "state of anarchy" (Thompson 2006). While the United Nations is a powerful deliberative body, it does not represent a central power that can easily force international compliance with a regulatory statute. Instead, the model of international law must be followed, and the negotiators themselves must enforce the rules. Taking all of this into account, it would be hard to believe that international agreement of any kind might be reached. And yet one has

## A2 “Too Late”

**Collapse is coming now, but it’s not too late—transition is key to prevent irreversible tipping points**

**Rockstrom, Stockholm University environmental science**

**professor, 2015** (Johan, “Bounding the Planetary Future: Why We Need a Great Transition,” Great Transition Initiative, April 2015, [http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI\\_publications/Rockstrom-Bounding\\_the\\_Planetary\\_Future.pdf](http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications/Rockstrom-Bounding_the_Planetary_Future.pdf), p. 6-7, IC)

This shift of paradigm must promote anticipatory action, since triggers that set irreversible change in motion can occur much earlier than the later catastrophic tipping points. For example, the East Siberian Arctic shelf holds a vast stock of sea floor methane hydrates (potentially 50 to 500 Gt of carbon compared to the 550 Gt emitted since the industrial revolution). Methane, which is roughly twenty times more potent a greenhouse gas than CO<sub>2</sub> even though it stays in the atmosphere for a shorter time, has started to leak in low volumes as the seabed and tundra thaw. The risk lies in a changing climate crossing an irreversible threshold (if it has not done so already) at which methane will flow in rising volumes. Paleo-climatic data shows that rapid global warming of 5 to 6 °C (9 to 10.8 °F) within one or a few decades has occurred in the past, phenomena that can only be explained by Earth system feedbacks, such as the abrupt release of methane hydrates from continental shelves.<sup>16</sup>

The self-reinforced warming that results from melting ice sheets as the reduced albedo (reflectivity) feeds back to enhance climate change offers another example of a triggering process in action. In 2012, for the first time, the entire surface of the Greenland ice sheets was observed to be melting in July for about two weeks. Correspondingly, the climate feedback from Greenland shifted from net cooling (negative feedback) to net warming (positive feedback), as the albedo dropped by close to 50%. Approximately 300 EJ of heat, equal to half of global annual energy use, were injected into the atmosphere during this two-week period.

Under business-as-usual projections, the window for stabilizing global warming below 2 °C (3.6 °F) will close by 2023, even without sudden surprises like methane outbursts.<sup>17</sup> The same narrow timespan holds for biodiversity loss, where critical functions in ecosystems (such as pollination and the ability of coral reefs to remain stable) may be irreversibly destroyed.

The world thus urgently needs a great transition that rapidly bends the curve of negative global environmental change. Such a turn toward sustainability demands a deep shift in the logic of development away from the assumption of infinite growth toward a paradigm of development and human prosperity within Earth limits. It will require transformations in energy systems, urban development, food systems, and material use. Achieving all this will entail



fundamental institutional changes in economic arrangements, financial systems, and world trade.

**Now is key**

**Rockstrom, Stockholm University environmental science**

**professor, 2015** (Johan, "Bounding the Planetary Future: Why We Need a Great Transition," Great Transition Initiative, April 2015, [http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI\\_publications/Rockstrom-Bounding\\_the\\_Planetary\\_Future.pdf](http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications/Rockstrom-Bounding_the_Planetary_Future.pdf), p. 11-12, IC)

Our historical condition does, whether we like it or not, change everything. Our current economic logic no longer works, as we confront potentially infinite costs at the planetary scale, rendering concepts like "externalities" and "discounting" useless. The nation-state becomes questionable as a useful unit for wealth creation when policy at the local level depends on regional and global actions and feedbacks. Governance shifts upwards in scale, but still needs rooting and interaction across scales. Sharing finite planetary budgets will require fundamental value changes. Planetary regulation needs to spur innovation and technological breakthroughs. Ethical norms need to evolve to embrace a universal belief that all citizens in the world have the right not only to an equitable share of the available environmental space, but also to a stable and healthy environment. No facet of contemporary society will be unaffected by the Anthropocene.

The window for a prosperous future for humanity on a stable planet remains open, if just barely. We have not yet tipped the planet away from its Holocene equilibrium. Whether we are able to navigate the world back into a safe operating space, thereby creating a chance for a world of nine to eleven billion co-citizens to live and thrive, is up to us. In the Anthropocene, we are in the driver's seat.

## **Growth Bad Impacts – General**

## Impact – Biodiversity 2NC

**Economic growth is leading us down a path to extinction- trade and other factors are causing biodiversity to die off**

**Gates, Trauger and Czech 14-** Professor of Wildlife Ecology, professor in natural resources management, PHD

(J. Edward, David L., and Brian, Peak Oil, “Envisioning an Alternative Future”, Economic Growth, and Wildlife Conservation, Chapter 15, p.317, 21 Nov 2014 [//WB](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3_15)

**There are many anthropogenic causes of the ongoing Sixth Mass Extinction, including human destruction of ecosystems, landscape fragmentation, overexploitation of species and natural resources, spread of invasive species, human population growth, illegal consumption and trade in wildlife products, the further spread of agriculture, and various forms of pollution.** Many of **these threats to biodiversity derive ultimately from economic growth** [11]. Habitat loss and degradation affects 86% of all threatened birds, 86% of the threatened mammals assessed, and 88% of the threatened amphibians (<http://www.iucnredlist.org/news/biodiversity-crisis>, accessed 21 October 2013). **Losses also stem from introductions of invasive alien species from travel and global trade that establish and spread outside their normal distribution.** Some threatening invasive species include feral domestic cat (*Felis silvestris catus*) and black rat (*Rattus rattus*), wild boar (*Sus scrofa*), green crab (*Carcinus maenas*), zebra mussel (*Dreissena polymorpha*), African tulip tree (*Spathodea campanulata*), Burmese python (*Python molurus bivittatus*), hemlock woolly adelgid (*Adelges tsuga annand*), and brown tree snake (*Boiga irregularis*). Introductions can happen deliberately or unintentionally, for example, by organisms “hitchhiking” in containers, ships, cars, or soil. **Exploitation of natural resources for food, pets, and medicine can result in unconstrained resource extraction, and overhunting and over fishing. Spread of diseases and pollution by humans are other factors;** for example, excessive fertilizer use can lead to high levels of nutrients in soil and waterways, affecting soil organisms and aquatic life. **Burning of fossil fuels by humans is resulting in changes to the global climate; these changes threaten entire ecosystems and their associated species.** By some accounts, “the race to save the composition, structure, and organization of biodiversity as it exists today—is over, and we have lost.” [53]. **Our sheer numbers and activities have made us a force of nature that now threatens the functioning of our planet’s life-support system.** In recognition of the prominent role played by humans since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in altering planetary geologic, climatic, and biologic systems, some geologists have labeled this interval the Anthropocene Epoch [61, 72]. In the Anthropocene, **evolution of species by natural selection has been replaced by human selection as the dominant process. Baring a mass die-off of humans, there is little that anyone can do now to stop this Sixth Mass Extinction.** As noted by Stephen M. Meyer [53], “In the past century we have accumulated a vast extinction debt that will be paid in the century ahead.” During this time, **Earth could lose upward of 50% of its plant and animal species, making extinction one**

**of our longest-lasting legacies to future generations.** Little comfort can be taken in the fact that over tens of millions of years, the biodiversity of our planet may recover from this Sixth Mass Extinction, as it has from past extinction events; but, as happened following the demise of the dinosaurs at the end of the Cretaceous (65 million years ago), **the evolutionary trajectory of life on Earth will have been permanently altered,** resulting in totally different species composition and distribution. The biodiversity of Earth will be as different then as that between today and the Age of Dinosaurs!

### **Biodiversity loss causes extinction**

**Jackson 12** (Ross, PhD in operations research at Case Western, Masters in Industrial management at Purdue, Chairman of GAIA Trust, Ex-Independent IT consultant and software designer specializing in international finance. "Occupy World Street"

<http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YfpyNxdvu4IC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=occupy+wall+street+marxism+criticism&ots=VgS8nTrZ1B&sig=-ZkZnlymqND7x5Lb8UecwY1fcjM#v=onepage&q&f=false>

A substantial majority of scientists agree that the world is currently undergoing the sixth known extinction of species, the most recent being when the dinosaurs were wiped out by a meteor crashing into the earth.<sup>1</sup> While the previous five extinctions were spurred by volcanic eruptions, meteor impacts, and other exogenous causes, the current one has been brought on by human actions. **Species extinction is another example of ecosystem reaction to overload, and is potentially fatal for humankind, as we are dependent on other plant and animal species for our own survival.** A number of biologists have predicted that up to one-fifth of all living species could disappear within 30 years, and that if present trends continue, one-half of all species of life on earth will be extinct in less than 100 years, including one-third of the mammal population as a result of habitat destruction, pollution, invasive species, and climate change. Daniel Simberloff, a University of Tennessee ecologist and prominent expert in biological diversity, says, "The speed at which species are being lost is much faster than any we've seen in the past— including those [extinctions] related to meteor collisions." One of the major direct causes is loss of habitat as humans take over more and more of the space previously occupied by other species as population grows. Hunting, logging, overfishing, and pollution have also caused significant losses. Many species of birds, frogs, and other animals sensitive to toxins have fallen to pollution. Other life-forms can be very sensitive to subtle changes caused by increasing CO<sub>2</sub> levels. For example, coral reefs are dying on account of a complex of factors, including small temperature and acidity changes in the oceans, while the polar bear's time is running out as the arctic ice melts. Many plants and insects are disappearing without us even noticing, as are many microorganisms in soils that are

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depleted by chemical agriculture. These extinctions are going to have serious consequences for humanity. It is impossible to predict specifically how this ongoing mass-extinction event will affect the human population other than to say that it will be severely negative. The problem is that natural systems are complex, deeply interconnected, and far beyond our capability to understand. **A species that disappears may have unpredictable effects on the whole food chain, all the way up to humans at the top.** Biodiversity is not just about pleasant experiences of humankind in nature, but is **about resilience, robustness, and redundancy in the face of change**—it is **nature's immune system**. **When we weaken biodiversity, we increase the likelihood of some aspect of nature going off in an entirely unexpected direction that is potentially fatal for humankind, for example, mutations and cell crossovers leading to new kinds of dangerous bacteria and viruses, or perhaps fatal attacks on crops or domesticated animals that we are dependent upon for food.**

## Impact – Biodiversity Ext.

**All of the main causes of environmental degradation stem from growth**

**Daley and Kent, 13**

(Ben and Rebecca, “Environmental Science and Management”, Centre for Development, Environment and Policy, Section 1.4,  
[//WB">http://www.soas.ac.uk/cedep-demos/000\\_P500\\_ESM\\_K3736-Demo/unit1/page\\_11.htm">//WB](http://www.soas.ac.uk/cedep-demos/000_P500_ESM_K3736-Demo/unit1/page_11.htm)

**The causes of the environmental crisis** The causes of the environmental crisis have been the subject of considerable debate. However, in general, its main causes are now acknowledged to be: **technological developments** over the course of human history - and particularly since the Industrial Revolution - **which have allowed humans to exert a greater influence over natural resources and ecosystems rapidly increasing human population** which has led to significant increases in human population density in many parts of the world **dramatic increases in resource and energy consumption** - particularly since the Industrial Revolution, and especially since around 1950 - **which have accompanied economic growth** and rising standards of living in some parts of the world as illustrated in 1.4.2. 1.4.2 Energy consumption, economic development and CO2 emissions; selected Latin America countries **the emergence and development of the capitalist world economy in which increasing flows of people, resources, products, energy and waste have occurred, together with increasing environmental impacts utilitarian attitudes towards the environment** which have allowed the unrestricted exploitation of natural resources and ecosystems **short-term patterns of decision-making exhibited by many governments** companies and individuals, which place greater emphasis on short-term profit maximisation (or value maximisation) than on environmental protection

## Impact – Disease 2NC

**The current economic system structurally discourages research to solves diseases – focus on profit prevents cures from being distributed**

**Wiist, DHSc, MPH, MS, 6**

(William, “Public Health and the Anticorporate Movement: Rationale and Recommendations”, American Journal of Public Health, Government, Politics, and Law Peer Reviewed, August 2006, [//WB">http://people.oregonstate.edu/~flayb/MY%20COURSES/H671%20Advanced%20Theories%20of%20Health%20Behavior%20-%20Fall%202012/Readings/Wiist06%20Corporate%20influences,%20PH%20and%20the%20anticorporate%20movement.pdf">//WB](http://people.oregonstate.edu/~flayb/MY%20COURSES/H671%20Advanced%20Theories%20of%20Health%20Behavior%20-%20Fall%202012/Readings/Wiist06%20Corporate%20influences,%20PH%20and%20the%20anticorporate%20movement.pdf)

**MANY PUBLIC HEALTH professionals are aware of or have been involved in public health problems and issues related to corporate products, services, or practices. Freudenberg<sup>1</sup> described a wide variety of products and practices of what he termed disease-promoting corporations.** Included are products such as tobacco, unsafe and polluting motor vehicles, expensive medications, guns, alcohol, and certain foods. Other issues that have generated public health advocacy and research include consumer product safety, hazardous industrial materials, water and air pollution, food supply safety, nutritional content and marketing, and occupational health and safety. **Corporations also influence health services.** For example, **federal funding for some health services such as Medicaid has decreased while the number of people eligible for services has increased<sup>2</sup> in part because corporations have increased employee contributions to health insurance premiums or they do not provide health insurance.**<sup>3</sup> Regulatory agencies have a limited number of employees to conduct inspections of corporations and enforce health and safety regulations.<sup>4</sup> Also, **efforts to prevent or minimize damage from corporate practices or products face opposition from large, well-funded, organized corporate opposition.**<sup>1</sup> For example, the tobacco settlement<sup>5</sup> and the automobile industry position on safety and fuel efficiency.<sup>4</sup> Typically, **the field of public health has addressed issues such as these as singular issues, as a specific product, or as a single company or a particular type of industry. Public health could do more along those lines, but as egregious as the harm from some products, services, and practices may seem, the prevention or amelioration of the harmful effects in and of themselves does not address the fundamental structure and function common to all corporations. Rather than expending efforts and resources to confront a particular type of industry or a single health issue, the field of public health might be more effective with a research agenda** and a professional preparation curriculum that focus on the corporation as a societal structural factor in disease. **Such an approach is consistent with the historical and contemporary mission of public health.** Over the past decade **there has been a movement to return public health to its social justice roots, to a focus on the social determinants of health.**<sup>6,7</sup> There has been a call for a third public health revolution that focuses on the distal causative factors of disease.<sup>8</sup> **Public health ethics, values, and beliefs identify public health’s primary role as that of addressing the fundamental societal structural causes of disease.**<sup>9</sup> **Public health is increasingly focusing on distal structural factors related to inequities in health,<sup>10</sup> income inequality, economic growth and instability,<sup>11</sup> social relationships,<sup>12</sup> the built environment,<sup>13</sup> and trade regulations.**<sup>14,15</sup> **Public health could benefit** in several ways **from a focus on the corporation as a distal, societal structural factor.** Because corporate products, services, and practices provide tangible targets for advocacy and research, **such an approach could be more useful than focusing on** concepts such as **free market fundamentalism or extreme capitalism.** Research could examine the influence of the

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corporate entity on indicators of health status. Academic programs could prepare practitioners to address the corporate role in disease and injury. **Public health advocacy activities related to the corporate products already noted could link to the anticorporate movement. Focusing on the corporation as a societal structural factor might also suggest ways to address issues such as race/ethnicity, gender, age, socioeconomic status, and disability that are often manifest in a corporate setting.** An anticorporate movement's perspective of the corporate entity as a societal structural factor is instructive for public health. **Review of that perspective points out the mutual interests in social justice, ethics, and the social determinants of health that public health has with the anticorporate movement.**

### **Disease causes extinction—no burnout**

Karl-Heinz **Kerscher 14**, Professor, "Space Education", Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten

**The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.**



## Impact – Endocrine 2NC

### **Economic growth and industrialization cause an increase of endocrine disrupters- Asia proves**

**Tanbe 8**- Professor at the Center for Marine Environmental Studies

(Shinsuke, “Temporal trends of brominated flame retardants in coastal waters of Japan and South China: Retrospective monitoring study using archived samples from es-Bank, Ehime University, Japan”, Marine Pollution Bulletin Volume 57, Issues 6–12, 2008, Pages 267–274, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X0800009X>)/WB

**Brominated flame retardants (BFRs) are a group of compounds that are added to a wide range of products**, such as printed circuit boards, computer cases, household electronic appliances and construction materials to prevent the outbreak of fire (Alaee et al., 2003). **These substances are high volume chemicals** and include polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), hexabromocyclododecanes (HBCDs), polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) and tetrabromobisphenol A (TBBPA). **Among them, additive flame retardants like PBDEs, HBCDs and PBBs are the focus of current concerns due to their persistence, bioaccumulative nature, and possible adverse effects on humans and wildlife** (Darnerud, 2003 and Birnbaum and Staskal, 2004). These additive flame retardants can enter the environment through several routes such as leaching during production and application processes, by volatilization during use as well as disposal in domestic waste, landfills or during recycling. Although the potential risk of PBDEs in wildlife is not clear, experimental **studies using different PBDE commercial mixtures as well as individual BDE congeners have shown various effects in both fish and mammals. The potential adverse toxicological effects include liver enzyme induction, activation of the Ah receptor, immunological and neurotoxic effects, propensity to disrupt thyroid hormone homeostasis, and vitamin A levels** (de Wit, 2002 and Darnerud et al., 2001). Similarly, HBCDs have also been found to induce neurotoxic effects in cerebellar granule cells of rats in vitro ( Reistad et al., 2006). Consequently, **the concern about these compounds as potential endocrine disruptors in humans and wildlife has been growing in recent years**. Monitoring studies over a period of time can provide information regarding contaminant variability and trends in exposure. Several temporal trend studies have shown increasing PBDE levels in various environmental matrices (Hites, 2004), probably due to increased use of these chemicals as flame retardants. In contrast, though **usage of HBCDs is not regulated and is now increasing**, very few studies have reported HBCD levels in environmental samples. Covaci et al. (2006) in a recent overview of HBCDs in several environmental media found increasing trends in the environment. According to the Bromine Science and Environmental Forum (BSEF) 2004, **the global market demand for PBDEs and HBCDs was estimated at 67,490 and 16,700 tons, respectively, of which 37% and 23%, correspondingly, was consumed in Asia. Asia is currently a major global industrial center with some of the fastest economic growth rates in the world. Urbanization and onset of industrialization have resulted in increased production of**

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new chemicals and their subsequent release into the environment in this region. In addition, lack of strict environmental regulations/enforcement in some of the Asian countries allows import and disposal of electric and electronic waste (e-waste) generated in industrialized countries (UNEP, 2005).

### **Endocrine disruption causes extinction**

**Togawa 99** (Tatsuo, Institute of Biomaterials and Bioengineering – Tokyo Medical and Dental University, Technology in Society, August)

Advanced technology provides a comfortable life for many people, but it also produces strong destructive forces that can cause extinction of the human race if used accidentally or intentionally. As stated in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955, hydrogen bombs might possibly put an end to the human race.<sup>1</sup> Nuclear weapons are not the only risks that arise from modern technologies. In 1962, Rachel Carson wrote in her book, *Silent Spring* [2], that the amount of the pesticide parathion used on California farms alone at that time could provide a lethal dose for five to ten times the whole world's population. Destruction of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, and chemical pollution by endocrine destructive chemicals began to appear as the result of advanced technology, and they are now considered to be potential causes of extinction of the human race unless they are effectively controlled.

## **Impact – Laundry List 2NC**

**Extinction—laundry list of internal links prove human effects will destroy the earth**

**Rockstrom, Stockholm University environmental science**

**professor, 2015** (Johan, “Bounding the Planetary Future: Why We Need a Great Transition,” Great Transition Initiative, April 2015, [http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI\\_publications/Rockstrom-Bounding\\_the\\_Planetary\\_Future.pdf](http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications/Rockstrom-Bounding_the_Planetary_Future.pdf), p. 1-2, IC)

Human societies have for millennia faced severe environmental challenges, some of which have even triggered social and ecological collapse. Such was the fate of Mayan civilization and Mesopotamian irrigation societies, among many others. However, the scale of impact remained local or regional—until now. Over the past fifty years, the evidence has mounted of a massive shift in the magnitude and pace of human pressures on the planet. Although this “Great Acceleration” began in the mid-1950s, over the last twenty-five years, we have started to see the first evidence that critical thresholds of the Earth system are in danger of being crossed (Figure 1).<sup>1</sup> Multiple signals sound the alert: the collapse of marine fisheries; accelerated melting of ice sheets, upwelling of warm ocean waters, and methane release from thawing Siberian seabeds; climate volatility and extreme droughts; shifts in ecological regimes in lakes caused by nutrient runoffs from fertilizers and other sources; and the collapse of tropical coral reef systems. Today, we can state with a high degree of confidence that the sheer accumulation of such anthropogenic impacts can disrupt the homeostasis of the Earth system.<sup>2</sup>

Humanity has become the dominant force of change on Earth, surpassing in importance the geophysical forces that have heretofore shaped the biosphere.<sup>3</sup> In this new geological epoch, often called the Anthropocene, a profound new risk can be added to the conventional concerns of dwindling resources and local pollution: human action could push the Earth system to abrupt and irreversible shifts of the planetary ecosphere. The repercussions could prove calamitous at local, regional, and global levels.

As a result, if humanity continues on its current trajectory, it will likely be unable to meet the needs of a world population that is expected to reach at least nine billion by 2050.<sup>5</sup> As human biophysical pressures rise, threatening the stability of the planet, our understanding of development must transcend the current paradigm. We must urgently address the twin challenges of shrinking the human footprint and equitably sharing the limited resources and ecological space of Earth.

### Impact – Laundry List Ext.

**There is no scenario where growth wins, competition hurts relation, energy security harms the environment, expansion leads to income inequality, and only a focus on sustain-based politics can solve**

**Meltzer, Steven, and Langley**, professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, associate Director at CIC, where he works on development policy and the post-2015 agenda, rector of Policy and Research at Climate Advisers, February **2013**

(Joshua, David, Claire, THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION: THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH , pg 23-24,

<http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=317112116088088090095116120006096004053017063051087026113098068127097026102127074024053029061030029060000114120126115023013073053061042009079098019126123071020069100059050000007072080068080107022104065079030097089011105065126124074091116029111017081&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2> )

American policymakers therefore face a paradox. On the one hand, the need for—and perhaps also the demand for—a new growth model is strong. On the other hand, the obstacles to its creation are daunting. Although predicting the future is an invidious task, especially when levels of global uncertainty are so high and American politics is so finely divided, we see four broad scenarios that could result from the interplay of these contrasting forces.

- **Scenario 1: Muddle Through.** This scenario sees a continuation of business-as-usual, with a slight rebalancing of growth from the richest Americans to the middle classes, as a result of a combination of recovery, growth in high-value exports and an increase in income taxes for higher earners. A period of high energy prices stimulates significant gains in energy efficiency, but also sees the United States emerge as a major producer of unconventional oil as well as unconventional gas. This increases American energy security, but carbon emissions are only reduced slowly, as cheaper energy prices stimulate demand and reduce the competitiveness of renewables. Pressure is placed on China and India to discover and develop their own unconventional carbon reserves, with an inevitable impact on climate trajectories. Policymakers increasingly focus on adaptation to climate impacts and on geo-engineering as a potential route to reducing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.<sup>171</sup> **Internationally, levels of trust and cooperation between major powers is low,** while a growing number of countries face powerful protest movements from both ends of the political spectrum.
- **Scenario 2: Going for Growth.** This scenario builds on scenario 1 but assumes a singular focus on growing the economy. **Unconventional oil and shale gas are rapidly exploited and often exported,** with lower energy prices boosting the economy. Domestic coal demand continues to fall, but low-cost coal is sold aggressively to emerging markets. **Consumption remains a key driver of economic growth,** which is rapid but unevenly distributed, with some metropolitan areas prospering and others experiencing a steep decline in their wealth and population. The labor market performs strongly, but it does

not generate the jobs needed to reduce income inequality. Economic mobility also remains low, but, on the whole, urban voters continue to support “growth first” politics. American greenhouse gas emissions fall, but only slowly, **while its coal exports boost emissions in other countries.** Declining federal government support for renewable energy means that gas does not become a bridging fuel to zero-carbon energy sources. American resilience to risk is strengthened by an improved fiscal position, but increased resources—diplomatic, military and economic—are used to react to, rather than manage, crises, both overseas and at home. America leads still, but in a highly competitive and often fractious world. • Scenario 3: Intelligent Design. This scenario is also consistent with strong levels of economic growth but includes a more deliberate attempt to reinforce positive trends, restrain negative ones and increase American resilience to a range of risks. Successive presidents focus on employment through renewed public investment in education and training, additional support for sectors with high export potential, and innovative approaches to regulation, especially in the financial sector. The Federal Reserve places greater emphasis on its mandate to maximize employment, alongside its current focus on interest rates and price stability.<sup>172</sup> In the energy sector, the government takes a strategic approach to maximizing the country’s new opportunities, with policies to maximize the potential of gas to reduce emissions (e.g., use in transportation) and some contribution from the energy sector to fiscal consolidation (through reduced fossil fuel subsidies and an increased use of taxation or market instruments).<sup>173</sup> None of these measures are especially dramatic, but taken together they have a measurable impact on sustainability and allow the United States to provide somewhat increased levels of leadership internationally. As a result, geopolitical outcomes are more cooperative, with some innovations in global governance, even though important stresses remain unaddressed.<sup>174</sup> • Scenario 4: Emergency Response. Policy is driven in unpredictable directions by a series of shocks, **such as a further breakdown in global financial systems, serious conflict or state failure, or a series of extreme weather events or clear evidence of disruptive climate change.** In response to one or more of these shocks, the United States becomes a highly directive actor as it mobilizes what it perceives to be an urgent threat to its security. At a global level, net economic impact is negative, possibly strongly so, as growth slows in a number of countries. The impact on sustainability is hard to predict. It is most likely to be positive if an environmental shock triggers the crisis, although even then outcomes will be highly dependent on the timing of the event and the extent to which appropriate technologies are primed for rapid diffusion. The impact on geopolitics will also be mixed, especially if the world divides into victims and villains (with the United States on either side) and if coercive measures (e.g., trade sanctions) are used to deliver change. **This scenario becomes an increasingly likely successor to the previous scenarios, assuming that patterns of growth take the world further outside the “safe operating space for humanity.**

## Impact – Pollination 2NC

**The loss of species is a horrible event that could lead to a collapse of the environment and extinction- pollinators are uniquely key**

**Gates, Trauger and Czech 14-** Professor of Wildlife Ecology, professor in natural resources management, PHD

(J. Edward, David L., and Brian, Peak Oil, “Envisioning an Alternative Future”, Economic Growth, and Wildlife Conservation, Chapter 15, p.317, 21 Nov 2014 [//WB">http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3\\_15\)//WB](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3_15)

**Not only are extinctions irreversible, but they also are posing a serious threat to human health and well-being.** A great analogy is to think of species as rivets in an airplane and humans as its passengers [43, 66]. For simplicity, let us ignore where we are going, who is piloting our airplane, or the appearance of new rivets; although, each of which has philosophical implications. The airplane can lose rivets up to a point, without sacrificing its integrity. However, at some point, the removal of a critical rivet will cause it to suddenly crash. It is impossible to say how many rivets can be lost, but if all losses are in a critical area of the plane, it may not take too many. As an example, **the lost of one keystone species on which numerous other species are dependent could cause a trophic cascade, resulting in the extinctions of numerous species and compromising the functioning of the entire ecosystem** [64]. **Many species also provide critical ecosystem services, such as processing wastes and recycling nutrients, at no cost to us. Other species aid in the control of pest species in agriculture and forestry, reducing the use of insecticides and treatment costs to society. Different species of bees, flies, butterflies, birds, and bats are important plant pollinators worldwide.** In fact, bees pollinate 71 of the 100 crops that provide 90% of human food. The estimated value of these crops is about US\$ 200 billion annually [71]. Domestic honey bees (*Apis mellifera*) are critical pollinators in the USA. Their monetary value as commercial pollinators is estimated to be about US\$ 15– 17 billion annually [37, 71]. For some high-value crops, in the absence of pollinators it might be cost-effective to pollinate them by hand. For example, in parts of China, the decline of native bees from overuse of pesticides and lack of natural bee habitats has forced farmers to pollinate apple and pear trees by hand (<https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5193>, accessed 11 October 2013). However, **there are not enough humans in the world to pollinate all of our crops by hand. Without bees, we would be forced to survive on a few wind-pollinated crops, such as wheat, barley, and corn.** Picture supermarkets without almonds, apples, avocados, blackberries, blueberries, cantaloupes, cherries, cranberries, cucumbers, grapefruits, onions, oranges, peaches, pears, plums, pumpkins, raspberries, watermelons, and much more. We sometimes hear people ask, **“What is the importance of this species or that species?” What they mean to say is, “What is its importance to humans?”** We can certainly develop long lists of species and describe how they benefit or harm humans (if known); but, **this exercise does not consider the importance of our listed species to other species, besides humans; or, that their ecological relationships may not have been studied**; or, that most species on Earth are unknown to science, about 86% of the earth’s species [55]! **Each species found on Earth is the result of many millions of years of evolution, is important in its own right, and is interwoven coevolutionarily with other species in a complex fabric of life that if torn or shredded could endanger our very own existence**

## Impact – Poverty 2NC

### **Economic growth exacerbates poverty**

**Nation Multimedia Group 13**- uses National Statistical Coordination Board data

("Economic growth masks poverty", 5/4/13,  
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Economic-growth-masks-poverty-30205224.html//WB>

Three years ago Philippine President Benigno Aquino III ran with the battle cry "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" (If there is no corruption, there will be no poverty). It served as the cornerstone of his "Straight Path" platform. **Halfway into his term, the president has achieved much, including the stellar economic growth** that has earned the country an investment-grade credit status from Fitch Ratings. **This is why the disclosure last week by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) that the incidence of poverty has remained unchanged for the past six years was a big embarrassment to the administration.** Many believe this was the reason Economic Planning Secretary Arsenio Balisacan, who heads the NSCB, was bumped off the official delegation that flew with the president to Brunei last Wednesday for the Asean Summit. **The NSCB report said poverty incidence for the first half of 2012 was 27.9 per cent.** Comparing this with the 2006 and 2009 first-semester figures of 28.8 per cent and 28.6 per cent, respectively, **it said poverty remained unchanged** as the computed differences were not statistically significant. The NSCB noted that in terms of income distribution, 20 per cent of the population (or the poorest segment) accounted for only 6 per cent of the total national income, while the upper 20 per cent accounted for nearly 50 per cent. **All efforts to address poverty will be for naught if the government continues to neglect agriculture.** In a paper written in November 2008, Balisacan presented facts that remain true to this day: **despite the relatively rapid pace of urbanisation** in the past 20 years, **poverty in the Philippines is still largely a rural phenomenon.** Two of every three poor persons are in rural areas and mostly dependent on agricultural employment and incomes. **Poverty incidence in agricultural households is roughly thrice that in the rest of the population.** While agriculture's share in the total labour force has dropped from about half in the late 1980s to only a little more than a third by the mid-2000s, the sector continues to account for about 60 per cent of total poverty. Last week, Balisacan was reported as saying that the visible underemployment in agriculture was a persistent problem that always came up in labour survey results. "This means that agriculture sector workers work less than 40 hours a week, perhaps because there isn't much demand for labour in their areas, and they are looking for additional work, possibly because the wages they receive are not enough to meet their needs. If the problem of visible underemployment in agriculture is addressed, then incomes of farmers would increase, poverty incidence would decrease, and we would not be compromising food security," he said. The government should convince the private sector to invest in agriculture. It can start with the coconut industry, where, according to National Anti-Poverty Commission chief Joel Rocamora, the 70-billion peso (US\$1.7 billion) coconut levy fund is available to spur farmers' production. Also, the government can improve the agriculture sector by simply coordinating with Agriculture Secretary Proceso Alcala, who has a number of programmes and projects that need only official support to get implemented. At a recent roundtable with the Inquirer's business section, Alcala cited a quedan system that allows coconut farmers to take part in value-added production from coco sugar to coco biodiesel through cooperative- and joint-venture-type arrangements, and the expansion of the programme under which farmers may borrow funds using an ATM card, to cover the top 20 rice-producing areas nationwide. **In the next three years, the Aquino administration hopes to cut poverty** incidence to 16.6 per cent, or half the 1991 rate of 33.1 per cent. **It had better start aggressively addressing the issues stunting agriculture, otherwise, it will have no option but to again lower the poverty threshold income** (or the minimum amount required to meet basic food and non-food needs) to meet its goal, as it did in 2011 when the threshold was lowered from the previous 52 to 46 pesos for every Filipino per day. **Yes, this can cut the official number of poor people, but this is not what we need. We need the government to implement programmes and policies that will attack the root causes of poverty.**

### Poverty outweighs nuke war

**Abu-Jamal 1998** (Mumia, Peace Activist, "A Quiet and Deadly Violence," FLASHPOINTS, September 19, 1998, available online at <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>, accessed 6/30/07)

This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: **[E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war** that caused 232 million deaths; and **every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty** throughout the world **as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermo nuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.** [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing.. This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor.



## Impact – Warming 2NC

**Growth causes a laundry list of impacts [climate change, biodiversity loss, soil erosion, disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles] and extinction—reject technological optimism, only cultural shift can solve**

**Althouse, Masters in economics, 2015** (Jeffrey, with advisors Carloes Young, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro economics associate professor, Dany Lang, University of Paris 13 associate professor, and Eckhard Hein, Berlin School of Economics and Law professor, “Post-Keynesian Ecological Economics: Towards Greener Pastures,” EPOG Master’s Thesis, defended 6/23/15, p. 4-6, IC)

With the publication of the last UN International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, it has become painstakingly clear that human activity has caused an unprecedented amount of change to the Earth’s natural processes, yielding significant impacts on both current and future generations (IPCC 2014). Both the pace of global warming due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the extent of its effects appear to have been vastly underestimated. Conservative estimates now put likely warming scenarios at between 3.7 and 4.5 °C this century, far beyond the supposedly “manageable” 2 °C warming limit set by international experts. **Additional stress augurs poorly for already strained ecological systems**, as well as economic growth and social stability. As the IPCC report states, “...climate-change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, **further erode food security**, and prolong existing and create new **poverty traps**, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging **hotspots of hunger.**” (IPCC 2014, p. 20) Climate change, however, is just one of many biophysical limits that are being pushed or surpassed at this time – ranging from **biodiversity loss to soil erosion to disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles** and the future costs of accruing such **ecological debts are likely to rise** as global leaders fail to make serious commitments to stay within planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009). As the world’s population continues to grow, along with an ever-expanding middle class, the availability of both renewable and nonrenewable resources are likely to face a number threats that will ripple through the economy. However, despite the overwhelming evidence of natural limits to continued economic growth, economics has been slow to shed old orthodoxies which overlook economic dependence on the natural world. Both the landmark “Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972) publication by the Club of Rome and further research by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1970; 1971; 1976) over the limits continued growth, given finite material inputs and increasing energy needs to transform such resources, began a flurry of controversy and responses by the economic mainstream in the early 1970’s. Neoclassically trained economists, believing in perfect rationality, and perfect substitutability of natural inputs “adopted

mathematical models of optimising behavior, assuming microeconomic axioms, regarding humans as self-interested utility maximisers, pricing externalities and conducting tradeoffs” (Spash & Ryan 2010, p. 2). Their unflinching optimism in price signals to bring about technological change allow even the most catastrophic environmental disasters to be easily overcome. Even modern ecological economics has largely been complicit in merely appropriating neoclassical and mainstream models of production with moderate alterations to include externalities, bringing about only negligibly different results rather than drastic ideological, behavioral, or political change (Spash 2012, Holt 2005). While they have been slow to pick up the mantle on this subject (Mearman 2009), a growing number of heterodox economists are beginning to set their sights on ecological issues and work across disciplines to bring new perspectives and a more realistic analysis to an old debate that needed reviving (Berg et al. 2015, Foley & Taylor 2014, Victor and Jackson 2014). PostKeynesians have been especially active in this field, bringing traditionally micro-based insights from environmental science into a decidedly “macro” framework (Rezai et al. 2012). The foundations of the postKeynesian paradigm historical time, fundamental uncertainty, and effective demand figure prominently in what is now being called “ecological macroeconomics” This paper provides a brief overview of postKeynesian ecological economics and the intuitions gleaned from it this far. It is found that while the post-Keynesian lens has proven fruitful to better understand some ecological issues, much more must be done to understand the role that the drivers of growth play in finding a sustainable growth path. Increasing efficiency and productivity growth alone are likely insufficient and in some cases may even be counterproductive to achieve the drastic dematerialization of production needed to avoid catastrophic human and environmental damage from climate change. The uncertainty involved in predicting future climate scenarios, and human adaptability to them, should act as a catalyst for more radical solutions, rather than doubling down on technological optimism. A truly sustainable economic path will require a decrease in energy and material-intensive production, as well as a counterbalancing increase in socially beneficial services with low environmental impact. Achieving this in the limited time available will require a significant cultural shift towards sufficiency, rather than efficiency, a more equal distribution of wealth, and government policies that focus less on growth and more on wellbeing. Going forward, postKeynesian economists will need to adopt a coherent definition of sustainability founded in the fundamentals of uncertainty, irreversible time and the double-edged sword of effective demand in a finite world (Berr 2009). While certainly a subject to be debated, such issues beg for a complementary normative theory of social progress to better understand how to ensure inter and intra generational wellbeing and advance the shift of values away from growth-centric dogma. Wellbeing for current and future generations, without compromising natural processes or access to them, must hold primacy over growth.

**Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now is key to avoid catastrophic collapse**

Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510>, accessed 8-31-14.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain” that human influence has warmed the global climate system and that it is “extremely likely” that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 “is anthropogenic” [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]

## A2 “Growth Good – Enviro”

### **Growth requires more raw materials—that destroys the environment**

**Maxton, Club of Rome secretary general, 2015** (Graeme, “Economic growth doesn’t create jobs, it destroys them,” The Guardian, 4/21/15, <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/apr/21/jobs-economic-growth-inequality-environment-club-of-rome>, IC)

#### 3. Boosting growth is not the way to solve environmental problems

Economic growth is the cause of them. It requires a constant increase in the flow of raw materials extracted from the planet to be turned into goods, services and waste. The more we grow, certainly using current economic thinking, the more resources we need to use and the more pollution we create.

Rather than pursuing economic growth then, we should tackle our problems head on. We should develop policies to ensure that everyone has enough money to live on, because it leads to healthier and more stable societies. We should plan to reduce the gap between rich and poor, and we need to stop prevaricating when it comes to the environment and actually do something.

## **A2 “Growth Good – Inequality”**

### **Growth doesn't solve inequality—empirically proven. Tech exacerbates the problem**

**Maxton, Club of Rome secretary general, 2015** (Graeme, “Economic growth doesn't create jobs, it destroys them,” The Guardian, 4/21/15, <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/apr/21/jobs-economic-growth-inequality-environment-club-of-rome>, IC)

Because the system is designed to reward those who already have money and assets, the free market economic model takes wealth from the poor and gives it to the rich. This is especially true since 2008 as government and consumer debts in the rich world have risen and average incomes have stagnated or fallen. The gap between the rich and poor is bigger today than in 1914. The gap between rich countries and poor ones is also much greater.

The coming wave of new technology will make these problems worse. A study on the future of employment at Oxford University predicts that almost half of all jobs are at threat from robotisation in the next 20 years. Many of these are highly skilled jobs, such as those done by pilots, doctors, accountants and lawyers. The jobs that will be left are those that require a great deal of personal attention or artistic input – in other words, those that are generally poorly paid.

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## **Growth Bad Impacts – War**

## Growth Causes War – Monteiro

Pursuit of growth creates structural incentives for conflict

### Monteiro and Debs 14

(Nuno and Alexandre, Department of Political Science at Yale , “An Economic Theory of Hegemonic War”,  
[http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/MonteiroDebs\(2014\)Feb03Yale.pdf](http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/MonteiroDebs(2014)Feb03Yale.pdf), dml)//WB

This paper introduces a novel framework for understanding the economic causes of hegemonic wars that allows us to solve these two puzzles. Our argument starts from a simple premise: countries differ in their economic power, and a hegemon has a greater influence than other countries in setting the terms of international economic engagement. Specifically, the hegemon can affect the division of the surplus generated by its economic interaction with other, weaker states. It also has the ability to regulate the cost other states have to pay to access foreign resources they need in order to grow. Combined, these two mechanisms may prevent weaker states from using their available resources in an optimal way, undermining their economic growth. For these states, war against the economic hegemon may be a rational option. A challenger faced with a constraining structure of the international economy will find war rational not depending on whether its relative power is rising or declining, but on whether war would bring about a more favorable international economic environment, thereby facilitating faster economic growth. Although war is costly and the challenger’s relative weakness make it less likely to win, victory would allow it to invest its available resources optimally, generating faster economic growth. Therefore, when the gain in economic efficiency brought by victory in war is sufficiently large to make the challenger’s expected outcome of fighting (despite its relatively low likelihood of winning) better than the continuation of peace, war will break out.

## Growth Causes War – Resource Scarcity

**Resource scarcity is inevitable and increases the propensity for global war**

**Reuveny and Barbier, 14-** PHD, MBA, BS, expert in international political economy, sustainable development, and the political economy of the Middle East, PHD in political science, Expert in IR and the International Political Economy

(Rafael and Katherine, “On the effect of natural resources on interstate war”, progress in Physical Geography 2014, Vol. 38(6) 786–806,  
<http://ppg.sagepub.com/content/38/6/786.full.pdf+html>)/WB

The effect of resources on interstate war has attracted growing scholarly and governmental attention. The quantitative literature, by contrast, has been slow to develop. **this paper examines the causal role of a country’s resources on its overall propensity for war in world politics. Our formal model offered competing effects, and so we turned to empirical analysis. Our statistical models included measures of eight types of resources per country and other variables.** The estimation used a large N sample of countries and years. We find that **a country’s resources play statistically significant roles in its overall propensity to engage in war.** Next, we consider implications of these findings for the coming decades, assuming that past trends in our model will continue into the period on which we plan to comment. In so doing, **we return to the NIC (2012) projection of growing international conflict over resources increasing the likelihood of interstate war by 2030.** Regardless of whether this projection will hold true, it is useful to use it as a reference point for our discussion if only because of the stature of the NIC in the USA and the influence it can exert on its government (and possibly others). **Our first steps to forecast the average levels of the resources included in our models by 2030.** This is a major undertaking, for any numbers pertaining to one resource are linked to the supply and demand patterns of other resources. Such a forecast would need to venture into geology and environmental science (for resource availability), and into economics and sociology (for resource extraction and consumption). **In place of such extensive additional work, we rely on the NIC’s resource change expectations for 2030** and use our model to examine implications for war. To summarize, **we assume: (1) the effects identified by our models will hold to 2030; and (2) the availability of resources will evolve according to the NIC’s projection. The NIC expectation for declining availability of energy, freshwater, and minerals by 2030 implies Fuel, Freshwater, and Minerals will decline. By 2030, the NIC expects rainfall will generally decline due to climate change, indicating less Precipitation. The NIC expectations of rising demand for food and declining food supply imply that Agriculture will rise to meet the demand, but still fall short. The NIC also highlights the precedence for countries’ reliance upon increased deforestation as means to support growing populations, suggesting Timber, Arable Land, and Cropland could increase.** We recognize these are strong assumptions and revisit them shortly. Taking the NIC projections at face value, **our finding that increases in Freshwater, Precipitation, Minerals, and Fuel in a country reduce its overall propensity for interstate war coupled with the NIC projected worsening outlook for these resources, suggests higher chances for interstate war by 2030. our finding that rises in Arable Land, Timber, and Agriculture raise war propensity, taken alongside the NIC’s projection of increases in these resources, also suggests increased chances of warfare.** We find **these effects grow over time and have the same order of magnitude of those obtained for the non-resource variables.** Summarizing, our finding for **the NIC resource scenario to 2030 supports an expectation of growing chances of interstate war** for the average country. This prospect is worrying, but it assumes, as all regressions do, that the other variables in the model remain constant. This assumption rarely holds, so let us consider next which of our nonresource variables could change by 2030. The NIC, the UN, and many others, expect the populations of the large majority of countries to increase by 2030, though by a declining rate. **Our model suggests a larger Population will increase propensity for war,** but a smaller Population Growth rate will reduce this propensity. By 2030, GDPpc will likely rise for all countries, though we do not know if it will rise



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Reuveny and Barbieri 801 Downloaded from ppg.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on July 13, 2015 above the US\$14,250 (in current dollars) threshold for the inverted U we see for the one-year lagged results. If it does, further rises in GDPpc would make warfare less likely; otherwise, or if the effect proves to be linear as in Table 4's distributed lag results, the chances of war will rise. **The NIC assumes climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of weather Disasters. This too would raise the chances of war in the model.** National Capability may climb, reflecting the likely growth of its components. This effect would reduce the chances of war. Considering these modifications, **increased chance for warfare still seems possible,** provided, again, the future trends will resemble their estimated precedents and that resource stocks will follow the NIC's projected trajectory, neither of which is assured.

## A2 “Diversionary War”

**Diversionary conflict theory is not true- There is no rally around the flag affect and states do not attack rivals**

**Clary, 4/21/15- PHD candidate at MIT**

(Christopher, Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, MIT Political Science Department, p.16, [//WB">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2597712\)//WB](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)

Why Diversionary Peace and Not Diversionary War? A theory that argues economic crises are likely to generate pressures to improve relations with historic rivals is seemingly at odds with one of the most well-known concepts in security studies: diversionary war. **Diversionary war theories suggest that economic downturns or political difficulties lead national leaders to instigate conflict overseas.** Two distinct causal logics are often posited: (1) that conflicts with external groups will generate greater feelings of “in-group” loyalty, spurring a “rally around the flag” effect<sup>37</sup> or (2) that success in diversionary war could serve as a substitute for failures in domestic policy, so that leaders might opt to “gamble for resurrection” when domestic policies have failed but foreign policies might succeed.<sup>38</sup> Given these arguments, why is it more plausible to believe diversionary peace is observed rather than diversionary war? **First, the constituent mechanisms that propel the theory were questionable upon examination.** German theorist Georg Simmel, perhaps the earliest to study “in-group/out-group” behavior, the social psychological foundation of many theories of diversionary war, stressed that empirically, **“conflict between groups or nations has often led to anomie rather than to an increase in internal cohesion.”**<sup>39</sup> Similarly, **close examination of U.S. public opinion data has shown weak support for consistent “rally around the flag” effects, finding overall the rally effect being perhaps a 1 percent increase in public support.**<sup>40</sup> In general, **the U.S. public appears to be “pretty prudent” in its support for the use of force overseas,** rather than blindly patriotic.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, **it seems odd to 17 assume voters are unaware of the perverse incentives that a blind “rally around the flag” effect would generate.** Michael Colaresi has proposed an informational model whereby voters are more likely to increase support to an executive during the use of force only in instances where it is easy for the public to observe post hoc if the rationale for conflict was true. **The public knows post hoc they can punish the executive for lying to them, so gives them the “benefit of the doubt” during crisis.**<sup>42</sup> The further implication of Colaresi’s model being that the rally around the flag effect should be smallest in countries where no such post hoc accountability is possible because of the absence of elections, free media, or external oversight institutions. In other work, **Philip Arena has demonstrated formally that so long as voters continue to take into account the state of the economy after a diversionary episode, then a leader is unlikely to benefit any more from diversionary war during downturns than he or she might during normal times.**<sup>43</sup> Unless the rally affect swamps retrospective economic voting, there should be no behavioral change during downturns. Second, **the empirical support in favor of diversionary war during periods of economic or political disturbance is at best unconvincing.** M. Taylor Fravel concludes, **“[D]espite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of U.S. behavior and in cross-national studies. By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.”**<sup>44</sup> Of particular interest, Williams, Brulé, and Koch find evidence in advanced economies that voters punish foreign diversions during economic downturns, and they hypothesize this 18 empirical finding stems from voters preference for marshaling resources at home during periods of economic trouble.<sup>45</sup> **This empirical finding conforms to** Geoffrey Blainey’s more casual observation four decades ago **that starting trouble overseas during periods of economic difficulty is irrational since paying for that conflict is more difficult because of those economic hardships at home.**<sup>46</sup> In addition to null findings in support of diversionary war’s existence, there is limited support for the opposite conclusion that domestic vulnerability might spur reconciliation abroad. Christopher Darnton provided historical, qualitative evidence that economic downturns facilitated rapprochement when rival states in Latin America shared a common enemy.<sup>47</sup> M. Taylor Fravel examined China’s willingness to undertake compromise in territorial disputes, drawing on Steven David’s concept of omnibalancing, in which national leaders seek to employ resources to best manage both external and internal threats simultaneously.<sup>48</sup> Particularly for developing states, David

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and others have argued, internal threats may present more acute risks to regime survival.<sup>49</sup> Fravel argues that **internal threats to territorial integrity or threats to internal political stability can create incentives for states to compromise on disputes in order to free up resources for other tasks** or gain new resources as a result of the resolved conflict.<sup>50</sup> Finally, Krista Weigand has presented crossnational quantitative evidence that **states undergoing periods of domestic political turmoil have been more likely to attempt territorial settlements** than those with placid domestic conditions.<sup>51</sup> 19 Setting aside the overall levels of empirical support, there is at least one other way to reconcile diversionary war with patterns of diversionary peace. **It is possible that if diversionary war does occur it is less likely to occur between rivals. While rivalries have emotional salience because of the enduring conflict, they also involve states that have been unable to resolve the rivalry through military force**, as evidenced by the rivalry's continued existence. **A war that a leader expects to lose is unlikely to be an attractive diversion from domestic woes**.<sup>52</sup> As Amy Oakes notes, many weak states are seeking at most a "diversionary spectacle," by provoking controversy with a target "unlikely to fight back."<sup>53</sup> The median dyad in the international system is 71 percent more unequal in its distribution of capabilities than the median rival pair.<sup>54</sup> Rivals, on average, are less attractive targets for opportunism than other states.

### **Domestic diversionary theory is not true- empirics prove**

#### **Swagerty 13- PHD candidate in Political Science**

(Scott, "Domestic Diversionary Conflict and Economic Performance", Arizona State University, January 2013, <http://www.scottswagerty.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/SwagertyDivCon.pdf>)/WB

This paper has considered the theory of domestic diversionary conflict, which posits that when faced with domestic political unpopularity, state leaders initiate conflicts with domestic ethnic minority groups in an effort to consolidate political support. **The theory is derived from the strand of diversionary conflict literature that focuses on interstate wars, but argues instead that domestic targets are more attractive for leaders because there are more opportunities to initiate a conflict and because they are inherently less risky for the belligerent state than an interstate war**. The theory hypothesizes that in times of domestic political unpopularity, state leaders will be more likely to use repression against domestic ethnic minority groups. However, **as this paper has argued, the theory of domestic diversionary conflict is underdeveloped and makes competing theoretical commitments that render it problematic for explaining patterns in the use of violent repression against ethnic minority groups**. Empirically, this paper has provided **strong evidence that no significant relationships exist between variables measuring domestic political unpopularity and the frequency of incidents violent repression against ethnic minority groups**. The results from algorithmic data partitioning methods did not identify any variables related to domestic political unpopularity as making improvements to the misclassification rate of the model. More directly, **comparing the statistical results from a model that includes and excludes these variables shows that the predictors measuring domestic political unpopularity have very little effect on the model's overall predictive accuracy**. **This is compelling evidence that previous positive empirical relationships may be related to potential endogeneity in the independent variables**.<sup>21</sup> The results from this paper call into question the theoretical plausibility of domestic diversionary conflicts and provide evidence that states use violent repression against ethnic minorities in response to rebellious activities that threaten state power. Additionally, **violent repression against ethnic minority groups can be predicted where discrimination against that ethnic group is highly institutionalized, where the state has the military capability to execute such acts, and in states with low levels of economic development. Across all models, no indicator measuring political unpopularity or economic under-performance was ever a significant predictor of a state's use of violent repression against ethnic minority groups**. In short, this paper provides strong evidence that states use violent repression to contain threatening ethnic minority group activity and not as a diversion to consolidate political support.

## A2 “Interdependence”

**Trade institutions do not keep the peace – empirics prove**

**Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 12**- Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin, honorary M.A. from Oxford University, M.A. in political science from University of Wisconsin, B.A. in political science and philosophy from Seattle University in 1995 and B.A. 1996, Physics, University of Chicago. M.A. 1999, Energy and Resources, University of California at Berkeley. M.A. 2003, Sociology, Stanford University. Ph.D. 2006, Political Science, Stanford University

(Emilie and Alexander, “War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don’t Always Keep the Peace”, p.261, Conflict Management and Peace Science, July 2012, <http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/29/3/257.short>)/WB

Why Trade Institutions Don’t Always Keep the Peace **Many before us have been skeptical of the claim that interdependence promotes peace among states.** It is well understood that **international institutions can have adverse effects on conflicts among member states, mismanaging crisis situations and worsening conflict intensity** (Gallarotti, 1991), or **producing rivalry among states due to their relative social positions** (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). We are nevertheless among the first to directly tackle the principal claims supporting the liberal thesis that trade institutions dampen conflict, and to propose an explanation for why conflict often characterizes outcomes. This is important because **we observe significant instances of violent conflict4 between PTA members:** the 1990s alone included border clashes between **Armenia and Azerbaijan, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);** the outbreak of **war in the Great Lake**s, with foreign involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe; **all members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA);** **the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and violent border clashes between Egypt and Sudan, all members of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU);** and **fighting between India and Pakistan, members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).** **North and South Korea frequently are involved in violent incidents; both are members of the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries (GSTP).** **A majority of these disputants are also members of the WTO.** Powers contends that in Africa, 16% of all militarized international disputes registered by the Correlates of War data from 1950 to 1992 occurred between PTA members (Powers, 2003, 2004). **These examples show clearly that members of the same trade institution can and do conflict, that conflict often breaks out into violence, and that commerce is frequently not enough to keep the peace.** They stand in sharp contrast to the liberal expectation that trade institutions dampen conflict through an increase in trust. **Trade institutions do increase repeated contact** between members; **however, contact does not necessarily build trust** or a sense of community. The lessons of European integration theory suggest that building community through upgrading the common interest between PTA members requires a minimum level of homogeneity: a pluralist social structure, a high level of economic and industrial development, and ideological similarity (Haas, 1960). **Security communities are also most likely to develop through economic relations** among Western nations, as even the most institutionalized forms of integration in the developing world 4As per the usual convention, we define “violent” MID to be any MID in which at least one death occurred. Hafner-Burton & Montgomery: War, Trade, and Distrust 261 Downloaded from cmp.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on July 15, 2015 cannot be said to create the mutual identification at the core of the concept (Bearce, 2003). Although evidence suggests that economic integration has led to the formation of a collective identity and trust among member states of the European Union over time, it is well understood that “democratic features of liberal democracies enable the community in the first place” (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 166). **The liberal argument that trade institutions dampen conflict** by building trust among leaders to overcome commitment problems consequently **chiefly applies to the Western world of advanced democratic nations. Yet the overwhelming majority of trade institutions manage trade between partners that include at least one developing or nondemocratic state, and there is no evidence**

**to show that these institutions build trust** over asymmetrical distribution of gains. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom cogently argue that states that belong to many different international institutions may have a greater number of international interests to competitively defend and a greater array of opportunities to enact aggressive behavior in defense of those perceived interests (Boehmer et al., 2002). We extend this argument one step further;

**trade institutions create and shape states' interests, affecting not only the number of potential issues for dispute, but also establishing conditions that can lead to distrust. Institutions do this by placing states in social positions of power within international relations, which shape expectations for behavior** by defining which issues are legitimate for contestation **via military means and enable states to coerce, bribe, reward, or punish each other.** We address this possibility in the next section.

**Overdependence in the current trade system causes countries to go war due to thinking that it is the only way- as dependence increases so does trust thus increasing the propensity for conflict**

**Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 12-** Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin, honorary M.A. from Oxford University, M.A. in political science from University of Wisconsin, B.A. in political science and philosophy from Seattle University in 1995 and B.A. 1996, Physics, University of Chicago. M.A. 1999, Energy and Resources, University of California at Berkeley. M.A. 2003, Sociology, Stanford University. Ph.D. 2006, Political Science, Stanford University

(Emilie and Alexander, "War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don't Always Keep the Peace", p.261, Conflict Management and Peace Science, July 2012, <http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/29/3/257.short>)/WB

We are concerned with two particular types of relative social positions: dependence and access centrality. **Take two states, A and B; state A's dependence on state B is proportional to the number of trade institutions both belong to and is inversely proportional to the total number of trade institutions state A belongs to.** In other words, **A's dependence on B increases if A and B join additional trade institutions together, but A's dependence on B decreases if A joins additional trade institutions without B.** Like differences in military capabilities, different levels of dependence create structural motives for peace among trading partners in some circumstances, and conflict under others (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). Here, we focus on one particular type of dependence: **direct dyadic sensitivity dependence due to the PTA network.** It is direct because the measure relates primarily to direct links to each of the two actors in question; dyadic because it looks at the strength of the link between the two actors; and sensitivity because it measures how sensitive each actor is to the other due to the link rather than the potential opportunity cost of breaking it. **Although multiple different kinds of dependence** (direct and indirect; monadic, dyadic, and systemic; sensitivity and vulnerability; single and multi-dimensional) **are relevant** to relations between states (Maoz, 2009, 2010), **we are focusing on this particular type** and measuring it in this way in this article **because it provides for a direct contrast between the mechanism of trust through interdependence,** typically also measured as direct dyadic sensitivity interdependence (i.e. the strength of a tie between two states, the number of PTAs that both belong to), **and the mechanism of distrust through dependence,** which can be measured by dividing the liberal measure by the total number of

PTAs that each state belongs to. Specifically, we expect that **distrust will characterize conditions of asymmetrical dependence.** We consequently expect the liberal prediction to be most robust when states hold positions of dependence vis-a-vis each other that are relatively equal; under these conditions, mutual memberships in trade institutions are most likely to produce trust and, therefore, to create conditions favorable to conflict avoidance. However, we expect that **states will be more likely to conflict with members of their trade institutions when one state is much more dependent on the other;** under these conditions, **disparity in dependence** is more likely to **lead to distrust, and therefore, provide incentives for the distrustful state to initiate a conflict.** Hypothesis 1: Dyads characterized by greater relative disparity in dependence will be more likely to engage in militarized disputes than dyads characterized by relative equality in dependence. While the (direct dyadic sensitivity) dependence of two states on each other can be derived from their direct membership ties alone, access centrality is an emergent property of the ties between all states in the entire system. There are three (major) classes of centrality measures—access, brokerage, and efficiency—which measure the extent to which an actor is generally well-connected to others, can act as a broker between actors, and can reach other actors quickly (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Here, we use the access centrality measure since this family of measures has been shown to be important in the relationship between international institutions and conflict in general and PTAs in particular (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006, 2008, 2009). Conceptually, **a state's access centrality in a network is proportional to the ties received from other states.** **A state with high access centrality**—that is, one with a large number of strong ties to other important states—**is particularly socially powerful** and important in the network of trade institutions. Further, we believe that **a large number of ties to other important states will increase that state's capabilities further,** and so we use a measure of access centrality (eigenvector centrality) that reflects this. With large disparities in centrality, we expect that (similar to our predictions on dependence) trust will be more likely to form among states that have equal access centrality, while **distrust and therefore conflict will characterize relationships between pairs of states with large disparities in access centrality.** Disparities in social power thus operate opposite to disparities in material power, where (according to realist arguments) equality leads to increased conflict and a preponderance of power suppresses it. Hypothesis 2: Dyads characterized by greater relative disparity in access centrality will be more likely to engage in militarized disputes than dyads characterized by relative equality in access centrality. **Large disparities in dependence and access centrality create asymmetries in states' abilities to socially coerce, bribe, reward, or sanction each other;** more influential and access central states simply have more social capital to expend. **These states will distrust marginal countries that are not well integrated** into their networks **and will be more likely to escalate conflict rather than resolve disputes peacefully.** Conversely, **less influential states have little ability to respond to social coercion and so may choose to respond in a material way through military or economic action.** Disparities thus produce incentives for forum-switching for such states. **Highly dependent or peripheral states are excluded** from communities and fear domination within economic forums, **and thus rather than attempting to compete** in the socioeconomic

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sphere where disparities are large, **countries have incentives to enter militarized conflicts instead**. Expectations and abilities combine to undermine trust across these dyads.

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## **Transition/Alternatives**



## Decline Solves – Biodiversity

### **Economic Decline is the only possible way to solve for this looming biological disaster**

**Gates, Trauger and Czech 14-** Professor of Wildlife Ecology, professor in natural resources management, PHD

(J. Edward, David L., and Brian, Peak Oil, “Envisioning an Alternative Future”, Economic Growth, and Wildlife Conservation, Chapter 15, p.317, 21 Nov 2014 [//WB](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1954-3_15)

Our hope is that steps taken now and in the future will help save some biodiversity and provide it a fighting chance for survival. We owe it to future generations to make the attempt [34]. But, **we cannot hope to save much biodiversity if growth is our only economic goal.** Society needs to realize that **growth does not equal prosperity** [41]. Besides, **exponential population growth will not continue through this century, as resources will not be available to support it,** reinforcing the need to move quickly to a SSE. Much can be done now to aid in stabilizing the population, for example, making contraceptives readily available to men and women, increasing the educational opportunities for women, providing various tax incentives to encourage small families, and many other enticements. Immigration also needs to be addressed by governments; desperate people seeking a better life elsewhere may find that there are few opportunities in future industrialized economies, especially if a SSE is our national goal [11]. **As populations stabilize and then decline in tandem with resource availability, our economy will have to be continually restructured to deal with the fact that growth is no longer desirable or possible.** We need to reassess our long-term vision for human civilization and decide what we must do now to move it toward a more sustainable future for the benefit of the planet and generations yet to come. Once we fully accept how we reached this point in time and understand our situation, we can start envisioning and working toward a future where our civilization is just one of a series of interacting ecosystems that comprise a single huge Earth ecosystem. We envisage a future society distinguished by a stable population and per capita consumption, a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, full recycling of materials, waste streams that the environment can easily absorb or reuse in productive ways, and use of alternative, non-fossil-fuel sources of energy. **Populations will be much smaller and in dynamic balance with available resources. Improvements in infrastructure by governments will be made without consumption of fossil fuels or piling on more debt and interest on debt.** 336 J. E. Gates et al. Whether this outcome is obtainable or not is debatable; nevertheless, we will reach a balance between resource regeneration and resource consumption [7], either by our own choices or by nature’s imposition. **The ways things are now have been created by humans only recently, oftentimes without consideration of the ecological consequences. Ways of doing things can be changed or eliminated and replaced with better ways that are beneficial to the long-term health of humanity and the global environment.** We can regain control over our consumptive human systems that foster the pursuit of wealth and status and develop new resilient systems for living sustainably, working toward true happiness and personal growth, in a world enriched by biologically diverse and healthy ecosystems and a stable climate. **Unless we do this collectively as a global society and work toward that vision, we,** in spite of our collective intelligence, **will be confronted with the collapse of our modern, industrialized civilization; the tragic loss of a large portion of Earth’s biodiversity;** and the knowledge that we could have done more to prevent it.

## Decline Solves – Democracy

### **Transition to mass democratic awakening is coming now**

**Smith, UCLA history PhD, 2013** (Richard, “‘Sleepwalking to Extinction’: Capitalism and the Destruction of Life and Earth,” Common Dreams, 11/15/13, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2013/11/15/sleepwalking-extinction-capitalism-and-destruction-life-and-earth>, IC)

Economic systems come and go. Capitalism has had a 300 year run. The question is: will humanity stand by and let the world be destroyed to save the profit system?

That outcome depends to a great extent on whether we on the left can answer that question “what’s your alternative?” with a compelling and plausible vision of an eco-socialist civilization. We have our work cut out for us. But what gives the growing global eco-socialist movement an edge in this ideological struggle is that capitalism has no solution to the ecological crisis, no way to put the brakes on collapse, because its only answer to every problem is more of the same growth that’s killing us.

“History” was supposed to have “ended” with the fall of communism and the triumph of capitalism two decades ago. Yet today, history is very much alive and it is, ironically, capitalism itself which is being challenged more broadly than ever and found wanting for solutions.

Today, we are very much living in one of those pivotal world-changing moments in history. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that this is the most critical moment in human history.

We may be fast approaching the precipice of ecological collapse, but the means to derail this train wreck are in the making as, around the world, struggles against the destruction of nature, against dams, against pollution, against overdevelopment, against the siting of chemical plants and power plants, against predatory resource extraction, against the imposition of GMOs, against privatization of remaining common lands, water and public services, against capitalist unemployment and precarité are growing and building momentum.

Today we are riding a swelling wave of near simultaneous global mass democratic “awakening,” an almost global mass uprising. This global insurrection is still in its infancy, still unsure of its future, but its radical democratic instincts are, I believe, humanity’s last best hope.

### **That solves best**

**Asara, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, et al 2015** (Viviana; Iago Otero, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin IRI THESys; Federico Damaria, Institute of Environmental Science and Technology at the Universitat Autònoma de

Barcelona; and Esteve Corbera, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Department of Economics and Economics History, "Socially sustainable degrowth as a social—ecological transformation: repoliticizing sustainability," *Sustain Science*, 7/5/15, <http://www.degrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/editorial-SOCIALLY-SUSTAINABLE-DEGROWTH-AS-SOCIAL-ECOLOG-TRANSFORMATION.pdf>, IC)

From a degrowth perspective, the current social—ecological—economic crisis is the result of systemic limits to growth and the obsession to promote growth at all costs, including the creation of debt to fuel growth or austerity policies to restore stability (Kallis et al. 2014, 2009; Bonaiuti 2013). These tensions recall O'Connor's (1998) second contradiction of capitalism, which highlights that capitalism systematically undermines the biophysical conditions on which it depends in the pursuit of capital accumulation, although there are no automatic connections between biophysical limits, increases in costs of capital and the end of capital accumulation (Klitgaard 2013; see also Harvey 2014). However, recognizing the importance of defining ecological limits in which the economic activity should be embedded is not sufficient (Deriu 2008; Muraca 2013). On the one hand, it should be acknowledged that the ecological crisis directly stems from the 'imperial mode of living' of the global North, which is "rooted in prevailing political, economic, and cultural everyday structures" (Brand and Wissen 2012:555). Taking this into account, economic growth is not only environmentally unsustainable, but also unjust, and degrowth connects with concepts such as the recognition and reparation of ecological debt, post-extractivism and Buen Vivir (Martinez-Alier 2012; Demaria et al. 2013). On the other hand, degrowth advocates agree that ecology by itself cannot pinpoint the way or the normative ground on how to reach the desired social-ecological transformation (Muraca 2013; Deriu 2008). Degrowth aims to open up the democratic discussion of selective downscaling of man-made capital and of the institutions needed for such a 'prosperous way down' (Odum and Odum 2001). An important lesson taken from early political ecologists is that degrowth is about a (collective and individual) democratic movement of establishing limits within which human well-being and creativity can flourish (Muraca 2013; Kallis et al. 2014; Asara et al. 2013). The literature on autonomy emphasizes collective self-limitations, rather than (external) limits to growth, invoked not to protect nature or avoid disaster, but because simplicity, conviviality and frugality is how good life is conceived. Limits to growth therefore become "a social choice, not [...] an external imperative for environmental or other reasons" (Schneider et al. 2010:513).

### **Ecological collapse is inevitable in a world of growth—only mass democracy can solve**

**Smith, UCLA history PhD, 2014** (Richard, "Climate Crisis, the Deindustrialization Imperative and the Jobs vs. Environment Dilemma," *Truthout*, 11/12/14, <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/27226-climate-crisis-the-deindustrialization-imperative-and-the-jobs-vs-environment-dilemma>, IC)

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Since the 1990s, climate scientists have been telling us that unless we suppress the rise of carbon dioxide emissions, we run the risk of crossing critical tipping points that could unleash runaway global warming, and precipitate the collapse of civilization and perhaps even our own extinction. To suppress those growing emissions, climate scientists and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have called on industrialized nations to slash their carbon dioxide emissions by 80 to 90 percent by 2050. (1)

But instead of falling, carbon dioxide emissions have been soaring, even accelerating, breaking records year after year. In May 2013, carbon dioxide concentrations topped the 400 parts per million mark prompting climate scientists to warn that we're "running out of time," that we face a "climate emergency" and that unless we take "radical measures" to suppress emissions very soon, we're headed for a 4-degree or even 6-degree Celsius rise before the end of the century. And not just climate scientists have made warnings, but also mainstream authorities, including the World Bank, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and others. In 2012, the IEA warned that "no more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050 if we hope to prevent global warming from exceeding more than 2 degrees Centigrade."(2) In September 2014, the global accounting and consulting giant PricewaterhouseCoopers warned that

For the sixth year running, the global economy has missed the decarbonisation target needed to limit global warming to 2°C . . . To avoid two degrees of warming, the global economy now needs to decarbonise at 6.2 percent a year, more than five times faster than the current rate, every year from now till 2100. On our current burn rate we blow our carbon budget by 2034, sixty-six years ahead of schedule. This trajectory, based on IPCC data, takes us to four degrees of warming by the end of the century. (3)

Yet despite ever more dire warnings from the most conservative scientific, economic and institutional authorities, and despite record heat and drought, superstorms and floods, and melting ice caps and vanishing glaciers, "business as usual" prevails. Worse, every government on the planet is pulling out all the stops to maximize growth and consumption in the effort to hold on to the fragile recovery. (4)

Extreme Extraction, Extreme Consumption and the "Great Acceleration"

Around the world, governments are pushing "extreme extraction" - fracking, horizontal drilling, deep-ocean drilling and so on. In the United States, President Obama congratulates himself for suppressing coal emissions and boosting auto mileage. But what do these trivial gains matter, really, when he's approved drilling under the Arctic Sea, reopened the Eastern seaboard from Florida to Delaware (closed since the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill), approved new and deeper drilling in the Gulf of Mexico even after the BP blowout and brags that he's "added more oil pipeline than any president in history, enough to circle the earth and then some"? (5)

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In fact, Obama has approved so much new oil and gas extraction that even Americans can't consume it all, so "Saudi America" has once again, after a 40-year hiatus, become an oil exporter. Canadians are doing their bit to cook the planet faster by extracting tar sands bitumen, the dirtiest of the dirtiest. China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia are scrambling to suck out the oil under the South China Sea. Even Ecuador is opening its previously off-limits Yasuni Biosphere Reserve to drilling by Chinese oil companies. Around the world, we're consuming oil like there's no tomorrow. And not just oil, everything. Industrialized and industrializing nations are ravenously looting the planet's last resources - minerals, forests, fish, fresh water, everything - in what Michael Klare calls "the race for what's left" in his eponymous book. (6)

Extreme extraction is driven by extreme production and consumption. Around the world, resource consumption is growing at several multiples the rate of population increase, driven by the capitalist engines of insidious commodification, incessant invention of new "needs," daily destruction of existing values by rendering more and more of what we've already bought disposable and replaceable, and, of course, by the insatiable appetites of the global 1%. Today, the global rich and the middle classes are devouring the planet in a kind of après-moi-le-déluge orgy of gluttony. Russian oligarchs party on yachts the size of naval cruisers. Mideast oligarchs build refrigerated cities in the middle of baking deserts. China's newly rich consume not the usual baubles only, but also the world's last tigers, rhinoceroses, elephants, bears, pangolins and other rare exotic creatures, along with the last tropical forests - on an industrial scale. (7) Consumption by the global rich is beyond obscene, but given its size, global middle-class consumption has vastly more impact on the planet's environment. For every Rolls Royce, there are thousands of Mercedes Benz cars. For every Learjet, hundreds of Boeing 777s.

Just look at China: Once China joined the capitalist world market, it has had to generate steady growth, at least 8 percent per year, just to keep up with its population which is still growing by around 7 million people per year, the equivalent of adding another Hong Kong every year. Further, given seething public anger and open, often violent protest against corrupt, crony capitalist Communist Party officials, the government has desperately sought to push growth and consumption to placate the opposition and to coddle middle-class supporters. So it has built entire completely unnecessary industries, including the world's largest automobile industry that China has no oil to fuel, which only adds layers to the country's gasping pollution, and which has brought transportation to a standstill in China's cities. In the 1980s, Beijing had a few thousand (rather vintage) cars, trucks and buses, but one could bicycle across the whole city in half an hour and not have to wear a gas mask. Today, with 5 million cars on the city's streets, that journey can take hours by car, while on many days attempting that cross-town ride on your bicycle will put you in the hospital. (8)

China is now consuming half the world's coal, more than half the world's steel, cement, copper and vast quantities of other resources, to build unnecessary industries, unnecessary and dangerous dams, forests of useless vanity skyscrapers, to blanket the country with nearly empty high-speed rail

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networks and empty national expressways systems. (9) It has built millions of empty apartment blocks, even entire cities complete with shopping malls, universities, hospitals and museums - but no people. By one estimate, China's builders have put up more than 64 million surplus apartments, enough new flats to house more than half the US population, and they're adding millions more every year.(10)

It's not so different here. In the United States, no one even talks about resource conservation anymore. That's so quaint, so 1970s. So "small is beautiful" and all that. Since the Reagan revolution it's been all about the "me" generation, about ever more consumption, about "living very large" as The Wall Street Journal puts it. American houses today are more than twice the size on average of houses built in the 1950s - even as families are shrinking. Most come with central air, flat-screen TVs in every room and walk-in closets the size of 1950s spare bedrooms. And those are just average houses. McMansions offer breathtaking extravagance and waste: swimming pools in the basement next to the bowling alleys next to the home theater next to the gym, the bar lounge and game rooms. And those are just the basements. Upstairs there are the Elle Décor floors and furnishings of tropical hardwoods, Architectural Digest kitchens in marble and stainless steel, Waterworks bathrooms, "bedroom suites" the size of small houses, lighting and audio "systems" and on and on. (11)

Americans are said to use more electricity just for air conditioning than the entire continent of Africa uses for all purposes. Middle-class Americans don't even drive "cars" much anymore. They drive behemoth gas-hog SUVs and luxury trucks with names to match: giant Sequoias, mountainous Denalis and Sierras, vast Yukons, Tundras, Ticonderogas and Armadas. Many of these are more than twice the weight of US cars and pickup trucks in the 1950s. There goes Obama's plan to reduce US global warming emissions by boosting fuel economy. (12) Americans used to vacation at the nation's incomparable national parks and seashores. Now, increasingly, they jet off to far corners of the globe, or drift about the seas on 20-story high cruise ships bashing coral reefs.

Globalization and the advent of "The China Price" has also enabled industrialists to boost consumption by dramatically lowering the cost of light-industrial consumer goods production, so much so that they could finally annihilate most remaining "durable" goods categories - from refrigerators to shoes, and substitute cheaper, throwaway replacements.(13) Thus, "fast fashion" (or "trashion fashion") from H&M, Target, Zara and others now rules the women's apparel market with clothes so cheap it's not worth the cost of dry-cleaning them.

As fashion industry insider Elizabeth Kline relates in her recent book, *Overdressed: The Shockingly High Cost of Cheap Fashion*, (14) "seasonal shopping patterns have given way to continuous consumption." Zara delivers new lines twice a week to its stores. H&M and Forever 21 stock new styles every day. In Kline's words: "Buying so much clothing and treating it as if it is disposable, is putting a huge added weight on the environment and is

simply unsustainable." To say the least. The US cotton crop requires the application of 22 billion pounds of toxic weed killers, every year. Most fiber is dyed or bleached, treated in toxic chemical baths to make it brighter, softer, more fade resistant, water proof or less prone to wrinkles. Upholstery fabrics and children's pajamas are treated with ghastly chemicals to make them stain resistant or fireproof. These toxic baths consume immense quantities of chemicals and water and it goes without saying that in China, the chemicals are routinely just dumped in rivers and lakes, untreated. Then after all the chemical treatments, the fabrics have to be dried under heat lamps. These processes consume enormous quantities of energy.

The textile industry is one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the world, and it's growing exponentially. In 1950, when there were around 2.5 billion people on earth, they consumed around 10 million tons of fabric for all uses. Today, we are 7 billion, but we consume more than 70 million tons of fabric annually, nearly three times as much per person as we consumed in the 1950s (hence those walk-in closets). Producing 70 million tons of fabric consumes astounding quantities of resources, including more than 145 million tons of coal and between 1.5 and 2 trillion gallons of fresh water, every year. Synthetic fibers like polyester and such (now 60 percent of the market) are the worst: They consume between 10 and 25 times as much energy to produce as natural fibers. (15) In short, "fast fashion" is speeding the disposal of planet earth. And that's just one disposables industry.

Shortly after the great People's Climate March in September, the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) issued its latest Living Planet Index detailing how human demands on the planet are extinguishing life on earth. According to the report, the world has lost more than half of its vertebrate wildlife in just the last 40 years - 52 percent of birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish and mammals. Read that again: HALF THE WORLD'S VERTEBRATE WILDLIFE HAS BEEN LOST IN JUST THE LAST 40 YEARS. "The decline was seen everywhere - in rivers, on land and in the seas - and is mainly the result of increased habitat destruction, commercial fishing and hunting," according to the report. The fastest decline among animal populations were found in freshwater ecosystems, where numbers have plummeted by 75 percent since 1970. "Rivers are the bottom of the system," said Dave Tickner, WWF's chief freshwater adviser. "Whatever happens on land, it all ends up in the rivers." Besides pollution, human overconsumption for industrial purposes is massively straining the world's freshwater systems: "While population has risen fourfold in the last century, water use has gone up sevenfold." (16) All these trends are driving what scientists are calling "The Great Acceleration" of consumption that took off after World War II and has sharply picked up speed in the last three decades as China industrialized. Like some kind of final planetary going out of business sale, we're consuming the world's last readily accessible natural resources in a generation or two, in a geological blink of an eye.

Capitalist Priority to Growth and Profits Over People and Planet

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What's more, given capitalism, we're all more or less locked into this lemming-like suicidal drive to hurl ourselves off the cliff. Whether as CEOs, investors, workers or governments, given capitalism, we all "need" to maximize growth, therefore to consume more resources and produce ever more pollution in the process - because companies need to satisfy the insatiable demands of investors and because we all need the jobs. That's why at every UN Climate Summit, the environment is invariably sacrificed to growth.

As George H.W. Bush told the 1992 Climate Summit, "The American way of life is not negotiable." Barack Obama is hardly so crude and arrogant, but his dogged refusal to accept binding limits on carbon dioxide emissions comes to the same thing. And Chinese president Xi Jinping is certainly not going to sacrifice his "Chinese Dream" of great-power revival and mass consumerism on a hitherto unimagined scale, if Obama refuses to negotiate the planet-destroying "American way of life."

In short, so long as we live under capitalism, today, tomorrow, next year and every year thereafter, economic growth will always be the overriding priority till we barrel right off the cliff to collapse.

Where Are the Radical Solutions?

Given the multiple existential threats to our very survival, you might expect that our leading environmental thinkers and activists would be looking into those "radical" solutions, and especially be thinking "beyond capitalism." Don't hold your breath. From the perennial boosters of "green capitalism" and tech-fixits like Lester Brown, Al Gore, Thomas Friedman and Paul Krugman, (17) to the apostles of "degrowth" like Tim Jackson, the New Economic Foundation's Andrew Simms, and Serge Latouche, for decades, mainstream debate has been confined to hopelessly discredited, self-contradictory and empirically implausible save-the-planet strategies - held in check by their protagonists' fear of challenging the principal driver of global ecological collapse, capitalism. Thus, speaking for the mainstream, the United Kingdom's Jonathon Porritt, former Green Party co-chair and director of Friends of the Earth, and Tony Blair's environment czar, wrote in 2005 that "Logically, whether we like it or not, sustainability is therefore going to have to be delivered within that all-encompassing capitalist framework. We don't have time to wait for any big-picture successor." (18) Thus, even as his own studies demonstrate how (market-driven) out-of-control growth is burning up the planet, the world's preeminent climate scientist-turned-activist James Hansen can't bring himself to associate with the left, to think outside the capitalist box, to abandon his doomed-to-fail carbon tax scheme and join the struggle against the economic system that is destroying the future for his grandchildren. (19) And even as he cites ever more dire warnings from climate scientists, Bill McKibben, the world's premier climate protest organizer, won't touch the third rail of capitalism because he's not a socialist and because he doesn't want to alienate his liberal base and wealthy foundation funders. (20)

"The Problem Isn't Climate Change, It's Capitalism" - Naomi Klein



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With her impassioned and eloquent new blockbuster, *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate*, (21) Naomi Klein has finally broken open the mainstream discourse, cataloguing the failures, contradictions and corruptions of so-called green capitalism and raising anew the question of "big-picture successors." Klein nails climate change squarely on the door of capitalism with a withering indictment: "Our economic system and our planetary system are now at war." Climate scientists tell us that "our only hope of keeping warming below . . . 2 degrees Celsius is for wealthy countries to cut their emissions by somewhere in the neighborhood of 8-10 percent a year." "The 'free' market simply cannot accomplish this task." In bold, almost Marxist eco-socialist phraseology, she tells us that "What the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in humanity's use of resources; what our economic model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered growth . . ." (p. 21). In one of many vivid paragraphs in this powerful book she writes:

Extractivism is a nonreciprocal, dominance-based relationship with the earth, one purely of taking. It is the opposite of stewardship, which involves taking but also taking care that regeneration and future life continue. Extractivism is the mentality of the mountaintop remover and the old-growth clear-cutter. It is the reduction of life into objects for the use of others, giving them no integrity or value of their own - turning living complex ecosystems into "natural resources," mountains into "overburden" (as the mining industry terms the forests, rocks, and streams that get in the way of its bulldozers). It is also the reduction of human beings either into labor to be brutally extracted, pushed beyond limits, or, alternatively, into social burden, problems to be locked out at borders and locked away in prisons or on reservations. In an extractivist economy, the interconnections among various objectified components of life are ignored; the consequences of severing them are of no concern. (p. 169)

Klein presents a devastating critique of capitalism. But for all of that, it's not clear that she has an alternative to capitalism. Since she doesn't call for "system change" to, say, eco-socialism, it's hard to see how we can make the profound, radical changes she says we need to make to prevent ecological collapse. Klein calls for "managed degrowth" of the "careless" economy of fossil-fuel "extractivism" - offset by the growth of a "caring economy" of more investment in emissions reduction, environmental remediation, the caregiving professions, green jobs, renewable energy, mass transit and so on (p. 88-95). I couldn't agree more. But how can we change these priorities when the economy remains in the hands of huge corporations who want to keep the priorities just as they are?

Here and there she argues for economic planning and democratic control of the economy. She says we need a "comprehensive vision for what should emerge in place of our failing system, as well as serious strategies for how to achieve those goals (p. 9-10)," "we need an entirely new economic model and a new way of sharing this planet" (p. 25). She says the "central battle of our time [is] whether we need to plan and manage our societies to reflect our goals and values, or whether that task can be left to the magic of the market" (p. 40), and "a core battle must be the right of citizens to democratically

decide what kind of economy they need" (p. 125). But since she does not explicitly call for abolishing capitalism, socializing the economy and instituting society-wide, bottom-up, democratic economic planning, how is society supposed to democratically decide what kind of economy they want?

Under capitalism, those decisions are the prerogative of corporate boards. We don't get to vote on the economy, but we need to. She calls for "slapping the invisible hand" of the market and "reining in corporate greed" (p. 120, 125). But she does not call for nationalizing or socializing the major corporations, for abolishing private property in the major means of production (the institutional basis of corporate greed) and replacing it with socialized property. She rejects "the reigning ideology," the "economic model" of "market fundamentalism" and "neo-liberalism" (p. 19-21). But that's not the same thing as rejecting capitalism. "Slapping the invisible hand" of the market system is not the same thing as replacing the invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of generalized economic planning. She rejects the "free" "unfettered" market (p. 21), but she does not reject the market system per se.

So, for example, she supports feed-in tariffs "to ensure that anyone who wants to get into renewable power generation can do so in a way that is simple, stable, and profitable" (p. 131). She calls for reviving industrial planning to prioritize public transit and smart grids, returning some utilities to the public sector, taxing the rich to pay for more public spending, and decentralizing and localizing control over utilities, energy and agriculture (p. 21, 120, 130-134, and chapter 4 passim). And she supports decentralized local planning and state industrial policy to generate "green" jobs (p. 127, 133). But this is all within the framework of a standard capitalist economy. She does not call for generalized economic planning.

In her vision of the future, it appears that corporations will still run the world's economies and capitalist governments will still run politics. Thus: "Since the [oil] companies are going to continue being rich for the foreseeable future, the best hope of breaking the political deadlock is to radically restrict their ability to spend their profits on buying, and bullying, politicians . . ." "the solutions are clear. Politicians must be prohibited from receiving donations from the industries they regulate, or from accepting jobs in lieu of bribes, political donations need to be both fully disclosed and tightly capped . . ." (p. 151-152). And the way to do that, she says, is for popular mobilization to force companies and governments to accept reforms: "[i]f enough of us decide that climate change is a crisis worthy of Marshall Plan levels of response, then it will become one, and the political class will have to respond, both by making resources available and by bending the free market rules that have proven so pliable when elite interests are in peril." (p. 6, 152, 450). In short, it's all a bit confusing and somewhat contradictory, at least in my reading.

It would be good if Klein could be pressed to clarify whether she thinks the climate crisis, and the broader "extractivist" ecological crisis we face, is intrinsic to the nature of the capitalist system or just market fundamentalism.

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And if it's inherent to capitalism, then what would she replace it with? Because otherwise, given her ambivalence and lack of clarity, the message of her book can read like Occupy. When New York bankers replied to the Occupy movement in 2011, "Don't like capitalism? What's your alternative?" for all its audacity and militancy, Occupy had no alternative to offer. We can't build much of a movement without something to fight for, not just against. Klein herself says, "saying no is not enough. If opposition movements are to do more than burn bright and then burn out, they will need a comprehensive vision for what should emerge in the place of our failing system, as well as serious political strategies for how to achieve those goals." (p. 9-10). Yet as far as I can see, Klein doesn't articulate a vision of an alternative economic system to replace our failing system, capitalism.

As to strategy, Klein says, "Only mass social movements can save us." She hopes that mass mobilizations, protests and blockades will be enough to "bend the rules of the market," to force corporations to change enough to save the humans. But these problems are not going to be solved just by protests and "blockadia." They require completely different institutional arrangements: the abolition of private property in the major means of production, the abolition of the market domination of the economy, the institution of generalized, direct economic planning, and the institution of economic democracy across the entire economy not just local communities, because at the end of the day, corporations can't "bend the rules of the market" enough to save the humans, and still stay in business in a competitive market economy.

Moreover, unless we can come up with an alternative economic system that will guarantee reemployment for all those millions of workers in industries around the world that will have to be retrenched or shut down to get that 90 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, we won't be able to mobilize them to fight for the radical changes they and we all need to save ourselves. If Naomi Klein really means to call for a mass movement to degrow the economy within the framework of capitalism, that sounds like a non-starter to me. Three hundred thousand people came out into the streets of New York to demand that the powers that be do something about climate change. But they were not demanding "degrowth" or industrial shutdowns. Given capitalism, how could they?

### The Necessity of Economic Planning and Public Ownership of the Major Means of Production

The only way we can brake fossil fuel-driven global warming is to socialize the fossil fuel industries, buy them out if necessary, but nationalize them, socialize them one way or another, so we can phase them out, conserve the fuels we absolutely can't do without, at least for a transition period, and reallocate their resources to things society does need. And not just the fossil fuel industries and electric utilities. We would have to socialize most of the rest of the industrial economy as well because if we suppress fossil fuel production by anywhere near 90 percent, then autos, petrochemicals, aviation, shipping, construction, manufacturing and many other industries

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would grind to a halt. Naomi Klein quotes a top UN climate expert who remarked, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, that given all the failed promises to date, given the backsliding and soaring carbon dioxide emissions, "the only way" climate negotiators "can achieve a 2-degree goal is to shut down the whole global economy." (22) Well, I don't know if we need to shut down the whole world industrial economy, but it's difficult to see how we can halt the rise in greenhouse gas emissions unless we shut down a whole lot of industries around the world.

### The Imperative of Deindustrialization in the North

The "degrowth" people are right in part. But there are two huge problems with their model. First, given capitalism, any degrowth serious enough to sharply reduce carbon dioxide emissions would bring economic collapse, depression and mass unemployment before it brought sustainability. That's why pro-market décroissance fantasists like Serge Latouche call for degrowth but then, quelle surprise, don't want to actually degrow the GDP, let alone overthrow capitalism. (23) But there is just no way around this dilemma. With no way to magically "dematerialize" production so we can keep growing the economy without growing emissions, then cutting carbon dioxide emissions by even 50 percent, let alone 90 percent, would require retrenching and closing large numbers of large and small corporations around the world and that means gutting the global GDP - with all that implies.

With most of the capitalist world economy on the verge of falling back into recession, even the slightest hint of any slowdown in plundering the planet sends markets tumbling. Even the thought that Ebola could slow the growth of trade sends jitters through the markets. (24) That's why, given capitalism, no one except (securely tenured) professors would ever take the idea of "degrowth" seriously. (25) And yet, given that we live on a finite planet, the fact remains that we can't save humanity unless we radically degrow the overconsuming economies in the North. So we do need degrowth. But the only way to get "managed degrowth" without ending up in another Great Depression, is to do so in an entirely different, nonmarket or mostly nonmarket economy.

The second problem is that we don't need to "degrow" the whole economy. We need to completely abolish all kinds of useless, wasteful, polluting, harmful industries. Yet we also need to grow other parts of the economy: renewable energy, public health care, public transit, the bicycle-industrial complex, durable and energy efficient housing, durable vehicles, appliances and electronics, public schools, public services of all kinds, environmental remediation and reforestation - the "caring economy" Naomi Klein talks about and about which I have also written. But the problem for Jackson, Klein and the rest of the degrowth school, is that - given private property in the means of production, given the anarchy of production for the free market, given the "iron law" of priority to profit maximization and given the imperatives of competition - there is just no way to prioritize people and planet over growth and profits in a market economy.

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The only way to rationally reorganize the economy, to deemphasize the "careless" industries and emphasize the "caring" industries, is to do this ourselves, directly, by consciously, collectively and democratically planning most of the industrial economy, even closely coordinating most of the world's industrial economies. To do this, we would have to socialize virtually all large-scale industry (though, as I've said elsewhere, this does not mean we need to nationalize mom-and-pop restaurants, small-scale owner-operator businesses, worker cooperatives, small farms and the like, though even some of those would need to be tightly regulated). Naomi Klein is rightly skeptical about "energy nationalization on existing models," because Brazil's Petrobras or Norway's Statoil are "just as voracious in pursuing high-risk pools of carbon as their private sector counterparts." (26) But that's because the "existing model" they operate in is the capitalist world economy - so even if they're state-owned, they still need to abide by the rules of the market. This only underlines the eco-socialist argument that the only way we can stop global warming and solve our many interrelated environmental crises is with a mostly planned, mostly publicly owned, mostly nonmarket economy. (27)

### Contraction and Convergence

Given the state of the planet right now, the only way we can move toward sustainability is if the industrialized nations and China impose an emergency contraction: radically suppress, and in many cases close down all kinds of useless, superfluous, wasteful, polluting industries and sectors. At the same time, most of the global South is far from overconsuming the planet; they're underconsuming most everything. Four hundred million Indians lack electrical service. Most of the developing world still lacks basic infrastructure, schools, health care, decent housing, jobs and much else. So the South certainly needs "development," but if the South develops on the basis of capitalism, like China, this will only wreck the world faster. Global sustainability thus requires selective deindustrialization in the North combined with sustainable industrialization in the South - a global contraction and convergence centered on a sustainable (and hopefully happy) medium that will put the brakes on greenhouse gas emissions and enable the whole world to live in tolerable comfort while conserving resources for our children, and set aside sufficient resources for the other species with whom we share this planet to live out their lives.

If you listen to mainstream environmentalists like Bill McKibben and 350.org, what you hear is that the solution to the climate crisis is "to get off fossil fuels and switch to renewables." But while electricity generation is a big part of the problem, it is by no means all or even most of it. That's because greenhouse gas emissions are produced across the entire economy, not only or even mainly by electric generating stations. As the table below shows, in the United States, electricity generation (including heat) accounts for 32 percent of carbon dioxide emissions. (Subtracting heat from this total, electricity generation likely accounts for about a quarter of all US emissions.) Transportation is a close second, accounting for 28 percent, industry, 20 percent, agriculture, 10 percent and so on. (28) In China, electricity and heat account for 50 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, industry, 31 percent,

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transportation, 8 percent (2011). (29) In France, electricity accounts for a trivial share of the country's carbon dioxide emissions because nearly 80 percent of France's electricity is produced by nuclear power plants.

Thus, the first thing to be noted from this table is that even if we shut down every coal, oil and gas-fired electric generating plant in the United States tomorrow and replaced them all with solar and wind, that would reduce US carbon dioxide emissions by less than one-third. That means that if we want to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 90 percent in the next 35 years, we would have to drastically suppress emissions across the rest of the economy. We would have to drastically retrench and even close down not only fossil fuel companies like Peabody Coal and ExxonMobil, but the industries that are based on fossil fuels - autos, aircraft, airlines, shipping, petrochemicals, manufacturing, construction, agribusiness, refrigeration and air conditioning and so on - and companies like GM, Boeing, United Airlines, FedEx, Cargill, Carrier and so on.

If we're going to stop the plunder of the planet's last accessible resources, then we would also have to retrench or close down lots of mines, lumber companies, pulp and paper and wood products companies, industrial fishing operations, industrial farming, concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), junk food producers, private water companies, disposable products of all sorts, packaging, retail and so on - companies like Rio Tinto, Georgia Pacific, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, Tyson Foods, H&M, Walmart etc.

And if we're going to stop fouling our nest, poisoning our fresh water, soil, the oceans and atmosphere with myriad toxic chemicals, then we would have to shut down, or at the very least, drastically retrench and rigorously regulate the world's worst toxic producers - chemicals, pesticides, plastics etc., companies like Monsanto, Dow, DuPont and others.

I know this sounds completely crazy. But I don't see what other conclusion we can draw from the scientific evidence. If we have to decarbonize by 6 to 10 percent per year, to 90 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 to contain global warming, how can we do that without radically retrenching and closing down large numbers of power plants, mines, factories, mills, processing and other industries and services from the United States to China? An unpleasant thought. But what other choice do we have? If we don't radically suppress greenhouse gas emissions, we're headed for global ecological collapse. And if we don't stop looting the world's resources and poisoning the air, land and water with every manner of toxics, what kind of world are we going to leave to our children?

Besides, these industries and companies are hardly immortal. Most of the worst environmentally destructive industries in the United States are businesses that have been built or massively expanded since World War II. Most of China's resource-wasting and polluting industries and coal-fired power plants have all been built in the last 20 to 30 years. Why can't these be dismantled or repurposed, if we need to do so to save the humans? This will cause dislocation for sure. But that's nothing compared to the dislocation we will face when droughts bring on the collapse of agriculture in the United

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States, when Shanghai and the Shenzhen sink beneath the waves, if we don't suppress carbon dioxide emissions, now.

In the last analysis, the only way to save the planet is to stop converting so much of it into "product." Leave the coal in the hole, the oil in the soil, the gas under the grass - but also leave the trees in the forests, the fish in the sea, the minerals in the mountains, and find ways for our billions to live lightly on the earth.

I'm no Luddite (though as a skilled craftsman, I'm a sympathizer). I'm not suggesting we abandon modernity and go back to living in some pre-industrial state. After all, Europeans currently generate barely half the greenhouse gas emissions as Americans and they're not living in caves. Actually, they live a lot better than Americans, though they consume less, in large part because they don't fetishize individualism; they provide much more for each other through collective social services, publicly funded health care, and so on, so they don't need to earn as much to live better than Americans.

Even so, West European consumption is still far from sustainable. Europeans still need to suppress carbon dioxide emissions, curb many other pollutants and end useless consumption as well. Much is made, for example, of Germany's increasing use of renewable energy. But what difference does it make, really, if the Germans get 30 percent or even 100 percent of their electricity from renewable sources, if what they use that electricity for is to power huge factories producing an endless waste stream of oversized, over-accessorized, designed-to-be-obsolcesced Mercedes Benz global warmers? What kind of "sustainability" is that?

I'm for modern technology - up to a point. I imagine any modern ecological society will still have some cars, planes, chemicals, plastic, cell phones and so on, though much less and many fewer of them. The problem is that so much of what we produce today is so unnecessary, harmful and unsustainable. Even though an ecological society would still need some cars and trucks, for example, to supplement expanded public transportation, it would not need hundreds of millions of new models every year. That's just such a waste. Cars could easily be built like my old '62 Volkswagen Beetle. That car can last practically forever since it was simple, built to be easily rebuilt, and every part is still in production. Why can't we make the few cars and trucks we need to be equally rebuildable and upgradeable, so they can last for decades, if not practically indefinitely, instead of the seven to 10 years they typically last these days? And why can't we share them, in public car-sharing collectives, instead of having millions of privately owned cars parked on the streets most of the time?

## Decline Solves – Laundry List

**We must de-develop now, growth based politics are impossible to sustain, and they lead to increasing environmental degradation and massive economic inequality**

**Shrivastava** Distinguished Professor and Director of David O'Brien Centre for Sustainable Enterprise at Concordia University, **2015**

(Paul, Organizational sustainability under degrowth, pg1, emeraldinsight, <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/MRR-07-2014-0157>)

By degrowth, I do not mean what traditional economics calls recession or stagnation. It is not just temporary or even medium-term shrinkage of the conventional economy. The degrowth movement begins with the realization that due to ecological limits and social and intergenerational considerations, conventional economic growth as currently measured will generally slowdown, and economies will have to fit within socially and ecologically acceptable parameters (Brown and Garver, 2009). **Degrowth is both an empirical reality and a response to our current economic and ecological crises.** Empirical evidence of degrowth is manifested in the slowing growth rates in the post-2008 global financial crisis. US and European economies are struggling to maintain even a 2 per cent to 3 per cent growth. India and China, which grew for a decade at double digits (10 to 14 per cent), have cut their growth estimates to less than half those numbers. Japanese growth has meandered between -2 per cent to +2 per cent for over a decade. Virtually, all national governments around the world, and many state and municipal governments as well, are running deficit budgets at historically high levels. This is not just a temporary recession for a quarter or two, but rather a sustained trend reflecting natural limits to economic growth (Meadows et al., 2004; Stiglitz, 2012). At the Montreal International Conference on Degrowth for the Americas (<http://www.montreal.degrowth.org>) held in May 2012, we examined degrowth solutions as a response to the global financial economic crisis. These included collaborative consumption, shared economy, hybrid organizations, alternative currencies and population control, among others. **Degrowth is a call for a radical break from traditional growth-based models of economy and society.** It seeks to move away from the production – consumption-dominated models of the past. **It seeks to invent new ways of living together in a true democracy and embodying values of equality and freedom.** It is based on sharing and cooperation, and with sufficiently moderate consumption so as to achieve personal and collective fulfillment. Schumacher's (1973) notion of "small is beautiful" was a precursor of this type of degrowth thinking. Now, the degrowth paradigm has emerged with great vitality in English, German, French and Spanish worlds (Brown and Garver, 2009; Daly, 1996; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Jackson, 2011; (Latouche, 2009; Alier, 2009; Victor, 2010). Degrowth paradigm assumes that in a physically limited world, working under the laws of thermodynamics, it is impossible to grow endlessly (Daly, 1996; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). **If we do**



**not plan for it, degrowth will be forced upon us through inflation, increased work, reduced leisure hours and other forms of immiseration of living standards** (poorer education, health care, infrastructure, quality of air and water, etc.). **It is better to deliberately face degrowth scenarios earlier on and then intentionally choose our paths forward instead of facing dire circumstances where we might be left with little choice.** An essential insight of degrowth thinking is that natural capital cannot be entirely substituted with money or artificial capital. We cannot replace potable water, clean air, fertile soil and beautiful landscapes in our current linear economic model of “take, make, dump”. To replenish natural capital stocks, we need to create circular economic loops. It acknowledges the need to limit consumption and pollution to maintain healthy ecosystems for the long-term future. **In a growth-based world, market solutions and technological innovations that are ostensibly eco-friendly still contribute to an increase in overall consumption.** The efforts at dematerializing consumption remain marginally effective. The relocation of polluting industries away from the Western industrial nations was not accompanied by a reduction of our global ecological footprint – there is no decoupling between our economy and ecological impact (Costanza, 1991). Degrowth is necessary because conventional economic growth (measured in terms of GDP) has not kept its promise to improve our collective well-being (Stiglitz, 2012). **GDP growth no longer guarantees us better material living conditions.** It is no longer associated with well-paying stable jobs. As GDP increases, we have also seen pollution, obesity, depression, crime and high-risk technologies on the rise. GDP growth also does not guarantee increased economic or social equality. In fact, growth in recent decades has been accompanied by the significant widening of our societal inequalities.

## Decline Solves – Warming

**Decline now is key in order to stop climate change from becoming irreversible**

### Swanbrow 12

\_Citing a UM study published in the peer reviewed Environmental Science and Policy (Dian, "Global warming: New research blames economic growth", 5/1/2012, Michigan Chronicle, [//WB">http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/20369-global-warming-new-research-blames-economic-growth">//WB](http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/20369-global-warming-new-research-blames-economic-growth)

It's a message no one wants to hear: **To slow down global warming**, we'll either **have to put the brakes on economic growth** or transform the way the world's economies work. **That's the implication of an innovative University of Michigan study examining the most likely causes of global warming. The study**, conducted by José Tapia Granados and Edward Ionides of U-M and Óscar Carpintero of the University of Valladolid in Spain, **was published online in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Science and Policy. It is the first analysis to use measurable levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide to assess fluctuations in the gas, rather than estimates of CO2 emissions, which are less accurate. "If 'business as usual' conditions continue, economic contractions** the size of the Great Recession or even bigger **will be needed to reduce atmospheric levels of CO2**," said Tapia Granados, who is a researcher at the U-M Institute for Social Research. For the study, the researchers assessed the impact of four factors on short-run, year-to-year changes in atmospheric concentrations of CO2, widely considered the most important greenhouse gas. Those factors included two natural phenomena believed to affect CO2 levels - volcanic eruptions and the El Niño Southern oscillation - and also world population and the world economy, as measured by worldwide gross domestic product. **Tapia Granados and colleagues found no observable relation between short-term growth of world population and CO2 concentrations**, and they show that incidents of volcanic activity coincide with global recessions, which may confound any slight volcanic effects on CO2. With El Niño outside of human control, economic activity is the sole modifiable factor. In years of above-trend world GDP, from 1958 to 2010, the researchers found greater increases in CO2 concentrations. For every \$10 trillion in U.S. dollars that the world GDP deviates from trend, CO levels deviate from trend about half a part per million, they found. Preindustrial concentrations are estimated to be 200-300 parts per million. **To break the economic habits contributing to a rise in atmospheric CO2 levels and global warming. Tapia Granados says that societies around the world would need to make enormous changes.** "Since the mid 1970s, scientists like James Hansen have been warning us about the effects global warming will have on the earth," Tapia Granados said. "One solution that has promise is a carbon tax levied on any activity producing CO2 in order to create incentives to reduce emissions. The money would be returned to individuals so the tax would not burden the population at large. **What our study makes clear is that climate change will soon have a serious impact on the world, and the time is growing short to take corrective action.**"

**The only way to reduce climate change is degrowth- the only instances where CO2 has decreased is during**

**Caradonna et. al.**, Ph.D. The Johns Hopkins University, 7 May 2015

(Jeremy, A Call to Look Past An Ecomodernist Manifesto: A Degrowth Critique, [http://www.resilience.org/articles/General/2015/05\\_May/A-Degrowth-Response-to-An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf](http://www.resilience.org/articles/General/2015/05_May/A-Degrowth-Response-to-An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf))

After careful analysis, those in the degrowth camp have come to the conclusion that the only way for humanity to live within its biophysical limits and mitigate the effects of climate change is to reduce economic activity, to downscale consumerist lifestyles, to move beyond conventional energy sources, to give up on the fantasy of “decoupling” economic and population growth from environmental impacts, and to rethink the technologies that have gotten us into our current predicament. **There has been no known society that has simultaneously expanded economic activity and reduced absolute energy consumption.** x All efforts to decouple growth of gross domestic product (GDP) from environmental destruction through technological innovations and renewable energies have failed to achieve the absolute reductions necessary for a livable planet. There has only been a handful of instances over the past century during which global or regional carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have actually declined. Notable instances include: 1) the Great Depression of the 1930s, 2) the economic recession following the second oil shock in the early 1980s, 3) the collapse of Soviet economies after the end of the Cold War, and 4) the two years of recession following the financial crisis triggered in 2008. That is, from all that we know, only a less “busy” economy can actually achieve lower emissions. xi Likewise, the ecological economist Peter A. Victor has shown through modeling the Canadian economy that economic growth makes the job of fighting climate change all the more difficult. He writes that “for example, if an economy grows at 3% per year for 40 years, an average annual reduction in GHG [greenhouse gas] intensity of 7.23% is required if GHG emissions are to be reduced by 80%. This compares with an average annual reduction in GHG intensity of 4.11% if there is no economic growth during that period.

## Yes Mindset Shift

### **Crisis solves for mindset shift—that results in transition**

#### **Alexander, PhD and University of Melbourne Lecturer in Environmental Programs, and Rutherford, 2014**

(Samuel and Jonathan, “The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition,” Simplicity Institute, Report 14a, 2014, <http://simplicityinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Deep-Green-Alternative.pdf>, p. 19-20, IC)

Perhaps a more reliable path could be based on the possibility that, rather than imposing an alternative way of life on a society through sudden collapse, a deep crisis could provoke a social or political revolution in consciousness that opens up space for the deep green vision to be embraced and implemented as some form of crisis management strategy. Currently, there is insufficient social or political support for such an alternative, but perhaps a deep crisis will shake the world awake. Indeed, perhaps that is the only way to create the necessary mindset. After all, today we are hardly lacking in evidence on the need for radical change (Turner, '2012), suggesting that shock and response may be the form the transition takes, rather than it being induced through orderly, rational planning, whether from ‘top down’ or ‘from below’. Again, this ‘non-ideal’ pathway to a post-growth or post-industrial society could be built into the other strategies discussed above, adding some realism to strategies that might otherwise appear too utopian. That is to say, it maybe that only deep crisis will create the social support or political will needed for radical reformism, eco-socialism, or eco-anarchism to emerge as social or political movements capable of rapid transformation. Furthermore, it would be wise to keep an open and evolving mind regarding the best strategy to adopt, because the relative effectiveness of various strategies may change over time, depending on how forthcoming crises unfold.

It was Milton Friedman (1982: ix) who once wrote: ‘only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.’ What this ‘collapse’ or ‘crisis’ theory of change suggests, as a matter of strategy, is that deep green social and political movements should be doing all they can to mainstream the practices and values of their alternative vision. By doing so they would be aiming to ‘prefigure’ the deep green social, economic, and political structures, so far as that it is possible, in the hope that deep green ideas and systems are alive and available when the crises hit. Although Friedman obviously had a very different notion of what ideas should be ‘lying around’, the relevance of his point to this discussion is that in times of crisis, the politically or socially impossible can become politically or socially inevitable (Friedman, 1982: ix); or, one might say, if not inevitable, then perhaps much more likely.

It is sometimes stated that every crisis is an opportunity – from which the optimist infers that the more crises there are, the more opportunities there are. This may encapsulate one of the most realistic forms of hope we have left.

**Mindset shift is possible—people are willing to decrease energy consumption. Even if it's difficult, it's try or die**

**Proedrou, American College of Thessaloniki IR lecturer, 2015**

(Filippos, "Rethinking energy security: An inter-paradigmatic debate," Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Policy Paper No. 24, February 2015, <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/%CE%9D%CE%BF-24-Rethinking-energy-security.pdf>, p. 11-12, IC)

Critics also argue that a broad downscale of energy consumption, especially in the global North with an eye to benefit the global South, is not a feasible project. As Daly (2005, 1973, p. 163) argues, however, 'such a policy is radical, but less radical than attempting the impossible, i.e., growing forever' and 'in choosing between tackling a political impossibility and a biophysical impossibility, I would judge the latter to be the more impossible and take my chances with the former.' There are strong grounds, nevertheless, for someone to believe that taking this course might not be so utopian after all. Lovins (1976), for example, has focused on behavioral changes that can lead to a substantial change in energy consumption. Our behavior is premised upon our normative and ideological background and our fixation on growth. It is a matter of understanding that more does not always equal better (Max-Neef 1991, 1995). When it does not, we should free up energy resources for the poorer regions, in the same way that we donate a part of our income for charity, not least to the third world channeled through the activities of a vast network of NGOs that work for the improvement of living conditions in the least developed countries. There is a certain threshold of sufficiency, beyond which the accumulation of more material wealth does not significantly add to human happiness (Daly 2008, p. 10). To the contrary, adding a small amount to the income of the poor makes a big difference to their welfare level and, subsequently, to their experience of pleasure, satisfaction and happiness.

Freeing up resources, as well as income, then, is neither as irrational nor as unlikely as it might seem in the beginning. Switching into less energy-intensive modes of living would also be wholeheartedly welcomed by a significant part of the population in modern societies. Data show that the most affluent societies present the highest number of suicides, as well as increased levels of stress that are connected with a number of serious health problems. Disentangling prosperity from growth and moving beyond the subsequent addiction with the infinite accumulation of wealth and resources would thus render western societies less rich, but holds the potential to make them more prosperous with their citizens enjoying better quality of life and higher welfare standards (Jackson 2009; Speth 2008; Kallis et al 2012).

**Continued ecological degradation results in mass mindset shifts—ecological protests prove**

**Lawrence, St Joseph's College New York sociology assistant professor, and Abrutyn, University of Memphis sociology**

**assistant professor, 2015** (Kirk S. and Seth B., “The Degradation of Nature and the Growth of Environmental Concern: Toward a Theory of the Capture and Limits of Ecological Value,” *Human Ecology Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2015, <http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ch043.pdf>, p. 93-96, IC)

Ecological degradation alters supply and demand curves for ecological services, reducing supply and increasing demand (Costanza et al., 1997). We posit that the increase in demand is both a reflection and an outcome of the growth of ecological concern, which can act as a powerful motivation for ecological value-seeking by interested individuals, organizations, and nation-states. Early examples of environmentalism appeared in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the protection of colonies (Grove, 1995). Protests following Three Mile Island and Love Canal in the United States, Kenya’s Green Belt Movement, Chico Mendes and the rubber tappers in Brazil, and the appearance and expansion of environmental and environmental justice movements as the scale of degradation increased in the post-World War II period are clear examples of the growth of ecological concern (Foster, 1999; McNeill, 2000; Pellow et al., 2001; Rudel et al., 2011).

With displaced degradation, ecological value—in addition to economic profit— is captured by more powerful groups as they increase the level and quality of the ecosystem services they enjoy. But the use of power can also be in response to pressures from below for increases in ecological quality; specifically in the form of the ideology of ecological concern and in demands for ecological services that exceed current supply. We argue that ecological degradation triggers or amplifies these two factors, which tend to converge and become forces of social change. Given that humans prefer higher quality environments and the ecological services they provide for their mental and physical benefits, the environment is clearly a component in what is commonly called a standard of living. A decline in the real or perceived standard of living is an important motivating force for social action (Harris, 1977). And, similar to other forms of collective behavior, a certain level—or threshold—of concern typically needs to be met before that concern grows into pressure for change (Granovetter, 1978). Thus, the threshold would be reached when a significant proportion of the population—in size and/ or influence—experiences a real or perceived decline. We include the perception of a decline because the images of nature, the environment, and its effects are “refracted” through cultural lenses (Foster & Holleman, 2012). When an actual or threatened reduction in local ecological quality from pollution or other forms of degradation creates a real or perceived decline in the standard of living, social movements often emerge to address the problems, including applying pressure on elites in the political economy to respond (cf. Polanyi, 1944 [2001]). The response can be for the improvement of local ecological quality through the institutionalization of sustainable use and a “steady-state economy” (Daly & Townsend, 1993), but that solution is often subordinated to unsustainable economic growth (Foster et al., 2010; Pierce, 1992).

Another response to the demand for ecological services is to harness power for the capture of ecological value from distant sources; this can lead to

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conflict and imbalanced trade. In the modern world-system, scholars have studied the effects of imbalanced coercive power in systemic processes including colonization and trade. Core nations, or those in the most dominant trade positions (Frank, 2007), are able to extract natural resources and obtain cheap labor, either through the use of force or imbalanced exchanges, from semi-peripheral and peripheral nations (Chase-Dunn, 1998; Wallerstein, 1974). For example, typical unequal exchanges involve the transfer of economic and ecological value as low-value (but ecologically costly) raw materials flow from less-developed “extractive economies” in the periphery to developed countries in the core who profit from the transformation and consumption of the raw materials into high-value products; some of which are exported back to the periphery (Bunker, 1985; Eisenmenger & Giljum, 2007). Moreover, core nation-states and their multinational corporations use economic and political power to negotiate the terms of trade and foreign environmental, labor, and other regulations in their favor (Woods, 2006; see also Konisky, 2008; Stiglitz, 2007). Research has also uncovered “recursive exploitation”: reforestation in the powerful core countries of the world-system, such as the United States and Japan, is linked to deforestation in the less powerful semi-periphery, such as Costa Rica and Indonesia, which in turn is tied to greater deforestation in the least powerful countries, such as Madagascar and Cote d’Ivoire (Burns et al., 2009; cf. Roberts et al., 2009)

When the growth of ecological concern is limited to the local environment, a characteristic that can be traced back to our hunting and gathering origins (Moran, 2006, pp. 9–11), the capture of ecological value from others may meet with resistance primarily from ecological limits and opposition from groups who suffer the negative consequences. As previously mentioned, the demand of payments for ecological debt by groups in the global South is one example of contestation (e.g., Martínez-Alier, 1997). Other examples include movements in India against water use by Coca-Cola (Ciafone, 2012), in Brazil against ethanol production by Cargill (Via Campesina, 2010), and movements across Latin America against ecological injustices committed by powerful groups within the countries (Carruthers, 2008).

In recent years, the ideology of ecological concern has become globalized, and may constitute a worldwide value-orientation (Dunlap, 2006; Dunlap & York, 2008) as it has been institutionalized as part of global governance (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 2009; Frank et al., 2000; Lawrence, 2009; Schofer & Hironaka, 2005). The expansion of concern acts as an emergent counter-force to attempts at ecological value capture. Sometimes the pressure emerges from local groups and “boomerangs” through international organizations to return back to the local political economy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). International certification programs, such as “dolphin safe” and organic labeling, are additional means by which ecological concern is globalized (Pattberg, 2012). Ecological concerns are also part of larger movements for global change, such as the anti-capitalist movement (Buttel & Gould, 2004) and as “a movement of movements” as revealed at World Social Forums (Kaneshiro et al., 2012). Additionally, the proliferation of global environmental, nature-based, and environmental justice organizations,

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such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and possibly thousands of others is evidence of other emerging global movements (Hawken, 2007).

It would be a mistake to ignore the pressure these groups and movements put on those in positions of power to effect change; if only as a means to reducing political and economic costs found in grievances and protests that threaten political elite's legitimacy or potential constituency (Martínez-Alier, 1997). As movements and organizations emerge and polities react to the pressures by creating environmental departments and regulations, a global ideology of ecological concern becomes a real force shaping the relationships between nation-states and patterns of legitimacy, albeit with inconsistent results thus far (Schofer & Hironaka, 2005).

An additional limit emerges as systemic degradation, or the total amount of degradation across Earth's entire biosphere. It is accelerated both by the feedback loop discussed above and by the pursuit of ecological value as a solution. Climate change, for instance, is a form of degradation that has global effects regardless of the source of pollution. When system degradation threatens the system, as experienced locally in terms of declining quality of ecological services and opportunities, another source of pressure to act is placed on those in power. Systemic degradation can also contribute to spread the ideology of ecological concern, although with a lag effect because transportation/communication technologies, scientific knowledge, and the perception of a declining standard of living have not kept pace with the ability to degrade ecosystems and the entire biosphere; in addition, any ideology is always filtered through cultural lenses and must compete with other ideologies for prominence (Foster & Holleman, 2012). Ultimately, a struggle ensues between forces of ecological degradation and protection.

### **Ecological degradation spurs mindset shift**

**Taylor, University of Victoria environmental studies assistant professor, and Segal, University of Victoria Master's degree in Health and Social Services, 2015** (Duncan M. and David, "Healing Ourselves and Healing the World: Consumerism and the Culture of Addiction," Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, March 2015, [http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/19-3-A5-Taylor\\_and\\_Segal.pdf](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/19-3-A5-Taylor_and_Segal.pdf), p. 84, IC)

We began this article by claiming that over the next few decades we will undoubtedly witness the rapid decline of industrial civilization. Why? Because a viable economy is utterly dependent on a sustainable and viable ecology and the current industrial global economy has been designed to grow constantly and ignore the limitations of a finite planet. At this time humanity is now using more than 25% more renewable resources each year than the biosphere is producing (Taylor and Taylor, 2007). Issues such as climate change and energy shortages are impelling us to confront the issue of limits to conventional economic growth as well as our profound inseparability and



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mutual vulnerability with the larger social and biophysical systems of this planet.

We recognize that a voluntary transformation away from a consumer based culture and towards life sustaining practices is likely not going to occur, at least on a wide level. However, as the unraveling of ecological and social systems continue to increase, this will also allow for more and more people to question their own values and life meanings. In turn, those individuals and communities that have begun to experiment with the sustainable practices and more ecologically informed worldviews will be the seeds, or little perturbations that just may influence the trajectory of the collapse in more positive directions. Further, as the veil of egobased individualism and frenzy of addictive consumerism is lifted, a rich network of ideas and practices may be ready to catch the fall, hopefully with enough resiliency to act as attractor points for a new level of cultural reorganization.

This is the silver lining to the Great Unraveling. Whether we acknowledge it consciously or not we are being affected by the larger systemic social and biophysical changes that are taking place around the world. As subsystems of these larger systems we are changing as they are changing – and conversely, as we change so can they. Individual and collective social systems rarely change without experiencing unsustainable levels of disequilibrium. As industrial society becomes progressively unhinged individuals and communities will be forced to experiment with new ways of living, both with each other and the natural world. Already, transition town initiatives (Hopkins, 2011), ecovillages, city revitalization projects (e.g., Portland Oregon), permaculture communities, downshifting and simplicity forum groups, local food and buy local initiatives are acting as social “attractor points” and as visions of hopeful possibilities. It is our hope that this time of transition will compel those living beyond their means to slow down and pay attention to the fertile inner landscape primed and ready for growth.

## Yes Transition

**Consumerism destroys the environment, and transition is necessary and possible—adaptation to economic decline is key to reframing lifestyles**

**Brown, Clark University environmental science and policy professor, and Vergragt, Clark University senior research scientist with a PhD in Chemistry from Leiden University, 2015**

(Halina Szejnwald and Philip J., “From Consumerism to Wellbeing: Toward a Cultural Transition?” Journal of Cleaner Production, 5/12/2015, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652615004825>, p. 17-18, IC)

Since its rapid evolution after the WWII, consumer society in the US, and the lifestyles it has engendered, has long ceased to deliver on the great promise of wellbeing for all, while exacting a heavy ecological toll. It runs on its own momentum, propelled by cultural meanings and symbols, social practices, institutional inertia, existing infrastructure, and by business and political interests. Since technology alone cannot counteract the ecological cost of unrestrained growth and consumerism, much less address the shrinking gains in wellbeing, a transition beyond this dominant economic model is needed. But it is unrealistic to expect the policy and political leaders to lead that social change. Similarly, there are few signs so far that the established NGOs are about to include consumption and consumerism in their agendas. The change will need to come from the people and, we contend, have at this core an evolution toward a new framing of wellbeing.

While it is generally accepted that cultural change occurs very slowly, under some condition it may actually be very rapid. This was the case with consumer society, which emerged in the US (and other economies) through concerted efforts of government, unions, and the corporate sector when the historical window of opportunity opened up. In the span of a one or two generations the middle class radically changed its “normal” lifestyles, consumption behaviors, and its understanding of what good life consists of. Can such a rapid change take place again, this time following a trajectory beyond consumerism? The difficulty with addressing this question is that the theoretical framework for understanding cultural change of that nature and magnitude is underdeveloped. For one thing, widely accepted theories conceptualize social change as necessarily involving contestation between self-aware incumbents and challengers with specific agendas and alternative collective visions of the future. While that may be the case at in the future, the origins of the change beyond consumerism are very likely to have less conspicuous and less ideological roots. Another difficulty with theorizing about social change toward an alternative to consumer society, based on the history of its emergence, is that the story is commonly told as a historical account, not through a theoretical lens.

In this paper we propose that the cultural change entailing a new framing of wellbeing, if it happens, is unlikely to be driven by moral imperatives or persuasive campaigns, or follow the leadership of organized NGOs. Rather, the fundamental human strife for wellbeing and subjective happiness in everyday life is a more likely driving force. We hypothesize that the shifts in lifestyle choices and adaptations to the current economic realities can produce new social practices, interactions and meanings, which in turn lead to reframing the understanding of wellbeing. Extensive research on what makes people happy and satisfied with their lives suggests that such reframing can readily incorporate a shift away from consumerist lifestyles. In that reframing, materially scaled down life would be richer in other ways: more reciprocal and connected to others, and with a stronger sense of a community. We also hypothesize, drawing on the demographic and economic statistics that technologically connected, educated, confident and open to change millennials might lead the way in the shift toward a less-consumerist society. Their diminishing interest in suburban life in favor of cities, constricted economic opportunities, and the size and interconnectedness all point in that direction.

It is not known at this point whether the various forms of sharing economy, and the growing interest in the precepts of the new economy may contribute to this reframing process. To the extent that some forms (albeit in minority) of sharing economy foster social trust and community building, and that the new economy movement challenges income inequalities and many established institutions, there may be opportunities for mutual reinforcement. In this paper we note these trends and we summarize the small body of relevant empirical research as a way to highlight the opportunities further research on the possible transition beyond consumer society.

### **Decline forces a transition to sustainable, localized economies**

**Göpel, 14** – heads the Berlin office of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. Her research focuses on system transformations and new prosperity models. Preceding this post she helped start up the World Future Council and later directed its Future Justice program with a focus on the representation of future generations and long-termism in current governance structures. Maja has a PhD in political economy and diploma in media and communications; she lectures at universities and enjoys working in international networks. (Maja, Postwachstum, “Getting to Postgrowth: The Transformative Power of Mind- and Paradigm Shifts”, 4/28/14, <http://blog.postwachstum.de/getting-to-postgrowth-the-transformative-power-of-mind-and-paradigm-shifts-20140428>)

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report: **a renewed opportunity for deep structural change**. System transformation researchers like those at the Nesta Foundation in the UK brought forward a list **of five “main ingredients” for successful transformation: Failures and frustrations with the current system multiply as negative consequences become increasingly visible. The landscape in which the regime operates shifts** as new long-term trends emerge or sudden events drastically **impact the general availability or persuasiveness of particular solutions**. Niche alternatives start to develop and gain momentum; coalitions emerge that coalesce around the principles of a new approach. New technologies are energizing the upcoming alternative solutions either in the form of alternative products or opportunities for communication and connection. **In order to achieve far-reaching regime changes, dissents and fissures within the regime itself are key, rather than small adaptations** and co-optation into the old regime.[3] A core element in this sequence is the “new approach” mentioned in point 3. Just as paradigms and hegemonic mindsets have a hampering effect on alternative proposals, **the challenging of these paradigms and their crisis equally holds the emancipatory power for system transformations**. While many argue that, with regard to the development story of economic growth, such alternatives are still dispersed happenings and nowhere near providing a consistent approach, I think we are at a tipping point. A first superficial review of a few movements shows a lot of commonalities between the core principles of, for example, the “Economy for the Common Good”[4], the “Transition Town movement”[5], and the Commoning movement[6], or the international efforts to measure a new development paradigm led by Bhutan with its Gross National Happiness approach[7]. **Cross-cutting ideas and rationales juxtaposed to the mainstream economic ones are: A holistic understanding of human needs and prosperity beyond consumption Equitable and balanced progress of the whole socio-ecological system A vision of sufficiency providing freedom from fear of falling behind in the race for more wealth and freedom** from constantly created shopping-wants that impede wellbeing **Growth in creativity, capacities, time wealth and conviviality** (process utility) in co-creative relationships A **culture of respect, precaution and caring for what is already there. Shedding old paradigms and imaginaries of life, society and desirable futures** usually goes alongside crises in the “real” world. We are looking at a rocky ride ahead, but **the more clarity we have about where we want to get and how it can be done, the better we can coordinate**. This leaves me to finish with Milton Friedman: “Only a crisis-actual or perceived-produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.”

## A2 “Human Nature”

**They’re empirically wrong—post-consumerist communities can exist**

**Chatzidakis, Royal Holloway University of London marketing**

**senior lecturer, et al 2014** (Andreas; Gretchen Larsen, Durham University marketing senior lecturer; and Simon Bishop, Nottingham University Business School organizational behavior assistant professor; “Farewell to consumerism: Countervailing logics of growth in consumption,” *Ephemera*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014,

<http://www.ephemerajournal.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/contribution/14-4chatzidakislarsenbishop.pdf>, p. 760, IC)

The associated logic of post-consumerist citizenship centres on a denial of consumption as a central, meaningful act in and of itself (Soper, Ryle and Thomas, 2009). Of course, consumption is not and cannot be absent in any society, but in a de-growth society the primary focus is social and community participation, rather than consumption. Critics of de-growth claim an inherent contradiction within the logic, which emerges from the view that it is human nature to desire power, and that therefore, such communal, egalitarian forms of society and economy would be impossible to sustain. Post-consumerist citizenship has however been adopted in various social movements and ‘new consumption communities’ where people withdraw as much as possible from the market-place by voluntarily and collectively simplifying their lives (Bekin, Carrigan and Szmigin, 2005). The imperative of degrowth is further reflected in various forms of consumer-oriented activism deployed by anarchist movements (Portwood-Stacer, 2012) and has been used as a key political slogan in several anti-capitalist and anti-consumerist spaces, e.g. within the Athenian neighbourhood of Exarcheia (Chatzidakis, Maclaran and Bradshaw, 2012). An increasing number of people are being drawn towards de-growth as a radical alternative to the status quo, despite facing much resistance from those who benefit from current economic systems premised on growth, i.e. owners of capital and those seduced by the promises of capitalism.

**Transition is possible but growth must stop—human nature can be changed by contingent circumstance**

**Lawrence, St Joseph’s College New York sociology assistant professor, and Abrutyn, University of Memphis sociology**

**assistant professor, 2015** (Kirk S. and Seth B., “The Degradation of Nature and the Growth of Environmental Concern: Toward a Theory of the Capture and Limits of Ecological Value,” *Human Ecology Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2015, <http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ch043.pdf>, p. 98-100, IC)

In response, environmental and environmental justice movements have led efforts to protect the biosphere in local and distant locations. Their work must be part of global movements toward innovation of sustainable means to live

within the limits, however historically defined, necessary for ecosystems and the biosphere to provide ecological value for all inhabitants. As described by the theoretical model, and as demonstrated by societies in the past, failure results in ecological failure and the collapse of an environment's ability to support life. Due to the expansion of these processes to the global level, the Earth system is now in peril.

Important political, economic, and cultural ramifications emerge from this model. Local, NIMBYist protection of ecological value is unjust in the short term and unsustainable in the long term. The sense of what is "local" may change as knowledge of the complexity and interconnectedness of ecosystems spreads. The displacement of ecological degradation could reach an end when there are no longer any distant resources to exploit, which could occur as resources are exhausted and/or as ecological concern becomes universal, leaving no "others." An explicit recognition of the value of ecological services to the continuation of our species and of the connections between ours and other species that provide them is essential. But they cannot be privatized and sold to the highest bidder and/or for the benefit of some at the expense of others; that is, a continuation of capitalism's "cheap nature" strategy (Moore, 2014, p. 308). It must be a recognition and protection of ecological quality that all should share in. And the speed of the treadmills of production and consumption that have been reducing ecological quality cannot continue to expand.

This requires a much larger cultural change, away from ecologically destructive values and practices and toward a holistic ecological view. Beck's (2000) cosmopolitanism, in which a plurality of actors at multiple intra- and intersocietal levels strives for universal goals, is one guide. While imperfect, there is evidence that this has begun: The United Nations' conferences on sustainable development, Bolivia's "Law of the Rights of Mother Earth" (Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra) and the push for its global adoption (Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, 2014), and, as previously mentioned, at World Social Forums. Contra modernization theory, ecological concern is not limited to developed countries. As Foster (2009) passionately argues, it may take a socialist revolution to generate the sweeping political, economic, and other cultural changes necessary to prevent local and global ecological destruction.

We do see the potential in a global ecosocialism for avoiding continued ecological decline and collapse. But, as Harvey (1996) asserts, a successful ecosocialist project must negotiate the multiple and changing temporal and social scales at which power and meaning reside; for example, there are "two senses of universality" in which universal inclusion must coexist with particularities in identity and practice (Harvey, 1996, p. 203). The particularities must, however, recognize the equality of all, both humans and the non-human world, in the sharing of ecological quality. It may be best, then, to return to Marx via Moore (2014, pp. 287, 304), who argued that human and extra-human natures, "historical natures," exist in a dialectal relationship—they can thrive or decline together. We believe that the emergence of ecological concern for human and extra-human natures as a

universal ideology offers that promise. We hope that by explicating the social drivers of the capture of ecological value, the discussion and theory presented here can be part of that process.

**Transition changes even habituated behavioral patterns—crisis scenarios are uniquely destabilizing**

**Taylor, University of Victoria environmental studies assistant professor, and Segal, University of Victoria Master’s degree in Health and Social Services, 2015** (Duncan M. and David, “Healing Ourselves and Healing the World: Consumerism and the Culture of Addiction,” Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, March 2015, [http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/19-3-A5-Taylor\\_and\\_Segal.pdf](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/19-3-A5-Taylor_and_Segal.pdf), p. 81, IC)

Research in the field of adventure therapy has posited that it is contexts of disequilibrium that allow for the opportunities of healing by unsettling habituated behavior patterns and promoting the adoption of healthier ways of being (Taylor, Segal & Harper 2010). Arguably we are now at a time in our collective history when we are experiencing greater and greater levels of systemic social and environmental disequilibrium and chaos. Consequently, we are experiencing both at the individual and collective levels new opportunities for reorganization and integration. And while the first response for many is both the denial and the reassertion of habitual behaviors as well as the arguments for the continued entrenchment of the industrial/expansionist worldview, it is this very experience of chaos that is “the mother of our individual and collective evolution” (Dupuy, 2013, p.166). One of the principles of chaos theory is that the trajectory of a system experiencing a high level of disequilibrium can be easily be impacted by even a very small perturbation. A useful analogy is that of a ball-bearing and a series of peaks and valleys. Times of relative systemic stability are akin to a ball-bearing in a valley. Here only very strong outside perturbations can affect its location. However, times of high levels of systemic disequilibrium are akin to a ball-bearing perched precariously on a peak. At such times even very small perturbations and stresses have the potential to destabilize the existing state and determine the ball-bearing’s trajectory into one valley or another. Similarly, we are now at a time in history when even very small groups of people and communities with sufficient intent and focus can make a significant difference in helping to determine the direction of the larger social systems and even biophysical systems in which they are embedded.

**Mindset shift solves—their conceptions of human nature are reductionist and misapply science**

**Bollier, USC Norman Lear Center senior fellow, and Conaty, New Economics Foundation fellow, 2015**

(David and Pat, “A New Alignment of Movements? Part II: Strategies for Convergence of Movements,” Commons Transition, 2/26/15, <http://commonstransition.org/a-new-alignment-of-movements-part-ii-strategies-for-a-convergence-of-movements/>, IC)

Pat Conaty elaborated on this idea by suggesting a strategic focus on protecting and reproducing the “living economy” – the idea that “real wealth is life, not dead coins, and so we should concentrate on livelihoods and the problem of wealth-sharing and abundance... .What is the prize? The living economy. The problematique, he argued, is the same as in earlier generations – How to share the equity? That’s what the vernacular idea of ‘co-operative commonwealth’ is all about.”

The idea of the economy as a living system, and not a set of mechanical, impersonal forces, lies at the center of an important 2012 essay by ecophilosopher and theoretical biologist Andreas Weber, “Enlivenment.” [15] Drawing upon recent findings and theorizing in evolutionary sciences, Weber argues that free-market economics is based on misleading scientific theories about human nature and rely upon reductionist Enlightenment categories that ignore the creative agency of life itself. Weber argues that we should conceptualize “the economy” as a commons – a complex living system in which humans that have broad capacities to co-operate, negotiate with each other, and show creative agency.

A strategy that sets its sights on such a paradigm shift would find it very appealing to protect, enrich and extend the commons; the economy could be seen not as an extractive machine oblivious to the natural world, but as a living system that must sustain all species. David Bollier suggested that this would provide solid ground for a “movement of movements” to come together. Focusing on “real wealth as life itself” provides a powerful rationale for identifying:

Ways and means to internalise market externalities (which are harming the environment, communities and future generations);

Solutions for reducing inequality and social insecurity;

Pathways to reconnect people with nature and with each other; and

A new vision of development that goes beyond conventional markets and GDP.

Adopting the commons perspective, Bollier argued, could help movements highlight the connections between “the economy,” the biophysical environment and social communities. All can be seen as integrated into a living system that commoners themselves must co-create and co-manage: a new vision for re-imagining governance, resource management and culture. In developing a discourse of the commons, movements would be able to



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reclaim a rich legal history and focus on viable practical models. It would also be possible to emphasise our common humanity as transnational tribes of commoners increasingly work together. Jason Nardi agreed and felt that the Social Solidarity Economy activists could find the idea of “solidarity for the commons” as a resonant and rallying vision.

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**\*\*Growth Good\*\***

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## **Growth Sustainable**

## Sustainable – 2AC

**Growth is infinite, every time humanity has come close to running out of something, a more efficient alternative is created**

**Ridley 14** [April 25, 2014, Matt Ridley, "The World's Resources Aren't Running Out," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156>, online, RaMan]

How many times have you heard that we humans are "using up" the world's resources, "running out" of oil, "reaching the limits" of the atmosphere's capacity to cope with pollution or "approaching the carrying capacity" of the land's ability to support a greater population?

The assumption behind all such statements is that there is a fixed amount of stuff—metals, oil, clean air, land—and that we risk exhausting it through our consumption. "We are using 50% more resources than the Earth can sustainably produce, and unless we change course, that number will grow fast—by 2030, even two planets will not be enough," says Jim Leape, director general of the World Wide Fund for Nature International (formerly the World Wildlife Fund).

But here's a peculiar feature of human history: We burst through such limits again and again. After all, as a Saudi oil minister once said, the Stone Age didn't end for lack of stone. Ecologists call this "niche construction"—that people (and indeed some other animals) can create new opportunities for themselves by making their habitats more productive in some way. Agriculture is the classic example of niche construction: We stopped relying on nature's bounty and substituted an artificial and much larger bounty. Economists call the same phenomenon innovation.

What frustrates them

about ecologists is the latter's tendency to think in terms of static limits. Ecologists can't seem to see that when whale oil starts to run out, petroleum is discovered, or that when farm yields flatten, fertilizer comes along, or that when glass fiber is invented, demand for copper falls.

That frustration is heartily reciprocated. Ecologists think that economists espouse a sort of superstitious magic called "markets" or "prices" to avoid confronting

the reality of limits to growth. The easiest way to raise a cheer in a conference of ecologists is to make a rude joke about economists. I have lived

among both tribes. I studied various forms of ecology in an academic setting for seven years and then worked at the Economist magazine for eight years.

When I was an ecologist

(in the academic sense of the word, not the political one, though I also had antinuclear stickers on my car), I very

much espoused the carrying-capacity viewpoint—that there were limits to growth. I nowadays lean to the view that there are no limits because we can invent new ways of doing more with less.

This disagreement goes to the heart of many current political issues and explains much about why people disagree about environmental policy. In the climate debate, for example, pessimists see a limit to the atmosphere's capacity to cope with extra

carbon dioxide without rapid warming. So a continuing increase in emissions if economic growth continues will eventually accelerate warming to dangerous rates. But

optimists see economic growth leading to technological change that would result in the use of lower-carbon energy. That would allow warming to level off long before it does much harm.

It is striking, for example, that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's recent forecast that temperatures would rise by 3.7 to 4.8 degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial levels by 2100 was based on several assumptions: little technological change, an end to the 50-year fall in population growth rates, a tripling (only) of per capita income and not much improvement in the energy efficiency of the economy.

Basically, that would mean a world much like today's but with lots more people burning lots more coal and oil, leading to an increase in emissions. Most

economists expect a five- or tenfold increase in income, huge changes in technology and an end to population growth by 2100: not so many more

people needing much less carbon. In

1679, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, the great Dutch microscopist, estimated that the planet could hold 13.4 billion people, a number that most demographers think we may never reach. Since then, estimates have bounced around between 1 billion and 100 billion,

with no sign of converging on an agreed figure. Economists point out that we keep improving the

productivity of each acre of land by applying fertilizer, mechanization, pesticides and irrigation. Further innovation is bound to shift the ceiling

upward.

Jesse Ausubel at Rockefeller University calculates that the amount of land required to grow a given quantity of food has fallen by 65% over the past 50

years, world-wide. Ecologists object that these innovations rely on nonrenewable

resources, such as oil and gas, or renewable ones that are being used up

faster than they are replenished, such as aquifers.

So current yields cannot be maintained, let alone improved. In his recent book "The View from Lazy Point," the ecologist Carl Safina estimates that if everybody had the living standards of Americans, we would need 2.5 Earths

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because the world's agricultural land just couldn't grow enough food for more than 2.5 billion people at that level of consumption. Harvard emeritus professor E.O. Wilson, one of ecology's patriarchs, reckoned that only if we all turned vegetarian could the world's farms grow enough food to support 10 billion people. Economists respond by saying that since large parts of the world, especially in Africa, have yet to gain access to fertilizer and modern farming techniques, there is no reason to think that the global land requirements for a given amount of food will cease shrinking any time soon. Indeed, Mr. Ausubel, together with his colleagues Iddo Wernick and Paul Waggoner, came to the startling conclusion that, even with generous assumptions about population growth and growing affluence leading to greater demand for meat and other luxuries, and with ungenerous assumptions about future global yield improvements, we will need less farmland in 2050 than we needed in 2000. (So long, that is, as we don't grow more biofuels on land that could be growing food.) But surely intensification of yields depends on inputs that may run out? Take water, a commodity that limits the production of food in many places. Estimates made in the 1960s and 1970s of water demand by the year 2000 proved grossly overestimated: The world used half as much water as experts had projected 30 years before. The reason was greater economy in the use of water by new irrigation techniques. Some countries, such as Israel and Cyprus, have cut water use for irrigation through the use of drip irrigation. Combine these improvements with solar-driven desalination of seawater world-wide, and it is highly unlikely that fresh water will limit human population. The best-selling book "Limits to Growth," published in 1972 by the Club of Rome (an influential global think tank), argued that we would have bumped our heads against all sorts of ceilings by now, running short of various metals, fuels, minerals and space. Why did it not happen? In a word, technology: better mining techniques, more frugal use of materials, and if scarcity causes price increases, substitution by cheaper material. We use 100 times thinner gold plating on computer connectors than we did 40 years ago. The steel content of cars and buildings keeps on falling. Until about 10 years ago, it was reasonable to expect that natural gas might run out in a few short decades and oil soon thereafter. If that were to happen, agricultural yields would plummet, and the world would be faced with a stark dilemma: Plow up all the remaining rain forest to grow food, or starve. But thanks to fracking and the shale revolution, peak oil and gas have been postponed. They will run out one day, but only in the sense that you will run out of Atlantic Ocean one day if you take a rowboat west out of a harbor in Ireland. Just as you are likely to stop rowing long before you bump into Newfoundland, so we may well find cheap substitutes for fossil fuels long before they run out. The economist and metals dealer Tim Worstall gives the example of tellurium, a key ingredient of some kinds of solar panels. Tellurium is one of the rarest elements in the Earth's crust—one atom per billion. Will it soon run out? Mr. Worstall estimates that there are 120 million tons of it, or a million years' supply altogether. It is sufficiently concentrated in the residues from refining copper ores, called copper slimes, to be worth extracting for a very long time to come. One day, it will also be recycled as old solar panels get cannibalized to make new ones. Or take phosphorus, an element vital to agricultural fertility. The richest phosphate mines, such as on the island of Nauru in the South Pacific, are all but exhausted. Does that mean the world is running out? No: There are extensive lower grade deposits, and if we get desperate, all the phosphorus atoms put into the ground over past centuries still exist, especially in the mud of estuaries. It's just a matter of concentrating them again. In 1972, the ecologist Paul Ehrlich of Stanford University came up with a simple formula called IPAT, which stated that the impact of humankind was equal to population multiplied by affluence multiplied again by technology. In other words, the damage done to Earth increases the more people there are, the richer they get and the more technology they have. Many ecologists still subscribe to this doctrine, which has attained the status of holy writ in ecology. But the past 40 years haven't been kind to it. In many respects, greater affluence and new technology have led to less human impact on the planet, not more. Richer people with new technologies tend not to collect firewood and bushmeat from natural forests; instead, they use electricity and farmed chicken—both of which need much less land. In 2006, Mr. Ausubel calculated that no country with a GDP per head greater than \$4,600 has a falling stock of forest (in density as well as in acreage). Haiti is 98% deforested and literally brown on satellite images, compared with its green, well-forested neighbor, the Dominican Republic. The difference stems from Haiti's poverty, which causes it to rely on charcoal for domestic and industrial energy, whereas the Dominican Republic is wealthy enough to use fossil fuels, subsidizing propane gas for cooking fuel specifically so that people won't cut down forests. Part of the problem is that the word "consumption" means different things to the two tribes. Ecologists use it to mean "the act of using up a resource"; economists mean "the purchase of goods and services by the public" (both definitions taken from the Oxford dictionary). But in what sense is water, tellurium or phosphorus "used up" when products made with them are bought by the public? They still exist in the objects themselves or in the environment. Water returns to the environment through sewage and can be reused. Phosphorus gets recycled through compost. Tellurium is in solar panels, which can be recycled. As the economist Thomas Sowell wrote in his 1980 book "Knowledge and Decisions," "Although we speak loosely of 'production,' man neither creates nor destroys matter, but only transforms it." Given that innovation—or

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"niche construction"—causes ever more productivity, how do ecologists justify the claim that we are already overdrawn at the planetary bank and would need at least another planet to sustain the lifestyles of 10 billion people at U.S. standards of living? Examine the calculations done by a group called the Global Footprint Network—a think tank founded by Mathis Wackernagel in Oakland, Calif., and supported by more than 70 international environmental organizations—and it becomes clear. The group assumes that the fossil fuels burned in the pursuit of higher yields must be offset in the future by tree planting on a scale that could soak up the emitted carbon dioxide. A

widely used measure of "ecological footprint" simply assumes that 54% of the acreage we need should be devoted to "carbon uptake." But what if tree planting wasn't the only way to soak up carbon dioxide? Or if trees grew faster when irrigated and fertilized so you needed fewer of them? Or if we cut emissions, as the U.S. has recently done by substituting gas for coal in electricity generation? Or if we tolerated some increase in emissions (which are measurably increasing crop yields, by the way)? Any of these factors could wipe out a huge chunk of the deemed ecological overdraft and put us back in planetary credit. Helmut Haberl of Klagenfurt University in Austria is a rare example of an ecologist who takes economics seriously. He points out that his fellow ecologists have been using "human appropriation of net primary production"—that is, the percentage of the world's green vegetation eaten or prevented from growing by us and our domestic animals—as an indicator of ecological limits to growth. Some ecologists had begun to argue that we were using half or more of all the greenery on the planet. This is wrong, says Dr. Haberl, for several reasons. First, the amount appropriated is still fairly low: About 14.2% is eaten by us and our animals, and an additional 9.6% is prevented from growing by goats and buildings, according to his estimates.

Second, most economic growth happens without any greater use of biomass. Indeed, human appropriation usually declines as a country industrializes and the harvest grows—as a result of agricultural intensification rather than through plowing more land.

Finally, human activities actually increase the productio (sometimes too much, causing algal blooms in water). In places like the Nile delta, wild ecosystems are more productive than they would be without human intervention, despite the fact that much of the land is used for growing human food. If I could have one wish for the Earth's environment, it would be to bring together the two tribes—to convene a grand powwow of ecologists and economists. I would pose them this simple question and not let them leave the room until they had answered it: How can innovation improve the environment?

## Sustainable – Markets

### **Dedvelopment relies on a flawed market analysis, infinite growth is possible**

**Ridley 14** [April 25, 2014, Matt Ridley, "The World's Resources Aren't Running Out," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156>, online, RaMan]

While current economic growth seems to do more good than harm for overall environmental quality, worries about the effects of growth on the environment make a lot of sense. The early stages of economic growth brought much environmental damage, and countries like China and India are now going through what the developed world experienced 50–100 years ago. Pollution is real and can sometimes require government regulation as a solution. By contrast, worries that the world will run out of critical resources make far less sense, while arguments that economics cannot handle scarcity make no sense at all. In 1972, the Club of Rome predicted that the world would run out of oil by 2003 if oil consumption did not slow down, and by 1992 if consumption continued to

grow. Opponents of suburban expansion tell us that farmland will become too scarce if urban growth is not limited. In the early 2010s, there were worries that China was monopolising access to a few 'rare earth' elements necessary for high-tech manufacturing, with the potential to strangle Western access. And David Attenborough says only madmen and economists believe infinite growth is possible in a finite world.<sup>53</sup> All these stories ultimately rest on mistakes about how markets work.

Economist Harold Hotelling explained the economics of non-renewable resources in 1931.<sup>54</sup> Imagine you owned a large deposit of a non-renewable resource – say, iron. Imagine further that the only thing in the world that you cared about was profits. How fast should you pull all your iron out of the ground and sell it? The naïve answer – as fast as you can! – is not right. In fact, it is an answer that throws away money. Pulling everything out of the ground in a hurry is generally more expensive than a slower approach. Suppose you could either mine all the ore this year, all the ore next year, or some this year and some next year. Hotelling showed that miners would pull ore out of the ground until the profits from mining this year, plus interest on those earnings, were the same as the profits expected from mining ore next year and selling it then. Miners then will not simply extract ore as quickly as possible. Instead, they will weigh up current interest rates, current production costs, expected future production costs, and expected future prices. Even when the only thing they care about is profit, tomorrow's profits count, too. And \$1.05 in profits tomorrow is worth more than a \$1 profit today, if the interest rate is less than 5%. In the simple Hotelling model, the world never runs out of any resource. The prices of all resources slowly increase over time, in line with interest rates, unless technological innovation changes the costs of mining or makes it easier to use less of the resource. What does this mean in the real world? It means we need not worry much about running out of things. As relative scarcity increases, so too does relative price. Companies have no incentive to try and pull everything out of the ground now if they expect prices to rise, and increasing relative scarcity drives prices upwards. As prices rise, technology adapts both to increase the effective supply of the commodity – by making previously unfeasible reserves viable – and to figure out how to use alternative, relatively less scarce materials instead. As oil prices rose from the mid-1970s and consumers demanded more fuel-efficient cars, substitutes for oil were found and previously uneconomical reserves became worth exploiting. Rising oil prices first encouraged innovation in the Alberta oil sands, then brought us massive amounts of cheap natural gas through hydraulic fracturing. And the rare earths crisis fizzled to nothing as the threat of increased prices both encouraged manufacturers to consider other alternatives and provided incentives for new rare earths mining outside China.<sup>55</sup> If urbanisation ever turned any substantial amount of farmland into subdivisions, the consequent rise in the value of farmland and price of food would both encourage innovation in improving crop yields and in developing denser urban living environments. None of these innovative responses to price changes would have surprised Julian Simon. In The Ultimate Resource, Simon argued that while physical resources are finite, human ingenuity in using those resources is infinite.<sup>56</sup> Doom-laden predictions of scarcity end-times might sell papers, but they consistently fail because they ignore our capacity to improve.

**Growth solves all resource shortages and makes itself sustainable – we can grow for thousands of years**

**Worstell 12**(Tim Worstell, Senior Fellow at the Adam Smith institute in London, expert on rare earth elements, "We are nowhere near hitting 'peak oil', because we keep inventing new ways of extracting the stuff", 7/6/12, [blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/timworstell/100018350/so-thats-the-end-of-peak-oil-then//Aspomer](http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/timworstell/100018350/so-thats-the-end-of-peak-oil-then//Aspomer))

Peak oil always was a silly thing to panic over and now we've the UK's very own High Priest of the Church of Gaia telling us so. George Monbiot used his column this week to point out that we're not running out of oil and the wells are not going to run dry anytime soon. Supply is increasing rather nicely. As he says: The constraints on oil supply over the past 10 years appear to have had more to do with money than geology. The low prices before 2003 had discouraged investors from developing difficult fields. The high prices of the past few years have changed that. Any economist could have told him that. Resource constraints are always an economic problem: solved by the price mechanism. It was never true that we would run out of oil – it just gets more expensive. At a higher price, people use less and go and hunt for more. Both have happened: the amount of oil (or energy of any kind) used to produce one dollar of GDP has been falling for decades now. Techniques to extract more have been developed as those prices rise. And I'm afraid that people don't seem to understand the implications of those new techniques. Take the Macondo field drilled by BP. Yes, a disaster in the Gulf: but also the deepest well ever drilled. Having developed the technology to drill so deeply we have not only discovered one new oil field – we've also discovered a whole new Earth that we can explore for oil. That part of the entire globe that between 4,000 and 5,000 feet below the surface. Inventing fracking does not mean just extracting gas from Pennsylvania or oil from the Bakken. It means prospecting the whole planet again for such deposits. New technologies mean we have invented whole new planets to explore for resources. This does not apply only to peak oil or peak gas. There are those out there who worry about peak copper, peak indium and even peak tellurium (an odd one when we use 125 tonnes a year and there's 120 million tonnes in the crust). None of these are geological problems, they are all plain and simple economic ones. This is not to say that the world is free from problems. As Monbiot points out, if you care to worry about such things, having so much more oil might boil us all. But we already know the solution to that, a simple carbon tax. For we are not running out of the things that are subject to the price system. We are finding problems with things like the atmosphere, clean water, fisheries, which are not subject to it. The answer is therefore to introduce the price system to those natural resources so that we don't run out of them.



## Sustainable – Self-Correcting

### **Growth is sustainable, self-correcting and innovative**

**Seabra, 14-**

Leo has a background in Communication and Broadcasting and a broad experience which includes activities in Marketing, Advertising, Sales and Public Relations, writes about technology, digital media, sports, travels, food and sustainability, 2/27, "Capitalism can drive Sustainability and also innovation," <http://seabraaffairs.wordpress.com/2014/02/27/capitalism-can-drive-sustainability-and-also-innovation/>

There are those who say that if the world does not change their habits, even the end of economic growth, and assuming alternative ways of living, will be a catastrophe. "Our lifestyles are unsustainable. Our expectations of consumption are predatory. Either we change this, or will be chaos". Others say that the pursuit of unbridled economic growth and the inclusion of more people in consumption is killing the Earth. We have to create alternative because economic growth is pointing to the global collapse. "What will happen when billions of Chinese decide to adopt the lifestyle of Americans?" I'll disagree if you don't mind... They **might be** wrong. **Completely wrong** .. Even very intelligent people wrongly interpret the implications of what they observe when they lose the perspective of time. In the vast scale of time (today, decades, not centuries) it is the opposite of what expected, because they start from a false assumption: the future is the extrapolation of this. But not necessarily be. How do I know? Looking at history. What story? The history of innovation, this thing generates **increases in productivity, wealth, quality of life in an unimaginable level. It is innovation that will defeat pessimism as it always did. It was innovation that made life today is incomparably better than at any other time in human history. And will further improve. Einstein, who was not a stupid person, believed that capitalism would generate crisis, instability, and growing impoverishment.** He said: "The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the true source of evil." The only way to eliminate this evil, he thought, was to establish socialism, with the means of production are owned by the company. A centrally controlled economy would adjust the production of goods and services the needs of people, and would distribute the work that needed to be done among those in a position to do so. This would guarantee a livelihood to every man, women and children. Each according to his possibilities. To each according to their needs. And guess what? What happened was the opposite of what Einstein predicted. Who tried the model he suggested, impoverished, screwed up. Peter Drucker says that almost of all thinking people of the late nineteenth century thought that Marx was right: there would be increased exploitation of workers by employers. They would become poorer, until one day, the thing would explode. Capitalist society was considered inherently unsustainable. It is more or less the same chat today.

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Bullshit. Capitalism, with all appropriate regulations, self-corrects. It is an **adaptive** system that learns and **changes by design**. The design is just for the system to **learn and change**. There was the opposite of what Einstein predicted, and held the opposite of what many predict, but the logic that “unlike” only becomes evident over time. It wasn’t obvious that the workers are those whom would profit from the productivity gains that the management science has begun to generate by organizing innovations like the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone .. to increase the scale of production and cheapen things. The living conditions of workers today are infinitely better than they were in 1900. They got richer, not poorer .. You do not need to work harder to produce more (as everyone thought), you can work less and produce more through a mechanism that is only now becoming apparent, and that brilliant people like Caetano Veloso still ignores. The output is pursuing growth through innovation, growth is not giving up. More of the same will become unsustainable to the planet, but most of it is not what will happen, will happen more different, than we do not know what is right. More innovative. Experts, such as Lester Brown, insist on statements like this: if the Chinese also want to have three cars for every four inhabitants, as in the U.S. today, there will be 1.1 billion cars there in 2030, and there is no way to build roads unless ends with the whole area used for agriculture. You will need 98 million barrels of oil per day, but the world only produces about 90 million today, and probably never produce much more. The mistake is to extrapolate today’s solutions for the future. We can continue living here for 20 years by exploiting the same resources that we explore today? Of course not. But the other question is: how can we encourage the stream of innovations that will enable the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Africans .. to live so as prosperous as Americans live today? Hey, wake up ... what can not stop the engine of innovation is that the free market engenders. **This system is self correcting**, that is its beauty. We do not need to do nothing but ensure the conditions for it to work without distortion. The rest he does himself. **It regulates itself.**

## A2 “Buchanan”

### **Growth is sustainable – production can be increased without using more energy**

**Krugman '14** (Paul, American economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Slow Steaming and the Supposed Limits to Growth, NY Times)

Environmental pessimism makes strange bedfellows. We seem to be having a moment in which three groups with very different agendas — anti-environmentalist conservatives, anti-capitalist people on the left, and hard scientists who think they are smarter than economists — have formed an unholy alliance on behalf of the proposition that reducing greenhouse gas emissions is incompatible with growing real GDP. The right likes this argument because they want to use it to block any action on climate; some on the left like it because they think it can be the basis for an attack on our profit-oriented, materialistic society; the scientists like it because it lets them engage in some intellectual imperialism, invading another field (just to be clear, economists do this all the time, often with equally bad results.) A few days ago Mark Buchanan at Bloomberg published a piece titled “Economists are blind to the limits of growth” making the standard hard-science argument. And I do mean standard; not only does he make the usual blithe claims about what economists never think about; even his title is almost exactly the same as the classic (in the sense of classically foolish) Jay Forrester book that my old mentor, Bill Nordhaus, demolished so effectively forty years ago. Buchanan says that it’s not possible to have something bigger — which is apparently what he thinks economic growth has to mean — without using more energy, and declares that “I have yet to see an economist present a coherent argument as to how humans will somehow break free from such physical constraints.” Of course, he’s never seen such a thing because he’s never looked. But anyway, let me offer an example that I ran across when working on other issues. It’s by no means the most important example of how to get by with less energy, and in no sense enough by itself to make that much difference. But it is, I think, a useful corrective to the rigorous-sounding but actually silly notion that you can’t produce more without using more energy. So, let’s talk about slow steaming. After 2008, when oil prices rose sharply, shipping companies — which send massive container ships on regular “pendulum routes”, taking stuff (say) from Rotterdam to China and back again — responded by reducing the speed of their ships. It turns out that steaming more slowly reduces fuel consumption more than proportionately to the reduction in speed. So what happens when you switch to slow steaming? Any one ship will carry less freight over the course of a year, because it can do fewer swings of the pendulum (although the number of trips won’t fall as much as the reduction in speed, because the time spent loading and unloading doesn’t change.) But you can still carry as much freight as before, simply by using more ships — that is, by supplying more labor and capital. If

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you do that, output — the number of tons shipped — hasn't changed; but fuel consumption has fallen. And of course by using still more ships, you can combine higher output with less fuel consumption. There is, despite what some people who think they're being sophisticated somehow believe, no reason at all that you can't produce more while using less energy. It's not a free lunch — it requires more of other inputs — but that's just ordinary economics. Energy is just an input like other inputs. Some other points here: notice that we are not talking about having to develop a new technology; slow steaming is just a choice, not a technological advance, and in fact it doesn't even require that you change the equipment — you're just using the same ships differently. Given time to redesign ships for fuel efficiency, and maybe to develop new technologies, it would presumably be possible to ship the same amount of cargo with even less energy consumption, but that's not necessary to make the case that growth and less energy can go together. So where does the notion that energy is somehow special come from? Mainly, I'd say, from not thinking about concrete examples. When you read this stuff you hear lots of metaphors about bacteria or whatever, nothing about shipping or manufacturing — because if you think about actual economic activities even briefly, it becomes obvious that there are tradeoffs that could let you produce more while using less energy. And greenhouse gas emissions aren't the same thing as energy consumption, either; there's a lot of room to reduce emissions without killing economic growth. If you think you've found a deep argument showing that this isn't possible, all you've done is get confused by your own word games.

### **Energy is NOT a hard limit to growth – productive use of energy means we won't run out**

**Worstell '14** (Tim, Senior Fellow of the Adam Smith Institute, "Mark Buchanan still isn't Understanding Paul Krugman (Or Me) on the Limits to Growth", Forbes)

As I've mentioned before when we get physicists trying to do economics then the result we end up with tends not to actually be economics. And so it is with Mark Buchanan's rebuttal to Paul Krugman's point about energy availability being a limit to growth. The problem is that Buchanan wants to insist that energy is going to be a hard limit to growth. Economic growth will just stop at one point for there's not infinite energy and therefore there cannot be infinite economic growth. He's simply not grasping the point that the economists are trying to tell him. Sure, the provision of energy is something that produces a restraint upon growth, no one at all is doubting that (just ask any economist whether free and unlimited energy would increase the growth rate. Given that it would that we've not got free and unlimited energy is obviously a restraint upon the current growth rate) but energy is not a hard limit on future economic growth. Buchanan's response to Krugman's mauling of his original argument is here: So, I can't PROVE that higher GDP will always necessarily mean more energy used, but that's the way it's been so far, and

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even in the very recent past. Of course, I'd be surprised if a determined search through history couldn't dig up a few special cases, especially over short periods of time, where GDP up and yet energy consumption went down. The point is that this doesn't typically happen, especially for economic activity on national or global scales. Make things more energy efficient and we end up using them to consume more energy overall. That's a broad empirical reality. Sure, we all agree that economic growth has meant higher energy use. No one at all is doubting that empirical reality. For we've only ever faced a restraint on our energy supplies, not a hard limit. We've always had to do some more work, dig up more coal, drill more oil, deploy more solar panels, in order to get that extra energy. And we've done so too. However, in order to insist that the availability of energy will at some point make further economic growth impossible you've also got to believe both of the following two things. Firstly, that there's some limit to how much energy we can abstract from the system to do useful work. I'm perfectly willing to agree that CO2 emissions lead to a limit on the volume of fossil fuels we can usefully consume. But given insolation there's no actual shortage of energy we could capture. Or, at least, not a shortage that's of any importance at all or us on any human timescale. We could start to talk about 15,000 AD after another 13 millennia of exponential growth (an entirely made up number) and the like but I have great difficulty in believing that that's something that should inform current policy debates. So I don't actually believe that we face a hard energy limit anyway. But that brings us to the second: that if we do face a hard energy limit then growth will have to stop. And that's where Buchanan isn't listening. OK, let's say he's right. The efficiency with which we use energy rises over time but not as fast as economic growth. If we face a hard energy limit then there is obviously going to be a restraint upon that growth: we wouldn't be able to grow the economy faster than we can increase the efficiency of energy usage in producing economic value. That's just obvious. But all that does is mean that a hard energy limit is a restraint upon economic growth: that growth would still continue. (sorry, could continue, there's always the possibility that we'll elect socialists and growth will stop) but at that slower rate at which we increase the productivity of the limited amount of energy that we've got. Buchanan's just not understanding what he's being told. That increasing productivity of energy use means that even if we're limited to, say, 1,000GW of energy a year for the planet then we can still have economic growth. Because we will, over time, become more efficient at producing economic value from that 1,000 GW. Energy isn't a hard restriction upon economic growth, it's just a restraint.

## **A2 “Complexity”**

### **Complexity is not a problem and it's inevitable**

**Tainter 2009** (Joseph Tainter, professor of environment and society at Utah State University, “Interview with Joseph Tainter on Collapse,” 11/3/09  
[http://varnelis.net/blog/interview\\_with\\_joseph\\_tainter\\_on\\_collapse//Mkoo](http://varnelis.net/blog/interview_with_joseph_tainter_on_collapse//Mkoo)

So as civilizations develop, you conclude, they differentiate—for example, by creating highly specialized social roles—and build greater and greater levels of organization that require higher investment of energy to maintain. Eventually the marginal returns on investment decline and civilizations either figure out how to deal with that situation or collapse. You note that from the perspective of humans as a species and hominidae as a family, complexity is quite unusual. Most of our existence has been in small settlements or nomadic groups that have relatively little differentiation and low levels of complexity. Today we are living in the most complex society that has ever existed, yet we've avoided collapse thus far. Why is that? JT: Diminishing returns to complexity are probably inevitable, but collapse doesn't necessarily follow. Collapses are actually not that common. There are several ways to cope with diminishing returns to complexity. One is to find energy subsidies to pay for the process. That is what we have done with fossil fuels. And it is a big part of why a future crisis in fossil fuels is the most important thing we should be worrying about.

## A2 “Debt”

### **Debt won't hurt us – their analysis misunderstands the debt**

**Krugman 12** (Paul, economist, 1-1-12, "Nobody Understands Debt" New York Times) [www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/krugman-nobody-understands-debt.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/krugman-nobody-understands-debt.html)

In 2011, as in 2010, America was in a technical recovery but continued to suffer from disastrously high unemployment. And through most of 2011, as in 2010, almost all the conversation in Washington was about something else: the allegedly urgent issue of reducing the budget deficit. This misplaced focus said a lot about our political culture, in particular about how disconnected Congress is from the suffering of ordinary Americans. But it also revealed something else: when people in D.C. talk about deficits and debt, by and large they have no idea what they're talking about — and the people who talk the most understand the least. Perhaps most obviously, the economic “experts” on whom much of Congress relies have been repeatedly, utterly wrong about the short-run effects of budget deficits. People who get their economic analysis from the likes of the Heritage Foundation have been waiting ever since President Obama took office for budget deficits to send interest rates soaring. Any day now! Photo Paul Krugman Credit Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times And while they've been waiting, those rates have dropped to historical lows. You might think that this would make politicians question their choice of experts — that is, you might think that if you didn't know anything about our postmodern, fact-free politics. But Washington isn't just confused about the short run; it's also confused about the long run. For while debt can be a problem, the way our politicians and pundits think about debt is all wrong, and exaggerates the problem's size. Deficit-worriers portray a future in which we're impoverished by the need to pay back money we've been borrowing. They see America as being like a family that took out too large a mortgage, and will have a hard time making the monthly payments. This is, however, a really bad analogy in at least two ways. First, families have to pay back their debt. Governments don't — all they need to do is ensure that debt grows more slowly than their tax base. The debt from World War II was never repaid; it just became increasingly irrelevant as the U.S. economy grew, and with it the income subject to taxation. Second — and this is the point almost nobody seems to get — an over-borrowed family owes money to someone else; U.S. debt is, to a large extent, money we owe to ourselves. This was clearly true of the debt incurred to win World War II. Taxpayers were on the hook for a debt that was significantly bigger, as a percentage of G.D.P., than debt today; but that debt was also owned by taxpayers, such as all the people who bought savings bonds. So the debt didn't make postwar America poorer. In particular, the debt didn't prevent the postwar generation from experiencing the biggest rise in incomes and living standards in our nation's history. But isn't this time different? Not as much as you think. It's true that foreigners now hold large claims on the United States, including a fair amount

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of government debt. But every dollar's worth of foreign claims on America is matched by 89 cents' worth of U.S. claims on foreigners. And because foreigners tend to put their U.S. investments into safe, low-yield assets, America actually earns more from its assets abroad than it pays to foreign investors. If your image is of a nation that's already deep in hock to the Chinese, you've been misinformed. Nor are we heading rapidly in that direction.



## A2 "K-Waves"

### **Kondratieff wave theory empirically false**

**North 09** (Gary, economist and publisher and PhD in history from the University of California, Riverside, The Myth of the Kondratieff Wave, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/north/north725.html>, 6/27/09, AD: 7/6/09)

THE K-WAVE These days, the Kondratieff Wave has a spiffy new name: the K-Wave. (I can almost hear it: "Attention: K-Wave shoppers!") The K-Wave is supposedly going to bring a deflationary collapse Real Soon Now. The Western world's debt structure will disappear in a wave of defaults. Kondratieff's 54-year cycle is almost upon us. Again. The last deflationary period ended in 1933. This became clear no later than 1940. World War II orders from Great Britain, funded by American loans and Federal Reserve policy, ended the Great Depression by lowering real wages. In 1942, price and wage controls were imposed by Washington, the FED began pumping out new money, ration stamps replaced the free market, the black market overcame shortages, and the inflationary era began. That was a long time ago. But the K-Wave is heralded as a 50 to 60-year cycle, or even more specifically, a 54-year cycle. That's the entire cycle, trough to trough or peak to peak. The K-Wave supposedly should have bottomed in 1933, risen for 27 years (1960), declined in economic contraction until 1987, and boomed thereafter. The peak should therefore be in 2014. There is a problem here: the cyclical decline from 1960 to 1987. It never materialized. Prices kept rising, escalating with a vengeance after 1968, then slowing somewhat – just in time for the longest stock market boom in American history: 1982–2000. OK, say the K-Wavers: let's extend the cycle to 60 years. Fine. Let's do just that. Boom, 1932–62; bust, 1963–93; boom, 1994–2024. Does this correspond to anything that happened in American economic history since 1932? No.

### **Empirics prove**

**North 09**(Gary, economist and publisher and PhD in history from the University of California, Riverside, The Myth of the Kondratieff Wave, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/north/north725.html>, 6/27/09, AD: 7/6/09)

You may think that I am devoting way too much space to this. But I want my readers to understand why Kondratieff was wrong in 1925. His popularizers were even more wrong in 1975–85, with their "idealized" chart, and their contemporary heirs' unwillingness to learn from the fact that the downward phase of the cycle is now 44 years late. It should have begun no later than Kennedy's administration: 1932+30=1962. This assumes that the original downward phase was due in 1932. It wasn't. It was due around 1926: 1896+30=1926. It should have lasted until 1956. But 1945–73 was a boom era, with mild recessions and remarkable economic growth per capita. Forget

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about a K-Wave which is going to produce price deflation. The Federal Reserve System remains in control. Sorry about that. It is creating new money. Long-term price deflation of 5% per annum is not in the cards or the charts – anywhere. I recommend that you not take seriously arguments to the contrary that are based on the latest updated version of the K-Wave. The K-Wave forecasted that secular deflation was just around the corner, repeatedly, ever since 1932. It wasn't.

## A2 “Peak Oil”

### **Peak oil is false**

**Mead 12** (Walter Russell, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, 7/15/12, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post” The American Interest) <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/>

**Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East.** The energy revolution of the 21st century isn't about solar energy or wind power and the “scramble for oil” isn't going to drive global politics. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 20th centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world's energy resources and the structure of the world's energy trade support American affluence at home and power abroad. By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found here) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined. Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America's decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. So dramatic are America's finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world's new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom's 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground.

## A2 “Population”

### **Growth results in lower population – Bangladesh study proves**

**Hasan 06** (Mohammad, Department of Finance and Economics, AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION GROWTH AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN BANGLADESH, <http://www.bdiusa.org/Publications/JBS/Volumes/Volume7/JBS7.2-2-Part-1.pdf>, 2/20/06, AD: 7/6/09)

This paper empirically examines the nature of the time-series relationship between population growth and per capita income growth using the annual data of Bangladesh within the framework of cointegration methodology. This study finds evidence of a long-run stationary relationship between population and per capita income. Our results also indicate a bi-directional or feedback relationship between population and per capita income. The results of a negative causality flowing from per capita income to population growth appear to indicate that per capita income tends to lower the population growth. Likewise, population growth positively contributes to the growth of per capita income.

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## **Growth Good Impacts**

## **Impact – China War 2AC**

### **U.S growth is empirically successful and deters China Conflict Galser, 12-**

“China is Reacting to Our Weak Economy” Bonnie S. Glaser (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 5/2/2012  
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/china-is-reacting-to-our-weak-economy>

To maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and secure American interests, the United States must sustain its leadership and bolster regional confidence in its staying power. The key to those goals is reinvigorating the U.S. economy. Historically, the Chinese have taken advantage of perceived American weakness and shifts in the global balance of power. In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from Saigon just after the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Treaty, which signaled the U.S. withdrawal from the region. When the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met one of Deng Xiaoping’s “three obstacles” requirements for better ties and withdrew from Can Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in 1988, China snatched seven of the Spratly Islands from Hanoi. Two decades later, as the United States-Philippines base agreement was terminated, China grabbed Mischief Reef from Manila. Beijing must not be allowed to conclude that an economic downturn means our ability to guarantee regional stability has weakened. The Chinese assertive behaviors against its neighbors in recent years in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea were in part a consequence of China’s assessment that the global financial crisis signaled the beginning of U.S. decline and a shift in the balance of power in China’s favor. The Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia will help prevent Chinese miscalculation and increase the confidence of U.S. partners in U.S. reliability as the ballast for peace and stability in the region. But failure to follow through with actions and resources would spark uncertainty and lead smaller countries to accommodate Chinese interests in the region. Most important, the United States must revive its economy. China will inevitably overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world in the coming decade or two. The United States must not let Beijing conclude that a relative decline in U.S. power means a weakened United States unable to guarantee regional peace and stability. The Chinese see the United States as mired in financial disorder, with an alarming budget deficit, high unemployment and slow economic growth — which, they predict, will lead to America’s demise as the sole global superpower. To avoid Chinese miscalculation and greater United States-China strategic competition, the United States needs to restore financial solvency and growth through bipartisan action.

### **War with China goes nuclear – safeguards won't prevent escalation**

**Wittner 11** – (11/28/11, Lawrence, PhD in history from Columbia University, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, "COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?" <http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446>)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, **there are signs that it could.** After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far

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higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands.  
Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.



## **Impact – China War Ext.**

### **Economic interdependence and further growth reduces the risk of US-China War**

**Atanassova-Cornelis and van der Putten 14** Elena Atanassova-Cornelis is a Lecturer in East Asian Politics at the Department of Politics, University of Antwerp, Frans-Paul van der Putten is a Senior Research Fellow specialized in China at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, November 5, 2014, “Changing Security Dynamics in East Asia: A Post-US Regional Order in the Making?”  
[https://books.google.com/books?id=RGapBQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=RGapBQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Indeed, there are some significant points of contention between the two powers, which may lead to a US-China conflict or even military confrontation, such as US arms sales to Taiwan, and issues related to the South China Sea and East China Sea, among others. These points of conflict raise serious questions as to whether the two countries can truly maintain a cooperative relationship, as the possibility of quarrels, debates, and tensions is very real. However, this does not preclude a broader trend of cooperation. Even allies do not share interests all of the time, and may even debate bitterly. This chapter does not argue that future conflict is not possible, but it argues that cooperation and co-management of difficult problems are more likely trends within this framework of the dual-leadership structure. Globalization and interdependence make a win-win scenario increasingly likely. China needs US direct investment and consumption to fuel its manufacturing sector, while the US needs China's market and manufacturing. China's possession of US debt gives it a key stake in the stability of the US economy and the state of the federal deficit. The national interests of China and the US in economic interdependence and pragmatic goals make a win-win more likely than a zero-sum game based around the negative 3-Cs. In comparing broader common and overlapping interests, namely, regional stability and prosperity, the two powers should be able to handle their differences through peaceful means. To this end, they need to avoid conflict and further develop crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms and Institutions. According to the win-win perspective, China's rise could be good for both America and China. Interdependency theory explains that as long as relations between major powers can be managed, conflict is not inevitable. Additionally, growing globalization and regional integration may result in greater economic interdependence. There are many examples of existing cooperation, such as the China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue that began in 2006 and currently takes place twice a year, in Beijing and in Washington. Additionally, we see frequent summits and state visits, such as President Barack Obama's visit to China in 2009 and President Xi Jinping's visit to the US in 2013. Moreover, the co-management concept also refers to Inclusion rather than exclusion. Namely, China and America should work together with all related powers in East Asia. This dual-leadership structure may also reduce anxiety among other players, making it less likely that they would be forced into making a choice between Beijing and Washington.

### **Economic decline hurts US-China Relations**

**Dean 9** Jason Dean, Chicago Bureau Chief at The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2009, "Chinese Premier Blames Recession on U.S. Actions", <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123318934318826787>

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao squarely blamed the U.S.-led financial system for the world's deepening economic slump, in the most public indication yet of discord between the U.S. government and its largest creditor. Leaders in China, the world's third-largest economy, have been surprised and upset over how much the problems of the U.S. financial sector have hurt China's holdings. In response, Beijing is re-examining its U.S. investments, say people familiar with the government's thinking. Mr. Wen, the first Chinese premier to visit the annual global gathering of economic and political leaders in Davos, Switzerland, delivered a strongly worded indictment of the causes of the crisis, clearly aimed largely at the United States though he didn't name it. Mr. Wen blamed an "excessive expansion of financial institutions in blind pursuit of profit," a failure of government supervision of the financial sector, and an "unsustainable model of development, characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption." Chinese leaders have felt burned by a series of bad experiences with U.S. investments they had believed were safe, say people familiar with their thinking, including holdings in Morgan Stanley, the collapsed Reserve Primary Fund and mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a result, the people say, government leaders decided not to make new investments in a number of U.S. companies that sought China's capital. China's pullback from Fannie and Freddie debt helped push up rates on U.S. mortgages last year just as Washington was seeking to revive the U.S. housing market. To be sure, China's economy now is so closely intertwined with the U.S.'s that major, abrupt changes are unlikely. The U.S.-China economic relationship has become arguably the world's most important. China has been recycling its vast export earnings by financing the U.S. deficit through buying Treasuries, helping to keep U.S. interest rates low and give American consumers more spending power to buy Chinese exports. China now has roughly \$2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, and has continued to buy U.S. government debt -- surpassing Japan in September as the biggest foreign holder of Treasuries, by one official U.S. measure. China must continue to recycle its trade surplus if it doesn't want its currency to appreciate too quickly. Still, the relatively smooth financial ties between the two powers that underpinned the global economic boom of recent years are being tested. As both sides survey the wreckage of the U.S. housing bubble and credit crunch, mutual recriminations are raising doubts about the relationship. The Chinese premier's remarks came a few days after Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner fanned the flames when he accused China of "manipulating" its currency during his confirmation process. That was widely seen as an escalation of long-standing U.S. complaints that China artificially depresses the value of the yuan to bolster its exports, and prompted strong denials from Beijing. The Obama administration has since played down the statement's significance. More Friction Frictions between the two countries began to worsen long before Mr. Obama took office. The Chinese central bank last year stopped

lending its Treasury holdings for fear the borrowers will go bankrupt, according to people familiar with the discussions -- a decision that disrupted the functioning of the Treasury market. Beijing rejected pleas by Washington to resume its lending of Treasuries, the people said. Meanwhile, China -- for years the largest foreign investor in bonds from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- has been sharply trimming its holdings of that debt. After making direct net purchases of \$46.0 billion in the first half of 2008, China's government and companies were net sellers of \$26.1 billion in the five months through November, according to the latest U.S. data. Weak demand for such debt from China and other foreign investors helped prompt the Federal Reserve to announce in November that it would take the step of buying up to \$600 billion in debt from Fannie, Freddie and two other U.S. government-related mortgage businesses. While Chinese officials have generally been circumspect in public, some Chinese commentators have sharpened their rhetoric in recent weeks. Washington "should not expect continuous inflow of more cheap foreign capital to fund its one-after-another massive bailouts," said a December editorial in the government-owned, English-language China Daily. Officials at the newspaper said the commentary wasn't ordered by the government. Cash-rich Chinese financial institutions are under withering criticism at home for investments in the West that have lost money, such as a \$5.6 billion stake in Morgan Stanley purchased by China's sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corp., 13 months ago. The U.S. company's shares have dropped around 60% since then. Chinese institutions have rebuffed entreaties to invest in struggling U.S. companies even as investors from Japan and the Middle East have stepped up. For years, Washington has pushed China to adopt an economic and financial system more like that in the U.S. -- arguing, for example, that China should liberalize capital flows in and out of the country. In many cases, China has moved more slowly than the U.S. desired. Beijing has resisted American pressure to let its currency appreciate in line with market forces, for example, which economists say has helped inflate China's trade surplus. But often, U.S. suggestions had a sympathetic audience among reformers in China's government, and many of China's financial overhauls in recent decades have been inspired by the U.S. model. Now, some of these changes, and their proponents, have lost credibility in China in the wake of the financial meltdown, and recently commentators and officials in China have been increasingly critical about Washington. Amid high-level Sino-U.S. economic talks in Beijing in early December, Chinese officials admonished the U.S. and Europe for their financial governance. Vice Premier Wang Qishan, China's top finance official, called on the U.S. to "take all necessary measures to stabilize its economy and financial markets to ensure the security of China's assets and investments in the U.S." A similar complaint was issued by Lou Jiwei, chairman of CIC, the government fund established in 2007 to seek higher returns on a \$200 billion chunk of China's currency holdings. Mr. Lou said in a December speech that he has "lost confidence" because of inconsistent government policies concerning support for Western banks." "We don't know when these institutions will be invested in by their governments," he said. Fate of U.S. Investments CIC officials are especially sensitive about the fate of their U.S. investments because they have been

under fire for the poor performance of earlier deals. CIC has sustained large paper losses on the \$3 billion it invested in Blackstone Group LP in June 2007, as well as the Morgan Stanley stake. Staffed by officials, some western-educated, who have helped promote financial-market liberalization in China, CIC is also viewed by some Chinese as a symbol of the country's close financial ties to the U.S. -- another reason it has been in the crosshairs. Around October, a lengthy Chinese-language essay began circulating on the Internet excoriating Mr. Lou and other top CIC officials, along with Zhou Xiaochuan, China's central bank governor, for being too close to the U.S. and then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. The diatribe quickly gained wide circulation in Chinese financial circles. One passage charged that Mr. Zhou "colluded with Henry Paulson to buy U.S. bonds, forced [Chinese yuan] appreciation, attached China's economy to the U.S. and broke China's economic independence." Chinese and U.S. interests remain deeply enmeshed. Washington's huge stimulus plans will result in even heavier borrowing, and, while rising savings in the U.S. could create more domestic capital to help fund that, Chinese lending will remain important. Japan investors, too, have been selling Fannie and Freddie debt and making other moves to limit their U.S. risk. An official at another Asian central bank in charge of managing hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves noted late last year that trading in some derivative instruments had factored in a slightly higher possibility of default by the U.S. government, though that prospect is still viewed by most investors as extremely low. The alarm for Chinese leaders started ringing loudly in July and August as problems deepened at Fannie and Freddie. Senior Chinese leaders, who hadn't been apprised in detail of how China's reserves were being invested, learned for the first time in published reports that the country's exposure to debt from those two alone totaled nearly \$400 billion, say people familiar with the matter. Fearing that the U.S. government might not fully back the companies, China demanded and received regular briefings throughout the peak of the crisis from high-level Treasury Department officials, including Mr. Paulson, on the market for U.S. debt securities -- especially those of the mortgage giants. Mr. Paulson and other Treasury officials spoke regularly with Vice Premier Wang and other senior Chinese officials to soothe their concerns. Hit With Questions Chinese officials often bombarded their U.S. counterparts with questions, according to people who were present at meetings. While Mr. Paulson was in Beijing for the Olympics in August, he dined with Mr. Zhou, the central bank chief, at the Whampoa Club, an upscale restaurant that serves modern Chinese cuisine in a traditional courtyard building near the city's Financial Street. On Sept. 7, Mr. Paulson announced that the U.S. government would seize Fannie and Freddie, but Chinese officials remained concerned. At one briefing for Chinese officials to explain the change, said people present, they questioned and debated the meaning of nearly every line of the new Treasury plan. Then Washington allowed Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. to collapse, further shaking Beijing's faith. One casualty was CIC's nearly \$5.4 billion investment in the Reserve Primary Fund, the money-market fund that "broke the buck" in September as a result of the Lehman collapse. CIC had placed money in the Primary Fund because "money market funds are supposed to be very safe," said a Chinese

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official in an interview late last year. But on Sept. 16, the Primary Fund's managers announced that they were delaying redemptions. CIC officials emailed Reserve asking to withdraw all of its money from the fund, and promptly received a reply agreeing to the request, says the Chinese official. CIC officials believed the agreement meant that CIC had become a creditor to the troubled fund, and therefore was entitled to all of its money. A Reserve spokeswoman says the company doesn't comment on individual clients. Later in the day on Sept. 16, Reserve announced that the Primary Fund's net asset value had fallen to 97 cents a share, below the standard \$1.00 level. Reserve initially said redemption requests received before 3 p.m. that day would be honored in full, but has since said that the net asset value already was down to 99 cents a share by 11 a.m. As Reserve further delayed payments, CIC began to fear that it might not get all of its money. The Reserve issue "is causing a lot of concern with a lot of financial institutions in China," said the Chinese official. Some officials expected that the U.S. and its financial institutions would better protect China from loss. "If the U.S. is treating us this way, eventually that will be enough cause for concern in the stability of the [U.S.] system," the official said. A CIC spokeswoman declined to comment on the current status of the dispute.

## **Impact – Disease 2AC**

### **Economic growth helps the fight against disease, but decline hinders it**

**Alexander 9** Brian Alexander, MSNBC.com contributor, 3/10/2009, “Recession may worsen spread of exotic diseases”, <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29599786/#.Vaa-vfkzjX0>

Budget cuts over a period of years have left public health at all levels of government underfunded by \$20 billion, according to a report published in the U.S. in October by the non-partisan Trust for America’s Health. The recession has only piled on the pain, with states and counties being especially hard hit. For example, Washington’s King County was forced to cut roughly \$19 million out of public health in its 2009 budget. Funding was surprisingly tiny even before the recession. “When I started at the CDC in the summer of 2001, I was told my branch budget was zero,” said Dr. James Maguire, former chief of the CDC’s parasitic diseases branch and now a Harvard professor. “It was always pretty sparse.” Currently, the budget for the branch is thought to be less than \$75,000, not including staff salaries. (The agency was unable to provide a definite amount.) The total for all emerging diseases was \$130.3 million for fiscal 2008. By comparison the CDC expects to spend about \$103.7 million on anti-tobacco promotions. The 2009 CDC budget for chronic disease prevention, which includes heart disease, diabetes and stroke, is more than \$932 million. A significant amount of the CDC funding for emerging diseases goes to salaries and state and local health departments, explained Dr. Ali Kahn, deputy director of the National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne and Enteric Diseases at the CDC, “There is no doubt we could do a lot more in the U.S. and worldwide with additional funds,” said Kahn. The recession has weakened the government’s ability to develop better treatments, vaccines or prevent an epidemic, experts said. “States do not have resources to keep people on board and these people are monitoring diseases, the epidemiologists doing shoe leather investigations,” said Jeffrey Levi, executive director of Trust for America’s Health. “You cannot turn them on and off with a switch. If you lose them you’ve lost them forever.”

### **Disease causes extinction—no burnout**

Karl-Heinz **Kerscher 14**, Professor, “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten

**The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence**, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, **multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens**. This is **because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection**, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. **This simple model predicts that if**

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virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

## Impact – Enviro 2AC

**Increased economic growth leads to environmental protection, empirics prove**

**Meadows 12 Et. Al.** [September/October 2012, Dennis Meadows (American scientist and Emeritus Professor of Systems Management, and former director of the Institute for Policy and Social Science Research at the University of New Hampshire), Obtained from ForeignAffairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-commons/2012-09-01/growth-good,RaMan>]

In 1970, U.S. President Richard Nixon signed the Clean Air Act into law, launching one of the most successful public health and environmental programs in history. In the first decade that followed, in Los Angeles, the amount of pollution from ozone -- the main component of smog -- exceeded government health standards on 200 days each year. By 2004, that number had dropped to 28 days. In the 1970s, also as a result of polluted air, nearly 90 percent of American children had lead in their blood at levels higher than what the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention deemed safe, and parents were alarmed by studies showing that lead interfered with cognitive development.

Today, only two percent of children have such high levels of lead in their bodies. By controlling hazardous emissions, the Clean Air Act delivered these and many other health benefits.

And it did so without curbing economic growth. The United States' GDP has risen by 207 percent since the law was passed over four decades ago. And because the law sparked innovation -- from catalytic converters, which convert toxic exhaust fumes from automobiles into less dangerous substances, to smokestack scrubbers -- pollution reductions have proved relatively inexpensive. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for every dollar the United States has spent on cutting pollution through the Clean Air Act, it has gained more than \$40 in benefits.

Yet in his recent article "Environmental Alarmism, Then and Now," July/August 2012, Bjorn Lomborg argues that the modern environmental movement has been distracted by unproductive goals and a desire to thwart economic growth. As evidence, he cites The Limits to Growth, a book published in 1972 by a group of scientists associated with the Club of Rome. The book cautioned that exponential increases in population, consumption, and pollution would exhaust the earth's finite natural resources and trigger the collapse of the world system. Lomborg rightly points out that the Club of Rome's worst forecasts never materialized, but he believes the book had a perverse effect on the way people think. "By recommending that the world limit development in order to head off a supposed future collapse," he writes, "The Limits to Growth led people to question the value of pursuing economic growth."

Lomborg assumes that those who acknowledge that the planet has finite resources must necessarily oppose economic progress.

This framing reveals the limitations of Lomborg's argument. The question the environmental movement asks is not, "How can we arrest growth?"

The question is, "What kind of growth do we want?" For decades, heads of state, economists, captains of industry, and environmental leaders have opted for the type of growth that allows economic output to rise, makes the air cleaner, and preserves the planet's resources at the same time.

The public call for environmental protection did not begin with the publication of a slender volume from the Club of Rome. It emerged from what people saw with their own eyes: raw sewage in the Great Lakes, smog so thick that it obscured the George Washington Bridge, oil despoiling Santa Barbara's pristine beaches, old-growth forests stripped bare in Oregon. It was Americans' desire to protect their families and their resources that ignited the modern environmental movement and inspired the passage of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe

Drinking Water Act, and other landmark legislation. Lomborg, however, claims that the Club of Rome's dire warnings distracted people from making real progress.

Spurred by analyses such as that presented in The Limits to Growth, much time and effort over the years has been diverted from useful activities to dubious or even pernicious ones." As an example, he says that instead of banning DDT, a known carcinogen, the United States should have focused on air pollution.

He claims that because air pollution does not enjoy "celebrity backers," it has been "ignored." The lives saved by the Clean Air Act prove him wrong. For 40 years, the environmental movement has sought to make the air safer to breathe, the water cleaner to drink, and the wilderness better protected. Only those who forget the sight of yellow-brown haze or burning rivers would call this a distraction. GETTING IT RIGHT

Today, a new set of images reveals the hazards not of economic growth per se but of the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. These are not predictions from a 40-year-old report but measurements of real

developments.

Right now, 90 percent of the world's large fish, such as tuna, swordfish, and marlin, have disappeared thanks to overfishing. This is alarming not just for the sake of the species themselves but also for industry and food supplies: the National Ocean Economics Program reports that between 1997 and 2007, California's commercial fishing revenues dropped by 43 percent because fish stocks were plummeting. Meanwhile, 90 percent of West Africa's rain forests have been destroyed, and between 2000 and 2005 alone, the world lost rain-forest acreage equal to the size of Germany. The amount of carbon dioxide in the air has increased by 23 percent over the last 50 years, driving climate change and intensifying such extreme weather events as the 2010 floods in Pakistan, which affected 20 million people, and

the 2011 floods in Thailand, which caused more than \$45 billion in damage.

Accounting for the world's natural capital is not



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alarmist; it is wise. Clean air, a stable climate, plentiful fish, lush forests, fresh water, and energy resources are the building blocks of prosperity. Identifying how to tap them without exhausting them will open the door to economic growth.

Consider, for instance, the automobile industry. The United States can continue to waste oil, a limited and expensive resource, by burning it in inefficient engines that use outdated technologies. Or it can build cars that travel farther on less gasoline. The Obama administration has opted to encourage the latter by raising the fuel-efficiency standard to 54.6 miles per gallon by 2025. Within 20 years, better-performing cars will reduce U.S. oil use by more than the amount that the country imported from Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 2010. They will also save drivers more than \$80 billion a year at the pump and, by 2025, halve the amount of carbon pollution emitted by vehicles in the United States. Even if the United States finally starts to clean up its automobile fleet, demand for cars is rising around the globe. Right now, there are about 800 million vehicles in use; by 2050, that number will rise to 2.5 billion. If the world is to meet this demand without sending oil prices through the roof, endangering public health with dirty tailpipes, and intensifying climate change, then it must start finding ways to make this growth greener. The same holds for rising energy needs. Two-thirds of the buildings that are projected to exist in India in 2030, for

instance, have not yet been built. David Goldstein, a scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, has argued that if India incorporates energy-saving features from the beginning of construction, it can reduce energy use by 50 percent at no additional cost. In other words, it makes more economic sense to start with efficient buildings than to retrofit them later. The production of efficient buildings and cleaner cars will generate billions of dollars for manufacturers and employ millions of people. That constitutes growth, but because it will use less energy and generate less pollution, it will be more sustainable growth.

Lomborg fails to account for these gains because he persists in thinking that environmental leaders oppose economic growth. He is mistaken. At the recent Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, nobody called for an end to growth. Instead, the 50,000 heads of state, mayors, business executives, and citizens who gathered there affirmed that, despite Lomborg's claims to the contrary, infinite growth in the consumption of finite resources is simply not possible. Those of us who are concerned for the environment want economic growth. After all, prosperity often leads to greater environmental protection.

We just want to do it right. FRANCES BEINECKE is President of the Natural Resources Defense Council. PATTERNS, NOT PREDICTIONS Dennis Meadows According to Bjørn Lomborg, The Limits to Growth, a short book written 40 years ago (and of which I am a co-author), is "mostly forgotten." Nevertheless, he believes that the book "helped set the terms of debate on crucial issues . . . with malign effects that remain embedded in public consciousness four decades later." Among those "malign effects" is the growing recognition that current economic policies can produce problems greater than their benefits. Lomborg rejects that perception, concluding, "It is past time to acknowledge that economic growth, for lack of a better word, is good, and that what the world needs is more of it, not less." The expansion of economic

output over the past 250 years has produced enormous gains in human welfare. But conditions have changed. Humanity must now become more nuanced in its policies. We noted this in The Limits to Growth, writing, "Any human activity that does not require a large flow of irreplaceable resources or produce severe environmental degradation might continue to grow indefinitely."

Lomborg quotes only the first edition of our book, long out of print. Thus, readers cannot easily form their own conclusions. In Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update, we used

more recent data but still reached the original conclusions. Lomborg's critique of our report boils down to the assertion that we predicted the exhaustion of resources before the year 2000. But we said repeatedly in The Limits to Growth that it is impossible to predict the future of social systems precisely. Instead, our goal was to understand long-term patterns of development for world population, capital, and other physical variables.

We showed 12 different scenarios of the future, seven portraying collapse and five showing possibilities for a sustainable future. We declared unambiguously that the scenarios were "not exact predictions of the values of the variables at any particular year in the future. They are indications of the system's behavioral tendencies only." We were interested in patterns, not predictions. Unlike Lomborg, most readers noted this point. As the physicist Graham Turner wrote in a 2008 paper for Australia's Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) comparing "The Limits to Growth's predictions with "thirty years of reality," the book "was not intended to be predictive or for making detailed forecasts, but to provide a means for better understanding the behaviour of the world economic system." Lomborg claims that The Limits to Growth "worried about running out of oil (in 1990) and natural gas (in 1992)." But as Matthew Simmons, who was an energy adviser to U.S. President George W. Bush and a member of the National Petroleum Council, wrote in a 2000 white paper on energy, "Nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000. Instead, the book's concern was entirely focused on what the world might look like 100 years later. There was not one sentence or even a single word written about an oil shortage, or limit to any specific resource, by the year 2000." Lomborg errs because his critique overwhelmingly draws on numbers he took from one data table in the first edition of The Limits to Growth. He presents those numbers as predictions generated by our computer

model, even though our citations indicated that this table presented 1970 data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Mines and other sources. We used the numbers solely to illustrate important differences between linear and exponential growth; they had no connection to our scenarios.

What is more, Lomborg ignores the fact that we eliminated this table completely from the second and third editions of our book with no effect whatsoever on our results. Lomborg makes many other important mistakes. His discussion of his Figure 2, on commodity prices, ignores the rise in the commodity price index since the year 2000, which may herald a permanent shift in the trend. His Figure 3, on natural resource levels, confuses resource reserves with their crustal abundance. The first can be increased by raising prices; the second cannot. His Figure 4 compares the effects of short-lived air pollution with our scenario values for long-lived toxics, a category from which we explicitly excluded air pollution. Ignoring climate change, Lomborg suggests that conventional policies can solve society's problems. Many scientific studies contradict that view, most recently a report from IAP, a global network of 105 scientific academies. In

June, IAP published a joint statement acknowledging that the global system is "on track to alternative futures with severe and potentially catastrophic implications for human well-being."

The Limits to Growth said this in 1972, and Turner's CSIRO report has reconfirmed our concern. After analyzing empirical information on the development of global society, Turner concluded, "The analysis shows that 30 years of historical data compares favorably with key features of [The Limits to Growth's] business-as-usual scenario called the 'standard run' scenario, which results in collapse of the global system midway through the 21st Century." To avert that result, we proposed deliberate measures for slowing physical expansion.

Lomborg, by contrast, argues that human ingenuity alone will allow the world to overcome its environmental challenges. The problem is that he ignores the role ingenuity often plays in blocking constructive change.

## **Impact – Enviro Ext.**

### **Growth is key to pushing “green sectors” to achieve environmental sustainability**

**Vázquez-Brust et al. 14** Dr. Diego Vázquez-Brust is a Senior Lecturer in Strategy / International Business at the Center for Research into Sustainability in the School of Management at the Royal Holloway University of London, October 20, 2014, “Managing the transition to critical green growth: The ‘Green Growth State’”, [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0016328714001669/1-s2.0-S0016328714001669-main.pdf?\\_tid=6306d0e0-2f24-11e5-85e8-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1437427083\\_d20eb4fd9abcc5952f8c6a5caabba31](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0016328714001669/1-s2.0-S0016328714001669-main.pdf?_tid=6306d0e0-2f24-11e5-85e8-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1437427083_d20eb4fd9abcc5952f8c6a5caabba31)

Although Green Economies have long included a consideration of environmental issues (Hamdouch & Depret, 2010) the main drivers for Green Growth are not only ecological but also economic, social and technical. Green Growth is proposed as a post-financial remedy to reinvigorate the ailing global economy, refocusing it towards being more socially inclusive through investment in markets for environmental goods and services, and the development of natural infrastructure, and capital, such as forests, water bodies and bio-diversity (Lane, 2010). In this respect, Green Growth breaks from the Kyoto process which signalled restraint in the growth agenda and instead emphasises business opportunities, enterprise and job creation (Martinelli & Midttun, 2012). For example, South Africa’s Working for Water Program, which has created 25,000 new jobs for the unemployed in the removal of invasive plant species that consume high levels of water, and the Kibera Community Youth Program in Nairobi, which involves unemployed youths in the assembly of small and affordable solar panels (UNEP, 2008). Green Growth is not meant to be an extension of the Ecological Modernisation discourse (Dryzek, 1997; Prasad & Elmes, 2005), whose technical-economic focus aims only at improving environmental efficiency to maximise profit while minimising environmental costs (Springett, 2003). Instead game-changing, Critical Green Growth must be fundamentally rooted in economic approaches allowing for the inherent complexity of human–environment relationships. Critical Green Growth is to be fuelled by policies and managerial techniques promoting synergies between–rather than just decoupling – environment and traditional business.<sup>3</sup> To achieve this aspirational vision is not enough having a expanding green sector, but also pro-actively phasing out traditional “brown economy” and changing consumption patterns and lifestyle. Green Growth is a combination of growth in “green, smart sectors” and degrowth in “brown, inefficient sectors” (Csaba, 2010). The idea of creative destruction in which new forms and ideas drive out the old is central to this process (Fankhauser et al., 2013). Reflecting how accumulation of growth translates into Green Growth principles, suggest that Critical Green Growth discourse should shift concentration away from the quantity of growth, towards a quality of growth amalgamated from consumption of physical and non-physical outputs (i.e. services and experiences), and from the production of environmentally harmful goods and services to those that are environmentally enhancing (Swart, Raskin, & Robinson, 2004). Moreover, ‘environmental industries’ are to include

technological sectors which combine low-input, low entropy and low waste characteristics. Green Growth accepts the assumption that a fundamental transition away from Green House Gas (GHG) intensive energy sources is a matter of urgency. Policy makers must move beyond consideration of the physical availability of carbon based fuel sources. Instead, the true concern must be the decline in “the capacity of air, water, soil, and biota to absorb, with intolerable consequences for human wellbeing, the effects of energy extraction, transportation and use” in addition to the political stability to maintain the current status quo (Holdren, 2002). Consolidation of Growth systems should relate to interventions aimed to make sure that although Green Growth adds value(s) to the economy, it does so in order to identify virtuous cycles, consolidating networks necessary for a circular economy, coordinating global learning curves for green technology and a market for resources with emphasis on recirculation rather than wasteful linear throughput (Mathews, 2011), while seriously considering the need to invest in measures that prevent a major spike in energy prices, and thus significantly endanger national, regional and global economic activity. Allocation of Growth must be carefully monitored by governments. Critical Green Growth discourse also expects economies to be socially innovative in providing the basis for socially just and inclusive growth. Thus, there must be behavioural transitions to slow anthropogenic causes of climate change and trigger both high-skill intensive employment R&D in clean energy technologies – and low-skill intensive employment – for instance in forest planting, and organic agriculture. Inclusive growth is not only a long-term objective. It is also argued that green public and private spending is a better and more inclusive than “brown” spending, when seeking to reactivate economies in a recession.<sup>4</sup> Many environmental measures related to construction and resource management activities, such as making buildings more energy-efficient, are not only labour intensive but also location-specific and not practical candidates for off-shoring (Jacobs, 2013). As the discussions in the next section highlight, social justice considerations must be maintained at both the national and transnational scale as fundamental part of the Critical Green Growth approach. However, despite the identification of an aspirational discourse of Green Growth, the underlying question becomes how to manage the process to ensure that ‘creative destruction’ results in Green Growth? The metaphor is a garden where valuable plants must be nurtured but weeds extirped. But, who is the gardener in this metaphor?

### **Kuznets Curve proves that the environment started to get better with economic growth**

**Crampton 15** [Dr. Eric Crampton (Dr Eric Crampton joined The New Zealand Initiative as Head of Research in August, 2014. He served as Lecturer and Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Department of Economics & Finance), “The Case of Economic Growth”, Obtained from the New Zealand Initiative, online, <http://nzinitiative.org.nz/site/nzinitiative/files/Economic%20Growth%20Web.pdf>, RaMan]

This first-worse-then-better U-shaped relationship between economic growth and environmental quality is called the Environmental Kuznets Curve. The curve was first described in 1991 by economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, who wanted to test whether free trade between Mexico and the

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United States was likely to worsen or improve environmental quality in Mexico.<sup>46</sup> Trade opponents argued that American industrialists would set up factories in Mexico to take advantage of less restrictive environmental regulations, exporting pollution. Grossman and Krueger argued instead that free trade would increase incomes in Mexico and consequently reduce pollution. Grossman and Krueger found that when per capita GDP reached US\$4,000– \$5,000 in 1985 dollars, or about US\$10,000 today, sulphur dioxide and smoke levels started improving with economic growth rather than worsening. Mexican per capita GDP rose in real terms from about US\$4,000 in 1992 to about US\$10,000 in 2013. In 2010, a Washington Post headline announced: ‘Mexico City Drastically Reduced Air Pollutants Since 1990s’.<sup>47</sup> If anything, Grossman and Krueger were too pessimistic about how long it would take for outcomes to improve. For pollutants with strong local effects, like nitrogen oxide, sulphur dioxide, and particulate matter like fine soot, the relationship holds well. For pollutants whose effects are less noticeable in the area generating the pollution, the effect is weaker.<sup>48</sup> Environmental economist Susmita Dasgupta and co-authors reviewed the overall performance of the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature and, with some reservations, ultimately sided with the optimists.<sup>49</sup> Dasgupta, et al. argued that the most plausible long-run forecast is for improved environmental quality in both high- and low-income economies. Economic liberalisation, improved information, better technology, and more stringent and cost-effective approaches to regulating pollution in developing countries have begun to ‘flatten’ the Environmental Kuznets Curve.

## **Impact – Poverty 2AC**

**Economic growth is not only sustainable for the economy but also drastically helps the poor.**

**Ridley 14** [April 25, 2014, Matt Ridley, "The World's Resources Aren't Running Out," WSJ, <http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156>, online, RaMan]

But apart from improvements in longevity, happiness, health, education, safety and environmental quality, what has economic growth done for the poor? Chapter Two showed that absolute poverty is declining around the world. The fraction of the world's population living on less than \$1 or \$2 per day dropped rapidly over the twentieth century. The benefits of growth in New Zealand also have been widely shared. Figure 5, below, charts average income per adult in New Zealand as well as average incomes excluding the top 10% of earners. Average real incomes rose from about \$23,000 in 1953 to over \$41,000 in 2011. Average earnings for the bottom 90% rose from \$16,500 to \$31,800, almost doubling, in real terms, from 1953 to 2011. Economic growth from 1953 to 2011 reduced inequality between the bottom 90% and the top 10%. Growth in incomes has been strongest, relatively speaking, for those outside of the top 10%. Figure 5 shows income growth relative to a 1953 baseline. The data series starts in 1953 because, before that, a different measure of household earnings was used making the earlier data not comparable to the later figures. The table sets 1953's income equal to 100 for all three groups, then traces the growth since then. While the earnings of the top 1% grew rapidly from 1988 to 1999, over the longer period, the top 1% have not fared nearly as well. Incomes for the bottom 90% almost doubled from 1988 to 1999. The top 1% and 10% are up by half as much: incomes of both groups are 50% higher than in 1953. Unfortunately, the World Top Incomes Database used in the charts above does not provide more details about income growth for those outside the top 10%. For that, we need to turn to the Ministry of Social Development's recent report on trends in inequality and hardship from 1982 to 2013.<sup>59</sup> THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 33 Figure 6 plots income growth since 1982 for households in the second, fourth, sixth and eighth deciles. Twenty percent of households earn as much or less than the figure reported for the second decile; 40% earn as much as or less than the fourth decile, and so on. Figure 6: Household Income Growth Since 1982  
Income 1 40 130 1 20 1 10 1 00 90 80 70 60 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  
DECILE 2 DECILE 4 DECILE 6 DECILE 8  
YEARS Source: Author's calculations from appendices to Perry, 2014.<sup>60</sup> In all cases, incomes declined in real terms from 1982 to 1994, followed by strong growth. Households in the eighth-decile earned 30% more in 2013 than eighth-decile households in 1982. Households in the second decile earned 20% more in 2013 than second-decile households in 1982. And the figures above show that earners in the bottom 90% experienced strong income growth from 1953 to 1971, with stagnation from the early 1970s until the late 1980s or early 1990s, depending on the income group. An alternative approach is to compare earnings for the bottom and top 40% of households. Figure 7 compares income growth at the midpoint of the second and third deciles – a measure of

the median earnings of the bottom 40% – with income growth at the midpoint of the seventh and eighth deciles – a measure of the median earnings of the top 40%. While incomes grew more strongly for those in the top 40% than for those in the bottom 40% since the early 1980s, both groups have shared in the strong growth since 1994. Bryan Perry's report for the Ministry of Social Development concludes: There is no evidence of any sustained rise or fall in inequality in the last two decades. The level of household disposable income inequality in New Zealand is a little above the OECD median. The share of total income received by the top 1% of individuals is at the low end of the OECD rankings.<sup>62</sup> Bad economic policy in the 1970s, combined with worsening trade conditions, made the 1970s a lost decade; recovering from the Muldoon era took the bulk of the 1980s. The economic reforms of the 1980s were necessary, but they were hard – especially for poorer groups. Businesses had to learn how to operate in a new open and competitive environment; too many lower skilled workers had too few options when production lines rationalised. The period from 1982 to the early 1990s was terrible for workers in the bottom 40%. But by 2009, rapid income growth in the bottom 40% made up much of the difference. It is then not surprising that child poverty rates, as measured as the proportion of children in low-income households, measured after THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 35 housing costs, rose from about 15% in the 1980s to peak near 35% in the mid- 1990s, before dropping to just over 20% by 2013.<sup>63</sup> As poverty rates in this kind of measure are based on a household's income relative to the median, gains in median income will increase measured child poverty unless there is a parallel increase in household incomes for poorer households. The rise in housing costs over the 1990s and 2000s, largely due to tighter council restrictions on the supply of new housing, has also hurt poorer families. Households on less than half the median income have a much harder time making ends meet, after housing costs, than when councils encouraged more building. The Ministry of Social Development report cited above notes that after-housing-cost incomes for low-income households are no better than they were in the 1980s. The benefits of economic growth ring a bit hollow when all income gains are eaten up in higher rents. Addressing restrictive land use policies that prevent both building up and building out will consequently be an important part of improving real after-housing-cost incomes for those at the bottom.<sup>64</sup>

### **Poverty outweighs nuke war**

**Abu-Jamal 1998** (Mumia, Peace Activist, "A Quiet and Deadly Violence," FLASHPOINTS, September 19, 1998, available online at <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>, accessed 6/30/07)

This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: **[E]very fifteen**

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years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing.. This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor.

## Impact – Poverty Ext.

### **Economic growth solves poverty – empirics**

**Agrawal 15** Pradeep Agrawal is the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Chair Professor of Economics and Head of the RBI Endowment Unit at the Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi, where he has been the Officiating Director. He has also been the Director of the Research Center and Associate Dean of Research at the Kazakhstan Institute of Economics, Management and Strategic Research, Kazakhstan Professor Agrawal took his MS and PhD degrees in economics from Stanford University, “Economic Growth: The Key to Poverty Reduction in India”, Mar 26, 2015, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=pIlsCQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA17&dq=%22economic+growth%22+%22reduces%22+%22poverty%22+%22income+inequality%22&ots=8aCT-ERaRp&sig=LdOSJMASCKnspag16neriX5HT8#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Many economic studies have emphasized the role of higher economic growth to tackle the problem of poverty. This has been supported empirically by the work of Tendulkar (1998), Ravallion and Dart (1996) and Besley and Robins (2000). Using data from nearly 80 countries, Kray (2006) shows that in the medium-to-long-run, between 66 per cent and 90 per cent of the variation in changes in poverty can be accounted for by growth in average incomes, and all of the remainder is due to changes in relative incomes. The role of economic growth in poverty reduction has also been supported by Deaton and Dreze (2001), Bhagwati (2001) and Dart and Ravallion (2002). Sen (1996) has strongly emphasized the need for higher government expenditure on social assistance to the poor, especially in provision of education, as the most important determinants of poverty reduction. However, since government social expenditure that helps the poor is dependent on government revenue, which in turn grows with economic growth, the key role of economic growth is likely. in this chapter, we examine these issues empirically for India and show that economic growth indeed plays a key role in poverty reduction. Rates tend to be associated with more rapid reduction in poverty. We show with the help of national-level data that this result holds for India. Growth is considered pro-poor if the income share of the poor rises with growth (their incomes grow faster than that of the non-poor). We found evidence that inequality has declined slightly over the recent high growth period in India, and that it has also been accompanied by reduction in the poverty gap and severity. This evidence provides support for the view that the recent high growth period in India has been pro-poor. We consider how growth might reduce poverty. We show that higher growth was associated with higher employment creation and higher real wages. We also examine whether government revenue and expenditure improved with growth in India, which helped reduce poverty. We show that real government revenue and expenditure per capita increased with growth and, in turn, these translated into a corresponding improvement in expenditure on the social sectors (education, health and welfare expenditures). These contributed to poverty



reduction and making growth pro-poor during the recent high growth period. Given the importance of growth, India needs to follow policies helpful in sustaining high rates of growth. These include the creation of a stable macroeconomic environment, good infrastructure, well functioning education and health services for the poor, well functioning and inclusive financial system and good governance. We also need to pay special attention to the education sector and developing our human resources. Failure to sustain high growth will prove quite disastrous in terms of poverty reduction and development. But if we are able to sustain high growth, it will give India an excellent chance to reduce poverty significantly and meet various development goals, especially if the government takes steps to increase support for infrastructure development, education and health services, etc.

### **Policy Reforms that emphasize growth are critical to reducing income inequality and poverty**

**Hoeller et al. 14** PETER HOELLER is the Head of Division of the Public Economics Division at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ISABELLE JOUMARD is a Senior Economist Country Studies - India/Slovenia Desk OECD Economics Department, ISABELL KOSKE is an Advisor, Office of the Secretary-General, OECD, February 18, 2014, "REDUCING INCOME INEQUALITY WHILE BOOSTING ECONOMIC GROWTH: CAN IT BE DONE? EVIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES", <http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0217590814500015>

Growth-enhancing policy reforms that are likely to reduce income inequality (1) Improving the quality and reach of education Reforms to increase human capital are important for improving living standards, and are also likely to reduce labor income inequality. New analysis shows that a rise in the share of workers with upper secondary education is associated with a decline in labor earnings inequality (Fournier and Koske, 2012). Examples of policy initiatives to raise upper secondary education attainment include inter alia enhanced accountability for schools, better teacher recruitment and training and special support for pupils at risk of dropping out. Encouraging more students to pursue tertiary studies may have a more ambiguous effect on earnings inequality. Such reforms tend to widen income dispersion by increasing the share of high-wage earners (the composition effect). On the other hand, new research suggests that this effect may be more than offset by a decline in the returns to tertiary education relative to the returns to lower levels of education (Koske et al., 2012). Tuition fees that make students share at least part of the cost of tertiary education could lower disposable income inequality (as the current financing of education is regressive), provided overall quality and allocation of human capital and, ultimately, productivity. At the same time, a more equitable distribution of educational opportunities has been shown to result in a more equitable distribution of labor income (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002). Examples of reforms include postponing early tracking, strengthening links between school and home to help disadvantaged children learn and providing early childhood care and basic schooling for all. The latter may yield large positive returns over an individual's entire lifetime, particularly for the most disadvantaged (Chetty et al., 2011; OECD, 2006). (3)

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Reducing the gap between employment protection on temporary and permanent work If employment protection<sup>11</sup> is much stricter for regular than for temporary contracts, workers at the margin of the labor market — such as young people — risk getting trapped in a situation where they move between temporary work and unemployment without getting into permanent work. This can have adverse implications for human capital and career progression (OECD, 2004) and, ultimately, income equality and economic growth. New OECD analysis finds that low-income workers on temporary contracts earn less than workers with similar characteristics on permanent contracts (Fournier and Koske, 2012). This is not the case for higher-income workers. Tentative evidence on the size of the effect illustrated in Table 1 suggests, for example, that reducing protection for permanent work from the level observed in Germany (third-highest level) to that observed in Finland (which is about OECD average) while increasing protection for temporary work from the level observed in the United Kingdom (second-lowest level) to that observed in Finland (which is about OECD average) would reduce the 90/1 percentile ratio by about 0.24 (which is about 7% of the average 90/10 percentile ratio in OECD countries). More even job protection for temporary and permanent contracts is also likely to reduce the income gap between immigrants and non-immigrants, as previous studies have shown that immigrants suffer disproportionately from contract-related labor market dualism (Causa and Jean, 2007). (4) Increasing spending on active labor market policies High social benefits can reduce the incentives for work and employment. Active labor market policies may limit these adverse effects by better matching jobs with skills and enhancing job search support and monitoring. Existing empirical evidence suggests indeed that active labor market policies raise employment (Bassanini and Duval, 2006). This should entail positive effects for both GDP per capita and labor income equality. Programme design is key to reaping such gains, however (Martin and Grubb, 2001). (5) Promoting the integration of immigrants Better integration of immigrants in the labor market can both reduce inequality and raise GDP per capita through higher labor force participation. Targeted policies, such as language courses, and transparent systems of recognizing foreign qualifications should help to close the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants' labor market performance. <sup>11</sup>Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g., rules favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, training requirements) and firing (e.g., redundancy procedures, mandatory notification periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes). The Singapore Economic Review 1450001-16 Singapore Econ. Rev. 2014.59. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com by 35.0.56.250 on 07/15/15. For personal use only. (6) Improving labor market outcomes of women Women tend to take on more caring responsibilities than men, meaning they work fewer hours and thus take home less pay. Arguably, their higher labor supply elasticity should lead women to be taxed at a lower rate than men. Since this is not feasible in practice, policies to improve the availability of formal care for children and the elderly can serve as an alternative solution. Such policies should help to

reduce gender differences in working hours and — at least to the extent that hourly wages are little affected — pay, and at the same time improve long-run living standards through higher participation rates. (7) Fighting discrimination Since at least part of the earnings gap between immigrants and non-immigrants and between men and women is likely to be due to discrimination (Koske et al., 2012), more effective legal rules (e.g., legal action against those who engage in discriminatory practices) could also help. (8) Taxing in a way that allows equitable growth Taxes do not only affect the distribution of income; they also affect GDP per capita by influencing labor use and productivity, or both (Johansson et al., 2008). Some tax reforms appear to be win-win options—improving growth prospects while narrowing the distribution of income. Many, however, may imply trade-offs between these objectives. Following the same approach as for labor market, product market and education policies discussed above (Table 2), these complementarities and trade-offs are drawn out in Table 3. The findings in Table 3 and in the literature suggest some policy options that could promote growth and reduce inequality: (i) Re-assess tax expenditures that benefit mainly high-income groups (e.g., tax relief on mortgage interest). Cutting back such tax expenditures is likely to be beneficial both for long-term GDP per capita, allowing a reduction in marginal tax rates, and for a more equitable distribution of income. Lowering tax expenditures would also reduce the complexity of the tax system, and thus tax compliance and collection costs. (ii) Reduce distortions in taxing capital income. Tax relief — such as reduced taxation for capital gains from the sale of a principal or secondary residence — often distorts resource allocation without boosting aggregate savings and growth, and benefits mainly high-income groups. Specific tax relief may also provide tax avoidance instruments for top-income earners. In particular, there is little justification for tax breaks for stock options and carried interest. Raising such taxes would increase equity and allow a growth-enhancing cut in marginal labor income tax rates.

## **Impact – Russia War 2AC**

### **Economic growth promotes Russia's economic integration globally**

**Mankoff 14** Jeffrey Mankoff, a specialist in Eurasian/Russian affairs, is adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and associate director of International Security Studies at Yale University, May 14, 2014, "The Russian Economic Crisis", <https://books.google.com/books?id=bDfQdcC3L80C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>

As Russia struggles to get its economy back on track, its capacity for foreign adventures will likely remain limited. Yet Medvedev's focus on improving Russia's competitiveness provides an opportunity for pragmatic, economically focused engagement by the West. The United States and its allies have an opportunity to focus on concrete steps that buttress Russia's recovery and adherence to international economic norms. Although it has long been in the West's interest to build a pragmatic relationship with Moscow based on a limited set of mutual interests, the reality of the financial crisis has made that reconfiguration at once more feasible for the West and more urgent for Russia. It may take time for Western engagement to have an appreciable impact at the economic level, but Russia's present struggles mean that the West has a finite window of opportunity to take concrete political steps to show Moscow that if it plays by the rules, it will be accepted and respected as a player in the global economy. It is therefore imperative that the West and Russia make real progress on Moscow's economic integration now, before the crisis in Russia ebbs—and, with it, the opportunity to make the case that global integration is the surest way for Russia to achieve its goal of being a powerful and respected international actor.

### **Russia nuclear war causes extinction**

**Bostrom 2** (Nick Bostrom 2, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, [www.nickbostrom.com](http://www.nickbostrom.com))

**A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal.** There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time **that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.** [4] **Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately.** There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. **Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange.**

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**between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk**, since  
**it would not destroy or thwart humankind's potential permanently.**

## **Impact – Terror 2AC**

### **Economic growth makes terrorism less likely**

**Maximino 15** Martin Maximino, Master in Public Policy Harvard Kennedy School, June 3, 2015, “The relationship between terrorism and economic growth: New research”

<http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/conflicts/relationship-between-economic-growth-terrorism-new-research#sthash.IR5pQlyr.dpuf>

This study provides new and interesting insights for two reasons. First, the author introduces a distinction between agricultural and industrial economic growth, as opposed to a single economic output indicator. Choi notes that “only some forms of economic growth are associated with terrorist activity, and even then, they only correlate with particular forms of terrorist attacks.” Second, the study measures the impact of economic growth on three expressions of terrorism, as opposed to a single, homogeneous indicator of terrorist violence. Importantly, previous studies focus on one modality of terrorism, “under the implicit assumption that terrorist groups will use the same conventional attack tactics despite the continuously enhanced security environment.” The author distinguishes between international terrorism — involving at least two different nationals — domestic terrorism — wherein the victims and perpetrators are from the venue country — and suicide attacks, when a terrorist purposefully dies in the process of carrying out his or her mission. The study’s findings include: Higher industrial economic growth is associated with lower levels of international and domestic terrorist violence: “It appears that if industrial growth increases by 1%, the percent change in the incidence rate of domestic terrorism is a 1% decrease while holding the other variables constant; for the incidence rate of international terrorism, there is a 1% decrease.” Growth in the agricultural sector, by contrast, does not rise to statistical significance and may have “no bearing on terrorist behavior.” Conversely, a higher level of industrial economic growth is associated with higher levels of suicide attacks. Specifically, “If a country were to increase its industrial growth by 1%, its relative change in the expected number of suicide terrorism would be expected to increase by 2%, while holding all other variables in the model constant.” Among the control variables, Income Inequality, Democracy, and Post-Cold War were not statistically related across the two models designed. On the other hand, “the coefficients of State Failure and Population achieve significance with a positive sign regardless of the type of terrorism.” Although the assumption has been that fast and steady growth would provide more opportunities for potential terrorists and their would-be sympathizers to participate in the economy, and thereby reduce terrorist activity, the study’s data do not support that notion: “The findings are not all optimistic because a well-functioning market economy based on quick-paced but steady economic growth is not necessarily a cure-all solution for growing terrorist threats.” Further, the study’s analysis does not support the idea that social cleavages — specifically, an expanding gap between the rich and the poor and the resulting grievances of economic losers — necessarily increases terrorist activity. The data does, however, support the theory of “hard targets,” which predicts that

“as states become richer and better able to defend targets, suicide attacks are used more often.” The study has a number of policy implications, the author notes: “Overall, the results of this study demonstrate that economic growth is not a cure-all solution for terrorism because in some instances it may breed more terrorism. Nevertheless, healthy economic conditions are certainly beneficial to the war on terrorism because the majority of suicide attacks occur in only a few countries.”

### **WMD terror is likely and causes extinction**

Nathan **Myhrvold '13**, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades

## Impact – War 2AC

### **An unstable economy causes war—empirics prove**

**Mead 09** [February 4, 2009, Walter Russell Mead (James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University), “Only Makes You Stronger: Why the Recession Bolstered America”, online, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2169866/posts>, February 4, RaMan]

But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. the wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.



## Impact – War Ext.

### **Growth promotes peace**

**Qian 14** Joseph Cheng Qian, Master of Arts in Global Security Studies, John Hopkins University, “THE EFFECT OF TRADE, RESOURCES, AND MIGRATION ON CONFLICT”,  
<https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37270/QIAN-THESIS-2014.pdf?sequence=1>

Through economic interdependence, countries have drastically increased opportunities for interactions among societies that are often correlated with peaceful coexistence. Keohane and Nye observe that improvements in relations increase the cost of using military force, "there is no guarantee that military means will be more effective than economic ones to achieve a given purpose."<sup>13</sup> These ideas stretch back to the early 20th century with scholars such as Norman Angell declaring that economic interdependence rendered wars irrational and looked forward to the day when they would become obsolete. <sup>14</sup> Trade and Conflict Trade has always been referred to as the interdependent nature of open markets and the idea of comparative advantage. Trade is positively correlated with economic gains as actors often find that interdependence fosters economic cooperation through migration, tourism, and the promotion of exchanges creating a mutually beneficial economic relationship.<sup>15</sup> Scholars who have identified a strong correlation between trade and conflict such as Edward Mansfield note that the majority of existing literature emphasizes that trade, especially in the form of agreements enhances market access for goods, services, and investments. In addition to liberalizing and increasing the flow of overseas commerce, these institutions are designed to stabilize and reduce volatility in policy and flow of goods and services by constraining states from introducing new trade barriers and fostering policy transparency and convergence in expectations, standards, and stability.<sup>16</sup> Mansfield continues to argue that trade institutions reduce the variability of trade flows in three complementary ways. First, institutions help enforce existing market access commitments and deter the erection of new protectionist barriers that could otherwise precipitate fluctuations in trade. Second, trade institutions foster transparency and policy convergence among member-states. Third, such institutions change certain characteristics of markets, precipitating responses by private traders that reduce the volatility of crossborder transactions.<sup>17</sup> J.D. Morrow brings up the conflict dimension by highlighting that trade flows could reduce the risk of escalation by increasing the range of costly signals of resolve in a crisis.<sup>18</sup> Hegre et al. bring in themes of governance and fear of consequences in their study. They find that commerce promotes peace because violence has substantial costs. Economically important trade reduces conflict because interstate violence adversely affects commerce. If conflict did not impede trade, economic agents would be indifferent to risk and the maximization of profit. Because conflict is costly, trade should reduce interstate violence. Otherwise, national leaders would be insensitive to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors. The economic cost of conflict should reduce the likelihood of military conflict,

ceteris paribus, if national leaders are rational.<sup>19</sup>

### **Economic growth is empirically shown to decrease conflict**

**Kim and Conceição 10** Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição, Kim works with the United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Conceição with the United Nations Development Programme, Spring/Summer 2010, "THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT" [https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15\\_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf](https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf)

While there are a number of factors that could cause conflict, empirical studies find that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict. Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a). Growth rates are also strongly associated with risks of conflict in developing countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1 percentage point from the mean, the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 percent (Collier et al., 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conflict recurrence, was on average 0.5 percent compared to 2 percent in the countries that remained peaceful. Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a new conflict. Collier et al. (2009) finds that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study's sample mean was 4.6 percent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk would be increased to 5.3 percent. Growth rates are also strongly associated with risks of conflict in developing countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1 percentage point from the mean, the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 percent (Collier et al., 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conflict recurrence, was on average 0.5 percent compared to 2 percent in countries that remained peaceful. Empirical analysis of growth and conflict has inherent data limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology shows a strong causal link running from poor economic performance to conflict. One problem is that the direction of impact between the income per capita and conflict can run both ways. Assuming a priori oneway causality – that is, ignoring endogeneity – in regression analysis can result in biased estimates. Other information used in the empirical studies, such as income inequality, population, ethnic distribution, are also subject to difficulties of econometric identification and data quality (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Sambanis, 2004). To address the endogeneity problem, some studies adopt instrumental variable analysis, using a strictly exogenous variable that moves with income per capita, but not with conflict. For instance, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) use annual changes in rainfall data as an instrument for income growth. They find that the rainfall data predicts growth fluctuation in agricultural economies in Africa, and that income shocks are drivers of conflict. Besley and Persson (2008) and Bazzi and Blattman (2008) use international commodity price

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Human Development and trade shocks as the exogenous variables, but they find that the evidence on the relationship between economic shocks as drivers of conflict is mixed. Not only the economic performance variables (level of income or growth rate), but other components of human development, such as education attainment, may also affect the risk of conflict. Stylized facts suggest that education outcomes are closely linked with the outbreak of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find strong evidence that higher levels of secondary school attainment are associated with a lower risk of civil war. If the enrollment rate is 10 percentage points higher than the average in their sample, the risk of war is reduced by about three percentage points (a decline in the risk from 11.5 percent to 8.6 percent). This draws on data that refers to the period between 1960 and 1999 for developing countries. Very few countries with low human development could achieve high levels of political stability. We use the Human Development Index (HDI) to measure the human development (UNDP, 2008b), and the Political Stability and Absence of Violence reported in Kaufmann et al. (2009, p.6) to capture perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Figure 3 plots the political stability indicator and HDI for 178 countries. High values of the political stability indicator imply that the country suffers less violence, and the high HDI represents high levels of human development. The figure suggests that high HDI (say, above 0.5) does not guarantee high political stability. However, low HDI (below 0.5) is clearly associated with political instability (below zero).

### **Economic Interdependence and integration foster international peace**

**Allen 14** David Allen, graduated from Duke in 2014, Spring 2014, "Angell's Missing Link: Why Peaceful Interdependence May Require Economic Voting", Duke Political Science Standard, [http://polisci.duke.edu/uploads/media\\_items/dpss14.original.pdf#page=39](http://polisci.duke.edu/uploads/media_items/dpss14.original.pdf#page=39)

This study has attempted to explore differences across time in the degree to which state leaders associate economic performance with electoral outcomes. In examining this relationship, I have sought to revitalize liberal theory on the peace-promoting nature of interdependence, by pro-posing a new causal mechanism to explain why Angell's propositions may have failed then but remain fundamentally relevant today. Indeed, it is possible that state leaders a century ago were more inclined to engage in conflict with trading partners, not expecting harmful economic out-comes to significantly undermine their political longevity. However, following World War I, state governments became increasingly involved in the domestic economy to bring stability and protection from unchecked market forces. In this new postwar economic order, economic outcomes were increasingly influenced by government policy. Social security and economic stability, more so than foreign objectives, became the new priority of governments. It is possible then that individuals began to view economic success as part of government's

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mandate. If this were the case, then we would expect individuals to incorporate economic performance into their rational decision-making process as voters, using economic data to evaluate political officeholders. State leaders, in turn, would feel greater pressure to deliver positive economic conditions. Since standing trade relationships are a necessary pillar of economic growth, it stands to reason that leaders would subsequently avoid foreign conflicts that could threaten those relationships. This represents a possible causal mechanism for peace through interdependence. When that pressure to produce positive economic outcomes is absent, however, the prospects for peace-promoting interdependence rapidly diminish. The goal of this essay has been to measure the changing extent to which leaders have felt this compulsion over time. If leaders today perceive a significant relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes, whereas leaders in Angell's time didn't, then we may have contributed to understanding the failure of his theories one-hundred years ago, while preserving the validity of his rationale for the present-day. I tested for the relationship by using a bivariate regression model to compare changes in real personal income to changes in seat gains and losses in the U.S. House of Representatives I conducted this regression across separate time intervals in order to compare the strength of the relationship over time.

### **Economic decline inevitably leads to war**

**Roberts 15** [May 7, 2015, Paul Craig Roberts (American economist previously worked in the Reagan Administration), "War Threat Rises As Economy Declines", <http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2015/05/11/war-threat-rises-economy-declines-paul-craig-roberts/>, RaMan]

The defining events of our time are the collapse of the Soviet Union, 9/11, jobs offshoring, and financial deregulation. In these events we find the basis of our foreign policy problems and our economic problems. The United States has always had a good opinion of itself,

but with the Soviet collapse self-satisfaction reached new heights. We became the exceptional people, the indispensable people, the country chosen by history to exercise hegemony over the world. This neoconservative doctrine releases the US government from constraints of international law and allows Washington to use coercion against sovereign states in order to remake the world in its own image. To protect Washington's

unique Uni-power status that resulted from the Soviet collapse, Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 penned what is known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine. This doctrine is the basis for Washington's foreign policy. The doctrine states: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." In March of this year the Council on Foreign Relations extended this doctrine to China. Washington is now committed to blocking the rise of two large nuclear-armed countries. This commitment is the reason for the crisis that Washington has created in Ukraine and for its use as anti-Russian propaganda. China is now confronted with the Pivot to Asia and the construction of new US naval and air bases to ensure Washington's control of the South China Sea, now defined as an area of American

National Interests. 9/11 served to launch the neoconservatives' war for hegemony in the Middle East. 9/11 also served to launch the domestic police state. While civil liberties have shriveled at home, the US has been at war for almost the entirety of the 21st century, wars that have cost us, according to Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, at least \$6 trillion dollars. These wars have gone very badly. They have destabilized

governments in an important energy producing area. And the wars have vastly multiplied the "terrorists," the quelling of which was the official reason for the wars.

Just as the Soviet collapse unleashed US hegemony, it gave rise to jobs offshoring. The Soviet collapse convinced China and India to open their massive underutilized labor markets to US capital. US corporations, with any reluctant ones pushed by large retailers and Wall Street's threat of financing takeovers, moved manufacturing, industrial, and tradable professional service jobs, such as software engineering, abroad. This decimated the American middle class and removed ladders of upward

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mobility. US GDP and tax base moved with the jobs to China and India. US real median family incomes ceased to grow and declined. Without income growth to drive the economy, Alan Greenspan resorted to an expansion of consumer debt, which has run its course. Currently there is nothing to drive the economy. When the goods and services produced by offshored jobs are brought to the US to be sold, they enter as imports, thus worsening the trade

balance. Foreigners use their trade surpluses to acquire US bonds, equities, companies, and real estate. Consequently, interests, dividends, capital gains, and rents are redirected from Americans to foreigners. This worsens the current account deficit. In order to protect the dollar's exchange value in the face of large current account deficits and money creation in support of the balance sheets of "banks too big to fail," Washington has the Japanese and European central banks printing money hand over fist. The printing of yen and euros offsets the printing of dollars and thus protects the dollar's exchange value. The Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial and investment banking had been somewhat eroded prior to the total repeal during the second term of the Clinton regime. This repeal, together with the failure to regulate over the counter derivatives, the removal of position limits on speculators, and the enormous financial concentration that resulted from the dead letter status of anti-trust laws, produced not free market utopia but a serious and ongoing financial crisis. The liquidity issued in behalf of this crisis has resulted in stock and bond market bubbles. Implications, consequences, solutions: When Russia blocked the Obama regime's planned invasion of Syria and intended bombing of Iran, the neoconservatives realized that while they had been preoccupied with their wars in the Middle East and Africa for a decade, Putin had restored the Russian economy and military. The first objective of the Wolfowitz doctrine—to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival—had been breached. Here was Russia telling the US "No." The British Parliament joined in by vetoing UK participation in a US invasion of Syria. The Uni-Power status was shaken. This redirected the attention of the neoconservatives from the Middle East to Russia. Over the previous decade Washington had invested \$5 billion in financing up-and-coming politicians in Ukraine and non-governmental organizations that could be sent into the streets in protests. When the president of Ukraine did a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed association of Ukraine with the EU, he saw that it didn't pay and rejected it. At that point Washington called the NGOs into the streets. The neo-nazis added the violence and the government unprepared for violence collapsed. Victoria Nuland and Geoffrey Pyatt chose the new Ukrainian government and established a vassal regime in Ukraine. Washington hoped to use the coup to evict Russia from its Black Sea naval

base, Russia's only warm water port. However, Crimea, for centuries a part of Russia, elected to return to Russia. Washington was frustrated, but recovered from disappointment and described Crimean self-determination as Russian invasion and annexation. Washington used this propaganda to break up Europe's economic and political relationships with Russia by pressuring Europe into sanctions against Russia. The sanctions have had adverse impacts

on Europe. Additionally, Europeans are concerned with Washington's growing belligerence. Europe has nothing to gain from conflict with Russia and fears being pushed into war. There are indications that some European governments are considering a foreign policy independent of Washington's. The virulent anti-Russian propaganda and demonization of Putin has destroyed Russian confidence in the West. With the NATO commander Breedlove demanding more money, more troops, more bases on Russia's borders, the situation is dangerous. In a direct military challenge to Moscow, Washington is seeking to incorporate both Ukraine and Georgia, two former Russian provinces, into NATO. On the economic scene the dollar as reserve currency is a problem for the entire world. Sanctions and other forms of American financial imperialism are causing countries, including very large ones, to leave the dollar payments system. As foreign trade is increasingly conducted without recourse to the US dollar, the demand for dollars drops, but the supply has been greatly expanded as a result of Quantitative Easing. Because of offshored production and US dependence on imports, a drop in the dollar's exchange value would result in domestic inflation, further lowering US living standards and threatening the rigged, stock, bond, and precious metal markets. The real reason for Quantitative Easing is to support the banks' balance sheets. However, the official reason is to stimulate the economy and sustain economic recovery. The only sign of recovery is real GDP which shows up as positive only because the deflator is understated. The evidence is clear that there has been no economic recovery. With the first quarter GDP negative and the second quarter likely to be negative as well, the second-leg of the long downturn could begin this summer. Moreover, the current high unemployment (23 percent) is different from previous unemployment. In the postwar 20th century, the Federal Reserve dealt with inflation by cooling down the economy. Sales would decline, inventories would build up, and layoffs would occur. As unemployment rose, the Fed would reverse course and workers would be called back to their jobs. Today the jobs are no longer there.

They have been moved offshore. The factories are gone. There are no jobs to which to call workers back. To restore the economy

requires that offshoring be reversed and the jobs brought back to the US. This could be done by changing the way corporations are taxed. The tax rate on corporate profit could be determined by the geographic location at which corporations add value to the products that they market in the US. If the goods and services are produced offshore, the tax rate would be high. If the goods and services are produced domestically, the tax rate could be low. The tax rates could be set to offset the lower costs of producing abroad. Considering the lobbying power of transnational corporations and Wall Street, this is an unlikely reform. My conclusion is that the US economy will continue its decline. On the foreign policy front, the hubris and arrogance of America's self-image as the "exceptional, indispensable" country with hegemonic rights over other countries means that the world is primed for war. Neither Russia nor China will accept the vassalage status accepted by the UK, Germany, France and the rest of Europe, Canada, Japan and

Australia. The Wolfowitz Doctrine makes it clear that the price of world peace is the world's acceptance of Washington's hegemony. Therefore, unless the dollar and with it US power collapses or Europe finds the courage to break with Washington and to pursue an independent foreign policy, saying good-bye to NATO, nuclear war is our likely future. Washington's aggression and blatant propaganda have convinced Russia and China that Washington intends war, and this realization has drawn the two countries into a strategic

alliance. Russia's May 9 Victory Day celebration of the defeat of Hitler is a historical turning point. Western governments boycotted the celebration, and the Chinese were there in their place. For the first time Chinese soldiers marched in the parade with Russian soldiers, and the president of China sat next to the president of Russia. The Saker's report on the Moscow celebration is interesting. <http://thesaker.is/todays-victory-day-celebrations-in-moscow-mark-a-turning-point-in-russian-history/> Especially note the chart of World War II casualties. Russian casualties compared to the combined casualties of the US, UK, and France make it completely clear that it was Russia that defeated Hitler. In the Orwellian West, the latest rewriting of history leaves out of the story the Red Army's destruction of the Wehrmacht. In line with the rewritten history, Obama's remarks on the 70th anniversary of Germany's surrender mentioned only US forces. In contrast Putin expressed gratitude to "the peoples of Great Britain, France and the United States of America for their contribution to the victory." <http://thesaker.is/15865/> For many years now the President of Russia has made the point publicly that the West does not listen to Russia. Washington and its vassal states in Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan do not hear when Russia says "don't push us this hard, we are not your enemy. We want to be your partners." As the years have passed without Washington hearing, Russia and China have finally

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realized that their choice is vassalage or war. Had there been any intelligent, qualified people in the National Security Council, the State Department, or the Pentagon, Washington would have been warned away from the neocon policy of sowing distrust. But with only neocon hubris present in the government, Washington made the mistake that could be fateful for humanity.

## **Impact – Warming 2AC**

### **Growth is key to green tech**

**Ben-Ami, 11** (Daniel Ben-Ami, journalist and author, regular contributor to *spiked*, has been published in the *American*, the *Australian*, *Economist.com*, *Financial Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Independent*, *Novo* (Germany), *Ode* (American and Dutch editions), *Prospect*, *Shanghai Daily*, the *Sunday Telegraph*, the *Sunday Times*, and *Voltaire* (Sweden), 2011 (“Do not knock prosperity that makes the good life possible,” Published Online for *Shanghai Daily* on June 15, 2011, Available Online at <http://bit.ly/P9JUus>)

Finally, there is the argument about the environment itself. The most popular variant of the idea of a natural limit nowadays is that growth inevitably means runaway climate change. However, there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. There are many forms of energy, including nuclear, that do not emit greenhouse gases. There are also ways to adapt to global warming such as building higher sea walls. Since such measures are expensive it will take more resources to pay for them; which means more economic growth rather than less. If anything the green drive to curb prosperity is likely to undermine our capacity to tackle climate change. Schumacher’s fundamentally conservative argument chimes well with those who want to reconcile us to austerity. It suits those in power for the mass of the population to accept the need to make do with less. Under such circumstances it is no surprise that David Cameron, like his international peers, is keen for us to focus on individual contentment rather than material prosperity. It is hard to imagine a more anti-human outlook than one advocating a sharp fall in living standards for the bulk of the world’s population.

### **Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now is key to avoid catastrophic collapse**

Dr. David **McCoy** et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” *BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL* v. 348, 4—2—**14**, doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510>, accessed 8-31-14.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in **no doubt** about the **scale** and **immediacy** of the threat to **human survival**, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that **it is “virtually certain” that human influence has warmed the global climate system** and that **it is “extremely likely” that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 is anthropogenic** [1]. **Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of**

**biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence.** Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “**the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.**” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that **climate change is “the greatest threat to human health** of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. **Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet.** The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “**Business as usual**” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. **The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems.** The AAAS concludes that **there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts** on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]



## **Impact – Warming Ext.**

### **The Free Market solves climate change**

**Callahan 7** Gene Callahan is an American economist and writer. He currently teaches at State University of New York, Purchase Campus and is Honorary Fellow at Cardiff University, October 01, 2007, “How a Free Society Could Solve Global Warming”, <http://fee.org/freeman/detail/how-a-free-society-could-solve-global-warming>

When trying to determine if the free market is to blame for possibly dangerous carbon emissions, a logical starting point is to list the numerous ways that government policies encourage the very activities that Al Gore and his friends want us to curtail. The U.S. government has subsidized many activities that burn carbon: it has seized land through eminent domain to build highways, funded rural electrification projects, and fought wars to ensure Americans’ access to oil. After World War II it played a key role in the mass exodus of the middle class from urban centers to the suburbs, chiefly through encouraging mortgage lending. Every American schoolchild has heard of the bold transcontinental railroad (finished with great ceremony at Promontory Summit, Utah) promoted by the federal government. Historian Burt Folsom explains that due to the construction contracts, the incentive was to lay as much track as possible between points A and B—hardly an approach to economize on carbon emissions from the wood- and coal-burning locomotives. For a more recent example, consider John F. Kennedy’s visionary moon shot. I’m no engineer, but I’ve seen the takeoffs of the Apollo spacecraft and think it’s quite likely that the free market’s use of those resources would have involved far lower CO2 emissions. While myriad government policies have thus encouraged carbon emissions, at the same time the government has restricted activities that would have reduced them. For example, there would probably be far more reliance on nuclear power were it not for the overblown regulations of this energy source. For a different example, imagine the reduction in emissions if the government would merely allow market-clearing pricing for the nation’s major roads, thereby eliminating traffic jams! The pollution from vehicles in major urban areas could be drastically cut overnight if the government set tolls to whatever the market could bear—or better yet, sold bridges and highways to private owners. Of course, there is no way to determine just what the energy landscape in America would look like if these interventions had not occurred. Yet it is entirely possible that on net, with a freer market economy, in the past we would have burned less fossil fuel and today we would be more energy efficient. Even if it were true that reliance on the free-enterprise system makes it difficult to curtail activities that contribute to global warming, still the undeniable advantages of unfettered markets would allow humans to deal with climate change more easily. For example, the financial industry, by creating new securities and derivative markets, could crystallize the “dispersed knowledge” that many different experts held in order to coordinate and mobilize mankind’s total response to global warming. For instance, weather futures can serve to spread the risk of bad weather beyond the local area affected. Perhaps there could arise a market betting on the

areas most likely to be permanently flooded. That may seem ghoulish, but by betting on their own area, inhabitants could offset the cost of relocating should the flooding occur. Creative entrepreneurs, left free to innovate, will generate a wealth of alternative energy sources. (State intervention, of course, tends to stifle innovations that threaten the continued dominance of currently powerful special interests, such as oil companies—for example, the state of North Carolina recently fined Bob Teixeira for running his car on soybean oil.)

### **Economic growth is the only viable way to solve climate change – radical transformation is impossible**

**Hansen and Wethal 14** Arve Hansen is a Research Fellow in interdisciplinary development studies and geography at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway. Ulrikke Wethal is a Research Fellow in development and economic geography at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway. October 10, 2014, “Emerging Economies and Challenges to Sustainability: Theories, Strategies, Local Realities”, [https://books.google.com/books?id=uxbEBAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbv\\_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=uxbEBAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbv_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false)

As discussed in Chapter 3 by McNeill and Wilhite, the Kuznets curve has been used to describe the alleged relation between the environment and economic growth. The idea is that, as economies grow, growth will first lead to environmental degradation, but beyond a certain point, the fruits of this same growth can be used to prevent or ameliorate degradation. However, in advanced economies, most reduction in environmental degradation has taken place due to outsourcing of production rather than any innovative way of mitigating the challenges. In terms of achieving global sustainable development, the exportation of environmental problems through a relocalisation of production makes no positive contribution. While there has been increasing acknowledgement of the environmental crisis we are facing, radical action remains absent. So-called green-washing has been the main response to the call for sustainable development. This is not, we argue, necessarily because the idea of sustainable development is wrong, but mainly because countries are not willing to commit deeply to the required transformations. It is also because of the lack of visions that are both viable and appeal to large segments of societies. Economic growth enables job creation and increases living standards, and can allow governments to avoid the uncomfortable questions of more radical redistribution. Halting growth in a capitalist economy leads to recessions and unemployment. Even though it tends to hit the poorest hardest, the ramifications are felt across all groups in society. For a powerful political party (whether in a one-party system or a democracy) to preach no-growth or degrowth in this context is political suicide. Politics is the art of the possible (as von Bismarck famously said), and green-washing and technological fixes are much more palatable alternatives than the societal transformations required by deeper understandings of sustainability.

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## **Transition**

## Transition Bad

### **Economic decline destroys the environment and condemns billions – only growth can lead us towards a better world**

**Mead 12** [February 4, 2009, Walter Russell Mead (James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University), "The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?", online, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/>, RaMan]

Over a series of recent posts, I've been looking at the energy revolution that is changing the look of the 21st centuries. Some countries are losers, but the US in particular stands to make big gains at home and in its foreign policy. On the whole, this news is about as good as it gets: trillions of dollars of valuable resources are now available to power the US economy, cut our trade deficit and reduce our vulnerability to Middle East instability. Hundreds of thousands of well paid blue collar jobs are going to reduce income inequality and help rebuild a stable middle class. Many of the resources are exactly where we would want them: in hard hit Rust Belt states. World peace is also looking more possible: the great powers aren't going to be elbowing each other as they fight to control the last few dribs and drabs of oil. Nasty dictatorships and backward-facing petro-states aren't going to be able blackmail the world as easily. But there is one group (other than the Russians and the Gulf Arabs and the Iranians) that isn't sharing in the general joy: the greens. For them, the spectacle of a looming world energy crisis was good news. It justified huge subsidies for solar and wind power (and thereby guaranteed huge fortunes for clever green-oriented investors). Greens outdid themselves year after year with gloom and doom forecasts about the coming oil crunch. They hoped that public dislike of the Middle East and the costs of our involvement there could be converted into public support for expensive green energy policies here at home: "energy independence" was one of the few arguments they had that resonated widely among average voters. Back in those salad days of green arrogance, there was plenty of scoffing at the 'peak oil deniers' and shortage skeptics who disagreed with what greens told us all was settled, Malthusian science. Reality based" green thinkers sighed and rolled their eyes at the illusions of those benighted techno-enthusiasts who said that unconventional sources like shale oil and gas and the oil sands of Canada would one day become available. Environmentalists, you see, are science based, unlike those clueless, Gaia-defying technophiles with their infantile faith in the power of human creativity. Greens, with their awesome powers of Gaia-assisted intuition, know what the future holds. But those glory days are over now, and the smarter environmentalists are bowing to the inevitable. George Monbiot, whose cries of woe and pain in the Guardian newspaper have served as the Greek chorus at each stage of the precipitous decline of the global green movement, gave voice to green grief at the prospect of a wealthy and prosperous century to come: "We were wrong," he wrote on July 2, "about peak oil. There's enough to fry us all." Monbiot now gets the politics as well: There is enough oil in the ground to deep-fry the lot of us, and no obvious means to prevail upon governments and industry to leave it in the ground. Twenty years of efforts to prevent climate breakdown through moral persuasion have failed, with the collapse of the multilateral process at Rio de Janeiro last month. The world's most powerful nation is again becoming an oil state, and if the political transformation of its northern neighbour [a reference to Canada] is anything to go by, the results will not be pretty. In other words, a newly oil rich United States is going to fight even harder against global green carbon policies, and the new discoveries will tilt the American political system even farther in the direction of capitalist oil companies. Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced. Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous slut, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly. Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011: I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we're out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we're going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth. Here's why the tar sands are important: It's a decision point about whether, now that we're running out of the easy stuff, we're going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into? A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it's clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the "crappy liquor." Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth's climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I've written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren't rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record. Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had. The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren't so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found. Let's be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-

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clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn't been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn't going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator. The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan. The shale boom hasn't turned green success into green failure. It's prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we'd keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn't found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn't have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is... coal. To use McKibben's metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it's one we've been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we'd use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn't cheap and it isn't clean, but it works. The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren't entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give

thanks. The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn. Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night. An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won't fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them. But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn't where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity's grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs. A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one. When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren't worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared. A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings. A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can't and won't do. Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is.

## **Dedvelopment is nonsensical, starts an immediate collapse of the modern society**

### **Monbiot 09**

[George Monbiot, 8-1-2009, "Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?," Guardian, online, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change, RaMan>]

Like you I have become ever gloomier about our chances of avoiding the crash you predict. For the past few years I have been almost professionally optimistic, exhorting people to keep fighting, knowing that to say there is no hope is to make it so. I still have some faith in our ability to make rational decisions based on evidence. But it is waning. If it has taken governments this long even to start discussing reform of the common fisheries policy – if they refuse even to make contingency plans for peak oil – what hope is there of working towards a steady-state economy, let alone the voluntary economic contraction ultimately required to avoid either the climate crash or the depletion of crucial resources? The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely collapse of industrial civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it? I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased

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society. **if this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear.** But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement. **Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others.** However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint. From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will be likely to be imposed through violence. **Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth.** To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing. **This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the repeated catastrophe that follows.** However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing – an ordered and structured downsizing of the global economy – might be, we must keep this possibility alive. Perhaps we are both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't

## **Transition will never happen because of public perception**

**Monbiot 09** [George Monbiot, 8-1-2009, "Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?," Guardian, online, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change, RaMan>]

If I have understood you correctly, **you are proposing to do nothing to prevent the likely collapse of industrial civilisation. You believe that instead of trying to replace fossil fuels with other energy sources, we should let the system slide.** You go on to say that we should not fear this outcome. **How many people do you believe the world could support without either fossil fuels or an equivalent investment in alternative energy? How many would survive without modern industrial civilisation?** Two billion? One billion? **Under your vision several billion perish. And you tell me we have nothing to fear.** I find it hard to understand how you could be unaffected by **this prospect.** I accused you of denial before; this looks more like disavowal. I hear a perverse echo in your writing of the philosophies that most offend you: your macho assertion that we have nothing to fear from collapse mirrors the macho assertion that we have nothing to fear from endless growth. Both positions betray a refusal to engage with physical reality. **Your disavowal is informed by a misunderstanding. You maintain that modern industrial civilisation "is a weapon of planetary mass destruction".** Anyone apprised of the palaeolithic massacre of the African and Eurasian megafauna, or the extermination of the great beasts of the Americas, or the massive carbon pulse produced by deforestation in the Neolithic must be able to see that the weapon of planetary mass destruction is not the current culture, but humankind. **You would purge the planet of industrial civilisation, at the cost of billions of lives, only to discover that you have not invoked "a saner world" but just another phase of destruction.** Strange as it seems, a de-fanged, steady-state version of the current settlement might offer the best prospect humankind has ever had of avoiding collapse. For **the first time in our history we are well-informed about the extent and causes of our ecological crises, know what should be done to avert them, and have the global means – if only the political will were present – of preventing them. Faced with your**

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alternative – sit back and watch billions die – Liberal Democracy 2.0 looks like a pretty good option.



## Transition Fails

### **The thesis of degrowth a.k.a “dedevelopment” is politically impossible, a transition would be deleterious.**

**Jewel 14** [Fall, 2014, Lucille A. Jewell (Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law), “The Indie Lawyer of the Future: How New Technology, Cultural Trends, and Market Forces Can Transform the Solo Practice of Law”, Obtained from LexisNexis, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/inacademic/RaMan>]

2. Herman Daly: Ecological Economics Herman Daly teaches economics at the University of Maryland and formerly served as senior economist in the World Bank’s environmental department. n68 In the 1970s, Daly revitalized John Stuart Mill’s concept of the stationary economic state, and pioneered the term “sustainability” in policy analysis. n69 Daly argued that continuous economic growth was not a workable goal for the economy or the planet. n70 Daly situated the economy within the earth’s ecosystem, and referred to the general laws of thermodynamics to illustrate the unsustainability of unlimited economic growth. n71 When humans and their material things become so large that natural resource inputs and waste outputs move beyond nature’s ability to replenish its resources and absorb the waste, the throughput flow, and thus the human population, becomes unsustainable. n72 **For the past fifty years, growth has been the sine qua non of economic thinking. n73 While continuous growth is a physical impossibility, Daly recognized that limiting growth, in many instances is a political impossibility.** n74 Nonetheless, Daly warned that the consequences of inaction would be deleterious. n75 Humankind must take the transition to a sustainable economy - one that takes heed of the inherent biophysical limits of the global ecosystem so that it can continue to operate long into the future. If we do not make that transition, we maybe cursed not just with uneconomic growth but with an ecological catastrophe that would sharply lower living standards. n76 [\*336] Although continuous growth in the economy is not viable, there can be continuous development. n77 Development, as opposed to growth, means that production rates should match depreciation rates. n78 In terms of production, development requires more durable and long-lasting products. n79 Maintenance and repair become more important when development is emphasized, and these tasks may produce more jobs because they are not easily outsourced. n80 Daly argued that economies can no longer resort to the traditional solution for fighting poverty and joblessness; society cannot continue to ameliorate poverty and joblessness by stimulating more economic growth. n81 Rather, Daly suggests that people might have to share. n82 Daly has influenced contemporary quests for sustainability, qualitative development, and eco-conscious approaches to sharing resources. His concepts of sustainability and a steady state clearly apply to the legal profession and legal education. This is beyond the scope of this article, but Daly would likely argue that the legal community has relied too heavily on a growth model for legal education and needs to pull back the reins and align law school seats with available jobs for lawyers. As Daly notes, limits on this type of growth require an interventionist approach to trade regulation. n83 The relevance of Daly to this article, explored more fully below, is what role lawyers can play when individuals, communities, and governments seek to make the transition from growth to development.

### **Dedevelopment is too generalizing for the impact they are trying to solve, transition fails**

**Mestrum 09** [November 20, 2009, Francine Mestrum (International Council of the World Social Forum and Head of Global Social Justice), “DE-GROWTH OR OTHER GROWTH?”, online, <http://www.cetri.be/De-growth-or-other-growth?lang=frm>, RaMan]

The idea of de-growth is far from new. The emergent ecological crisis has given the concept a new impetus and its content has been somewhat updated. However, the idea of stopping growth altogether remains very controversial and it even seems that some advocates of ‘de-growth’ do not want to stop it. In this article, I will give the major arguments against the concept and propose an alternative approach. **We should limit our ecological footprint, which is different from ‘de-growing’.** For some, this is a semantic debate, for others, a fundamentally different view on our future. SCIENCE AND ECONOMY The idea of de-growth has first been promoted by the Romanian economist Georgescu-Roegen. His thesis was that western economic thinking is fundamentally wrong and he applied the principles of thermodynamics to the economy. This is how he introduced the idea of ‘entropy’ which indicates that infinite growth is impossible and that we should take into account our consumption of natural capital when developing economic theories. Natural resources are being exploited without their cost ever being measured whereas a return to an original situation is totally excluded. A comparison with financial capital is relevant here : using one’s capital to live from is perfectly possible but one knows this capital is finite and bankruptcy is the only possible final exit. Bankruptcy of the

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planet however will be final and irrevocable. It means we have to stop growing and to significantly reduce our economic activities. Several authors have developed this concept of de-growth. In France, the most famous one certainly is Serge Latouche. He considers de-growth to be incompatible with humanism. Latouche opposes modernity, development and technological 'progress'. In the United States, Herman Daly is a former follower of Georgescu-Roegen. He promotes a steady-state economy and makes a distinction between 'economic growth' and 'uneconomic growth' that causes more damage than it produces benefits. Today, the idea of de-growth is mainly promoted by 'green' thinkers and activists, sometimes in a rather radical way, sometimes in a more relative way. The 'New Green Deal' that speaks of 'prosperity without growth' of the New Economics Foundation is a good example of this last version. But it also shows that the ideas need more clarification and that it is all too easy to create wrong impressions. De-growth remains controversial and the arguments in favor of it have never convinced me. Therefore, I want to develop a couple of ideas that lead to a less pessimistic world view. Even if the advocates of 'de-growth' promise more 'happiness', this seems to me to be a rather easy promise to make and a difficult one to realize. ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS The discussion on de-growth often takes place in a confusing context. Several ideas are being put forward that may be correct but that do not necessarily lead to 'de-growth'. Let me therefore start with two statements. The first one concerns the indicators that are used to measure our prosperity. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has long been criticized, for very good reasons. GDP measures all our economic activities, independently from their positive or negative impact on our wellbeing or on our environment. A devastating natural catastrophe can produce more activities and thus more growth than a village party that contributes to social cohesion. Industrial activities with high carbon emissions are better to enhance GDP than the work of a craftsman. Environmental services, such as clean air and clean water are crucial for all life but they are delivered for 'free' and thus are not measured in the GDP, in the same way as the non-paid labor of mainly women is totally ignored. This is the reason why many scholars propose a new set of indicators. For poor countries, the UNDP has measured a 'human development index' that measures GDP in combination with literacy and life expectancy. In rich countries, an indicator for sustainable economic welfare (ISEW) is often introduced in order to measure the sustainability and the loss of natural capital of our activities. this indicator tells us when economic growth becomes 'uneconomic'. These indicators are of the utmost importance in order to get a more or less correct idea of the real 'progress' of our societies. But this has nothing to do with the question of the slowing down of our economic activities. If we can produce more economic growth and less uneconomic growth, we are on the right track. A second statement concerns the western unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. It is clear that this pattern cannot possibly be generalized all over the world. If the whole of world society were able to 'develop' and were going to use as many cars as we in Western Europe, were able to buy as many air tickets and to eat as much meat, we would need 2,5 planets in order to make it possible. The allowable ecological footprint in Western Europe has been largely exceeded and it will necessarily have to be reduced. How we have to do this is another question but the answer is not necessarily 'less growth'. Our way of life in the North is clearly unsustainable and we have to measure our 'progress' in a different way. This being said, de-growth is not necessarily the answer and I want to explain my arguments. ANOTHER WAY OF LIFE My first reason is totally prohibitive for the advocates of de-growth : technological progress. It does not mean that I unconditionally believe in the qualities and possibilities of technological progress, but I do think that it can solve certain problems. The ecological houses are a good example. Cars can drive with a substantial minor amount of petrol. Maybe there are possibilities for the sequestration or stocking of carbon emissions. Meat can be produced in laboratories. These are not panaceas, but it would be unreasonable to not examine the technological possibilities, especially in circumstances where solutions become very urgent and where changes in attitudes are particularly slow to emerge. The 'rebound-effect' that leads to higher consumption precisely because one knows there are less negative environmental consequences, will also have to be taken into account. A second argument is also linked to technological progress and concerns the recycling of waste. 'Cradle-to-cradle' solutions do not offer total solutions and are never totally possible, but they do offer a possibility to significantly reduce our resource consumption. Moreover these activities lead to more economic growth. A third argument is a consequence of the former ones. the most important thing to achieve is economic growth that causes no environmental damage and that needs fewer natural resources. Recycling and services are two possible alternatives. The 'knowledge economy' is not necessarily environment-friendly but some

**activities – translations and conference interpreting, e.g. – will not be more damaging than the costs for the transport of their workers or the use of a computer. I do not understand why growth in these sectors would have to be prohibited.**

A fourth reason is obviously the 'under-development' in the South. The Northern/Western pattern of life is unsustainable but it is also unacceptable to deny Africans or Asians the material comfort that we enjoy. Growth is not a panacea to solve poverty, but how to reduce poverty without growth remains to be seen. **To me, it seems obvious that poor countries will have to develop their productive capacities in order to satisfy the needs of their people. It means that third world countries need growth, growth that should try to limit as far as possible environmental damage.** In order to limit the worldwide ecological footprint, it means we should also talk of a distribution of industrial activities and, consequently start to plan in the way that transnational companies are already planning their activities. They do it in function of costs ; we should do it in function of a fair distribution of incomes and of environmental damage. This redistribution of activities is also the easiest and most direct way to realize a redistribution of incomes. Moreover, it allows for a significant reduction of international trade and transport and thus for less environmental damage. My last argument against de-growth is a consequence of all former points. The advocates of de-growth only rarely make a distinction between different types of activities and growth. **Their approach is too general, as if all growth necessarily implies the consumption of finite natural resources.** This is not correct and I think the most important thing is to organize growth in a different way, to produce another kind of growth and other types of economic activities that can lead to economic growth in the sense of Daly. I have never understood why economic growth and growth in general should be stopped. ANOTHER ECONOMY **The arguments in favor of de-growth clearly do not**

**convince me.** This does not mean that I can accept the current economic system. I hope that my arguments have already indicated in which direction I would like to see it change. I cannot develop all the different points here, but I think that a reference to the current economic and financial crisis, the growing inequalities and the missing gender dimension in economic thinking are the most important ones. Let me briefly develop the reasons that have to do with de-growth and ecology. One of the reasons why the advocates of de-growth keep hammering at it may be that growth has become in the past decades the only objective of economic activities. This is a rather new phenomenon and if it is a normal evolution within capitalism, it certainly is not within economic theory. Economy is about the satisfaction of basic needs with scarce resources. Economy, then, is about the allocation of these scarce resources. All other considerations fall outside of economic theory. **The economy can 'grow' as population grows and more needs have**

**to be satisfied. In fact, this is already an argument against de-growth because the population is indeed growing and a reduction of economic activities would lead to substantially less goods for everyone.** The economy can also grow when more and more desires are perceived as being needs. It is here that the distinction between economic and uneconomic growth has to be made, but it surely does not lead to obligatory growth. Originally, development was not defined in terms of growth. In the UN development thinking of the 50s and 60s development referred to the modernization of productive capacities, to a diversification of activities and to a rising living standard. This necessarily implied growth but growth was not the objective of development. It was a means in order to achieve an end and in order to finance the development effort, independently from the North. **Only in the last decades, after the**

**structural adjustments and with the poverty reduction strategies, has growth become an objective, and end in itself.** The reason is quite simple : redistribution of incomes disappeared from the agenda. It was said that poverty reduction needed growth and no one wondered where and how this growth had to be produced, whether poverty in the past had been reduced thanks to growth and how the growth had to be distributed. It was only when it became clear – once again – that this 'development' strategy did not work and that growth did not favor the poor, that a new concept of 'pro-poor growth' was introduced, which is, in fact growth produced by the poor themselves. In other words, the poor solve their poverty problem themselves. That is the way the World Bank sees it. **But one indisputable fact remains : poverty can only be**

**reduced either with growth or with redistribution.** OTHER SOCIAL POLICIES The growing poverty and inequality clearly show that something is fundamentally wrong with growth and with the way our economic system is functioning. It will have to be re-examined and to me it is clear that growth cannot be the objective of economic activities. In the same way, the whole reasoning on the 'homo oeconomicus' is so fundamentally flawed – especially from a gender perspective – that it ignores or sees as uneconomic all forms of altruism. The basic tenets of our economic theories will then have to be re-thought. Trade unions have their own relevant reasons for rejecting all ideas of de-growth as they refer to social problems. **Less growth – as we can see in today's**

**crisis – means less employment and less income for workers.** Clearly, this cannot be defended in a trade union context. Moreover, it is not easy to convince people to abandon material comfort on a voluntary basis. The promise of 'more happiness' or 'more wellbeing' is too abstract and too incredible to be seriously considered. From a sociological point of view then, **de-growth can never be a popular idea.** Whatever one may think of the 'happiness' of people, it is clear that the economic growth in the North in the past century – and its redistribution – has given rise to a much better standard of living. 'Without growth', as the most recent study of the New Economics Foundation states, is also incredible. In fact, the report itself admits it.

**Economic stability, according to the authors, cannot be based on growth of material consumption.** This means it can be based on immaterial consumption and on growth of the services sector. This is not an argument against growth. Moreover, the report states that 'prosperity without growth' in the Western world has become a financial and ecological necessity. In other words, growth in the South is acceptable. This puts the whole idea in a very different context and one can only say that the title of the report is very misleading. WHAT IS GROWTH ? I believe the concept of growth is in fact too general. It is obvious that from an ecological point of view we have to be much more cautious than we are and that we have to respect our planet and the resources it gives us. But growth that is based on other elements ? Just imagine that our societies decide to pay women for their reproductive work. If we do this at the price of a domestic worker, it would mean that our GDP would rise with 50 to 70 %. Do we have to oppose this because it is 'growth' ? A second more difficult point concerns growth which is based on natural resources and the argument of Georgescu-Roegen that all growth is always destructive. This is certainly true, though I suppose that for some resources depletion is not immediately threatening. Our planet is finite and intergenerational solidarity is a must, but how many generations do we have to take into account ? If we can organize our production in such a way that our resources will not be depleted within the coming half millennium, does that limit our responsibility ? But who knows if our planet will not be destroyed in the meantime by a meteorite, or by a very destructive nuclear war ? Or that we find water on

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Mars ? This ethical question is not easy to answer, though I seriously question the assumption that we have to leave the earth the way that we have found it. **Where does our responsibility stop ?** ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ARE SOCIAL PROBLEMS It should be clear that our prosperity cannot and should not only be determined by growth. To question the material growth and to defend a redistribution of material growth is a logical consequence. **In view of the coming climate conference it is clear that the new emerging economies are not willing to abandon their development only to please the West. A serious global redistribution will have to be organized.** It is also the best way to reduce the growing income inequality in the world. More industrial activities with environment friendly methods in the South, a serious reduction of uneconomic growth in the North and a serious economic growth based on green technologies, why should this not be possible ? Sustainable development means that development is not synonymous with growth and that it concerns the North as well as the South. Much more research is needed in order to find out what activities will have to be reduced and which ones will not. Now, everything is lumped together and this leads to a serious blurring of lines. We already know that the existing oil reserves will not last for a century. Countries need to have an opportunity – as Ecuador is doing – to not exploit their oil and to protect the rainforest and its inhabitants. If that means we can produce less plastic and can drive fewer cars, than we have to prepare for it, now. We need other forms of mobility. If we want to avoid a serious decline of our living standard it is best to be pro-active. Humankind is very inventive and I trust we can find new solutions. The most important conclusion should be that the ecological crisis cannot be paid for by those who have nothing and who did not cause the current crisis. In the international documents on sustainable development, the poor are either seen as victims or as culprits. It is clear that poor people who have no money for ecological houses will indeed consume more energy. But half of the world population is poor and is already the most important victim of the ecological crisis. Today, farmers suffer from drought or from floods. Islands are already disappearing. **Those who say, in general, that we have to de-grow also say implicitly that there is no hope for the 2.5 billion poor people and that inequality will continue to rise.** If we are prepared to re-think development and development cooperation, I am sure we can find ecologically sustainable solutions which can be 'sold' more easily to the populations of North and South. **De-growth seems to be an impossible idea. Material prosperity remains the basis for our wellbeing and our happiness, but there certainly are limits to the growth of prosperity.** This is not in defense of voluntary poverty, but in defense of controlling our markets and the limitless offer of useless and damaging products. Nobody will suffer from less neon publicity, less meat, fewer cars, less toys, less plastic bags. Re-thinking our agricultural policies, in North and South, can deliver a better and ecologically friendly production of everything we need. There are thousands of examples of activities that can maintain our prosperity, improve our wellbeing and limit the environmental damage. A determined analysis of the feasibility and the desirability of all activities is very urgent. Stories about 'de-growth' and 'without growth' make people afraid and fear never is a good councilor.

## Too Late

### **Current society is too embedded in our lives, it's too late for a transition**

**Gopel 14**[April 28, 2014, Maja Gopel (Head of the Berlin Office of the Wuppertal Institute for climate, Environment and Energy ), "Getting to Postgrowth: The Transformative Power of Mind- and Paradigm Shifts", online, <http://www.growthintransition.eu/getting-to-postgrowth-the-transformative-power-of-mind-and-paradigm-shifts/>, RaMan]

The socio-economic concept of path dependencies sheds some light on the underlying reasons: if the status quo is challenged, it translates into a deviation from the "normal" way of doing things which creates higher transaction costs, (presumably) higher risks and a fear of losing roles, identities and privileges. On top of this, standardized procedures, legal institutionalization and the creation of material-economic infrastructures leads to further lock-ins that take a lot of political will to change. This plethora of self-stabilizing path dependencies in our minds and institutions is what Antonio Gramsci captured in his concept of hegemony. Next to the more visible exertion of power in form of money, jurisdiction or other types of coercion, it is the widely established convictions and canonized knowledge, cultural narratives, belief-systems and the "derived needs" in a given society that play out in favor of those benefiting from the status quo.<sup>[1]</sup> These allow for "leadership with least resistance", if supported by a programmatic "social myth" which provides the imagination and justifications as to why this particular set of values, norms, practices, institutions and regulations is of general interest. The idea of endless economic growth benefiting all may have been the most powerful example for such a social myth. Its perseverance has been the biggest roadblock for getting the sustainable development agenda on track. The Rio Declaration of the United Nations made sustainable development the overarching policy principle of international cooperation. According to its official definition it means development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" while giving priority to the needs of the poor and acknowledging the limitations that social and technological activities impose on nature's ability to replenish means. [2] Economic, social and environmental concerns were to be integrated. What happened instead was that environmental and social aspects were fitted into the economic growth story and its underlying paradigm- which tells us nothing meaningful about human needs and keeps us blind to natural reproduction cycles. Needs are reduced to the general concept of "utility maximization" and, based on the ontological assumption that humans are selfish, insatiable and rational, it is concluded that this goal is best serviced by ever increasing consumption. Equipped with so-defined "representative actors", markets in which everything of value will find a price and is subject to supply and demand, are considered the most efficient and just institutions for progress. Consequently, it is assumed that wealth accumulation on the top will trickle down to the poor as long as they offer anything valuable. According to this rationale of universal monetarization, the need to assess nature's ability to replenish resources became unnecessary. The concept of "capital substitutability" crept into our development story which means that loss of nature can be compensated by other capital or input factors created by humans. As a consequence, the myth of economic growth became shielded against the attack of "limits to growth" reports and co-opted into the hegemonic regime, as Antonio Gramsci would say.

## **Economic growth is key to combat the rising debt, transition makes impacts happen faster**

**DiStefano 14** [June 9, 2014, Joseph N. DiStefano, "PhillyDeals: Book's fresh theory on the rising threat to economies", Obtained from LexisNexis via UMICH, RaMan]

If all you knew about Richard Vague was that, before he became a Philadelphia investor, philanthropist, and sponsor of Washington think-tank projects, the affable marketing mogul ran a couple of the nation's biggest credit-card banks, you might expect his book about lending to be a bankers' apologia. But *The Next Economic Disaster* - just 56 pages in its second draft, it will be fatter, with appendices, when published next month by the University of Pennsylvania Press - presents a fresh, forceful thesis: The threat to economies isn't too much borrowing by out-of-control governments. It's the piling-on of private debt by out-of-control banks and borrowers that will most surely lead to economic stagnation. Like French economist Thomas Piketty's fat case for a wealth tax, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Vague's slender book piles up data-tracking economic numbers across national economies over time. But Vague is comparing economic growth not to investment or income distribution, but to debt levels, which economists tend to treat as a symptom, not a cause, of changes in production and consumption. Vague observes that crushing private debt rises in advance of economic stagnation (unlike government debt, which is stimulative). And that debt tends to rise over time because it is typically refinanced by borrowers who hope to spend more and improve their condition. And that the current U.S. and European malaise, like Japan since the 1990s, is caused not by a cycle of investment, overproduction, and liquidation, but by a long-term accumulation of private debt. That debt is now at levels we haven't seen since before the Depression and World War II all but wiped out private indebtedness. There are a few hard roads out of overpowering debt: War and depression, which wipe out people, property, and their obligations. Inflation, which wrecks savings and investment and is tough to control. Voluntary belt-tightening and paydown, which Pennsylvania bankers complained was taking place among farmers collecting royalties in the early Marcellus Shale gas boom, but that is rare across societies, since it tends to mean lower living standards. Orderly debt-forgiveness programs, like the biblical concept of Jubilee years. Vague notes that bankruptcy courts allow businesses to cut their debt loads, or convert it to creditor ownership. Many bank critics urged President Obama's administration to make it easier for consumers to write down debt or transfer the underwater portion to lenders as equity. But it's tough to organize bailouts for anyone who isn't a big, well-organized industry. Most important to Vague is enforcing simple rules that would require lenders and loan financiers to set aside a lot of reserve capital in times of rapid loan growth - not just as a hedge against disaster, but to force them to slow down.

## A2 “Degrowth/Foster”

### **The primary author of dedevelopment agrees with us, a transition in the squo is factually impossible**

**Foster 11** [January 2011, John Bellamy Foster (professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review. His writes about political economy of capitalism and economic crisis, ecology and ecological crisis, and Marxist theory), online, Monthly Review, <https://monthlyreview.org/2011/01/01/capitalism-and-degrowth-an-impossibility-theorem/>, RaMan]

Today this recognition of the need to bring economic growth in overdeveloped economies to a halt, and even to shrink these economies, is seen as rooted theoretically in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, which established the basis of modern ecological economics.<sup>7</sup> Degrowth as such is not viewed, even by its proponents, as a stable solution, but one aimed at reducing the size of the economy to a level of output that can be maintained perpetually at a steady-state. This might mean shrinking the rich economies by as much as a third from today’s levels by a process that would amount to negative investment (since not only would new net investment cease but also only some, not all, worn-out capital stock would be replaced). A steady-state economy, in contrast, would carry out replacement investment but would stop short of new net investment

As Daly defines it, “a steady-state economy” is “an economy with constant stocks of people and artifacts, maintained at some desired, sufficient levels by low rates of maintenance ‘throughput,’ that is, by the lowest feasible flows of matter and energy.”<sup>8</sup> **Needless to say, none of this would come easily, given today’s capitalist economy. In particular, Latouche’s work, which can be viewed as exemplary of the European degrowth project, is beset with contradictions, resulting not from the concept of degrowth per se, but from his attempt to skirt the question of capitalism. This can be seen in his 2006 article, “The Globe Downshifted,” where he argues in convoluted form: For some on the far left, the stock answer is that capitalism is the problem, leaving us stuck in a rut and powerless to move towards a better society. Is economic contraction compatible with capitalism? This is a key question, but one that it is important to answer without resort to dogma, if the real obstacles are to be understood....** Eco-compatible capitalism is conceivable in theory, but unrealistic in practice. Capitalism would require a high level of regulation to bring about the reduction of our ecological footprint. The market system, dominated by huge multinational corporations, will never set off down the virtuous path of eco-capitalism of its own accord.... Mechanisms for countering power with power, as existed under the Keynes-Fordist regulations of the Social-Democratic era, are conceivable and desirable. But the class struggle seems to have broken down. The problem is: capital won.... **A society based on economic contraction cannot exist under capitalism. But capitalism is a deceptively simple word for a long, complex history. Getting rid of the capitalists and banning wage labour, currency and private ownership of the means of production would plunge society into chaos. It would bring large-scale terrorism....We need to find another way out of development, economism (a belief in the primacy of economic causes and factors) and growth: one that does not mean forsaking the social institutions that have been annexed by the economy (currency, markets, even wages) but reframes them according to different principles.**<sup>9</sup>

In this seemingly pragmatic, non-dogmatic fashion, Latouche tries to draw a distinction between the degrowth project and the socialist critique of capitalism by: (1) declaring that “eco-compatible capitalism is conceivable” at least in theory; (2) suggesting that Keynesian and so-called “Fordist” approaches to regulation, associated with social democracy, could—if still feasible—tame capitalism, pushing it down “the virtuous path of eco-capitalism”; and (3) insisting that degrowth is not aimed at breaking the dialectic of capital-wage labor or interfering with private ownership of the means of production. In other writings, Latouche makes it clear that he sees the degrowth project as compatible with continued valorization (i.e., augmentation of capitalist value relations) and that anything approaching substantive equality is considered beyond reach.<sup>10</sup>

What Latouche advocates most explicitly in relation to the environmental problem is the adoption of what he refers to as “reformist measures, whose principles [of welfare economics] were outlined in the early 20th century by the liberal economist Arthur Cecil Pigou [and] would bring about a revolution” by internalizing the environmental externalities of the capitalist economy.<sup>11</sup> Ironically, this stance is identical with that of neoclassical environmental economics—while distinguished from the more radical critique often promoted by ecological economics, where the notion that environmental costs can simply be internalized within the present-day capitalist economy is sharply attacked.<sup>12</sup> “The ecological crisis itself is mentioned” in the current degrowth projec

t, as Greek philosopher Takis Fotopoulos has critically observed, “in terms of a common problem that ‘humanity’ faces because of the degradation of the environment, with no mention at all of the differentiated class implications of this crisis, i.e., of

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the fact that the economic and social implications of the ecological crisis are primarily paid in terms of the destruction of lives and livelihood of the lower social groups—either in Bangladesh or in New Orleans—and much less in terms of those of the elites and the middle classes.”<sup>13</sup> **Given that it makes the abstract concept of economic growth its target, rather than the concrete reality of capital accumulation, degrowth theory—in the influential form articulated by Latouche and others—naturally faces difficulty confronting today’s reality of economic crisis/stagnation, which has produced unemployment levels and economic devastation greater than at any time since the 1930s. Latouche himself wrote in 2003 that “there would be nothing worse than a growth economy without growth.”**<sup>14</sup> **But, faced with a capitalist economy caught in a deep structural crisis,**

European degrowth analysts have little to say. The Barcelona Degrowth Declaration simply pronounced: “[S]o-called anti-crisis measures that seek to boost economic growth will worsen inequalities and environmental conditions in the long-run.”<sup>15</sup> Neither wishing to advocate growth, nor to break with the institutions of capital—nor, indeed, to align themselves with workers, whose greatest need at present is employment—leading degrowth theorists remain strangely silent in the face of the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression. To be sure, when faced with “actual degrowth” in the Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the need for a transition to “sustainable degrowth,” noted ecological economist Joan Martínez-Alier, who has recently taken up the degrowth banner, offered the palliative of “a short-run Green Keynesianism or a Green New Deal.” The goal, he said, was to promote economic growth and “contain the rise in unemployment” through public investment in green technology and infrastructure. This was viewed as consistent with the degrowth project, as long as such Green Keynesianism did not “become a doctrine of continuous economic growth.”<sup>16</sup> Yet how working people were to fit into this largely technological strategy (predicated on ideas of energy efficiency that degrowth analysts generally reject) was left uncertain. Indeed, rather than dealing with the unemployment problem directly—through a radical program that would give people jobs aimed at the creation of genuine use values in ways compatible with a more sustainable society—degrowth theorists prefer to emphasize shorter working hours, and separate “the right to receive remuneration from the fact of being employed” (by means of the promotion of a universal basic income). Such changes are supposed to allow the economic system to shrink and, at the same time, guarantee income to families—all the while keeping the underlying structure of capital accumulation and markets intact. Yet, looked at from a more critical standpoint, it is hard to see the viability of shorter work hours and basic income guarantees on the scale suggested other than as elements in a transition to a post-capitalist (indeed socialist) society. As Marx said, the rule for capital is: “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!”<sup>17</sup> To break with capitalism’s institutional basis of the “law of value,” or to question the structure underpinning the exploitation of labor (both of which would be threatened by a sharp reduction of working hours and substantial income guarantees) is to raise larger questions of system change—ones that leading degrowth theorists seem unwilling to acknowledge at present. Moreover, a meaningful approach to the creation of a new society would have to provide not merely income and leisure, but would also need to address the human need for useful, creative, non-alienated work. Even more problematic is the attitude of much of current degrowth theory toward the global South. “Degrowth,” Latouche writes, must apply to the South as much as to the North if there is to be any chance to stop Southern societies from rushing up the blind alley of growth economics. Where there is still time, they should aim not for development but for disentanglement—removing the obstacles that prevent them from developing differently...Southern countries need to escape their economic and cultural dependence on the North and rediscover their own histories—interrupted by colonialism, development and globalization—to establish distinct indigenous cultural identities...Insisting on growth in the South, as though it were the only way out of the misery that growth created, can only lead to further westernization.<sup>18</sup> Lacking an adequate theory of imperialism, and failing to address the vast chasm of inequality separating the richest from the poorest nations, Latouche thus reduces the whole immense problem of underdevelopment to one of cultural autonomy and subjection to a Westernized growth fetish. This can be compared to the much more reasoned response of Herman Daly, who writes, It is absolutely a waste of time as well as morally backward to preach steady-state doctrines to underdeveloped countries before the overdeveloped countries have taken any measure to reduce either their own population growth or the growth of their per-capita resource consumption. Therefore, the steady-state paradigm must first be applied in the overdeveloped countries...One of the major forces necessary to push the overdeveloped countries toward a...steady-state paradigm must be Third World outrage at their overconsumption...The starting point in development economics should be the “impossibility theorem”...that a U.S.-style high mass consumption economy for a world of 4 billion people is impossible, and even if by some miracle it could be achieved, it

would certainly be short-lived.<sup>19</sup> **The notion that degrowth as a concept can be applied in essentially the same way both to the wealthy countries of the center and the poor countries of the periphery represents a category mistake resulting from the crude imposition of an abstraction (degrowth) on a context in which it is essentially meaningless, e.g., Haiti, Mali, or even, in many ways, India.**

The real problem in the global periphery is overcoming imperial linkages, transforming the existing mode of production, and creating sustainable-egalitarian productive possibilities. It is clear that many countries in the South with very low per capita incomes cannot afford degrowth but could use a kind of sustainable development, directed at real needs such as access to water, food, health care, education, etc. This requires a radical shift in social structure away from the relations of production of capitalism/imperialism. It is telling that in Latouche’s widely circulated articles there is virtually no mention of those countries, such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, where concrete struggles are being waged to shift social priorities from profit to social needs. Cuba, as the Living Planet Report has indicated, is the only country on Earth with high human development and a sustainable ecological footprint.<sup>20</sup> It is undeniable today that economic growth is the main driver of planetary ecological degradation. But to pin one’s whole analysis on

overturning an abstract “growth society” is to lose all historical perspective and discard centuries of social science. **As valuable as the degrowth concept is in an ecological sense, it can only take on genuine meaning as part of a critique of capital accumulation and part of the transition to a sustainable, egalitarian, communal order; one in which the associated producers govern the metabolic relation between nature and society in the interest of successive generations and the earth itself**

(socialism/communism as Marx defined it).<sup>21</sup> What is needed is a “co-revolutionary movement,” to adopt David Harvey’s pregnant term, that will bring together the traditional working-class critique of capital, the critique of imperialism, the critiques of patriarchy and racism, and the critique of ecologically destructive growth (along with their respective mass movements).<sup>22</sup> In the generalized crisis of our times, such an overarching, co-revolutionary movement is conceivable. Here, the object would be the creation of a new order in which the valorization of capital would no longer govern society. “Socialism is useful,” E.F. Schumacher wrote in *Small is Beautiful*, precisely because of “the possibility it creates for the overcoming of the religion of economics,” that is, “the modern trend towards total quantification at the expense of the appreciation of qualitative differences.”<sup>23</sup> In a sustainable order, people in the wealthier economies (especially those in the upper income strata) would have to learn to live on “less” in commodity terms in order to lower per capita demands on the environment. At the same time, the satisfaction of genuine human needs and the requirements of ecological sustainability could become the constitutive principles of a new, more communal order aimed at human reciprocity, allowing for qualitative improvement, even plenty.<sup>24</sup> Such a strategy—not dominated by blind productivism—is consistent with providing people with worthwhile work. The ecological struggle, understood in these terms, must aim not merely for degrowth in the abstract but more concretely for deaccumulation—a transition away from a system geared to the accumulation of capital without end. In its place we need to construct a new co-revolutionary society, dedicated to the common needs of humanity and the earth.

**Deddevelopment has no real solvency mechanism, at best it’s a starting point for dialogue, the aff is key**

**Bourke 12** [2012, Sadhbh Juarez Bourke (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institute of Forest and Environmental Policy),

Obtained from SOE Scientific Paper online, <http://www.megforum.uni-freiburg.de/prevfora/Forum%202012/SOE%202012%20papers/Degrowth, RaMan>



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Unlimited growth in a finite earth is not an option. Our present rate of consumption is exhausting our natural resources and collapsing the earth's capacity to assimilate waste. Degrowth theories and social movements highlight the power of consumers to foster the necessary change. This includes consuming locally, and promoting fair trade, austerity and frugality. Promoting small family businesses and avoiding big companies. Overall, it implies a change in our value system. Due to its nature, Degrowth cannot be characterised with a specific set of principles. It has even been contested that it can be designed as a concept in itself. Perhaps it is more accurate to understand it as a starting point for a dialogue about a new social project based on.

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**heg core**

MAGS Lab

File by: Wendell, Alex, and Tony

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**--good**

**--pursuit inevitable**

**The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable – Any alternative to US primacy results in Nuclear Prolif and Global Instability**

**Tooley, 3-19** – [Mark Tooley, Graduate from Georgetown University, Work at the CIA, 3-19-2015, Christianity and Nukes American nuclear disarmament will not leave the world safer or holier, The American Spectator, <http://spectator.org/articles/62090/christianity-and-nukes>] Jeong

**Much of the security of the world relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella**, which continues to deter, protect, and intimidate. Doubtless China would vastly expand its own relatively minimal nuclear arsenal and seek parity at least with Russia absent overwhelming U.S. power. Russia's nuclear arsenal is engorged far beyond its strategic needs, and that arsenal has in fact been blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which evidently also falls outside the "ecumenical consensus." Some religious idealists imagine that disarming the West, mainly the U.S., will inspire and motivate the world to follow suit. Such expectation is based on a fundamentally and dangerously false view of global statecraft and human nature. **The power vacuum that American disarmament would create would inexorably lead to a far more dangerous and unstable world where nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would exponentially proliferate.** American military and nuclear hegemony for the last 70 years has sustained an historically unprecedented approximate global peace and facilitated an even more unprecedented global prosperity. **There is indeed a moral and strategic imperative for America today, which is to deploy its power against further nuclear proliferation and to deter aggression by current nuclear actors,** while also developing technologies and defensive weapons that neutralize nuclear armaments. If Iran's genocidally ambitious regime is in the end prevented from nuclearizing, it will only be thanks to American power. And if it does nuclearize, only American and Israeli nukes, perhaps joined by Saudi nukes, will deter its murderous designs. Christian teaching and humanity should demand no less.

## --sustainable

### **Hegemony is sustainable and resilient – Multiple warrants**

**Babones, 6-11-** [Salvatore Babones, Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, PhD in Sociology and Social Policy, Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 6-11-2015, American Hegemony Is Here to Stay: U.S. hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=2>] Jeong

IS RETREAT from global hegemony in America's national interest? No idea has percolated more widely over the past decade—and none is more bogus. **The United States is not headed for the skids and there is no reason it should be.** The truth is that America can and should seek to remain the world's top dog. The idea of American hegemony is as old as Benjamin Franklin, but has its practical roots in World War II. The United States emerged from that war as the dominant economic, political and technological power. The only major combatant to avoid serious damage to its infrastructure, its housing stock or its demographic profile, the United States ended the war with the greatest naval order of battle ever seen in the history of the world. It became the postwar home of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And, of course, the United States had the bomb. America was, in every sense of the word, a hegemon. "Hegemony" is a word used by social scientists to describe leadership within a system of competing states. The Greek historian Thucydides used the term to characterize the position of Athens in the Greek world in the middle of the fifth century BC. Athens had the greatest fleet in the Mediterranean; it was the home of Socrates and Plato, Sophocles and Aeschylus; it crowned its central Acropolis with the solid-marble temple to Athena known to history as the Parthenon. Athens had a powerful rival in Sparta, but no one doubted that Athens was the hegemon of the time until Sparta defeated it in a bitter twenty-seven-year war. America's only global rival in the twentieth century was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union never produced more than about half of America's total national output. Its nominal allies in Eastern Europe were in fact restive occupied countries, as were many of its constituent republics. Its client states overseas were at best partners of convenience, and at worst expensive drains on its limited resources. The Soviet Union had the power to resist American hegemony, but not to displace it. It had the bomb and an impressive space program, but little else. When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, American hegemony was complete. The United States sat at the top of the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This "unipolar moment" lasted a mere decade. September 11, 2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of China and reemergence of Russia put paid to the era of unchallenged American leadership. Now, America's internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, American hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of

**the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated.** America's costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world's seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers' wages have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration. If economic power forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons). When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were completely exhausted. Britain's public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just around the corner. This is not to argue that the U.S. government should ramp up taxes and spending, but it does illustrate the fact that it has enormous potential fiscal resources available to it, should it choose to use them. Deficits come and go. America's fiscal capacity in 2015 is stupendously greater than Great Britain's was in 1815. Financially, there is every reason to think that America's century lies in the future, not in the past. The same is true of the supposed exhaustion of the U.S. military. On the one hand, thirteen years of continuous warfare have reduced the readiness of many U.S. combat units, particularly in the army. On the other hand, U.S. troops are now far more experienced in actual combat than the forces of any other major military in the world. In any future conflict, the advantage given by this experience would likely outweigh any decline in effectiveness due to deferred maintenance and training. Constant deployment may place an unpleasant and unfair burden on U.S. service personnel and their families, but it **does not necessarily diminish the capability of the U.S. military.** On the contrary, **it may enhance it.** America's limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hardly the final throes of a passing hegemon. They are more akin to Britain's bloody but relatively inconsequential conflicts in Afghanistan and Crimea in the middle of the nineteenth century. Brutal wars like these repeatedly punctured, but never burst, British hegemony. In fact, Britain engaged in costly and sometimes disastrous conflicts throughout the century-long Pax

Britannica. British hegemony did not come to an end until the country faced Germany head-on in World War I. Even then, Britain ultimately prevailed (with American help). Its empire reached its maximum extent not before World War I but immediately after, in 1922.

### **No risk of power transitions – Multiple reasons for why hegemony is sustainable**

**Bremmer, 5-28** – [Ian Bremmer, American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk. PhD and M.A. from Stanford University in Political Science, 5-28-2015, These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World's Only Superpower, Time, <http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/>] Jeong

A 'superpower' is a country that wields enough military, political and economic might to convince nations in all parts of the world to do things they otherwise wouldn't. Pundits have rushed to label China the next superpower—and so have many ordinary Americans—but **the rumors of America's decline have been greatly exaggerated.** In the key categories of power, the U.S. will remain dominant for the foreseeable future. These facts show why America is still the world's only superpower, and why that won't change anytime soon.

1. Economics China's economy is growing at an impressive rate. But it's not just the size of an economy that matters—it's also the quality. According to the World Bank, GDP per capita in the US was \$53,042 in 2013; in China it was just \$6,807. In other words, little of China's dramatic economic growth is finding its way into the pockets of Chinese consumers—the byproduct of an economy driven by massive state-owned enterprises rather than private industry. China's headline growth may be higher, but it's the U.S. economy that's allowing its citizens to grow along with it. And crucially, the American economy remains the bedrock of the global financial system. Over 80% of all financial transactions worldwide are conducted in dollars, as are 87% of foreign currency market transactions. As long as the world continues to place such faith in America's currency and overall economic stability, the U.S. economy remains the one to beat.

**America's military superiority remains unrivaled—full stop.** The US accounts for 37% of global military spending, and spends more than four times what China, the world's No. 2 spender, does on its military. The U.S. dominates across land, sea, air and space. America's Middle East misadventures gave the U.S. military a black eye, but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan speak more to the changing nature of warfare than declining U.S. military superiority. Terrorists and guerilla fighters give conventional military powers fits by design. The U.S. must ultimately learn to scale down to better meet those challenges. Nevertheless, while conventional military strength might not deter terrorists, **it still does a terrific job of deterring hostile nations.** Political power comes in many dimensions. For the U.S., foreign aid is an effective way to cement its political clout globally. In 2013, the U.S. doled out \$32.7 billion in financial assistance; second was the UK at \$19 billion. Turns out that money buys strong political cooperation from countries in need. But in order to have political power abroad, you must first have stability at home. The U.S. has the oldest working national constitution in the world, as well as strong institutions

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and rule of law to accompany it. While far from perfect, the governing document created by America's founding fathers has evolved along with its people. The numbers show the enduring attraction of this system: 45 million people living in the U.S. today were born in a foreign country. That is more than four times higher than the next highest country. For many people around the world, America remains the ideal place to start a new life. Of the 9 largest tech companies in the world, 8 are based in the U.S. Give the growing importance of the technology sector, that's a big deal. For decades America worried about energy dependency, yet today America is the world's No. 1 producer of oil and natural gas, in large part due to the development of hydraulic fracturing, a product of public research and private energy. America's research universities and scientific institutions are best in class, allowing the nation to focus its ingenuity where it's needed most. And America is spending the money to keep its comparative advantage intact: 30% of all research and development dollars are spent in the U.S.



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**--specific scenarios**

**--econ**

**Hegemony solidifies economic stability and trade**

**Kim, 14** – [Aejung Kim, Correspondent with the Department of Political Science, Kent State University, Ohio, February 28, 2014, The Effects of the U.S. Hegemony on Economic Growth in East Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, <http://www.isca.in/IJSS/Archive/v3/i4/1.ISCA-IRJSS-2013-210.pdf>, pg. 2] Jeong

Although there is a difficulty in defining hegemony, hegemony is categorized as four groups: structural, behavioural, issue-specific, and multiissue hegemony<sup>8</sup>. Among four hegemonies, the term of structural hegemony was frequently used to depict the U.S. hegemony<sup>9-10</sup>. Based on this structural hegemony, the asymmetrical distribution of resources in the interstate system produces structural power contributing to the development of hegemony. Great Britain and the United States were historically described as the hegemonic leaderships playing a pivotal role in global economic interdependence. While Great Britain was a hegemon from the Napoleonic Wars to World War I, the United States has been a hegemon since World War II<sup>10-11</sup>. After the Cold War, there have been some debates about how sustainable the U.S. hegemonic power is. Realists have argued that the global system is viewed as anarchic based on self-help strategies, and major powers will balance the US power<sup>12</sup>. Unlike realists' argument, the United States still today plays a hegemonic role in different ways<sup>13</sup>. Hegemonic stability theory argues that it is imperative for one state to be predominant enough to create and maintain stable international regimes. The stability of hegemonic system elaborates the openness of international regimes based on the logic of collective goods. According to the theory, tremendously unbalanced distribution of resources in the postwar period provides one state with sufficient power that helps the state to be capable of supplying the international economic stability with its own motivation<sup>10</sup>. However, what if a hegemon does not have sufficient motivations? What is the consequence of a hegemonic role when there is no motivation or different motivation? Can economic instability be a possible answer as an opposite result? If it is this case, what makes a hegemon possess a different motivation? The literature on hegemonic stability theory fails to explain the variety of power dimensions by mainly focusing on the power with material resources, and the implications of the loss of the U.S. hegemonic power<sup>14</sup>. Given the weakness of hegemonic stability theory, this paper attempts to look at a different dimension of the hegemonic power system beyond the typical hegemonic stability arguments. Different geostrategic circumstances of the U.S. hegemony in different regions generate a condition for a hegemon to have a diverse motivation critical to economic performance. The **paper is designed to explain how the U.S. hegemon has an impact on economic performances in different regions** (i.e. East Asia and the MENA). East Asia: It was the end of the Pacific War, 1945, when the US model of laissez-faire was intruded on Northeast Asian countries giving strong pressures to change their industrial organization model into a liberal model of nonintervention<sup>15</sup>. **The economy of East Asia was significantly influenced by the US aid and the presence of**

**the US troops.** By the mid-1980s, they became the major trading partners with the United States and their multinational corporations played a conspicuous role in international system<sup>16</sup>. In an effort of the United States to contain the Soviet Union and Chinese communism, East Asia has been used as a battlefield since the Cold War supplying a vital geo-strategic circumstance for sudden economic development<sup>17</sup>. The East Asian region was susceptible for Communist penetration without a strong and rapid recovery from its devastated economy<sup>8</sup>. Cummings' works illustrate how a hegemonic system is crucial for the regional political economy in East Asian countries. Japan's monetary and trade policies were adjusted to restore trade after American occupation in Japan. In the postwar, **the United States did not only provide Taiwan and South Korea with military and economic aid, but also had a profound effect on economic policies in two countries even by sometimes tolerating import substitution in Taiwan and South Korea**<sup>18</sup>. The predominance of the U.S. hegemonic power, driven by geostrategic situation such as communist containment, formed the appropriate environment where trade has been intensified in the region<sup>15</sup>. By linking to the multilateral international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and alliances such as The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. hegemony has attempted to change other countries' own interests. The hegemonic system strongly maintains when the policies of a hegemon create benefit recipients in the region. The groups motivated by those benefits pressure their government to seek for policies fortifying the hegemonic strategies<sup>9</sup>. In the East Asian region, the U.S. hegemony was willing to foster economic growth in the region rather than deter it since the region has been a politically strategic place since the Cold War. In this case, the logic is that the stronger the country's economy is, the more benefits the hegemon earns. Sustained economic growth in East Asian countries could keep American power against the Communist sides and make strong allies among the countries in this region. South Korea was weak enough to change their ideology to communism right after 1953, the end of the Korean War. When its economy becomes stronger with the help of the U.S., it does not find any reason to move toward the Communist country. In the post-1945 years, the U.S. commitment to supporting free trade shaped the trading system with multilateral agreements by letting Japan and its neighbors get involved in the U.S. market. This system also increased the regional trade relations<sup>15</sup>. In conclusion, **the U.S. has had strong economic ties with East Asian countries with the geostrategic motivation of containing the communism.**

## --great power war

### **US Leadership solidifies international peace – Current policies prove retrenchment incentivizes great power wars**

**Bresler, 6-24** – [ Robert J. Bresler, Penn State Harrisburg professor emeritus of public policy, 6-24-2015, Obama-led US withdrawal has destabilized the world, Lancaster Online, [http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-world/article\\_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html](http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html)] Jeong

American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with political stability and economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and assist in economic development. **These initiatives prevented another great power war,** achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. **None would have happened without strong and persistent American leadership.** The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression, that also eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. **In the Middle East,** the Arab States and Israel saw the **U.S. as an honest broker,** assisting in the negotiation of peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there has been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective. Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of American support. Hence, **China, Russia and Iran are asserting hegemonic claims.** The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. **The United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa;** the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putin's military swallows the country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. **When the Obama administration made concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear club.** In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its own devices by Obama's withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim Brotherhood. **Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling abandoned by Obama's rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet.** **Warlordism and radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa.** A combination of devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, **America provided that force with persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust.** As the Obama administration

allows the U.S. to slip into the shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.

### **US Primacy prevents Great Power Wars – Anything else escalates and goes nuclear**

**Ikenberry, 14** – [Gilford John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, May/June 2014, The Illusion of Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics>] Jeong

Mead also mischaracterizes the thrust of U.S. foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, he argues, the United States has ignored geopolitical issues involving territory and spheres of influence and instead adopted a Pollyannaish emphasis on building the global order. But this is a false dichotomy. The United States does not focus on issues of global order, such as arms control and trade, because it assumes that geopolitical conflict is gone forever; it undertakes such efforts precisely because it wants to manage great-power competition. Order building is not premised on the end of geopolitics; it is about how to answer the big questions of geopolitics. Indeed, the construction of a U.S.-led global order did not begin with the end of the Cold War; it won the Cold War. In the nearly 70 years since World War II, Washington has undertaken sustained efforts to build a far-flung system of multilateral institutions, alliances, trade agreements, and political partnerships. This project has helped draw countries into the United States' orbit. It has helped strengthen global norms and rules that undercut the legitimacy of nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence, bids for regional domination, and territorial grabs. And it has given the United States the capacities, partnerships, and principles to confront today's great-power spoilers and revisionists, such as they are. Alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, democracy -- these are the tools of U.S. leadership, and they are winning, not losing, the twenty-first-century struggles over geopolitics and the world order. THE GENTLE GIANT In 1904, the English geographer Halford Mackinder wrote that the great power that controlled the heartland of Eurasia would command "the World-Island" and thus the world itself. For Mead, Eurasia has returned as the great prize of geopolitics. Across the far reaches of this supercontinent, he argues, China, Iran, and Russia are seeking to establish their spheres of influence and challenge U.S. interests, slowly but relentlessly attempting to dominate Eurasia and thereby threaten the United States and the rest of the world. This vision misses a deeper reality. In matters of geopolitics (not to mention demographics, politics, and ideas), the United States has a decisive advantage over China, Iran, and Russia. Although the United States will no doubt come down from the peak of hegemony that it occupied during the unipolar era, its power is still unrivaled. Its wealth and technological advantages remain far out of the reach of China and Russia, to say nothing of Iran. Its recovering economy, now bolstered by massive new

natural gas resources, allows it to maintain a global military presence and credible security commitments. Indeed, Washington enjoys a unique ability to win friends and influence states. According to a study led by the political scientist Brett Ashley Leeds, the United States boasts military partnerships with more than 60 countries, whereas Russia counts eight formal allies and China has just one (North Korea). As one British diplomat told me several years ago, “China doesn’t seem to do alliances.” But the United States does, and they pay a double dividend: not only do alliances provide a global platform for the projection of U.S. power, but they also distribute the burden of providing security. The military capabilities aggregated in this U.S.-led alliance system outweigh anything China or Russia might generate for decades to come. **Then there are the nuclear weapons.** These arms, which the United States, China, and Russia all possess (and Iran is seeking), help the United States in two ways. First, thanks to the logic of mutual assured destruction, they radically reduce the likelihood of great-power war. Such upheavals have provided opportunities for past great powers, including the United States in World War II, to entrench their own international orders. The atomic age has robbed China and Russia of this opportunity. Second, nuclear weapons also make China and Russia more secure, giving them assurance that the United States will never invade. That’s a good thing, because **it reduces the likelihood that they will resort to desperate moves, born of insecurity, that risk war and undermine the liberal order.** Geography reinforces the United States’ other advantages. As the only great power not surrounded by other great powers, the country has appeared less threatening to other states and was able to rise dramatically over the course of the last century without triggering a war. After the Cold War, when the United States was the world’s sole superpower, other global powers, oceans away, did not even attempt to balance against it. In fact, the United States’ geographic position has led other countries to worry more about abandonment than domination. Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have sought to draw the United States into playing a greater role in their regions. The result is what the historian Geir Lundestad has called an “empire by invitation.” The United States’ geographic advantage is on full display in Asia. Most countries there see China as a greater potential danger -- due to its proximity, if nothing else -- than the United States. Except for the United States, every major power in the world lives in a crowded geopolitical neighborhood where shifts in power routinely provoke counterbalancing -- including by one another. China is discovering this dynamic today as surrounding states react to its rise by modernizing their militaries and reinforcing their alliances. Russia has known it for decades, and has faced it most recently in Ukraine, which in recent years has increased its military spending and sought closer ties to the EU. Geographic isolation has also given the United States reason to champion universal principles that allow it to access various regions of the world. The country has long promoted the open-door policy and the principle of self-determination and opposed colonialism -- less out of a sense of idealism than due to the practical realities of keeping Europe, Asia, and the Middle East open for trade and diplomacy. In the late 1930s, the main question facing the United States was how large a geopolitical space, or “grand area,” it would need to exist as a great power in

a world of empires, regional blocs, and spheres of influence. World War II made the answer clear: the country's prosperity and security depended on access to every region. And in the ensuing decades, with some important and damaging exceptions, such as Vietnam, the United States has embraced postimperial principles. It was during these postwar years that geopolitics and order building converged. A liberal international framework was the answer that statesmen such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and George Marshall offered to the challenge of Soviet expansionism. The system they built strengthened and enriched the United States and its allies, to the detriment of its illiberal opponents. It also stabilized the world economy and established mechanisms for tackling global problems. The end of the Cold War has not changed the logic behind this project. Fortunately, the liberal principles that Washington has pushed enjoy near-universal appeal, because they have tended to be a good fit with the modernizing forces of economic growth and social advancement. As the historian Charles Maier has put it, the United States surfed the wave of twentieth-century modernization. But some have argued that this congruence between the American project and the forces of modernity has weakened in recent years. The 2008 financial crisis, the thinking goes, marked a world-historical turning point, at which the United States lost its vanguard role in facilitating economic advancement. Yet even if that were true, it hardly follows that China and Russia have replaced the United States as the standard-bearers of the global economy. Even Mead does not argue that China, Iran, or Russia offers the world a new model of modernity. If these illiberal powers really do threaten Washington and the rest of the liberal capitalist world, then they will need to find and ride the next great wave of modernization. They are unlikely to do that.

**A US led International Order is the only deterrent to Nuclear War – Allied institutions, geopolitical bargains, and democratic partnerships incentivize peace.**

**Ikenberry, 14** – [Gilford John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, May/June 2014, The Illusion of Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics>] Jeong

REVISIONISM REVISITED Not only does Mead underestimate the strength of the United States and the order it built; he also overstates the degree to which China and Russia are seeking to resist both. (Apart from its nuclear ambitions, Iran looks like a state engaged more in futile protest than actual resistance, so it shouldn't be considered anything close to a revisionist power.) **Without a doubt, China and Russia desire greater regional influence.** China has made aggressive claims over maritime rights and nearby contested islands, and it has embarked on an arms buildup. Putin has visions of

reclaiming Russia's dominance in its "near abroad." **Both great powers bristle at U.S. leadership and resist it when they can. But China and Russia are not true revisionists.** As former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami has said, Putin's foreign policy is "more a reflection of his resentment of Russia's geopolitical marginalization than a battle cry from a rising empire." China, of course, is an actual rising power, and this does invite dangerous competition with U.S. allies in Asia. But China is not currently trying to break those alliances or overthrow the wider system of regional security governance embodied in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the East Asia Summit. And even if China harbors ambitions of eventually doing so, U.S. security partnerships in the region are, if anything, getting stronger, not weaker. At most, China and Russia are spoilers. They do not have the interests -- let alone the ideas, capacities, or allies -- to lead them to upend existing global rules and institutions. In fact, although they resent that the United States stands at the top of the current geopolitical system, they embrace the underlying logic of that framework, and with good reason. Openness gives them access to trade, investment, and technology from other societies. Rules give them tools to protect their sovereignty and interests. Despite controversies over the new idea of "the responsibility to protect" (which has been applied only selectively), the current world order enshrines the age-old norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. Those Westphalian principles remain the bedrock of world politics -- and China and Russia have tied their national interests to them (despite Putin's disturbing irredentism). It should come as no surprise, then, that China and Russia have become deeply integrated into the existing international order. They are both permanent members of the UN Security Council, with veto rights, and they both participate actively in the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G-20. They are geopolitical insiders, sitting at all the high tables of global governance. China, despite its rapid ascent, has no ambitious global agenda; it remains fixated inward, on preserving party rule. Some Chinese intellectuals and political figures, such as Yan Xuetong and Zhu Chenghu, do have a wish list of revisionist goals. They see the Western system as a threat and are waiting for the day when China can reorganize the international order. But these voices do not reach very far into the political elite. Indeed, Chinese leaders have moved away from their earlier calls for sweeping change. In 2007, at its Central Committee meeting, the Chinese Communist Party replaced previous proposals for a "new international economic order" with calls for more modest reforms centering on fairness and justice. The Chinese scholar Wang Jisi has argued that this move is "subtle but important," shifting China's orientation toward that of a global reformer. China now wants a larger role in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater voice in such forums as the G-20, and wider global use of its currency. That is not the agenda of a country trying to revise the economic order. China and Russia are also members in good standing of the nuclear club. The centerpiece of the Cold War settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union (and then Russia) was a shared effort to limit atomic weapons. Although U.S.-Russian relations have since soured, the nuclear component of their arrangement has held. In 2010, Moscow and



Washington signed the New START treaty, which requires mutual reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. Before the 1990s, China was a nuclear outsider. Although it had a modest arsenal, it saw itself as a voice of the nonnuclear developing world and criticized arms control agreements and test bans. But in a remarkable shift, China has since come to support the array of nuclear accords, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It has affirmed a “no first use” doctrine, kept its arsenal small, and taken its entire nuclear force off alert. China has also played an active role in the Nuclear Security Summit, an initiative proposed by Obama in 2009, and it has joined the “P5 process,” a collaborate effort to safeguard nuclear weapons. Across a wide range of issues, China and Russia are acting more like established great powers than revisionist ones. They often choose to shun multilateralism, but so, too, on occasion do the United States and other powerful democracies. (Beijing has ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; Washington has not.) And China and Russia are using global rules and institutions to advance their own interests. **Their struggles with the United States revolve around gaining voice within the existing order and manipulating it to suit their needs.** They wish to enhance their positions within the system, but they are not trying to replace it. HERE TO STAY Ultimately, even if China and Russia do attempt to contest the basic terms of the current global order, the adventure will be daunting and self-defeating. These powers aren’t just up against the United States; they would also have to contend with the most globally organized and deeply entrenched order the world has ever seen, one that is dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. **This order is backed by a U.S.-led network of alliances, institutions, geopolitical bargains, client states, and democratic partnerships.** It has proved dynamic and expansive, easily integrating rising states, beginning with Japan and Germany after World War II. It has shown a capacity for shared leadership, as exemplified by such forums as the G-8 and the G-20. It has allowed rising non-Western countries to trade and grow, sharing the dividends of modernization. It has accommodated a surprisingly wide variety of political and economic models -- social democratic (western Europe), neoliberal (the United Kingdom and the United States), and state capitalist (East Asia). The prosperity of nearly every country -- and the stability of its government -- fundamentally depends on this order. In the age of liberal order, revisionist struggles are a fool’s errand. Indeed, China and Russia know this. They do not have grand visions of an alternative order. For them, international relations are mainly about the search for commerce and resources, the protection of their sovereignty, and, where possible, regional domination. They have shown no interest in building their own orders or even taking full responsibility for the current one and have offered no alternative visions of global economic or political progress. That’s a critical shortcoming, since international orders rise and fall not simply with the power of the leading state; their success also hinges on whether they are seen as legitimate and whether their actual operation solves problems that both weak and powerful states care about. In the struggle for world order, China and Russia (and certainly Iran) are simply not in the game. Under these circumstances, the **United States should not give up its efforts to**

**strengthen the liberal order.** The world that Washington inhabits today is one it should welcome. And the grand strategy it should pursue is the one it has followed for decades: deep global engagement. It is a strategy in which the United States ties itself to the regions of the world through trade, alliances, multilateral institutions, and diplomacy. It is a strategy in which the United States establishes leadership not simply through the exercise of power but also through sustained efforts at global problem solving and rule making. It created a world that is friendly to American interests, and it is made friendly because, as President John F. Kennedy once said, it is a world “where the weak are safe and the strong are just.”

### **Hegemony solves great power war – countries want relative power to their rivals**

**Mearsheimer 14** -- Professor of political science at the University of Chicago, PhD in international relations (John J., “Realism Reader,” edited by Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen, London ; New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 179-188, tony)

State behavior Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany. 8 The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the “911” problem- **the absence of a central authority to which a threatened state can turn for help- and states have even greater incentive to fear each other.** Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, lends to be intense, because the stakes are great. **States in the international system also aim to**

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**guarantee their own survival.** Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. **Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival.** In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from fanning alliances.<sup>9</sup> But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. **States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states,** or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul. Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. **The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival.** Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible."<sup>10</sup> Survival would then be almost guaranteed. <sup>11</sup> Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means- economic, diplomatic, and military-to shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one state's gain in power is another state's loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. **The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system.** Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, **even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive.** In short, **great powers have aggressive intentions.** <sup>12</sup>

### --laundry list

#### **Hegemony is the only solution – Solves terrorism, global conflicts, and economic stability**

**Babones, 6-11-** [Salvatore Babones, Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, PhD in Sociology and Social Policy, Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 6-11-2015, American Hegemony Is Here to Stay: U.S. hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=3> and 4] Jeong

In the twenty-first century, the United States effectively claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force worldwide. Whether or not it makes this claim in so many words, it makes it through its policies and actions, and America's monopoly on the legitimate use of force is generally accepted by most of the governments (if not the peoples) of the world. That is not to say that all American uses of force are accepted as legitimate, but that all uses of force that are accepted as legitimate are either American or actively supported by the United States. The world condemns Russian intervention in Ukraine but accepts Saudi intervention in Yemen, and of course it looks to the United States to solve conflicts in places like Libya, Syria and Iraq. The United States has not conquered the world, but most of the world's governments (with the exceptions of countries such as Russia, Iran and China) and major intergovernmental organizations accept America's lead. Very often they ask for it. This American domination of global affairs extends well beyond hegemony. In the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom was a global hegemon. Britannia ruled the waves, and from its domination of the oceans it derived extraordinary influence over global affairs. But China, France, Germany, Russia and later Japan continually challenged the legitimacy of British domination and tested it at every turn. Major powers certainly believed that they could engage independently in global statecraft and acted on that belief. France did not seek British permission to conquer its colonies; Germany did not seek British permission to conquer France. Twenty-first-century America dominates the world to an extent completely unmatched by nineteenth-century Britain. **There is no conflict anywhere in the world in which the United States is not in some way involved.** More to the point, **participants in conflicts everywhere in the world, no matter how remote, expect the United States to be involved.** Revisionists ranging from pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine to Bolivian peasant farmers who want to chew coca leaves see the United States as the power against which they are rebelling. The United States is much more than the world's policeman. It is the world's lawgiver. The world state of so many fictional utopias and dystopias is here, and it is not a nameless postmodern entity called global governance. It is America. Another word for a world state that dominates all others is an "empire," a word that Americans of all political persuasions abhor. For FDR liberals it challenges cherished principles of internationalism and fair play. For Jeffersonian conservatives it reeks of foreign adventurism. For today's neoliberals it undermines faith in the primacy of market

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competition over political manipulation. And for neoconservatives it implies an unwelcome responsibility for the welfare of the world beyond America's shores. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the United States has become an imperial world state—a world-empire—that sets the ground rules for smooth running of the global economy, imposes its will largely without constraint and without consideration of the reasonable desires of other countries, and severely punishes those few states and nonstate actors that resist its dictates. No one ever likes an empire, but despite Ronald Reagan's memorable phrase, the word "empire" is not inseparably linked to the word "evil." When it comes to understanding empire, history is probably a better guide than science fiction. Consider the Roman Empire. For several centuries after the ascension of Augustus, life under Rome was generally freer, safer and more prosperous than it had been under the previously independent states. Perhaps it was not better for the enslaved or for the Druids, and certainly not for the Jews, but for most people of the ancient Mediterranean, imperial Rome brought vast improvements most of the time. ANCIENT ANALOGIES notwithstanding, no one would seriously suggest that the United States should attempt to directly rule the rest of the world, and there is no indication that the rest of the world would let it. But the United States could manage its empire more effectively, which is something that the rest of the world would welcome. A winning strategy for low-cost, effective management of empire would be for America to work with and through the system of global governance that America itself has set up, rather than systematically seeking to blunt its own instruments of power. For example, the United States was instrumental in setting up the International Criminal Court, yet Washington will not place itself under the jurisdiction of the ICC and will not allow its citizens to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Similarly, though the United States is willing to use UN Security Council resolutions to censure its enemies, it is not willing to accept negotiated limits on its own freedom of action. From a purely military-political standpoint, the United States is sufficiently powerful to go it alone. But from a broader realist standpoint that takes account of the full costs and unintended consequences of military action, that is a suboptimal strategy. Had the United States listened to dissenting opinions on the Security Council before the invasion of Iraq, it would have saved hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives. The United States might similarly have done well to have heeded Russian reservations over Libya, as it ultimately did in responding to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. A more responsible (and consequently more effective) United States would subject itself to the international laws and agreements that it expects others to follow. It would genuinely seek to reduce its nuclear arsenal in line with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would use slow but sure police procedures to catch terrorists, instead of quick but messy drone strikes. It would disavow all forms of torture. All of these policies would save American treasure while increasing American power. They would also increase America's ability to say "no" to its allies when they demand expensive U.S. commitments to protect their interests abroad. Such measures would not ensure global peace, nor would they necessarily endear the United States to everyone across the world. But

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they would reduce global tensions and make it easier for America to act in its national interests where those interests are truly at stake. Both the United States and the world as a whole would be better off if Washington did not waste time, money and diplomatic capital on asserting every petty sovereign right it is capable of enforcing. **A more strategic United States would preside over a more peaceful and prosperous world.**

## **--Middle East Conflict**

### **No risk of overstretch – Military expansion solves Middle Eastern Escalation**

**Continetti, 14** – [Matthew Continetti, Editor-in-chief of The Washington Free Beacon, Graduate from Columbia University, 10-11-14, Accept No Substitutes, National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/390095/accept-no-substitutes-matthew-continetti>] Jeong

Two months ago, President Obama authorized bombing Islamic State forces in Iraq. One month ago, President Obama authorized bombing Islamic State forces in Syria. His plan: couple American air power with indigenous ground forces. “This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines,” Obama said last month, “is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years.” I disagree with his use of the adverb “successfully.” But Yemen and Somalia are exactly what we’re getting. Disordered and violent spaces, desultory and pinprick strikes, incompetent and wary allies, determined and implacable enemies — this is the Greater Middle East of Yemen and Somalia, this is the Greater Middle East of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The Islamic State continues to hold territory and make gains. The Pentagon, Rowan Scarborough reports, fears that the terrorist army is planning to capture Baghdad International Airport, using it as a base for urban warfare in the Iraqi capital. In the east, Islamic State forces have laid siege to the Kurdish town of Kobani, held at bay only by a slapdash increase in U.S. airstrikes. “I am fearful that Kobani will fall,” General Martin Dempsey said this week. You’re not alone, General. Why don’t you do something about it? I must know better than to ask such questions. Dempsey’s boss, President Obama, is more interested in avoiding the use of large numbers of ground forces than he is in actually seeing the Islamic State defeated. So he leaves the heavy fighting to our “partners.” But the partners are confused, inept. They are silent. And the enemy is gaining. **Without large numbers of American troops on the ground in Iraq, we lack the ability to choose targets, to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi army quickly and successfully, to constrain the Shiite government from pursuing a sectarian agenda.** Without large numbers of troops in Syria, we are unable to distinguish between friend and foe, to train and direct non-al-Qaeda opposition forces, to address the humanitarian crisis, and to prepare for — and hasten — a world without Bashar Assad. **Without the demonstration of American power and commitment that ground troops represent, allies such as Iraq and Turkey and Jordan and Saudi Arabia will not take the mission seriously.** Instead they will interpret the president’s actions as addressing a political problem — the appearance of weakness at home — instead of a geopolitical one — a growing al-Qaeda state that serves as the launching pad for jihad near and far. “People are not convinced that the American strategy is comprehensive and long-term and decisive,” said analyst Fawaz Gerges — no neocon he — on MSNBC on Thursday. There is no reason to believe the people are wrong. The president understands that America is the only country with the reach and power to end global crises. He says as much every day on

the fundraising circuit. “On every single issue of importance,” he told George Soros and others in New York City on Tuesday, “when there are challenges and there are opportunities around the world, it’s not Moscow they call; it’s not Beijing. They call us.” True. But they seem to be calling less and less. What Obama fails to grasp: It’s not enough to simply take the call. It’s not enough to deploy the minimum amount of force — increased air strikes, detachments to secure government facilities or treat Ebola patients or find Kony — in order to prevent imminent massacres, and to salve guilty consciences. You have to be ready to assume the responsibilities of hegemony, commit to the unpopular necessities in a 30-year-war against jihadism. **Necessities such as long-term bases, overseas deployments, prisons at Guantanamo Bay — necessities such as saying what you mean, so that when you pledge that the United States “will do our part to help”** Libya recover from Qaddafi, the help arrives; when you say Assad must go, he goes; when you admit a red line has been crossed, the interlopers pay; when you address the nation twice in two months to announce a campaign against an enemy determined to strike the United States, you treat that campaign with all the seriousness and tenacity and sense of mission it requires. If only. A future president — and with the way Obama is handling the Middle East, we will be dealing with the Islamic State and other hazards for many years indeed — needs to take a look at the strategic plan devised by Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute and Kimberly Kagan and Jessica Lewis of the Institute for the Study of War. “U.S. forces need to play the role of honest broker once again, as they did in 2007 and 2008,” the Kagans wrote recently in the Los Angeles Times. “But they can only play that role if they are present.” The Kagans say 25,000 troops are necessary to reverse enemy gains. Unpopular? For sure. Risky? You bet. The job of a president, however, is not to do the popular or safe thing. It’s to do the right thing. And if defeating the Islamic State before it has a chance to strike America is the right thing — and it surely is — then the president must choose the appropriate means to that end. In September 2003, The Weekly Standard published a cover story calling for more troops in Iraq. The headline was “Accept No Substitutes.” More than a decade later, the same rule applies. Until Americans are on the ground in large numbers in Iraq and Syria, until the U.S. government faces the fact that there is no way to defeat the Islamic State without also defeating Assad, our enemies will have the upper hand. And all of us — Christians, Jews, and Muslims, in the Middle East, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in America — will be at risk.

### **Instability causes Nuclear War – Multiple Reasons**

**Krepinevich, 13** – [Andrew F. Krepinevich, West Point graduate, he holds an M.P.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he joined following a 21- year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board, 2013, Critical MASS Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, file:///Users/user/Downloads/Nuclear-Proliferation-in-the-Middle-East.pdf , Conclusion] Jeong



Contrary to the prevailing wisdom in some quarters that Cold War models of deterrence will apply, a Middle East in which two hostile competitor powers—in this case, Iran and Israel—**have nuclear weapons promises to be highly unstable.** In part, this may stem from each side’s lack of insight into how its competitor calculates cost, benefit, and risk, leaving the door open for miscalculation. Regardless, there exists a structural instability in the competition owing to the exceedingly short missile flight times between states in the region and the costs (both financial and technical) of fielding, maintaining, and operating effective early warning and command and control systems. **Instability is heightened further due to the prospect that a third party might seek to trigger a catalytic war between two other states.** For example, firing ballistic or cruise missiles at one nuclear-armed state would be interpreted as an attack by its nuclear rival. Using cyber weapons to introduce false information into an early warning system may also be a means of triggering a catalytic war. Should Iran acquire a nuclear capability, intense pressure among some other states in the region to pursue nuclear weapons will likely emerge. If the region is host to a Shi’a/Persian bomb and a Jewish/Israeli bomb, then pride and honor, to say nothing of security, may “require” a Turkish bomb and a Sunni Arab bomb. The result would almost certainly be a ratcheting up of regional instability. Powers external to the region will likely seek to influence the competition and improve their standing with key regional powers by offering key technologies and capabilities that could greatly compromise regional stability in an already turbulent environment. **Preventing a proliferated Middle East may be beyond the capabilities of the United States or the international community.** Given the consequences of such an environment, however, all options for preventing this possibility should be thoroughly explored. At the same time, a hedging strategy must be developed that positions the United States and the international community to maximize the prospects of preserving both regional stability and the sixty-eight-year-old tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. Toward this end, a rich menu of plausible scenarios should be examined to identify ways in which deterrence might fail and, correspondingly, possible options to strengthen the barriers to nuclear use.

**--prolif**

**US Primacy guarantees successful deterrence measures – Checks global escalations**

**Mitchell, 14** – [ George J. Mitchell, B.L from Georgetown University, officer in the US Army Counter-Intelligence Corps, Trial Lawyer in the US Justice Department, former US special envoy to the Middle East and US Senate majority leader, chairman emeritus of the international law firm, 9-9-2014, US the only power that can push for peace America's prosperity and world dominance will extend into the future, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/09/08/america-only-power-that-can-push-for-peace-between-israel-palestinians/H4v87uWSKdWMdkvJuR0fYM/story.html>] Jeong

As the world's dominant power, the United States enjoys many benefits. But it also incurs many burdens, not the least of which is the widespread impression of American omnipotence. When I speak in Asia, I like to tell a story: A businessman in Pakistan wakes up one morning and goes into the bathroom to take a shower. But, when he turns on the faucet, there's no hot water. "Ah," he says, "Obama and the CIA, again." For some, every problem in the world is an American problem. The reality, of course, is that the United States' ability to control events in the world is limited. Many pundits and analysts, citing that reality, see the country in decline. I disagree. Though it may not be able to control events, the United States does have unequalled power to influence them. And, in the coming decades, that power will grow, not wane. Still, as the world's population increases, as the size and influence of China and India grow, as political turmoil rises, the United States will face many new challenges in deciding how to deploy its political, economic, and military power. But even in the face of these misperceptions and challenges, the United States can and must remain engaged in seeking peace in the Middle East. It took 1,800 years after the birth of Christ for the earth's population to reach 1 billion. The most recent billion — the 7th — was added in 13 years. The United Nations projects that by 2050, the world population will reach about 9.5 billion people. It will later peak around 10 billion, then level off and begin to decline. Most of the growth will be in Asia and Africa. Of the current population, one in five is Muslim, about 1.2 billion. Fifty years from now, one in three will be Muslim, or about 3.5 billion. To put that figure into perspective, that was the total population of the world as recently as 1970. Although we should be skeptical of all human predictions (including population projections), the overwhelming military dominance achieved by the United States makes it unlikely that there will be a major war among large nation-states in the foreseeable future. In that sense, the world is a safer place today than it was in the 20th century when more than 75 million people died in two world wars in countries where the population was much smaller than it is today.

### **Hegemony acts as a global deterrent – Maintains stability vis a vis primacy and globalization**

**Jacobs, 14** – [Ryan Timothy Jacobs, Graduate from University of North Carolina in International Studies, 6-27-2014, Why U.S. Hegemonic Power is Essential for Future Global Stabilization, [https://www.academia.edu/7784026/Why\\_the\\_U.S.\\_Hegemonic\\_Power\\_is\\_Essential\\_for\\_Future\\_Global\\_Stabilization](https://www.academia.edu/7784026/Why_the_U.S._Hegemonic_Power_is_Essential_for_Future_Global_Stabilization)] Jeong

In contrast, the political structure of a hegemony primarily differs from an empire on the notion of the political power having final authority. Also, a hegemony is not a political unit that rules over another unit that is "separate and alien to it." The Online Etymology Dictionary defines the term "hegemony", "(1560s) from Greek hegemonia "leadership, a leading the way, a going first;" also "the authority or sovereignty of one city-state over a number of others," as Athens in Attica, Thebes in Boeotia; from hegemon "leader," from hegeisthai "to lead," perhaps originally "to track down," from PIE \*sag-eyo-, from root \*sag- "to seek out, track down, trace". Originally of predominance of one city state or another in Greek history; in reference to modern situations from 1860, at first of Prussia in relation to other German states. 4 This leadership, and authority is commonly utilized to influence others to develop similarly in order to create a stable, international relationship. **Presently, as the hegemonic power, the United States seeks to produce democracy and capitalism; which focus on human rights and free trade.** Another interesting explanation of a hegemonic power is illustrated by Italian Marxist Gramsci in 1971, as "the supremacy of a social group manifest(ing) itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'" and "the 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent." 5 In addition, addressing the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (HST) is imperative for this research. HST is based on the idea that the international system can only remain stable if there is a single dominant state that regulates the interactions of other states in the system. The hegemonic power must have the power, will and commitment to enforce the rules. It must also be perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. The capability rests upon three attributes: a large, growing economy; dominance in a leading technological or economic sector; and political power backed up by projective military. 6 The Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics from Mount Holyoke College, Vincent Ferraro cites four nation-states that have been hegemonic powers: Portugal, Holland, Britain (at two points in history); and of course, the United States (to present day). After World War II, when the United States was recognized as the hegemonic power by its Western allies, international stability has relied upon U.S. dominance. Therefore states that threaten the stability of the western hegemonic power also fulminate global stability. **It is essential that the United States continues to play the predominant international role that it does today for many years to come.** As technology is rapidly expanding, one of the most important areas that U.S. involvement is necessary is

communications. "The United States technological assets-including its leadership in piloting social networking and rapid communications-give it an advantage, but the Internet also will continue to boost the power of nonstate actors. In most cases, US power will need to be enhanced through relevant outside networks, friends, and affiliates that can coalesce on any particular issue. Leadership will be a function of position, enmeshment, diplomatic skill, and constructive demeanor." 7 **Furthermore, future global stabilization requires the U.S. to advance developments in other facets of technology (weaponry, transportation, etc.), as it will be crucial for defense and peacekeeping operations,** as well. With the strengthening of international law, and success of the United Nations (U.N.), the U.S. would have the capability of assuring such stability. This would constitute the U.S., enshrined in democracy; as not only one of the beneficiaries of global stability, but also a body politic that exemplifies durability over time.

### **US Leadership is crucial to maintain democratic peace and check nuclear proliferation**

**Ikenberry, 14** – [Gilford John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, May/June 2014, The Illusion of Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics>] Jeong

RISE OF DEMOCRACY Mead's vision of a contest over Eurasia between the United States and China, Iran, and Russia misses the more profound power transition under way: the increasing ascendancy of liberal capitalist democracy. To be sure, many liberal democracies are struggling at the moment with slow economic growth, social inequality, and political instability. But the spread of liberal democracy throughout the world, beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating after the Cold War, has dramatically strengthened the United States' position and tightened the geopolitical circle around China and Russia. It's easy to forget how rare liberal democracy once was. Until the twentieth century, it was confined to the West and parts of Latin America. After World War II, however, it began to reach beyond those realms, as newly independent states established self-rule. During the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, military coups and new dictators put the brakes on democratic transitions. But in the late 1970s, what the political scientist Samuel Huntington termed "the third wave" of democratization washed over southern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia. Then the Cold War ended, and a cohort of former communist states in eastern Europe were brought into the democratic fold. By the late 1990s, 60 percent of all countries had become democracies. Although some backsliding has occurred, the more significant trend has been the emergence of a group of democratic middle powers, including Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey. These rising democracies are acting as stakeholders in the international system: pushing for multilateral cooperation,

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seeking greater rights and responsibilities, and exercising influence through peaceful means. Such countries lend the liberal world order new geopolitical heft. As the political scientist Larry Diamond has noted, if Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey regain their economic footing and strengthen their democratic rule, the G-20, which also includes the United States and European countries, “will have become a strong ‘club of democracies,’ with only Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia holding out.” The rise of a global middle class of democratic states has turned China and Russia into outliers -- not, as Mead fears, legitimate contestants for global leadership. In fact, the democratic upsurge has been deeply problematic for both countries. In eastern Europe, former Soviet states and satellites have gone democratic and joined the West. As worrisome as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s moves in Crimea have been, they reflect Russia’s geopolitical vulnerability, not its strength. Over the last two decades, the West has crept closer to Russia’s borders. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland entered NATO. They were joined in 2004 by seven more former members of the Soviet bloc, and in 2009, by Albania and Croatia. In the meantime, six former Soviet republics have headed down the path to membership by joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Mead makes much of Putin’s achievements in Georgia, Armenia, and Crimea. Yet even though Putin is winning some small battles, he is losing the war. **Russia is not on the rise; to the contrary, it is experiencing one of the greatest geopolitical contractions of any major power in the modern era.** Democracy is encircling China, too. In the mid-1980s, India and Japan were the only Asian democracies, but since then, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have joined the club. Myanmar (also called Burma) has made cautious steps toward multiparty rule -- steps that have come, as China has not failed to notice, in conjunction with warming relations with the United States. China now lives in a decidedly democratic neighborhood. These political transformations have put China and Russia on the defensive. Consider the recent developments in Ukraine. The economic and political currents in most of the country are inexorably flowing westward, a trend that terrifies Putin. His only recourse has been to strong-arm Ukraine into resisting the EU and remaining in Russia’s orbit. Although he may be able to keep Crimea under Russian control, his grip on the rest of the country is slipping. As the EU diplomat Robert Cooper has noted, Putin can try to delay the moment when Ukraine “affiliates with the EU, but he can’t stop it.” Indeed, Putin might not even be able to accomplish that, since his provocative moves may serve only to speed Ukraine’s move toward Europe. China faces a similar predicament in Taiwan. Chinese leaders sincerely believe that Taiwan is part of China, but the Taiwanese do not. The democratic transition on the island has made its inhabitants’ claims to nationhood more deeply felt and legitimate. A 2011 survey found that if the Taiwanese could be assured that China would not attack Taiwan, 80 percent of them would support declaring independence. Like Russia, China wants geopolitical control over its neighborhood. But the spread of democracy to all corners of Asia has made old-fashioned domination the only way to achieve that, and that option is costly and self-defeating. While the rise of democratic states makes life more difficult for

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China and Russia, it makes the world safer for the United States. **Those two powers may count as U.S. rivals, but the rivalry takes place on a very uneven playing field: the United States has the most friends, and the most capable ones, too. Washington and its allies account for 75 percent of global military spending.** Democratization has put China and Russia in a geopolitical box. Iran is not surrounded by democracies, but it is threatened by a restive pro-democracy movement at home. More important, Iran is the weakest member of Mead's axis, with a much smaller economy and military than the United States and the other great powers. It is also the target of the strongest international sanctions regime ever assembled, with help from China and Russia. **The Obama administration's diplomacy with Iran may or may not succeed, but it is not clear what Mead would do differently to prevent the country from acquiring nuclear weapons.** U.S. President Barack Obama's approach has the virtue of offering Tehran a path by which it can move from being a hostile regional power to becoming a more constructive, nonnuclear member of the international community -- a potential geopolitical game changer that Mead fails to appreciate.

**--SCS**

**American Primacy de-escalates South China Sea Tensions**

**NYT, 5-29** – [ New York Times: Editorial Board, 5-29-2015, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/pushback-in-the-south-china-sea.html>] Jeong

The United States has good reason to push back more forcefully against China's grab for power in the South China Sea, as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter did on a trip to Asia this week. Beijing has repeatedly ignored earlier warnings to moderate the aggressive behavior that is unsettling its regional neighbors and further undermining its relations with the United States. On Friday, American officials disclosed that China had installed two mobile artillery vehicles on an artificial island it is building in the sea, which is rich in natural resources like oil and gas and where China clearly hopes to establish some form of hegemony. The weapons are not considered a threat to American naval forces. Still, they reinforce fears that China intends to militarize the Spratly Islands, a collection of reefs and rocks also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, and use them to control the waterway's shipping lanes and dominate its smaller neighbors. China's ambitions have become increasingly clear since 2012 when it publicly asserted a claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. In recent months, photographic evidence from commercial satellites and American spy planes has left little doubt that China is moving with alarming speed to turn the Spratlys into more substantial land masses, complete with runways and harbors. **Some American officials now believe China regards its claims in the South China Sea as nonnegotiable**. If so, that's terrible news for the region but also ultimately for China, which claims it prizes stability but will find it impossible to realize its economic goals if Asia is in constant tension. China's bullying on the South China Sea has already caused many Asian countries to forge closer defense ties with the United States. Now, the Obama administration has decided to more firmly underscore America's intention to remain a Pacific power and to ensure that the region and its waters remain accessible to all nations. That is a role the United States has played constructively for decades, promoting a stability that has allowed Japan, South Korea and other countries, including China, to develop. **There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as forces do around the world,** Mr. Carter said in his speech. He also called for "an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants." **Although the administration would obviously prefer a peaceful resolution of all South China Sea disputes, it cannot allow China's claims to go unchallenged**. It sent a surveillance plane close to one of China's artificial islands, is considering air and sea patrols that could go closer to disputed reefs and shoals, and is expanding military exercises with regional partners. President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China plan to meet later this year. In the meantime, American officials and their Chinese counterparts must avoid any miscalculation that could lead to a direct confrontation.

**Tensions escalate and go nuclear – Noko and Chinese Aggression**

**Hua, 6-2** – [Shen Hua, Correspondent with VOA News, 6-2-15, Will South China Sea Dispute Lead to World War?, <http://www.voanews.com/content/will-south-china-sea-dispute-lead-to-world-war/2806950.html>] Jeong

WASHINGTON— **Will South China Sea issues trigger a third world war?** While American scholars and New York investors are paying close attention to the political, military and economic aspects of the South China Sea conflict, others find the speculation unconvincing. The U.S. and China have increasingly argued in recent days over Beijing's artificial island building, turning underwater land into airfields, in the South China Sea. U.S. Defense Secretary

Ash Carter said on Saturday that the U.S. opposes “any further militarization” of the disputed lands, while one of China’s top ranking military officials has defended building artificial islands in contested waters, saying the land reclamation is “justified, legitimate and reasonable.” Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, recently claimed that the South China Sea could become the next “Great War Zone.” Chang said last week at a panel discussion held by the U.S. Air Force Association that it will not be long before the U.S. takes initiatives to respond to China’s unyielding attitude and behavior in the South China Sea. He said the time frame is now. “The U.S. Navy is clearly going to test China’s claims of exclusion of the South China Sea,” Chang said. “We have to do that, because if there has been any consistent American foreign policy over the course of two centuries, it has been the defense of freedom of navigation.” “Now China is infringing on that notion at this time,” Chang added. “I think we probably will act in a very short time frame.” **Chang called it “a classic zero-sum game” for China to challenge the U.S. in the South China Sea.** He said China sees the South China Sea as one of its core interests with no room for negotiation, while the U.S. has been the influential maritime power for the past two centuries. Both could concede on the South China Sea issues, Chang said, but they will not abandon their long-held positions. Rick Fisher, senior research fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, told VOA that attention should also be paid to the development of nuclear weapons in China and North Korea. He said that although North Korea stays quiet for now, it is likely to take advantage of the South China Sea disputes in the foreseeable future. “As soon as North Korea can demonstrate that it can fire a nuclear missile, then North Korea becomes a factor because North Korea itself can decide to take a period of high confrontation in the South China Sea and put greater pressure on the United States in order to obtain concessions from South Korea or the U.S. itself.” So, Fisher said, “as soon as there is a crisis, North Korea could become a very dangerous element.” Fisher said although Kim Jong Un has rifts with the Chinese government, both share and act by the same communist ideology. Well-known American investor George Soros also expressed concerns about the Chinese aggression in the South China Sea in recent months. He said at a recent World Bank forum that if China suffers economically, it is likely to initiate a third world war in order to achieve national solidarity and to get itself out of the economic difficulties. Even if China and the U.S. do not engage in a war directly, Soros said, there is a high possibility of military conflicts between China and one of the U.S. security partners, Japan. World War III could follow as a result, Soros said. Tad Daley, director of the project on abolishing war at the Center for War/Peace Studies, disagrees with the notion that the South China Sea issues are having a strong impact on Chinese nuclear weapon strategies. He said China seems to only want to maintain nuclear deterrence, keeping its second-strike capability without taking the pre-emptive strike, or the first strike. Daley said China achieved its second-strike capability many decades ago. “Maybe in 1975, when China said you’d better not launch nuclear strikes on us, because probably a few nuclear warheads would remain, and we could take out Los Angeles and San Francisco,” Daley said. “That situation existed for many



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decades.” All these Chinese nuclear developments, he said, have not changed that “in any kind of meaningful way.” President Barack Obama on Monday also sternly warned China that its land reclamation projects in the South China Sea are counterproductive and a threat to Southeast Asian prosperity.

## --at: China Rise

### **No risk of China rise – Too many regional obstacles**

**Babones, 6-11-** [Salvatore Babones, Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, PhD in Sociology and Social Policy, Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 6-11-2015, American Hegemony Is Here to Stay: U.S. hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=2>] Jeong

WHEN PUNDITS scope out the imminent threats to U.S. hegemony, the one country on their radar screens is China. While the former Soviet Union never reached above 45 percent of U.S. total national income, the Chinese economy may already have overtaken the American economy, and if not it certainly will soon. If sheer economic size is the foundation of political and military power, China is positioned for future global hegemony. Will it build on this foundation? Can it? Much depends on the future of China's relationships with its neighbors. China lives in a tough neighborhood. It faces major middle-tier powers on three sides: Russia to the north, South Korea and Japan to the east, and Vietnam and India to the south. **To the west it faces a series of weak and failing states,** but that may be more of a burden than a blessing: China's own western regions are also sites of persistent instability. It is perhaps realistic to imagine China seeking to expand to the north at the expense of Russia and Mongolia. Ethnic Russians are abandoning Siberia and the Pacific coast in droves, and strategic areas along Russia's border with China have been demographically and economically overwhelmed by Chinese immigration. Twenty-second-century Russia may find it difficult to hold the Far East against China. But that is not a serious threat to U.S. hegemony. If anything, increasing Sino-Russian tensions may reinforce U.S. global hegemony, much as Sino-Soviet tensions did in the 1970s. To the southeast, China clearly seeks to dominate the South China Sea and beyond. The main barrier to its doing so is the autonomy of Taiwan. Were Taiwan ever to be reintegrated with China, it would be difficult for other regional powers to successfully challenge a united China for control of the basin. In the future, it is entirely possible that China will come to dominate these, its own coastal waters. This would be a minor setback to an America accustomed to dominating all of the world's seas, but it would not constitute a serious strategic threat to the United States. Across the East China Sea, China faces Japan and South Korea—two of the most prosperous, technologically advanced and militarily best-equipped countries in the world. Historical enmities ensure that China will never expand in that direction. Worse for China, it is quite likely that any increase in China's ability to project power beyond its borders will be matched with similar steps by a wary, remilitarizing Japan. The countries on China's southern border are so large, populous and poor that it is difficult to imagine China taking much interest in the region beyond simple resource exploitation. Chinese companies may seek profit opportunities in Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan, but there is little for China to gain from strategic domination of the region. There will be no Chinese-sponsored Asian equivalent of NATO or the

Warsaw Pact. Farther abroad, much has been made of China's strategic engagement in Africa and Latin America. Investment-starved countries in these regions have been eager to access Chinese capital and in many cases have welcomed Chinese investment, expertise and even immigration. But it is hard to imagine them welcoming Chinese military bases, and equally hard to imagine China asking them for bases. The American presence in Africa is in large part the legacy of centuries of European colonialism. China has no such legacy to build on.

### **No risk of China Rise – They don't want to be the global hegemon**

**Chen, 1-14** – [Dingding Chen ,Assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute, 1-14-15, Relax, China Won't Challenge US Hegemony The US should believe Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang's words: China will not seek hegemony, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-china-wont-challenge-us-hegemony/>] Jeong

Needless to say, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet complicated bilateral relationships in the world today. This explains why Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang's recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online ([here](#) and [here](#)). Wang Yang stated that China "[has] neither the ability nor the intent to challenge the United States." Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such soft remarks with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because Wang's remarks are seemingly inconsistent with China's recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true meaning of Wang's remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward Wang's conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that China's ultimate aim is to establish a China-centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia. In other words, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon. The reactions from the U.S. side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with regard to China's long term goals. But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asia's peace and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere when he said that China does not have the capabilities and desires to challenge the United States. The evidence of his sincerity is apparent. First let us look at China's capabilities, which need to be especially formidable if China wants to challenge the United States. Although China's comprehensive capabilities have been growing rapidly for the past three decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is still a huge gap between China and the U.S. in terms of comprehensive capabilities, particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and technological realms. China's economy might have already passed the U.S. economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of China's economy still remains a major weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day China's comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it would still be a huge mistake for China to challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely

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interconnected, creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries. Besides limited capabilities, China also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts. It is true that China's grand strategy is to realize the "China dream" — a dream that will bring wealth, glory, and power to China again — but this, by no means, suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia, or to create a Sino-centric tributary system around which all smaller states must obey China's orders. Perhaps these perceptions exist in the United States because many U.S. analysts have unconsciously let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power and influence. But the structure of international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony ineffective or even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony outweigh the benefits of hegemony in this new era of international politics, thanks to rising nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers. **The Chinese leaders understand this new and changed structure of international politics and based on their assessments, they have decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new era.**

### **--at: multipolarity**

#### **No rising competitors – China and Russia know they would get decimated**

**Ikenberry 14** -- PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (G. John, "The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order," Foreign Affairs Magazine, May/June 2014, [https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics\\_tony](https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics_tony))

Ultimately, **even if China and Russia do attempt to contest the basic terms of the current global order, the adventure will be daunting and self-defeating.** These powers aren't just up against the United States; they would also have to contend with the most globally organized and deeply entrenched order the world has ever seen, one that is dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. This order is backed by a U.S.-led network of alliances, institutions, geopolitical bargains, client states, and democratic partnerships. It has proved dynamic and expansive, easily integrating rising states, beginning with Japan and Germany after World War II. It has shown a capacity for shared leadership, as exemplified by such forums as the G-8 and the G-20. It has allowed rising non-Western countries to trade and grow, sharing the dividends of modernization. It has accommodated a surprisingly wide variety of political and economic models -- social democratic (western Europe), neoliberal (the United Kingdom and the United States), and state capitalist (East Asia). The prosperity of nearly every country -- and the stability of its government -- fundamentally depends on this order. In the age of liberal order, revisionist struggles are a fool's errand. Indeed, **China and Russia know this. They do not have grand visions of an alternative order.** For them, international relations are mainly about the search for commerce and resources, the protection of their sovereignty, and, where possible, regional domination. They have shown no interest in building their own orders or even taking full responsibility for the current one and have offered no alternative visions of global economic or political progress. That's a critical shortcoming, since international orders rise and fall not simply with the power of the leading state; their success also hinges on whether they are seen as legitimate and whether their actual operation solves problems that both weak and powerful states care about. In the struggle for world order, China and Russia (and certainly Iran) are simply not in the game. Under these circumstances, the United States should not give up its efforts to strengthen the liberal order. The world that Washington inhabits today is one it should welcome. And the grand strategy it should pursue is the one it has followed for decades: deep global engagement. It is a strategy in which the United States ties itself to the regions of the world through trade, alliances, multilateral institutions, and diplomacy. It is a strategy in which the United States establishes leadership not simply through the exercise of power but also through sustained efforts at global problem solving and rule making. It created a world that is friendly to American interests, and it is made friendly because, as President John F.

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Kennedy once said, it is a world "where the weak are safe and the strong are just."

### **--at: retrenchment**

#### **Retrenchment creates a power vacuum and offshore balancing – Only maintaining primacy checks global conflicts**

**Dueck, 4-30** – [Colin Dueck, Senior Fellow of the FPRI and an associate professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, Graduated from Princeton University in politics, and international relations at Oxford under a Rhodes scholarship, 4-30-2015, The Strategy of Retrenchment and Its Consequences, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=190230>] Jeong

Overall, US foreign policy under Obama has been characterized by a clearly declared unwillingness to engage in further large-scale ground campaigns overseas; relatively deep cuts in defense spending; a deep aversion to putting boots on the ground; and a keen preference for US allies to take the lead in facing pressing security challenges. The goal has been to retrench US military power overseas without undue risk to basic American interests, and to refocus on domestic policy priorities, or as the President puts it: "nation-building right here at home." [15] **This approach has achieved some of its intended consequences, but it has held unintended ones as well.** Specifically, **American retrenchment has left multiple international security threats to germinate in ways dangerous to US interests.** Leading actors including the governments of Russia, China, and Iran, together with Islamist militants inside the Arab world and beyond, have naturally interpreted the long-term trend as one of American disengagement, creating power vacuums they are happy to fill. President Obama for his part has never fully appreciated the possible costs, risks, and downsides of strategic retrenchment, and there is little indication he ever will. The unintended negative consequences of US retrenchment under Obama ought to raise questions about the case for offshore balancing. Academic proponents of offshore balancing do not dispute that Obama's regional and functional foreign policy strategies have frequently been incoherent in their specifics. Nor do advocates of offshore balancing dispute that current spasmodic attempts at retrenchment have often been half-hearted and poorly executed. But notice what the offshore balancers argue next: that the answer to any unexpected downsides of existing American strategic retrenchment, must be further and more profound retrenchment. Traditionally, foreign policy realists have recognized that a strategy of retrenchment is not in itself a guarantee of success. Like any other strategy, retrenchment must be implemented with considerable skill, prudence, and rigorous self-awareness, and in the arena of international power politics this is no small thing. Moreover there are certain inherent risks to retrenchment, even at the best of times. There are tradeoffs. Scholars of grand strategy have long understood that strategies with less immediate cost may also involve greater eventual risk, and vice-versa. [16] **When a great power retrenches, this is easily taken as a sign of growing weakness. The desire to reduce short-term costs may trigger increased strategic and international risk, eventually imposing even greater costs.** To put it bluntly, retrenchment doesn't always work out as planned. In one of the great realist

scholarly works of the past half-century, War and Change in World Politics, Princeton University Emeritus Professor Robert Gilpin discussed the inevitable downsides of strategic retrenchment. Here is what he said: Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on allies and rivals. Sensing the decline of their protector, allies try to obtain the best deal they can from the rising master of the system. Rivals are stimulated to "close in," and frequently they precipitate a conflict in the process. Thus World War I began as a conflict between Russia and Austria over the disposition of the remnants of the retreating Ottoman Empire. [17] This recognition of inevitable tradeoffs with any strategy remains a central insight of classical foreign policy realism. Yet today, the word "realism" is often attached to a proposed course of endless American retrenchment, with little explicit recognition of any possible downside. At the very least, we ought to recognize that offshore balancing is only one possible strategy with a realist or geopolitical logic. Another option, less commonly articulated within the academy but not entirely absent, would be a kind of forward realism, based upon the understanding that in the end a forward strategic presence on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is very useful for American interests. Indeed one might say this has been a consistent theme in US grand strategy since the 1940s, and rightly so. Now if America's relative international capabilities were really in steep and inevitable decline, then a grand strategy of deep retrenchment or offshore balancing might be most appropriate. But the US still holds unmatched capabilities, and their imminent demise is hardly inevitable. [18] **If anything, the risk today is that excessive and ill-managed American retrenchment in recent years feeds into a perception of US decline unnecessarily.** And this is exactly what has happened under President Obama.

### **US Hegemony is key to deter escalating aggressions – Retrenchment guarantees great power wars**

**Kagan, 14** – [Robert Kagan, PhD in American Diplomatic History from American University, Masters of Public Policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 5-24-2014, New Republic, Superpowers Don't Get to Retire: What our tired country still owes the world, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117859/allure-normalcy-what-america-still-owes-world>] Jeong

Today, however, Americans seem overwhelmed by the difficulty and complexity of it all. They yearn to return to what Niebuhr called "the innocency of irresponsibility," or at least to a normalcy in which the United States can limit the scope of its commitments. In this way America has perhaps returned to the mood of the 1920s. There is a difference, however. In the 1920s, it was not America's world order that needed shoring up. Americans felt, mistakenly as it turned out, that it was Britain's and Europe's job to preserve the world order they had created. Today, it is America's world order that needs propping up. Will Americans decide that it matters this time, when only they have the capacity to sustain it? You never miss the water 'til the well runs dry, or so the saying goes. One wonders whether Americans, including their representatives and their president, quite understand what is at stake. When President Obama first took office five years ago, Peter Baker of The New York Times reported that he intended to deal "with the world as it is rather than as it might be." It is a standard realist refrain and has been repeated time and again by senior Obama officials as a way of explaining why he decided against pursuing some desirable but unreachable "ideal" in this place or that. What fewer and fewer seem to realize, however, is that the last 70 years have offered Americans and many others something of a reprieve from the world "as it is." Periods of peace and prosperity can make people forget what the world "as it is" really looks like, and to conclude that the human race has simply ascended to some higher plateau of being. This was the common view in Europe in the



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first decade of the twentieth century. At a time when there had not been a war between great powers in 40 years, or a major Europe-wide war in a century, the air was filled with talk of a new millennium in which wars among civilized nations had become impossible. Three-quarters of a century and two world wars and a cold war later, millennial thoughts return. Studies cited by Fareed Zakaria purport to show that some “transformation of international relations” has occurred. “Changes of borders by force” have dropped dramatically “since 1946.” The nations of Western Europe, having been responsible for two new wars a year for 600 years, had not even started one “since 1945.” Steven Pinker observes that the number of deaths from war, ethnic conflict, and military coups has declined—since 1945—and concludes that the human race has become “socialized” to prefer peace and nonviolence. The dates when these changes supposedly began ought to be a tip-off. Is it a coincidence that these happy trends began when the American world order was established after World War II, or that they accelerated in the last two decades of the twentieth century, when America’s only serious competitor collapsed? Imagine strolling through Central Park and, after noting how much safer it had become, deciding that humanity must simply have become less violent—without thinking that perhaps the New York Police Department had something to do with it. In fact, **the world “as it is” is a dangerous and often brutal place.**

**There has been no transformation in human behavior or in international relations. In the twenty-first century, no less than in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, force remains the ultima ratio. The question, today as in the past, is not whether nations are willing to resort to force but whether they believe they can get away with it when they do.** If there has been less aggression, less ethnic cleansing, less territorial conquest over the past 70 years, **it is because the United States and its allies have both punished and deterred aggression, have intervened, sometimes, to prevent ethnic cleansing, and have gone to war to reverse territorial conquest.** The restraint showed by other nations has not been a sign of human progress, the strengthening of international institutions, or the triumph of the rule of law. It has been a response to a global configuration of power that, until recently, has made restraint seem the safer course. When Vladimir Putin failed to achieve his goals in Ukraine through political and economic means, he turned to force, because he believed that he could. He will continue to use force so long as he believes that the payoff exceeds the cost. Nor is he unique in this respect. What might China do were it not hemmed in by a ring of powerful nations backed by the United States? For that matter, what would Japan do if it were much more powerful and much less dependent on the United States for its security? We have not had to find out the answers to these questions, not yet, because American predominance, the American alliance system, and the economic, political, and institutional aspects of the present order, all ultimately dependent on power, have mostly kept the lid closed on this Pandora’s box. Nor have we had to find out yet what the world “as it is” would do to the remarkable spread of democracy. Skeptics of “democracy promotion” argue that the United States has often tried to plant democracy in infertile soil. They may be right. The widespread flowering of democracy around the world in recent decades may prove to have been artificial and therefore tenuous. As Michael Ignatieff once observed, it may be that “liberal civilization” itself “runs deeply against the human grain and is achieved and sustained only by the most unremitting struggle against human nature.” Perhaps this fragile democratic garden requires the protection of a liberal world order, with constant feeding, watering, weeding, and the fencing off of an ever-encroaching jungle. In the absence of such efforts, the weeds and the jungle may sooner or later come back to reclaim the land. One wonders if even the current economic order reflects the world “as it is.” A world in which autocracies make ever more ambitious attempts to control the flow of information, and in which autocratic kleptocracies use national wealth and resources to further their private interests, may prove less hospitable to the kind of free flow of commerce the world has come to appreciate in recent decades. In fact, from the time that Roosevelt and Truman first launched it, the whole project of promoting and defending a liberal world order has been a concerted effort not to accept the world “as it is.” **The American project has aimed at shaping a world different from what had always been, taking advantage of America’s unique situation to do what no nation had ever been able to do. Today, however, because many Americans no longer recall what the world “as it is” really looks like, they cannot imagine it.** They bemoan the burdens and failures inherent in the grand strategy but take for granted all the remarkable benefits.

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Nor do they realize, perhaps, how quickly it can all unravel. The international system is an elaborate web of power relationships, in which every nation, from the biggest to the smallest, is constantly feeling for shifts or disturbances. Since 1945, and especially since 1989, the web has been geared to respond primarily to the United States. Allies observe American behavior and calculate America's reliability. Nations hemmed in or threatened by American power watch for signs of growing or diminishing power and will. **When the United States appears to retrench, allies necessarily become anxious, while others look for opportunities.** In recent years, **the world has picked up unmistakable signals that Americans may no longer want to carry the burden of global responsibility.** Others read the polls, read the president's speeches calling for "nation-building at home," see the declining defense budgets and defense capabilities, and note the extreme reticence, on the part of both American political parties, about using force. The world judges that, were it not for American war-weariness, the United States probably would by now have used force in Syria—just as it did in Kosovo, in Bosnia, and in Panama. President Obama himself recently acknowledged as much when he said, "It's not that it's not worth it. It's that after a decade of war, you know, the United States has limits." Such statements set the web vibrating. In East Asia, nations living in close proximity to an increasingly powerful China want to know whether Americans will make a similar kind of calculation when it comes to defending them; in the Middle East, nations worried about Iran wonder if they will be left to confront it alone; in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, American security guarantees are meaningless unless Americans are able and willing to meet them. Are they? No one has taken a poll lately on whether the United States should come to the defense of its treaty allies in the event of a war between, say, China and Japan; or whether it should come to the defense of Estonia in a Ukraine-like conflict with Russia. The answers might prove interesting. Meanwhile, the signs of the global order breaking down are all around us. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea was the first time since World War II that a nation in Europe had **engaged in territorial conquest.** If Iran manages to acquire a nuclear weapon, it will likely lead other powers in the region to do the same, effectively undoing the nonproliferation regime, which, along with American power, has managed to keep the number of nuclear-armed powers limited over the past half century. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia are engaged in a proxy war in Syria that, in addition to the 150,000 dead and the millions displaced, has further destabilized a region that had already been in upheaval. In East Asia, nervousness about China's rise, combined with uncertainty about America's commitment, is exacerbating tensions. In recent years the number of democracies around the world has been steadily declining, while the number of autocracies grows. **If these trends continue, in the near future we are likely to see increasing conflict, increasing wars over territory, greater ethnic and sectarian violence, and a shrinking world of democracies.** How will Americans respond? **If the test is once again to be "national interests" narrowly construed, then Americans may find all of this tolerable, or at least preferable to doing something to stop it.** Could the United States survive if Syria remains under the control of Assad or, more likely, disintegrates into a chaos of territories, some of which will be controlled by jihadi terrorists? Could it survive if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, and in turn Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt acquire nuclear weapons? Or if North Korea launches a war on the South? Could it survive in a world where China dominates much of East Asia, or where China and Japan resume their old conflict? Could it survive in a world where Russia dominates Eastern Europe, including not only Ukraine but the Baltic states and perhaps even Poland? Of course it could. From the point of view of strict "necessity" and narrow national interest, **the United States could survive all of this.** It could trade with a dominant China and work out a modus vivendi with a restored Russian empire. Those alarmed by such developments will be hard-pressed, as Roosevelt was, to explain how each marginal setback would affect the parochial interests of the average American. As in the past, **Americans will be among the last to suffer grievously from a breakdown of world order. And by the time they do feel the effects, it may be very late in the day.** Looking back on the period before World War II, Robert Osgood, the most thoughtful of realist thinkers of the past century, discerned a critical element missing from the strategic analyses of the day. Mere rational calculations of the "national interest," he argued, proved inadequate. Paradoxically, it was the "idealists," those who were "most sensitive to the Fascist menace to Western culture and civilization," who were "among the first to understand the necessity of undertaking revolutionary measures to sustain America's first line of defense in Europe." Idealism, he concluded, was "an indispensable spur to reason in leading men to perceive and act upon the real imperatives of power politics." This was Roosevelt's message, too, when he asked Americans to defend "not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments, and their very civilization are founded." **Perhaps Americans can be inspired in this way again, without the threat of a Hitler or an attack on their homeland. But this time they will not have 20 years to decide. The world will change much more quickly than they imagine. And there is no democratic superpower waiting in the wings to save the world if this democratic superpower falters.**

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**--bad**

## --decline now

**Hegemony fails and destabilizes regional powers – no impact to the transition – turns case – disregard their fearmongering**

**Posen 14** – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June 24, 2014, tony)

Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would argue that the good the strategy has achieved far outweighs the bad. As noted in the introduction, partisans assume that liberal democracy, human rights, market economies, free trade, nuclear nonproliferation, middle and great powers that do not take responsibility for their own security, and U.S. political and military hegemony are all mutually causative, and all lead ineluctably to a vast improvement in the security and welfare of others, and hence to the U.S. security position. <sup>124</sup> They also posit that the world is fragile; damage to one of these good things will lead to damage to other good things, SO the United States must defend all. The "fragile and interconnected" argument is politically effective. By accident or design, the argument derives an inherent plausibility due to the inevitable limits of our substantive knowledge, fear, uncertainty, liberal ideology, and U.S. national pride. Most **targets of the argument do not know enough about the world to argue with experts who claim these connections**; the chain of posited connections always leads to danger for the United States, and fear is a powerful selling tool. Once fear is involved, even low-probability chains of causation can be made to seem frightening enough to do something about, especially if you believe your country has overwhelming power. It is pleasant to believe that the spread of U.S. values such as liberty and democracy depend on U.S. power and leadership. The argument does not stand close scrutiny. First, it obscures the **inherently strong security position of the United States**, which I have already reviewed. The economic, geographic, demographic, and technological facts supporting this point are seldom discussed, precisely because they are facts. It takes very large events abroad to significantly threaten the United States, and more moderate strategies can address these possibilities at lower costs. Typical Liberal Hegemony arguments for any new project take the form of domino theory. One small untended problem is expected easily and quickly to produce another and another until the small problems become big ones, or the collection of problems becomes overwhelming. Whether these connections are valid in any particular case will always be open to debate. Even if the connections are plausible, however, **it is unlikely given the inherent U.S. security position that the United States need prop up the first domino. It has the luxury of waiting for information and choosing the dominos it wishes to shore up**, if any. Second, proponents of Liberal Hegemony often elide the difference between those benefits of the strategy that flow to others, and those that flow to the United States. Individually, it is surely true that cheap-riders and reckless-drivers like the current situation because of the welfare, security, or power gains that accrue to them. United States commitments may make the international politics of some regions less exciting than would otherwise be the case. The United States, however, pays a significant price and assumes significant risks to provide these benefits to others, while the gains to the United States are exaggerated because the United States is inherently quite secure. Third, Liberal

Hegemonists argue that U.S. commitments reduce the intensity of regional security competitions, limit the spread of nuclear weaponry, and lower the general odds of conflict, and that this helps keep the United States out of wars that would emerge in these unstable regions. This chain of interconnected benefits is not self-evident. United States activism does change the nature of regional competitions; it does not necessarily suppress them. For example, where U.S. commitments encourage "free-riding," this attracts coercion, which the United States must then do more to deter. Where the United States encourages "reckless driving," it produces regional instability. United States activism probably helps cause some nuclear proliferation, because some states will want nuclear weapons to deter an activist United States. When the United States makes extended deterrence commitments to discourage proliferation, the U.S. military is encouraged to adopt conventional and nuclear military strategies that are themselves destabilizing. Finally, as is clear from the evidence of the last twenty years, the United States ends up in regional wars in any case.

Fourth, one key set of interconnections posited by Liberal Hegemonists is that between U.S. security provision, free trade, and U.S. prosperity. This is a prescriptive extension of hegemonic stability theory, developed by economist Charles Kindleberger from a close study of the collapse of global liquidity in 1931 and the ensuing great depression. 125 Professor Kindleberger concluded from this one case that a global system of free trade and finance would more easily survive crises if there was a "leader," a hegemon with sufficient economic power such that its policies could "save" a system in crisis, which would also have the interest and the will to do so, precisely because it was so strong. 126 Subsequent theorists, such as Robert Gilpin, extended this to the idea that a global economic and security hegemon would be even better. 127 Robert Keohane, and later John Ikenberry, added to this theory the notion that a "liberal" hegemon would be still better, because it would graft transparent and legitimate rules onto the hegemonic system, which would make it more acceptable to the "subjects" and hence less costly to run. 128 A comprehensive rebuttal of hegemonic stability theory is beyond the scope of this book. But this theory has fallen into desuetude in the study of international politics in the last twenty years. Proponents did not produce a clear, consolidated version of the theory that integrated economics, security, and institutional variables in a systematic way that gives us a sense of their relative importance and interdependence, and how they work in practice. The theory is difficult to test because there are only two cases: nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, and post-World War II United States, and they operated in very different ways under very different conditions. Finally, testing of narrow versions of the theory did not show compelling results. 129 These problems should make us somewhat skeptical about making the theory the basis for U.S. grand strategy.

### **US hegemonic decline is inevitable – Overstretching is happening now**

**Astore, 6-13** – [William Astore, Retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), is a TomDispatch regular. He has taught at the Air Force Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School, and now teaches History at the Pennsylvania College of Technology, 6-13-2015, America's Military Strategy? Persistent Overreach, The World Post, Huffington Post, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-astore/americas-military-strateg\\_b\\_7575900.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-astore/americas-military-strateg_b_7575900.html)] Jeong

Reports that President Obama is considering even more troops and bases to fight ISIS in Iraq put me to mind of Roman general Publius Quinctilius Varus.

Two millennia ago, Varus committed three Roman legions to the Teutoburg Forest in Germania in terrain that neutralized Roman advantages in

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firepower and maneuverability. Ambushed and caught in a vise, his legions were destroyed in detail as Varus took his own life. To Rome the shock and disgrace of defeat were so great that Emperor Augustus cried, "Quinctilius Varus, give me back my Legions!" **Ever since 9/11, American presidents and their military advisors have repeatedly committed U.S. troops and prestige to inhospitable regions in terrain that largely neutralizes U.S. advantages in firepower and maneuverability.** Whether it's the urban jungles of Baghdad or Fallujah or Mosul, or the harshly primitive and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, **American troops have been committed to campaigns that they can't win (in any enduring sense), under conditions that facilitate ambushes by an elusive enemy with superior knowledge of the local terrain. The number of U.S. soldiers killed or seriously wounded in these campaigns is roughly equivalent to those lost by Varus, though unlike Varus, no U.S. general has yet to fall on his sword.** Unlike Rome, which did learn from Varus's catastrophe the perils of imperial overreach, the U.S. persists in learning nothing. Perhaps that's because America's defeat is collective and gradual, rather than singular and quick. America may lack a Varus or a calamity like Teutoburg Forest, yet the overall result since 9/11 has been no less debilitating to American foreign policy. **Despite setback after setback, American presidents and generals persist in trying to control hostile territory at the end of insecure logistical lines, while mounting punitive raids designed to deny Al Qaeda or ISIS or the Taliban "safe havens."** We should have learned the impossibility of doing this from Vietnam, but it seems America's presidents and generals keep trying to get Vietnam right, even if they have to move the fight to the deserts of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan. Yet seeking to control territory in inhospitable regions like the Middle East or Afghanistan, whether you use American troops or proxy armies, is an exercise in strategic futility. **It's also old-fashioned thinking: the idea that, to exert influence and control, you need large numbers of military boots on the ground. But the world has already moved past such thinking into "borderless" hegemony as demonstrated by the Internet, by global business and finance, and by America's own practice of drone strikes and cyber-war. By repeatedly deploying American troops -- whether in the tens of hundreds or tens of thousands - to so many equivalents of the Teutoburg Forest, our leaders continue a strategy of overreach that was already proven bankrupt in Vietnam.** Meanwhile, despite our own early revolutionary history, our leaders seem to have forgotten that no country likes to be occupied or interfered with by foreigners, no matter how "generous" and "benevolent" they claim to be. Let's also not forget that boots on the ground in faraway foreign lands cost an enormous amount of money, a cost that cannot be sustained indefinitely (just ask the British in 1781). **America simply cannot afford more troop deployments (and commitments of prestige) that set the stage for more military disasters. When you persist in committing your legions to torturous terrain against an enemy that is well prepared to exact a high price for your personal hubris and strategic stubbornness, you get the fate you deserve.** After Varus's calamity, the Romans stopped campaigning east of the Rhine. When will America's leaders learn that persistence in strategic overreach is nothing but folly?

### **Decline inevitable –spending, overstretch, and pushback**

**Posen 14** – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "A New U.S. Grand Strategy," <http://www.bostonreview.net/us/barry-r-posen-restraint-grand-strategy-united-states>, tony)

The recent ISIS crisis in Iraq once again has American politicians arguing in favor of military intervention. Among the most vocal are those who led the United States into Iraq a decade ago, a decision that helped set in motion the events now playing out on the outskirts of Baghdad. **There will always be such crises and such calls for the United States to deploy its military far beyond its borders. The problem is that the United States has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics.** Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that can be called "**Liberal Hegemony,**" which **is unnecessary,**

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counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. In my book, *Restraint*, I explain why this grand strategy works poorly. Three major events affected my thinking—the enlargement of NATO to include the former vassal states of the Soviet Union, the war in Kosovo, and the war in Iraq. The first expanded U.S. obligations in ways that did little for U.S. security and needlessly antagonized Russia. Kosovo was an elective war, rationalized on the basis of information that was at best poor, and at worst deliberately mischaracterized by motivated policy entrepreneurs, and nearly bungled militarily due to the war's founding illusions. The 2003 Iraq war echoed the mistakes of the Kosovo war, but on a larger scale and with much greater costs. **Military spending has been excessive** throughout this period, **because the political ambitions that it serves have been greater than national security required.** This is a track record. **The United States needs a change of grand strategy.** The United States, like all other countries, **must live in the world as it is—a world without a single authority to provide protection.** Any state can resort **to arms to enforce its claims**, so the United States wisely remains prepared to enforce its claims, if it must. The most important claim is to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and safety. That said, **the development of military force is expensive, and the use of military force is terrible.** Great American generals from William Tecumseh Sherman to Dwight Eisenhower remind us that **war is hell and** that war is **waste.** **The United States needs military power and needs to be prepared to use it.** But this is no casual matter. **Military power must be subjected to** the discipline of **political analysis.** That is the purpose of grand strategy. An alternative grand strategy is “Restraint.” **Restraint advises us to look first at the elemental strengths** of the United States, which make it an easy country to defend. **The United States thus has the luxury to be very discriminate in the commitments it makes and the wars it fights.** Although the United States **has been much at war since the end of the Cold War, only one fight was forced on us—the Afghan War.** And even there, the United States **was not forced to fight that war in the naïve and profligate fashion that it chose.** The United States is a wealthy and capable state. It **can afford more security than most states.** But the United States **has extended the boundaries of its political and military defense perimeter very far.** Taken separately, **each individual project** has seemed reasonable and affordable, at least to its advocates. Taken together, however, they **add up to an embedded system of ambitious and costly excess.** For these reasons, I have signed up with the advocates of Restraint. **The United States should focus on a small number of threats, and approach those threats with subtlety and moderation.** It should do that **because the world is resistant to heavy-handed solutions.** It can do that because **the United States is economically and militarily strong, well-endowed and well-defended by nature, and possessed of an enormous ability to regenerate itself.** It is not smart to spend energies transforming a recalcitrant world that we could spend renewing a United States that still needs some work. Though it may seem inevitable that the United States took the path it did, there was much discussion in the 1990s about how to proceed. One can identify four different strands of opinion. Sadly, these have been reduced to two—the establishment consensus on Liberal Hegemony and Restraint. Four factors helped make Liberal Hegemony the victor. First, with the collapse of Soviet power the United States became the most capable global power in history. Nothing stood in the way. Second, the Western liberal model was triumphant. History vindicated the rightness of our system and made it in our eyes the appropriate model for others. Third, the Cold War ended with U.S. forces “manning the ramparts” around the world. Insecurity and disorder beyond the ramparts quickly created demands from within and without to move them outward. Fourth, the United States had built giant organizations to wage the Cold War and squadrons of national security experts to manage them. Most organization theorists will tell you that organizations never want to go out of business; if they succeed at their first task, they will try to find another. For these reasons, a more rather than a less ambitious strategy emerged after the Cold War, even before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, which supercharged the whole effort. At bottom, **these policies run up against three problems, which will get worse.** First, **other countries want security as much as we do.** When we define our security expansively, **we encourage some of them to compete more intensely.** **Others welcome our help, and because they can count on the United States, are stingy with their own**



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defense spending. They “cheap ride.” Second, global trends will make U.S. expansiveness ever more costly because other states are growing in power, as are peoples and groups, as the U.S. government’s National Intelligence Council has been reporting for several years. More capable states are more able to push back and hence more inclined to do so, as are individuals and nonstate actors. Third, perhaps since the middle of the nineteenth century, ethno-nationalist, religious, and class identities have become heavily politicized. Globalization and modernity have the paradoxical effect of intensifying these identities rather than weakening them. These identities ease the way for the political mobilization of power—for street action, for voting, for civil and international war, for terror. They provide both purpose and motive force. Strong politicized ethno-national and religious identities dislike rule by other groups, or foreigners, above all else. Liberal Hegemony puts the United States in that role, or close to it, too often. Finally, although modern high-technology weaponry has created the impression that military power is a scalpel that can be used to excise diseased politics, in my view it remains a club, which in the end mainly allows us to beat problems into grudging submission at best, remission at worse. Liberal Hegemony is not only unnecessary, it will prove increasingly costly. There are three important security challenges for the United States—the maintenance of a balance of power in Eurasia, the management of nuclear proliferation, and the suppression of international terrorist organizations that choose the United States as a target. Restraint dictates that, in Eurasia, the United States would do best to conserve resources by correctly assessing the situation. The European allies are well able to look after themselves, and Russia is no longer a candidate for hegemony. China, on the other hand, may ultimately bid for regional hegemony. But other states in Asia have considerable capacity to balance China, and rather than rushing the net toward a new “Cold War,” the United States should begin to energize these states to make reasonable contributions to their own security. Zero nuclear proliferation will be difficult to achieve—among other things, it could require costly and ineffective preventive wars. The United States should do what it can to slow proliferation, and confine possession of nuclear weapons to states that can be deterred because they have something to lose, and keep them out of the hands of independent groups, who may not be deterred because they have little to lose. This requires much **more active cooperation** with those states that possess nuclear weapons to ensure the highest standards of control and safety. Finally, peculiar **terrorist groups with vast ambitions**, such as al-Qaeda, will arise from time to time. Global cooperation to improve defenses and collect intelligence is the best answer. Wars to secure ungoverned or poorly governed spaces and attempts to build strong democracies have **foundered on nationalist resistance** to outside forces, and inter-group enmities. Because **invasion antagonizes local populations and generates new recruits for terror**, kinetic solutions should be used sparingly. I want to emphasize that the **military strategy and structure of Restraint is essentially maritime—“command of the commons.”** The United States should invest its scarce military power in the maintenance of an **ability to access the rest of the world**. It should **reduce**, however, **its regular military presence** in the rest of the world. The United States should avoid certain missions altogether, especially coercive state and nation building. Thus the United States can **radically cut** the **ground forces** that seem most apt

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for garrison duties and counterinsurgency. Major force structure cuts should allow the United States to save significant amounts of money, cutting the defense budget to perhaps 2.5 percent of GDP. Unless the United States begins to recognize the limitations of its power and its resources—as well as the uncertain effects that such decisions can have—it will forever overreach, overspend, and overcommit.

## **--multipolarity**

### **The world is multipolar – the United States is not a global hegemon and competing states make hegemony a pipe dream**

**Mearsheimer 14** -- Professor of political science at the University of Chicago, PhD in international relations (John J., "Realism Reader," edited by Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen, London ; New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 179-188, tony)

Hegemony's limits Great powers, as I have emphasized, strive to gain power over their rivals and hopefully become hegemons. Once a state achieves that exalted position, it becomes a status quo power. More needs to be said, however, about the meaning of hegemony. A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system.<sup>21</sup> No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system. A state that is substantially more powerful than the other great powers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers. The United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, is sometimes called a hegemon. But it was not a hegemon, because there were four other great powers in Europe at the time- Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia- and the United Kingdom did not dominate them in any meaningful way. In fact, during that period, the United Kingdom considered France to be a serious threat to the balance of power. Europe in the nineteenth century was multipolar, not unipolar. Hegemony means domination of the system, which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world. It is possible, however, to apply the concept of a system more narrowly and use it to describe particular regions, such as Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus, one can distinguish between global hegemons, which dominate the world, and regional hegemons, which dominate distinct geographical areas. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. No other state in the Americas has sufficient military might to challenge it, which is why the United States is widely recognized as the only great power in its region. My argument ... is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. The principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power across the world's oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. The United States, for example, is the most powerful state on the planet today. But it does not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia the way it does the Western Hemisphere, and it has no intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water. Indeed, there is reason to think that the American military commitment to Europe and Northeast Asia might wither away over the next decade. In short, **there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon.** The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and possibly control another region that is nearby and accessible over land. The United States is

the only regional hegemon in modern history, although other states have fought major wars in pursuit of regional hegemony: imperial Japan in Northeast Asia, and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany in Europe. But none succeeded. The Soviet Union, which is located in Europe and Northeast Asia, threatened to dominate both of those regions during the Cold War. The Soviet Union might also have attempted to conquer the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, with which it shared a border. But even if Moscow had been able to dominate Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which it never came close to doing, it still would have been unable to conquer the Western Hemisphere and become a true global hegemon. States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. **Regional hegemons**, in other words, **do not want peers**. Thus the United States, for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy. Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power's backyard. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than on the distant hegemon. Furthermore, if a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the sidelines. Of course, **if the local great powers were unable to do the job, the distant hegemon would take the appropriate measures to deal with the threatening state.** The United States, as noted, has assumed that burden on four separate occasions in the twentieth century, which is why it is commonly referred to as an "offshore balancer." In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. That state would be a status quo power, and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the existing distribution of power. The United States is in that enviable position today; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and there is no hegemon in any other area of the world. But if a regional hegemon is confronted with a peer competitor, it would no longer be a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to considerable lengths to weaken and maybe even destroy its distant rival. Of course, both regional hegemons would be motivated by that logic, which would make for a fierce security competition between them . . .

### **Unipolarity Fails – Creates global backlash and remains unsustainable**

**Mazarr, 14** – [Michael J. Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist at RAND, PhD in Public Policy from the University of Maryland, 3-12-2014, A Strategy of Discriminate Power: A Global Posture for Sustained Leadership, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893179>]

The leading challenge for U.S. grand strategy over the next decade is to exercise persistent global leadership under the shadow of intensifying constraints. **These include fiscal shortfalls that limit resources, fading**

**international deference to U.S. wishes, mismatches between the leading security challenges and instruments of power to confront those challenges, and the loss of key military superiorities alongside the appearance of new vulnerabilities.** At stake are international stability and the safety of the U.S. homeland. The primary task for U.S. strategists now is to find a sustainable global role more appropriate to available means that can safeguard leading U.S. interests and avoid embroiling more limited U.S. power in secondary issues. Tackling this daunting challenge of strategy—arriving at a more restrained and selective U.S. posture—would be more straightforward if the world no longer turned to the United States for leadership. Washington could comfortably trim its role and presence if the international system could maintain itself without a leading U.S. diplomatic, military and economic role; if the norms and institutions that sustain order, from global trade regimes to multilateral accords on such issues as cyber and climate, showed no worrisome cracks; or if Washington could pass substantial responsibility to a rising power with shared values. **But none of these things is true.** International politics appears to be skidding into an inflection point at which norms, values, and institutions that have been crucial to maintaining the peace and encouraging shared interests are under assault, new rivalries are blossoming,<sup>1</sup> and new sources of instability from radicalism to cyber conflict are becoming prevalent. To subtract another broadly stabilizing force—U.S. power—from the equation at such a delicate moment would risk peace and stability in ways profoundly damaging to U.S. interests. U.S. strategists thus face a powerful dilemma: the need for persistent, even in some cases intensified, global leadership with declining resources and leverage. How can the U.S. exercise persistent global leadership under the shadow of intensifying constraints? The United States needs a new recipe for national security capable of satisfying many conflicting requirements: leadership and restraint, global influence and reduced regional presence, decisiveness and selectivity. It does not need a new “grand strategy” per se; the appetite in official circles for overarching concepts appears limited, and in any case the essential aspects of a de facto grand strategy are already in place. What the United States needs, instead, is a new way of pursuing that long-standing and widely accepted grand strategy, a concept for developing more innovative and economical ways to achieve existing goals. The best candidate for such a concept could be called “discriminate power.”<sup>2</sup> U.S. strategy for the whole post-Cold War era has rested in a demand for global primacy, asserting that U.S. power is the linchpin of the international system.<sup>3</sup> The strategy held that the United States cannot allow any serious instability to go unchecked, and must maintain the capabilities necessary to underwrite this ambitious role. Because of its emphasis on the geopolitical risks of great power balancing, the current paradigm has emphasized traditional military power as the source of global credibility. This **approach is under assault from a variety of rising constraints.<sup>4</sup> Geopolitically, many states (like China and Russia, but also including U.S. allies) chafe against U.S. primacy.<sup>5</sup>** Fiscally, declining defense budgets are generating fewer resources to underwrite key instruments of power. At the same time, U.S. military predominance is gradually ebbing, particularly in areas related to the most demanding missions such as power

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projection into hostile areas. Regional powers are gaining area denial capabilities, and small groups or individuals are acquiring new technologies and techniques, from cyber to biological agents, with unprecedented ability to counteract U.S. power. Over time, persisting with existing approaches—even as financial, strategic, and political trends undercut them—will risk “strategic insolvency.”<sup>6</sup> This would bring increasing resistance, economic ruin, and strategic failure with consequences harming U.S. credibility, diplomacy, and military operations. But the United States cannot respond simply by withdrawing from the world scene; the U.S. presence is critical in multiple areas, from climate change to terrorism to piracy to combating global organized crime.<sup>7</sup> It is also crucial on the Korean border, in acting as the glue for the NATO alliance, and as the lead in potential responses to burgeoning and still unpredictable Chinese power.<sup>8</sup> There is substantial evidence, both in the perceptions of others and in watching what happens to complex issues when the United States abandons a catalytic role, that U.S. leadership and deterrence underwrite the load-bearing elements of the international system. Any new approach must therefore deal with a fundamental paradox. To continue in our current posture risks strategic bankruptcy, but to subtract the stabilizing force of U.S. power from the global equation at a volatile moment would be to risk peace and stability. Our current posture risks strategic bankruptcy, but subtracting U.S. power risks peace and stability.

## **--multilat**

### **No impact to retrenchment – Multilateralism check escalation**

**Fuller, 14** – [Roslyn Fuller, research Associate at the INSYTE Group, Lecturer at Trinity College and the National University of Ireland, 2014, “The Ukraine and the beginning of the multipolar world”, RT.com, 3/7/14, <http://rt.com/op-edge/ukraine-beginning-multipolar-world-430/>] Jeong

That was the theory, anyway. What happened, unfortunately, was that a few people – by and large based in Western nations, but by no means representative of their fellow citizens – took this opportunity to “take it all”, or at least as much of it as they could swallow without choking. Historically, this type of behavior has been de rigeur in international relations and old habits die hard. This “take it while it’s going” attitude meant using all the old institutions (the UN, the IMF) and the new ones (like the International Criminal Court) purely in pursuit of their own self-interests. These were quite narrow, as the people in charge of Western nations at this point were by and large corporate-friendly types who didn’t harbor too much sympathy for the unwashed masses. As a result, the post-War Keynesian economic framework was systematically dismantled, whole new nations entered the bond-servitude of IMF debt, and the new International Criminal Court was wielded effectively against recalcitrant third world leaders (Laurent Gbagbo, Muammar Gaddafi), while intervention-happy first world countries like Britain and the United States disingenuously claimed that over the 70 years since the Second World War they had been unable to come up with a definition of “aggression” (a feat all the more amazing, when one considers that the whole realm of international criminal law was kicked off by exactly these nations prosecuting leading Nazis for precisely this crime). Through all of these short-sighted policies, the message came through loud and clear: my way or the highway. Nothing’s changed. The multipolar world as an answer? International law practitioners could not fail to notice that in some respects our world was getting worse. In particular, inequality was increasing and control of our political and economic framework was rapidly devolving on fewer and fewer individuals, who made decisions that very few people could even understand, much less partake in. We were less well-off than our parents were and shut out from the very political processes that we had been trained to participate in. Money and connections were fast becoming the only qualifications one needed to get any job involving public responsibility, and ideas of economic and political equality that had once been mainstream were dismissed as “radical” and “naïve” with a vehemence that increased with each passing year. And this is why, for at least the past ten years, the multipolar world is a vision that has gained increasing traction in the international relations realm as possibly a fairly decent alternative to rule by the 1 percent. In this particular scenario, the world is again carved up, but this time four or five superpowers are in play. Who are these superpowers? Certainly, the USA and the EU, which work in tandem on many issues. The EU is, of course, still the lesser partner, but the more human and economic resources at its disposal, the more powerful the EU is going to be ten or twenty years down the line; hence, the impetus for rapid eastward expansion. China is also a certainty. With a billion people at its disposal, it is already the world’s second largest economy and has managed to translate this into spot number three in voting power at the World Bank. In this global chess game, Russia (the fourth power here) has adopted a position that has thus far mainly been defensive, not because of any inherent goodness, but merely because that’s where the chips are lying. Traditional client-States, like Syria and Iran, are firmly in Western crosshairs and the EU has already snapped up much of its former sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. While the EU is expanding as far as possible, Russia is trying to double down on what has traditionally been its sphere of influence in order to stay in the game. These familiar actors may eventually be rounded out by India and/or a more integrated South America spearheaded by Brazil. The current wrangling over the Ukraine has really only exposed some of the ways great powers do business with each other, i.e. testing where the boundaries lie. Will the boundary between the EU and Russia be on the eastern border of the Ukraine, the western border of the Ukraine, or smack down the middle? It’s hardly the type of question where you just sit back and see how things shake out when you are literally responsible for the fate of your nation (especially when military facilities are at stake), and it is a bland truism to point out that when two powerful nations set sights on each other,

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anyone in between them is in for a rough ride. This painful process is deeply rooted in an international system which shows no mercy for losers and very little for the hapless bystander. As this indicates, the multipolar world is in many respects regressive and nationally-oriented, but it does present a sea change from what we have been experiencing over the past twenty years, which is rule by an unchecked 1 percent and a world descending into modern feudalism. Russia before Putin was run by oligarchs with many a conservative Western analyst openly proposing emulating them. Had that continued and had China's thousands of billionaires and millionaires gotten onboard, we might be looking at a much worse picture. Now I admit that a choice between Cold War Version 2.0 with new and improved superpowers, or global serfdom is hardly inspiring stuff. But if we want to avoid making that choice, we're going to have to consider some deep changes. When I talk about the slow-grinding mills of God, I'm not primarily referring to Eastern or Western powers' ability to call "humanitarian intervention", "minority rights" or "propaganda black ops" on each other, terms which after decades of misuse retain a legal meaning, but have lost much currency in the broader area of public consumption. I'm referring to us as citizens, citizens primarily in the Western world, because we are still, despite everything, in the strongest position to affect international relations. As citizens we haven't demanded a great deal of accountability from our governments over the past two decades and have turned a blind eye to policies that have not only served to virtually dispossess us, but also to alienate us from other people whom we, at the end of the day, have no choice but to get along with, given as we're all inhabiting the same rock. Years of sitting back and hoping that someone else will take care of this mess is all catching up on us now. The good news is that it is perfectly possible to have an international system which does a far better job of providing a principled framework for dispute resolution than the current one does, but only if we all ditch the "my way or the highway" attitude, which has prevented the World Trade Organization, International Criminal Court, International Monetary Fund and United Nations from fulfilling their roles by putting short-term gains for the few ahead of long-term sustainability for everyone. It does require some effort though. Time to ditch reality TV in favor of tracking your MP's voting record, and replace general complaint hour at the pub with volunteering for any of the myriad causes that don't just talk about change, but actually do it. Rolling Jubilee which buys up and then writes off debt is a good example, but there are literally thousands of others. Demanding a (truly) independent investigation into sniper attacks on protesters in the Ukraine also comes to mind. Considering EU Foreign Policy Coordinator Catherine Ashton's lukewarm response when this point was raised with her by the Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet, that might well be necessary. Then there are all the legacy issues: drone strikes, Guantanamo Bay, Iraq... the usual. They've blurred the lines of international law – in public perception – and if we want to move forward, those lines need to get sharp again; it means dealing with those issues head on and owning up to what went wrong. The bottom line is that we have worked ourselves into a corner over the past twenty years by dismantling the very international legal system that would have enabled us to achieve our hopes of peace and prosperity. Trust is at an all-time low. We need to start rebuilding confidence in our international system and international law. Together!



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**--unsustainable**

## --china rise

### **China rise is inevitable and leads to a multipolar regionalized international system**

**Kupchan '14** (Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University and former Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana", 5/16/14, *wcp*)

It is of important geopolitical consequence that hegemony has normative dimensions and that power transitions entail clashes among competing norms. **The world is entering a period of transformation as power shifts from the West to the rising rest.** One school of thought—which dominates in Washington—holds that emerging powers are poised to embrace the existing international order; Western norms are universal norms, and the dictates of globalization are ensuring their worldwide spread. According to Ikenberry, "The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century." The West should "sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible" to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. "China and other emerging great powers," he concludes, "do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it."<sup>82</sup> The analysis in this article suggests that such conventional wisdom is illusory; emerging powers will not readily embrace the order on offer from the West. Regardless of the presumed functionality of the current order from a liberal, transactional perspective, emerging powers—China, India, Brazil, Turkey, to name a few—are following their own paths to modernity based on their own cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic trajectories. Their normative and social orientations will produce quite disparate approaches to building and managing international order. Unlike during earlier periods of multipolarity, when different hegemonies often operated independently of each other, in today's globalized world, multiple hegemonic zones will intensely and continuously interact with each other. In light of its growing economic and military power, China is likely to pose the most significant challenge to the ordering norms of Pax Americana. It is true that China for now is not challenging many of the rules associated with the Western liberal order, particularly when it comes to commerce. But as all great powers have done throughout history, China will likely seek to recast that order when it has the power to do so. Indeed, China is set to become the world's leading economy by the end of the next decade.<sup>83</sup> Drawing on its historical, cultural, and socioeconomic trajectory, Beijing is poised to bring to the fore a set of ordering norms that contrast sharply with those of Pax Americana. The normative orientation of China's past approach to exercising hegemony is hardly a reliable predictor of the ordering norms that might shape a Chinese sphere of influence in the future. Nonetheless, the historical record provides a basis for informed speculation.<sup>84</sup> China may well aspire to resurrect in East Asia a sphere of influence that is arrayed in concentric circles around a

Sinicized core. Through this tiered structure, China might attempt to exercise a brand of regional hegemony modeled on the tributary system. China's material primacy would serve as the foundation for its economic, strategic, and cultural centrality. Its neighbors would demonstrate deference to Beijing through both policy and ritual, but they would maintain their autonomy and their independent relations with each other. Nonetheless, China would become the region's strategic and economic hub, playing a role similar to that of the United States in the Americas. Beijing could well unfurl its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, laying claim to primacy in Northeast Asia and guardianship of the region's sea lanes. Indeed, Beijing has already ramped up maritime activities in the East China Sea and South China Sea and rejected Washington's call for addressing the area's territorial disputes through multilateral negotiation. Such a Sinocentric brand of hegemony in East Asia is of course incompatible with the current security architecture in which the United States continues to serve as the region's geopolitical hub. Accordingly, the United States and China have strong incentives to turn to diplomacy to tame their relationship over the course of this decade—before the naval balance in the western Pacific becomes more equal. On the table will have to be both the material and the normative dimensions of order. If Beijing and Washington succeed in reaching a meeting of the minds, a peaceful power transition in East Asia may be in the offing. If not, a historic confrontation may well loom. Should diplomacy fail to avert rivalry, Sino-American competition may nonetheless fall short of the bipolar enmity of the Cold War. **China and the United States are economically interdependent** whereas the Soviet Union and the United States carved out separate economic blocs. Moreover, China's geopolitical ambition, at least for the foreseeable future, seems focused primarily on East Asia, suggesting that rivalry with the United States could be more contained than the global competition that ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union. China's regional ambitions are, however, poised to clash head-on with America's determination to maintain strategic primacy in Northeast Asia. Even if it does not match the hostility of the Cold War, the resulting confrontation could well resemble the naval race between Great Britain and Germany that commenced at the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>85</sup> Although Wilhelmine Germany did not threaten the global dominance of the Royal Navy, its naval buildup in the European theater fueled a spiral of hostility that culminated in World War I. On the socioeconomic front, China has successfully fashioned a stable compact between its ruling elite and its rising bourgeoisie. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Imperial China was particularly adept at co-opting a rising merchant class into the existing political order. The same goes for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today. The CCP has deliberately incorporated China's rapidly expanding middle class into the centralized state, ensuring at least for now that the spread of private wealth does not undermine the party's unitary grip on power. As Kellee Tsai notes, "China's capitalists are pragmatic and creative but they are not budding democrats." "Economic growth," she concludes, "has not created a prodemocratic capitalist class."<sup>86</sup> The status quo certainly faces challenges from economic inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, factional strife within the CCP, and

restive minority populations. But meritocratic entry into public service, the continued competence of China's leaders, and governance that is broadly aimed at shared societal gains rather than rent-seeking augur in favor of political stasis. From this perspective, China's ascent should not be expected to transform its socioeconomic order along Western lines any time soon. On the contrary, its domestic order is likely to continue shaping its economic and geopolitical ascent, favoring policies that advantage the compact between the party and the middle class. If so, China is poised to emerge as a hegemonic power well before it democratizes, meaning that the world's leading economy will not ascribe to the dominant political norms associated with the Western liberal order. To be sure, the CCP's partial embrace of a market economy and its growing concern with legitimacy and accountability do moderate the "ideological distance" between Beijing and Washington.<sup>87</sup> Nonetheless, China and the United States remain miles apart on fundamental norms, including human rights, the rule of law, and representative government. **That gap may necessitate international deliberation about what constitutes legitimate forms of governance.** One option would be to associate legitimacy with responsible governance rather than procedural democracy. States that govern so as to meet the needs and fulfill the aspirations of their citizens, not just those that hold multiparty elections, would be considered in good standing.<sup>88</sup> Such revision to the normative foundations of Pax Americana may be needed to promote normative consensus as Western hegemony wanes. The ethnocentrism of China's imperial past suggests that a new era of Chinese hegemony would likely be characterized by cultural particularism, not universalism.<sup>89</sup> As it has already begun to do, Beijing will continue to develop a worldwide commercial network affording the extraction of raw materials and the development of export markets. But China shows few signs of wanting to export globally its own cultural and ideological norms—in sharp contrast with the universalizing ambition of both Britain and the United States. In this respect, China's ascent may mean that cultural dividing lines will matter more than they have during the era of American hegemony. **China would accept—and perhaps even encourage—a global order characterized by pluralism.** Whereas the United States has sought to construct an international order that rests on universal rules, norms, and institutions, **China might favor greater diversity and the devolution of authority to regional bodies that represent cultural groupings.** Just as China has long argued that America's political and social values are not appropriate for the Chinese, so too would a hegemonic China likely deem it inappropriate and unnecessary for the Chinese to propagate their own norms beyond a Sinicized sphere of influence in East Asia. In this respect, **a hegemonic China would likely welcome a more variegated global order, with different regions guided by their own cultural, social, and political norms.** Contra Samuel Huntington's prediction of a clash of civilizations, **regional groupings that fall along civilizational lines are by no means destined to collide with one another.**<sup>90</sup> However, managing relations among them would require a level of political and ideological pluralism inconsistent with the universalism of Pax Americana. As for its commercial orientation, China's ongoing economic success rests on a hybrid economic model that combines state control with market

mechanisms. So-called “state capitalism” has afforded multiple advantages, including long-range strategic planning, programmatic investment in infrastructure, and a regulatory framework that has helped mitigate the financial turbulence that has recently plagued the more open economies of the democratic West. To be sure, the Chinese economy faces multiple vulnerabilities, including unfavorable demographic trends; a relationship among the state, industry, and finance that impairs competition; and a lack of entrepreneurial innovation. Nonetheless, success breeds continuity. Beijing will likely continue to place a premium on the profitability of the export sector and state-owned enterprises, which enriches party elites as well as private entrepreneurs. It will also concentrate on expanding international access to the energy supplies and raw materials needed to fuel its manufacturing and industrial base. Its foreign economic policy is poised to remain extractive and mercantilist, with little emphasis on using economic penetration as an instrument of political reform. State-planning at home and mercantilism abroad are set to be enduring features of Beijing’s commercial strategy. As its economy continues to expand, China will remain interested in embracing, at least to some degree, the rules of open multilateralism. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that although China joined the World Trade Organization over a decade ago, it is continuing to practice a state-led brand of capitalism—the state sector still produces some 40 percent of the country’s GDP—and to exploit concessions won during accession negotiations to use the body to its advantage.<sup>91</sup> In this respect, it would be illusory to expect Beijing to bend increasingly to prevailing international rules as China’s power rises. On the contrary, as Chinese power grows, Beijing will likely bend the rules to favor China’s political and economic needs and norms—just as all great powers before it have done as they emerge as hegemons. Indeed, China’s leading role in the Shanghai Cooperation Council and the BRICS grouping, as well as its support for a regional trade group that excludes the United States, reveals that **Beijing is already seeking to circumvent institutions dominated by the West, not work within them.** China will not be alone among rising powers in pursuing a new brand of international governance that reflects its own interests and normative orientations. **A key challenge for coming decades will be to forge a major power consensus** that embraces a broad array of different ordering norms. As Zarakol warns, “There may be a limit to how long the majority of the world’s population will tolerate living under an international system whose rules they have very little input in.”<sup>92</sup> **The West will have to make room for the alternative approaches and visions of rising powers and prepare for an international system in which its principles no longer serve as the primary ideational and normative anchor.** If the next international system is to be characterized by a rules-based order rather than competitive anarchy, it will have to be predicated on great power consensus and toleration of political and social diversity rather than universalization of the liberal international order erected during the West’s watch. **Multipolarity and normative diversity suggest the onset of a more regionalized international system.**<sup>93</sup> Major powers—or supranational polities, as in the case of the European Union—would each seek to push outward its normative preferences within its regional sphere of influence. In the interdependent

world of the twenty-first century, effective global governance would require a combination of tolerance and coordination among such regional groupings. As the world's two leading powers, China and the United States would have a unique role to play in shaping this hybrid order—one that would at once recognize the political autonomy and normative diversity of different regions but also rest on a working consensus among regional groupings. China has a long tradition of regional hegemony. The United States is skilled at constructing hegemony in parts and in acting as a hemispheric power. These experiences may serve both countries well as they seek to manage peacefully the transition to a new and more regionalized international order.

### **Hegemony is declining now – trying to reinstate power risks lashout from BRIC powers**

**Suslov 14** – National Research University Higher School of Economics (Dmitry, "US Global Leadership Dilemma as a Challenge for the US-Russia Relations," p. 3-6, February 20, 2014, tony)

The central challenge that the US faces today is that in less than 20 years since the US declared victory in the Cold War, became the only superpower and quickly assumed the role of a center of the unipolar world, a global leader and manager of its own international system with a global reach, a global sheriff and bearer of values that seemed universal, it faced a sudden and comprehensive economic, foreign policy and political crisis.<sup>2</sup> The magnitude and shock of this crisis, which is still to be realized and comprehended, is no less dramatic, than the history of the US rise itself, which in 200 years turned itself from a colony to the only superpower and center of a unipolar world.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the US history is a history of unprecedented success, expansion and dynamism. Moreover, until now it seemed as if the historic development itself was "proving" the basic American ideological assumptions: that it is an exceptional nation with universal values, which is destined to lead the world to a universal democratic peace. But as soon as the US reached the apex and, it appeared as if a key and decisive moment has come for the US to fulfill its historic mission – transform the international system in accordance with the US interests and values – something went wrong.<sup>4</sup> In the economy, the US, still being the biggest nation-state economy in the world, most diversified and traditionally dynamic and technologically advanced among the developed economies, still the founder and most influential player of the global economic governance institutions, became the center of the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. The major pillar of the world economic order has become its major problem. The role the US plays in global economic and financial governance is increasingly at odds with the volume of its foreign debt and to American monetary policies (printing more dollars). It takes a much longer time than it used to be for the US to resume growth after crisis (and the ways out of the current "Great Recession" are unclear). Unemployment is high (for US standards) and not reducing. Finally, for the 1st time in a century the US is losing an image of the most vibrant, dynamic economy and foundation of the world's economic growth to China.<sup>5</sup> China,

India, other “new rising centers” and Asia as a whole are perceived today as the “last hope” of the world economy, not the US. While trust in the US economic dynamism and progress has been one of the major foundations of American soft and hard power. Symbolic (in terms of determining perceptions of the vector, which is of utmost importance in today world) is a comparison between the booming Shanghai with the aging infrastructure in the US. Politically, the US is facing unprecedented in recent decades and self-destructing polarization between Democrats and Republicans, which can hardly find anything to agree upon in both domestic and foreign policies, and their mutual diminishing popularity and loss of appeal – witness the Tea Party movement. Both Parties, and especially the Republicans, are undergoing dangerous transformation, with the traditional center depleting and the center of gravity going to the flanks, which aggravates polarization. This means that for the next years the US political system will remain to be paralyzed, and thus reducing effectiveness of the US domestic and foreign policies, reducing a US capacity to act as a responsible and a reliable partner. In foreign and national security policy the US faces a crisis of leadership and military overextension.<sup>6</sup> It turned out that indispensable of all its power preponderance and global presence, its diplomatic, military, economic, ideological, cultural and other instruments and assets, it is incapable of directing development of the international system in a way favorable for the US, incapable of transforming the world as it wishes. Despite the fact that the US is still the most powerful nation on Earth – militarily, diplomatically and economically, despite its efforts to consolidate unipolarity and global leadership under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and renew its global leadership under Barack Obama, despite its efforts to transform the international system in accordance with the US interests and values, **the world is clearly developing in a way unfavorable for the United States.**<sup>7</sup> And quite notably, that it started developing that way after the US acquired a hegemonic positions in the world. ☐ The US has failed to preserve itself as an undisputed pole of a unipolar system. The “unipolar moment” was indeed a moment, while “unipolar stability” turned out to be a fake in the global context. ☐ The US has failed to achieve the macro- and micro tasks in the sphere of global security it was claiming to deal with during the last 2 decades. Afghanistan and Iraq, democratization and modernization of the Broader Middle East, Arab-Israeli conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, etc. – in all or majority of cases the situation is worse than before the American “management”. There are reasons to say that Libya and Syria will follow these examples. ☐ Power is shifting from the West, including the US, to the rising centers, especially in Asia, and also diffusing more broadly among multiple actors.<sup>8</sup> Thus, it is increasingly difficult for the US to consolidate and organize others to fulfill an American agenda: these others are more and more either unwilling or demand a bigger price for their cooperation. The examples of Syria, Iran, North Korea, Middle Eastern conflict, US-Chinese relations, global climate change, nuclear reduction agenda, etc. vividly depict that the capacity of the US to determine and drive events, both multilaterally and unilaterally, has reduced. ☐ As the power of the “new centers” rise, while the US relative and

even absolute (decreasing defense budget and Armed Forces personnel, unwillingness of the Americans to fight new wars, economic troubles, deficit) power decreases, the US needs these new power centers to fulfill its agenda and pursue – sometimes vital - national interests. However, unless there is a convergence of interests, which is far from being the rule, these centers are unwilling to cooperate. ¶ Due to the diffusion of power the correlation of interests between the US and its allies and partners is becoming more complicated and non-linear. On some cases they can be strong supporters of the US policy, while on the other, sometimes no less important ones for the US, they create difficulties. Turkish policies on Syria on the one hand, and on Iran and Iraq, on the other hand, is a bright example of this complexity. This puts additional limits on American leadership. ¶ The world is again becoming pluralistic and heterogeneous in terms of values. Universality of the American values is again under fire, which undermines the US basic ideological beliefs and world perceptions.<sup>9</sup> ¶ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the capacity of the US military power to fulfill the necessary political targets – promoting democratization and overall reform of the international system through forceful regime change from the outside - was limited, and that the US is incapable to pursue an imperial foreign policy in the current conditions – just as all the other great powers. Besides these wars guarantee that the US will not return to an imperial practice in the observable future – which is already stipulated on the official level in Obama Administration’s Strategic Defense Guidance in 2012 (rejection of long-term occupation).<sup>10</sup> This significantly reduces the transformative component in the US Grand Strategy as such, making it to do more with the US “conventional” national interests, rather than with transformation of the international system, especially with the help of the military force. Moreover, these wars have exhausted the US military, decreased American physical capability and moral will to engage in new wars (witness the Obama Administration’s approach on Libya, Syria and Iran), and contributed to a situation, when the US was compelled to start reducing its defense budget and reviewing its global defense role and responsibility. The latter is illustrated in the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance and the 2011 “National Strategic Narrative” paper by “Mr.Y”.<sup>11</sup> **This contrasts with dynamic increase of the new poles’ defense budgets, including China, Russia and India.** For the 1st time since the end of the Cold War the gap in military expenditures between the US and the nonWestern power centers started to shrink. **It is still enormous, but dynamic and vector matter. This all makes the future of the American global leadership in the increasingly multipolar and even polycentric world the central problem of the US foreign policy for the years to come.**<sup>12</sup> The major challenge that the US faces is how to adapt itself to the new international conditions, what kind of modus operandi to employ, to preserve the US primacy and leadership and reverse the tendency of the international environment becoming less favorable for the US. This adaptation was – and still is – at the core of the Obama’s Grand Strategy. Another answer to the same question is provided by the Republicans.



### **The AIIB and increasing regional hegemony makes China rise inevitable**

**Keck '14** (Zachary Keck, M.A. Candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs @ George Mason University, "China's Growing Hegemonic Bent", 6/24/14, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-hegemonic-bent/>, wcp)

The People's Republic of China has been nothing if not consistent about its views on hegemony. From the time of Mao Zedong to present time, Chinese leaders have repeatedly and consistently denounced hegemony in all its forms. Indeed, the word "hegemony" is little more than a synonym for countries or actions that Beijing dislikes. But even as China continues to denounce hegemony rhetorically, it increasingly embraces it in action. This is true across a whole host of issues. None more so than Beijing's New Security Concept, which President Xi Jinping announced last month at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in Shanghai. David Cohen reminds us that the New Security Concept is likely more multi-faceted than it may appear at first glance. Nonetheless, at its core, the New Security Concept is that "security in Asia should be maintained by Asians themselves." As the Global Times reported about Xi's speech, it "stressed the role played by Asians themselves in building security, viewed as a rejection of interference from outside the region." During the speech, Xi also denounced alliances in the region. It makes good sense that China would want a U.S.-free Asia-Pacific — as China's rise has proceeded, the U.S. has increasingly become the only viable counterbalance to Beijing in the region. China's relative influence would therefore be greatly enhanced by America's exit from the region. The same goes for an end to alliances to the region — not only does China lack any formal allies, but its size ensures it will dominate any bilateral interactions with Asian nations. At the same time, the New Security Concept is transparently hegemonic. To begin with, the realization of the primary goals of the New Security Concept — namely, the exit of the U.S. from Asia and the end of alliances — would ensure China's hegemony over the region. Equally important, these goals are at odds with the views of the overwhelming majority of Asian nations. Specifically, China is alone in wanting the U.S. out of the strategic order in Asia. Every other Asia-Pacific nation — with the exception of North Korea — wants the U.S. to maintain a strong presence in the regional security architecture. In fact, most states want the U.S. to get its head out of the sand and play a bigger role in Asian security. Similarly, other Asian nations are strongly in favor of alliances in the region as evidenced by the fact that they are strengthening their ties to the U.S. and with each other. A related but different manifestation of China's growing hegemonic ambitions is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a "multilateral" development body that China is proposing as an alternative to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). On the surface, the AIIB is even less malign than the New Security Concept and in some ways this is true. However, a closer examination reveals that the AIIB is in many ways just the economic equivalent of the New Security Concept. To begin with, China wants to establish the AIIB to counterbalance the influence of the World Bank

and ADB, which Beijing views as too dominated by the U.S. and Japan respectively. Given the U.S. Congress's intransigence on IMF reforms, the desire to work around the World Bank can be justified. But China's apparent need to spurn the ADB instead of simply seeking a greater role in it by raising its contributions is less defensible. Indeed, a stronger commitment to the ADB would be an important indication of China's interest in seeking a larger role in the existing order rather than trying to upend it. Instead, China is taking the later course with the AIIB. Much like the New Security Concept, it is doing so because Beijing is crafting the institution to ensure it dominates it completely. For example, all reports suggest that China is trying to exclude Japan, India and the United States from the AIIB. This means that the institution — while ostensibly "multilateral" — will be funded almost entirely by China. As Oliver Rui, a professor of finance and accounting at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai, puts it: "China wants to play a more pivotal role in these kinds of organizations — so the best way is to establish an organization by itself... This is another way to think from a broad perspective in order to counterbalance Japan and the U.S." China's hegemonic ambitions are also apparent from the way Beijing intends to push the AIIB. As the Financial Times quotes a participant in the AIIB discussions (whose nationality is not given) as saying: "There is a lot of interest from across Asia but China is going to go ahead with this even if nobody else joins it." It should also be noted that, although the mutual benefits of the projects it will fund cannot be ignored, the ultimate objective of the AIIB is hegemonic in nature. Namely, China is seeking to build up infrastructure throughout the greater Asian region to more tightly tie its smaller neighbors' economic livelihoods to trade with China. And as China has already made clear in its territorial disputes with countries like Japan and the Philippines, Beijing is quite willing to exploit other nations' economic dependencies on it to force them to comply with its political mandates. Perhaps the greatest expression of China's new hegemonic ambitions is to force foreign nations and businesses to serve the interests of China as a nation or the narrow goals of the Communist Party. At times, this includes interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. For example, China has a long history of pressuring Southeast and South Asian nations to forcibly repatriate Uyghurs back to China. In recent years, Beijing has stepped up the pressure on these kinds of issues. Most notably, China appears to be all but actually drafting Nepal's laws for Tibetans itself. More widespread are China's efforts to force foreign companies to serve the ends of China and the CCP. This usually done by threatening to deny these companies access to China's growing consumer markets. As a result, this kind of pressure has become more effective in recent years, as seen by Hollywood and international media outlets (to name just two examples) becoming increasingly subservient to Beijing. As China's domestic market grows, so too will the frequency and success of this kind of pressure. None of this is to demonize China. As history has shown, rising powers seem to reflexively grow more hegemonic the stronger they become. Indeed, the U.S. once led the world in denouncing European intervention in the non-Western world. During the Cold War, however, it became more involved in the affairs of the so-called third world than any of the major former colonial powers like France

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and Britain. **Only a fool** (or town of them) **would therefore expect a rising China to shy away from hegemony and instead join the existing international order.** Still, China's near constant denouncements of the supposed hegemonic tendencies of others — which, ironically, were especially prevalent in Xi's CICA and General Wang's Shangri-La Dialogue speeches — are becoming increasingly hypocritical.

## **--dollar decline**

**Primacy of the dollar is ending causing hegemonic decline—  
decrease in political influence and long term military power**  
**Stokes '14** (Doug Stokes, Professor in International Security and Strategy @  
University of Exeter, "Achille's Deal: Dollar Decline and US grand strategy  
after the crisis", 2014, *wcp*)

THE DECLINE OF US HEGEMONY Whilst there was a general agreement that the interregnum between the end of the Cold War and the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) represented a more or less solid period of unchallenged and US-centric systemic unipolarity, debates over the decline of American power, polarity shifts and hegemonic transitions are now firmly back in fashion (Ikenberry et al., 2009). The US-led 2003 Iraq war led to broad comparisons between the US and previous empires, all of which had declined, most often through complex forms of imperial overstretch and the rise of other powers (Kennedy, 1987). The seeming failure to indigenize power in Iraq and Afghanistan, with US troops pulling out of those countries in 2011 and 2014, respectively, has added to the perception that even when deploying its formidable military power on weaker adversaries, the US can still not impose its will or compel others to accept political outcomes conducive to its national interests. Whilst scholars have debated the relative merits of primacy versus offshore balancing in the context of a purported US decline, most agree that militarily at least, the US continues to remain preponderant (Brown et al., 2009). However, whilst US military unipolarity may still be an enduring feature of international politics, what are less certain are the economic preconditions of American power. In 2011, for example, the US deficit reached US\$1.3 trillion, the second highest on record behind 2009's \$1.42 trillion, a figure equal to a total of 8.7 per cent of US gross domestic product, with the US military budget in the same year accounting for \$700 billion, more than that of the rest of the world combined. In 2012, the deficit fell, but remained stubbornly above \$1 trillion. Drawing upon hegemonic stability theory, a number of declinists argue that the global public goods system the US has underwritten in the postwar order has seen a gradual diffusion of power to contender states, with the US itself now increasingly subject to the forces of globalization and economic competition. The burden of underwriting this system is now undermining US leadership, which is ever more conditional on the very states that are free-riding on US public goods. Given the heavy reliance on US dollar hegemony, US power is thus increasingly conditional on 'foreign central banks doing the right thing' with America's fate 'in foreign hands. Foreigners may seek to exact a price from the United States in return for their assistance. In a crisis the United States will have little ability to resist' (Eichengreen, 2011: 262). A move away from the dollar could be sudden, or more gradual, but either way, US options in a fiscally tighter world would shrink considerably (Helleiner and Kirshner, 2009). Thus, given the budget deficit, an important precondition for US power is the capacity to get others to fund it – a very shaky foundation indeed for continued US hegemonic leadership. As Setser argues, 'political might is often linked to financial might, and a debtor's capacity to project military power

hinges on the support of its creditors' (Setser, 2008: 3). The financial crisis of 2008 has made this vulnerability even more acute, as the Anglo-American form of liberal capitalism is losing its appeal and its structural underpinnings of easy credit and 'loose money' have evaporated. Beyond its hard power, **US soft power and global influence have been said to have taken a mortal blow:** 'the global financial turmoil formally put an end to the unipolar post-Cold War era, in which the U.S. power preponderance, its alleged universal politico economic model of development (often referred to as the Washington Consensus), and its overwhelming international influence had been a defining feature' (Xinbo, 2010: 155). **If the sun is setting on the West, it is quickly rising in the East,** with a corresponding shift in polarity. As Calleo notes, 'China's suddenly critical role indicates that America's unipolar economic pretensions are being challenged by more radical global changes than a fitfully uniting Europe. The most significant such change is the rising power and wealth of the nascent Asian superpowers.' The financial crisis of 2008 has accelerated this trend, with global market forces no longer conspiring to 'finance America's unipolar role. Instead, economics will more and more constrain America's unipolar pretensions . . . . The challenge is both immediate and long term. In the near term, severe problems appear to lie in wait for the dollar' (2009: 103–5). Aside from the capacity of the Chinese to use their economic power to influence US decision-making, geopolitical tensions between the US and other powers could also trigger the so-called nuclear monetary option, where dollar purchasers 'might be prepared to take losses on reserves for both strategic reasons and geopolitical objectives in direct response to the US administration's foreign and security policy' (Subacchi, 2008: 359). This would represent a further check on the US' capacity to exercise global influence. For declinists, there is thus a profound weakness to US capabilities in that its hegemonic burdens and global public goods system impose huge costs on it, with its heavy reliance on the reserve currency status a dangerous vulnerability. Moreover, its hegemony has become increasingly conditional on rising powers' willingness to fund it through debt purchases with the globalization of markets, itself a US-led project, making the US more reliant on emerging powers: the 'growing importance of emerging markets has sharply reduced the United States' economic dominance, weakening the logic for why the dollar should constitute the largest part of central-bank reserves and be used to settle trade and financial transactions' (Eichengreen, 2009: 53). The Barack Obama administration's 2011 announcement that the US will retract from Europe as well as cut \$500 billion from the defence budget over the next decade has been interpreted as recognition of this reality (Walt, 2011).

## **--funding/tech**

### **Military funding cutbacks result in outdated tech – makes end of hardpower dominance inevitable**

**Eaglen '14** (MacKenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, "Why America's Military Dominance is Fading", 6/30/14, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america%E2%80%99s-military-dominance-fading-10772?page=2, wcp>)

It is often said Congress hates to cut or cancel weapons systems, usually for reasons relating to jobs and elections back home. But the record shows that Congress is much more likely to curtail new equipment purchases for the military rather than get rid of or retire the old stuff. This tendency is increasingly problematic for the U.S. military. In many capability sets and domains, the traditional margins of U.S. military technological supremacy are declining across the services. Too often, policy makers think of this as an emerging challenge that can be dealt with in the coming years. But, as has been documented previously and stated by many senior Pentagon officials over the past year, America's declining military superiority is now a "here-now" problem. Frank Kendall, undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, recently said, "I'm very concerned about eroding technological superiority and where we're headed. [...] We've had 20 years since the end of the Cold War [and] sort of a presumption in the United States that we are technologically superior militarily. I don't think that that's a safe assumption. In fact, I think that we've gotten complacent about that and we've been distracted for the last ten years fighting counterinsurgencies." U.S. Pacific Command chief Admiral Sam Locklear reiterated the same point recently, noting "**Our historic dominance that most of us in this room have enjoyed is diminishing, no question.**" Now that defense budgets are in their fourth year coming down, this preference to fund the old is increasingly coming at the expense of the new. Paying for yesterday's equipment is not a static or one-time bill. This is one that only grows as equipment ages and gets more expensive to maintain. These restrictions are starting to hurt investment in innovation and tomorrow's forces and their battlefield edge. Over the past decade, Congress has approved the truncation and early termination of many weapons—big and small. Letting go of legacy, or existing, equipment and assets has proven much trickier for Pentagon leaders. Look no further than the House-passed defense authorization bill for 2015 for example. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a key part of Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy modernization plans. Yet with near-sequestration budgets continuing, the Pentagon was forced to shrink its scheduled purchase from last year of buying forty-two F-35s in 2015 to only requesting thirty-four in the president's latest budget. The House of Representatives signed off on this smaller lot of F-35s without any resistance in its NDAA, and supported cuts—albeit to four aircraft instead of eight—in its version of the 2015 defense appropriations bill. The F-35 is a multirole fighter aircraft and is intended to replace many older airframes including the Air Force's A-10 Warthog, which the service has been flying for nearly forty years. As with the F-35, the Pentagon was forced to propose painful cuts to the A-10 due to near-sequestration-level budgets

enacted by Congress. Yet unlike with the F-35, proposed cuts to the A-10 have generated a hailstorm of debate and Congressional action as lawmakers have pushed back against its proposed retirement. If Congress prohibits the Pentagon from retiring the A-10, with budget caps looming, the Air Force will be forced to shift money from other priorities, including other fleets of aircraft and perhaps even the F-35. The very different Congressional reactions to proposed cuts to the A-10 and F-35 demonstrates that it is faster and often politically easier to curtail, cancel or delay weapons in development or production than to get rid of existing hardware. This “bird in the hand” approach by Congress ultimately feeds the need to then shrink further, postpone or eliminate more newer programs to help pay for the older stuff getting older. Congress holds an important oversight role in budgeting for national security. Yet despite frequent caricatures about Congress exclusively supporting expensive new weapons above all else, the reality is that members are often skeptical of new programs and tend to instead circle the wagons of protection around older systems the Pentagon has proposed shedding. While versions of the latest defense spending bills have gained attention for blocking a variety of military plans—including the proposed retirement of the A-10s and U-2 spy planes, as well as the temporary lay-up of eleven cruisers and three amphibious ships—Congressional skepticism of proposed retirements is not a recent phenomenon. In 2001, Congress prohibited the retiring of Los Angeles and Ohio-class submarines unless they were deemed unsafe. In 2005, Congress blocked retirements to all F-117 stealth fighters that were in use in 2004, as well as all E models of the KC-135 tankers. Congress reinforced this position the next year, again blocking all retirements of KC-135Es and F-117s. In 2011, Congress prohibited the Navy from retiring the EP-3E spy aircraft. In 2013 and 2014, Congress rejected Pentagon plans to retire Navy cruisers and amphibious dock landing ships (with one exception), as well as the RQ-4 Block 30 Global Hawk aircraft. Other limiting actions by Congress to shed systems since 2001 include C-5 and C-130E airlifters, along with B-52 and B-1 bombers. To its credit, in many of the cases where Congress blocked proposed retirements, it gradually gave ground. For instance, although it blocked all retirements to KC-135Es in 2005 and 2006, in 2007, it authorized the Air Force to retire twenty-nine in 2007 and up to eighty-five in 2008, contingent upon progress towards developing a next generation tanker. Similarly, while Congress prohibited all B-1 retirements in 2012, it relaxed its position in 2013 and authorized the Pentagon to retire up to six bombers. These steps were welcome measures to give the Pentagon more authority over its own budget. Yet delaying and limiting retirements came at a very real cost: **the Pentagon was forced to find dollar-for-dollar savings elsewhere in its budget, reducing other military capabilities and disrupting the Department of Defense’s plans.** Meanwhile, Congress has frequently given Pentagon leaders broader leeway to curtail and axe outright newer equipment programs. Many of the most notable examples came in 2010 and 2011, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed cancelling or terminating production on weapons such as the F-22 fighter aircraft, the C-17 cargo airplane, the CG (X) cruiser, the F-136 alternate engine, the Air Force’s combat search and rescue helicopter, the VH-71 Presidential

helicopter and the Army's Future Combat Systems. Other high-profile terminated and truncated programs from recent years include the Comanche helicopter, the EP-X reconnaissance aircraft, the Crusader self-propelled howitzer, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System and the C-27J airlifter. While in the case of the C-27J, the Pentagon was able to at least salvage some value by transferring seven of the aircraft from the Air Force to Special Operations Command and fourteen to the Coast Guard, all too often, such as with the Comanche and EFV, the Defense Department has spent billions of dollars without fielding any operational systems. Missile defense systems have been especially hard hit, with cancellations or early ends to the Multiple Kill Vehicle, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, the Airborne Laser, the Navy's Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program and the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance program. Similarly, many satellite systems have also been the targets of cuts, including the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental System and the Air Force's Transformational SATCOM system. High-profile systems have not been the only programs in development or production targeted by the Pentagon leadership and Capitol Hill. Even smaller systems have been shrunk, eliminated or killed, including the Army's Aerial Common Sensor, the Navy's Advanced Deployable System, the Precision Tracking Space Sensor and the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile. While clearly some retirement prohibitions and even some weapons cancellations may have been prudent, the long-standing misrepresentation that Congress has never met a new system it doesn't love is simply not accurate. The reality is that Congress fights much harder as a bloc to protect equipment that has been in use for years rather than pay for new equipment coming online. While occasionally healthy, this knee-jerk instinct to oppose most plans to let go of the older equipment threatens to hold back even further anemic U.S. military modernization plans. Worse, this preference is increasingly funneling more dollars to what are often less survivable systems. **In the long-run, Congress' inability to change the status quo is eroding the military's readiness for the next fight and mortgaging the future for the present.** Eventually, policy makers will need to restore balance across the Defense Department portfolio to adequately ensure tomorrow's forces get the very best equipment, just like those who served before them.



## --overstretch

### **Current military overstretch makes US heg unsustainable – Retrenchment is the only peaceful solution**

**Buchanan, 6-9** –[Patrick J. Buchanan, White House Communications Director, Masters in Journalism from Columbia University, Senior advisor to U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan, 6-9-2015, Imperial Overstretch, Human Events, <http://humanevents.com/2015/06/09/imperial-overstretch/>] Jeong

#### Toward the end of the presidency of George H.W. Bush, America stood alone at the top of the world – the sole superpower.

After five weeks of “shock and awe” and 100 hours of combat, Saddam’s army had fled Kuwait back up the road to Basra and Bagdad. Our Cold War adversary was breaking apart into 15 countries. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was reunited. The captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe were breaking free. Bush I had mended fences with Beijing after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were friends. The president declared the coming of a “new world order.”

And neocons were chattering about a new “unipolar world” and the “benevolent global hegemony” of the United States. Consider now the world our next president will inherit. North Korea, now a nuclear power ruled by a 30-something megalomaniac, is fitting ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

China has emerged as the great power in Asia, entered claims to all seas around her, and is building naval and air forces to bring an end to a U.S. dominance of the western Pacific dating to 1945. Vladimir Putin is modernizing Russian

missiles, sending ships and planes into NATO waters and air space, and supporting secessionists in Eastern Ukraine. **The**

**great work of Nixon and Reagan** – to split China from Russia in the “Heartland” of Halford Mackinder’s

“World Island,” then to make partners of both – **has been undone.** China and Russia are closer

to each other and more antagonistic toward us than at any time since the Cold War. Terrorists from al-Qaida and its offspring and the Islamic Front run

wild in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia. Egypt is ruled by a dictatorship that

came to power in a military coup. Japan is moving to rearm to meet the menace of North Korea and China, while NATO is but a shadow of its former self. Only four of 28 member nations now invest 2 percent of their GDP in defense. With the exception of the Soviet Union, some geostrategists contend, no nation, not defeated in war, has ever suffered so rapid a

decline in relative power as the United States. **What are the causes of American decline?**

**Hubris, ideology, bellicosity and stupidity all played parts.** Toward Russia, which had lost

an empire and seen its territory cut by a third and its population cut in half, we exhibited imperial contempt, shoving NATO right up into Moscow’s face and engineering “color-coded” revolutions in nations that had been part of the Soviet Union and its near-abroad. **Back** came in the form of an ex-KGB chief who rose to power

**promising to restore the national greatness of Mother Russia, protect**

**Russians wherever they were, and stand up to the arrogant Americans.** Our folly

with China was in deluding ourselves into believing that by throwing open U.S. markets to goods made in China, we would create a partner in prosperity. What we got, after \$4 billion in trade deficits with Beijing, was a gutted U.S. manufacturing base and a nationalistic rival eager to pay back the West for past humiliations. China wants this to be the

Chinese Century, not the Second American Century. Is that too difficult to

understand? **But it was in the Middle East that the most costly blunders were**

**committed.** Believing liberal democracy to be the wave of the future, that all peoples, given the chance, would

embrace it, we invaded Iraq, occupied Afghanistan and overthrew the dictator of Libya. So doing, we unleashed

the demons of Islamic fanaticism, tribalism, and a Sunni-Shiite sectarian war

now raging from North Africa to the Near East. Yet though America’s relative economic and

military power today is not what it was in 1992, our commitments are greater. We are now obligated to defend Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics against a resurgent Russia, South Korea against the North, Japan and the Philippines against a surging China. We bomb jihadists daily in Iraq and Syria, support a Saudi air war in Yemen, and sustain Kabul with

10,000 U.S. troops in its war with the Taliban. Our special forces are all over the Middle East

and Africa. And if the neocons get back into power in 2017, U.S. arms will

start flowing to Kiev, that war will explode, and the Tomahawks and B-2s will

be on the way to Iran. Since 1992, the U.S. has been swamped with Third World immigrants, here legally and

illegally, many of whom have moved onto welfare rolls. Our national debt has grown larger than our GDP. And we have run \$11 trillion in trade deficits since Bush I went home to Kennebunkport. Thousands of U.S. soldiers have died, tens of thousands have been wounded, trillions of dollars have been expended in these interventions and wars. Our present commitments are unsustainable. Retrenchment is an imperative.

### **Imperial overstretch makes hegemony unsustainable – can't check rising powers**

**Murray and Herrington '14** (Robert Murray and Luke Herrington, Dr. Robert Murray is the Vice President @ Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy, an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, a Senior Fellow of Security and Defense Policy at the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, and a Research Fellow at the University of Alberta's European Union Centre of Excellence. Luke Herrington has an MA in Global and International Studies from the University of Kansas, "Russia, Ukraine, and the testing of US Hegemony", 3/6/14, *wcp*)

There is a third form of decline, however, unique to hegemonic actors like the United States. According to hegemonic stability theory (HST), a world leader can only maintain the ability to ensure international stability for a limited time (approximately 70 to 100 years). At the end of that period, the world leader experiences a process of hegemonic decline. Aspects of relative or absolute decline could easily accompany this process, but hegemonic decline is unique. Typically occurring in the leading state's military and economic sectors, hegemonic decline frequently results from what Yale historian Paul Kennedy calls "imperial overstretch," and ultimately entails a retreat from global commitments. US Hegemonic Decline With a proper understanding of decline in mind, there is a compelling case to be made that the US may in fact be experiencing hegemonic decline. By withdrawing its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, and waffling on Iran in 2009, Libya in 2011, and Syria in 2013, it's hardly a wonder that many of the president's critics perceive him as abdicating in the Middle East and Central Asia. If American foreign policy really is in retreat, then declinist rhetoric may be justified. After all, this pull back is characteristic of hegemonic decline. This might further explain why the Obama Administration has had difficulty acting in Syria or Ukraine. An ailing hegemon—even in a unipolar system—simply cannot stand up to the great/emerging powers seeking to alter the balance of power in every situation. Add to that the fact that US resources in the region have been minimized as a result of the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we can see why America's strategic interests are limited. Of course, this is to say nothing of an alternative possibility. There is an equally compelling argument to be made that US grand strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia has always focused on promoting instability and sowing the seeds of discord. George Friedman, of the geopolitical forecasting firm STRATFOR, suggests that the US will continue this strategy to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon, among other things. As such, the "failure" to act on Syria may have been a calculated decision meant to leave Assad's regime in something of a state of chaos. From this perspective, the withdrawal of US troops from the

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region, and the “retreat” of American foreign policy may just be seen as a corrective to the previous onset of imperial overstretch caused by the neo-Reaganite/neoconservative promoted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately, it may be difficult to argue against the fact that American hegemony has been in decline and will continue to do so as time goes on. However, this decline is not absolute in nature, and while it is relative to an extent, it is primarily a hegemonic decline. To argue that China, Russia or any other BRICS state is close to the US in terms of capabilities measurement is a far stretch. Relatively speaking, the US still dominates the international system in most every measurable category that would seem to speak against arguments surrounding relative decline. The US’ hegemonic decline has profound implications moving forward. Though the US may still have a preponderance of power, it no longer has the ability to unilaterally deter or compel the actions of other great powers. Recent years have demonstrated that other larger powers are testing the proverbial waters on just how far the US will go to maintain its position in the system, and if it is perceived the US is weak or unwilling, great powers will assert themselves. Ukraine is just the latest example of Russia pushing the limits of American dominance. Indeed, the limited withdraw of some troops near the Ukrainian border may further illustrate this point. And other examples, such as Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, Iran’s nuclear program, and Arctic aggression all demonstrate clearly that the Russians no longer believe the US is fully capable of containing or deterring their actions. This also sets a dangerous precedent for other emerging powers, as questions abound regarding how China will approach Taiwan, Japan and other matters of its regional interests.

### --russia rise

**Russia rise means end of heg – declining military presence, lack of diplomatic clout, energy dominance and Crimean crisis prove Mahapatra '14** (Chintamani Mahapatra, Chairman of School of International Studies at Nehru University, "US, Ukraine and the End of Unipolarity", 6/14/14, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/us-ukraine-and-the-end-of-unipolarity-4387.html>, *wcp*)

When Ukraine became a sovereign independent republic following the Soviet disintegration, a unipolar world order was born. Now with Crimea's secession from Ukraine and the annexation to Russia, **the death of the unipolar world seems certain.** US unilateralism during the era of a unipolar world order remained unchallenged. There was no one to question then US President Bill Clinton's decision to rain missiles on Afghanistan as a response to the bombing of two US embassies in Africa; no one could challenge then US President George Bush's decision to unilaterally abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, withdraw from Kyoto Protocol, invade Iraq, and overthrow Saddam Hussein from power. Incumbent US President Barack Obama promised to promote a liberal world order; employ more diplomacy and less force; end occupation of Iraq; talk Iran out of a suspected nuclear weapon programme; bring North Korea back to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; positively engage the Islamic world; strive for establishment of a nuclear weapon free world; reach out to the largest democracy of the world; make China a responsible stakeholder; make Russia a partner for peace; and many more. However, project Obama, although partially successful, it has largely failed. President Obama can be given credit for Iran's decision to accept the détente with the US, Syria's willingness to destroy its chemical weapons, US Navy Seal's spectacular assassination of Osama bin Laden, and his successful approach to stemming the country's downward economic spiral. Nevertheless, his foreign policy flops appear more stunning. The Arab world is clearly on fire with dangerous political upheavals and unrelenting violence. The White House will have to accept a fair share of the blame for the Libyan chaos, Egyptian instability, the interminable civil war in Syria, and the North Korean nuclear tenacity. Additionally, the US is not in a position to inspire confidence among its Asian allies at the time of growing Chinese assertiveness. All goodwill between India and the US appears to have become a thing of the past following the fierce diplomatic discord sparked by the arrest and perceived mistreatment of an Indian consular officer by the New York Police Department. The Marshall Plan aid to Europe in the post World War II period remains in the history books, and the present day US is simply incapable of instituting a similar assistance programme to rescue Europe from its current economic calamity. In other words, **the unipolar world order was already facing the risk of extinction, when Russia's response to the political turbulence in Ukraine threatened to alter that order.** During the period of Soviet disintegration, pundits could not predict the final outcome of events in Moscow. Similarly, in the case of the Ukrainian political turmoil, no one could imagine the speed with which Russian President Vladimir Putin would be able to dismantle Ukrainian political geography and annex Crimea. The Obama

administration's response was slow and meek. Along with the EU, it imposed sanctions against some Russian individuals. Although Russia's membership from the G8 and its voting rights in the Council of Europe was suspended, no sanctions could be imposed on critical sectors of the Russian economy, and nor could any military measure be contemplated. High rhetoric and docile measures highlight Washington's response. **All these are the result of the resilience of a resurgent Russia and the relative decline of the US.** The US military presence in Europe is far less today compared to that during the height of the Cold War. There are no US aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean; US navy personnel numbers in Europe have reduced to 7000 from 40,000; and army personnel numbers have been reduced to 66,000 from over several hundred thousand in the recent past. **Reduction in the US military presence has coincided with the increased Russian leverage in Europe, especially in the energy sector.** Germany purchases one-third of Moscow's gas; Russia accounts for over half of Austria's gas imports; and Finland imports all of its gas from Russia. Germany's exports to Russia stand at \$40 billion a year; France's banks have over \$50 billion claims from Russia; and UK reaps billions of dollars of profit from the indulgences of Russian Oligarch in London. How can the US and the EU unite to resist expansion of Russian sway over Ukraine? While the European allies have developed mistrust in the US since the Snowden episode, Asian allies lack credibility in the US in the wake of Chinese muscle flexing. Brazil is upset with the US's eavesdropping activities and India is more than offended by the State Department's handling of the Devyani Khobragade incident. President Obama managed his relations with US allies, strategic partners and emerging powers shoddily, and finds it difficult to deal with Russian advances in Ukraine. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea have fallen into Russian hands, and three provinces in Eastern Ukraine seem to be in the queue. **As the dominoes fall, the unipolar global order also appears to be breaking down.**

### **The Putin Doctrine and Middle Eastern instability demonstrates decline in US international control**

**Haass '14** (Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department, "The Unraveling: How to Respond to a Disordered World", <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-10-20/unraveling>, wcp)

THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM Just why have things begun to unravel? For various reasons, some structural, others volitional. **In the Middle East, for example, order has been undermined by a tradition of top-heavy, often corrupt, and illegitimate governments; minimal civil society; the curse of abundant energy resources** (which often retard economic and political reform); poor educational systems; and various religion-related problems, such as sectarian division, fights between moderates and radicals, and the lack of a clear and widely accepted line between religious and secular spheres. But outside actions have added to the problems, from poorly drawn national borders to recent interventions. With more than a decade of hindsight, the decision of the United States to oust Saddam and remake Iraq

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looks even more mistaken than it did at the time. It is not just that the articulated reason for the war-ridding Saddam of weapons of mass destruction-was shown to be faulty. What looms even larger in retrospect is the fact that removing Saddam and empowering Iraq's Shiite majority shifted the country from balancing Iranian strategic ambitions to serving them, in the process exacerbating frictions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims within the country and the region at large. Nor did regime change have better results in two other countries where it was achieved. In Egypt, the American call for President Hosni Mubarak to leave office contributed to the polarization of the society. Subsequent events demonstrated that Egypt was not yet ready for a democratic transition, and U.S. withdrawal of support from a longtime friend and ally raised questions elsewhere (most notably in other Arab capitals) about the dependability of Washington's commitments. In Libya, meanwhile, the removal of Muammar al-Qaddafi by a combined U.S. and European effort helped create a failed state, one increasingly dominated by militias and terrorists. The uncertain necessity of the intervention itself was compounded by the lack of effective follow-up, and the entire exercise-coming as it did a few years after Qaddafi had been induced to give up his unconventional weapons programs-probably increased the perceived value of nuclear weapons and reduced the likelihood of getting other states to follow Qaddafi's example. In Syria, the United States expressed support for the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad and then did little to bring it about. Obama went on to make a bad situation worse by articulating a set of redlines involving Syrian use of chemical munitions and then failing to act even when those lines were clearly crossed. This demoralized what opposition there was, forfeited a rare opportunity to weaken the government and change the momentum of the civil war, and helped usher in a context in which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (isis), which has declared itself the Islamic State, could flourish. **The gap between rhetoric and action also further contributed to perceptions of American unreliability.** In Asia, too, the chief criticism that can be levied against U.S. policy is one of omission. As structural trends have increased the risks of traditional interstate conflict, Washington has failed to move in a determined fashion to stabilize the situation-not raising the U.S. military's presence in the region significantly in order to reassure allies and ward off challengers, doing little to build domestic support for a regional trade pact, and pursuing insufficiently active or sustained consultations to shape the thinking and actions of local leaders. **With regard to Russia, both internal and external factors have contributed to the deterioration of the situation.** Putin himself chose to consolidate his political and economic power and adopt a foreign policy that increasingly characterizes Russia as an opponent of an international order defined and led by the United States. But U.S. and Western policy have not always encouraged more constructive choices on his part. Disregarding Winston Churchill's famous dictum about how to treat a beaten enemy, the West displayed little magnanimity in the aftermath of its victory in the Cold War. Nato enlargement was seen by many Russians as a humiliation, a betrayal, or both. More could have been made of the Partnership for Peace, a program designed to foster better relations between Russia and the alliance. Alternatively, Russia could have been asked

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to join nato, an outcome that would have made little military difference, as nato has become less of an alliance in the classic sense than a standing pool of potential contributors to "coalitions of the willing." Arms control, one of the few domains in which Russia could lay claim to still being a great power, was shunted to the side as unilateralism and minimalist treaties became the norm. Russian policy might have evolved the way it has anyway, even if the United States and the West overall had been more generous and welcoming, but Western policy increased the odds of such an outcome. As for global governance, international accords are often hard to come by for many reasons. The sheer number of states makes consensus difficult or impossible. So, too, do divergent national interests. As a result, attempts to construct new global arrangements to foster trade and frustrate climate change have foundered. Sometimes countries just disagree on what is to be done and what they are prepared to sacrifice to achieve a goal, or they are reluctant to support an initiative for fear of setting a precedent that could be used against them later. There is thus decidedly less of an "international community" than the frequent use of the phrase would suggest. Once again, however, in recent years, developments in and actions by the United States have contributed to the problem. The post-Cold War order was premised on U.S. primacy, which was a function of not just U.S. power but also U.S. influence, reflecting a willingness on the part of others to accept the United States' lead. **This influence has suffered from what is generally perceived as a series of failures or errors, including lax economic regulation that contributed to the financial crisis, overly aggressive national security policies that trampled international norms, and domestic administrative incompetence and political dysfunction.** Order has unraveled, in short, thanks to a confluence of three trends. **Power in the world has diffused across a greater number and range of actors.** Respect for the American economic and political model has diminished. And **specific U.S. policy choices, especially in the Middle East, have raised doubts about American judgment and the reliability of the United States' threats and promises.** The net result is that while the United States' absolute strength remains considerable, American influence has diminished.

### **Ukraine crisis signals end of US global domination**

**Korolev '14** (Alexander Korolev, Post-Doctoral Fellow in Center on Asia and Globalization @ USingapore, "The Ukrainian Crisis and the End of the Cold War", 4/9/14, wcp)

The systemic changes reside in the fact that **the American Unipole has found itself in a world it does not control anymore.** Despite the fact that the power threshold of balancing against the United States is still high (America's material primacy is still uncompromised), other important conditions of unipolar standing, such as the effectiveness of the American Grand Strategy, the benevolent image of it and its policies, and unavailability of allies outside the U.S. alliance system have been severely undermined. Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the damage the financial meltdown has done to the "American brand" and liberal world order, obvious foreign policy defeats in Syria as well as soft-power undermining whistle-blowers fleeing to what Mr. Romney calls

“America’s number one geopolitical foe” have undermined the predominance of American unipolarity. At the same time, inability of the United States to obtain the European state’s support of the American hard-line approach toward Russia during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and now during the Ukrainian crisis demonstrates the fact that the legitimacy of American leadership in European affairs has diminished, and that **there are serious cracks in the system of alliances created by the U.S.** during and after the Cold War. If the European participants of NATO do not support American policy initiatives, NATO can go from being an instrument of American policy, to a mechanism for containing the U.S. And Russia, in fact, managed to contain the United States through some European NATO participants, especially Germany and France. After the period of unquestioned domination during the unipolar interlude of the 1990s, these developments now manifest **the beginning of a painful for America “return to normalcy.”** During this process, the anti-Russian blinkers are dangerous because not only do they misinform the general public about Russia’s real stand on the Ukrainian issue, but they also tie American policy makers closely to the constructed anti-Russian sentiment limiting their capacity to undertake a more balanced foreign policy, necessary for the avoidance of further overstretches of an already overstretched empire. Cornering Russia on the issue of Ukraine is dangerous for the maintenance of the Western world order because Russia, due to its geography, is much more powerful than it seems to be. As the Russo Georgian war of 2008 has demonstrated, its capacity to project power in its salient environment is much higher than the raw figures of population, GDP, military expenditure, military personnel as well as rumours about Russia’s military backwardness might suggest. The possibility of direct military engagement of the United States, (not to mention E.U. members), next to Russian borders is highly unlikely. At the same time, due to scarce economic links between Russia and the United States and strong energy dependence of Europe on Russia, Putin can remain fairly indifferent to American calls to impose sanctions on Russia. Moreover, Russian politicians have warned their American and European counterparts that they will also impose retaliatory sanctions, not necessarily symmetrical way. The Western containment toolkit, therefore, is rather limited. The inability of the West to contain Russia geopolitically and its simultaneous failure to find a peaceful common ground with Russia on the Ukrainian Crisis has provoked cascades of Russo-phobic hysteria in the West. Meanwhile, Putin has, again, successfully beaten his western counterparts at geopolitical chess game by gainfully changing Russia’s national geographic map. Regardless of different normative interpretations, bringing Crimea – an extremely important geostrategic asset with predominantly Russian population and crucially important military bases – back to Russia is a substantial geopolitical victory. Despite being dehumanised by the Western media, the Russian “annexation” of Crimea has caused zero civilian casualties and was accompanied by a popular referendum – a striking contrast to the Western military interventions known so far. **Putin has won.** The United States and its Western supporters, in turn, have to register still another crushing failure on their side and to add it to the existing list of the recent diplomatic failures. In an attempt to castigate Russia,



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American government is now making big normative claims it cannot deliver anymore. This strongly undermines the superpower's credibility. In this light, it would hardly be a gross exaggeration to say that the Ukrainian crisis marks the end of American and, in a broader sense, Western global domination.

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**--specific scenarios**

## --china

### **U.S. hegemony risks great power war with China**

**Ikenberry 14** -- PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (G. John, "From Hegemony to the Balance of Power," <http://www.dbpia.co.kr.proxy.lib.umich.edu/Journal/ArticleDetail/3570128>, p. 51-53, tony)

This old U.S.-led regional system is now giving way to something new. Fundamentally, this transformation is being driven by the rise of China and the global power transitions currently underway. After two decades of rapid economic growth, China is increasingly in a position to project regional and global power and influence. Countries in the region that previously have had the United States as their leading trade partner now find China in that position. Old American allies — such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia — are now economically tied to China, even as they remain security partnerships with the United States. China's massive growth in economic capacity and wealth is providing a platform for a rapid buildup and modernization of its military power. It is also pursuing an expanding agenda of regional and global diplomacy. The United States, in the meantime, has struggled through a period of economic downturn and weakness that has put pressure on its global hegemonic capacities. Out of these shifts, East Asia is undergoing a transition that, at the broadest level, might be described as a movement from a hegemonic logic to a balance of power logic. In the old hegemonic order, China was largely on the outside. During most of the Cold War, it was relatively weak and peripheral. But today, the lines of authority and power are shifting, and the hegemonic order is eroding — or at least it is being supplemented and complicated by other more traditional balance of power dynamics.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the shift underway in the region might best be seen as a double shift. First, there is a return to more explicit balancing calculations and logics. Great power politics has returned to the region. The region is returning to balance in the literal sense that the "oversized" American presence in the region is being reduced by the growing presence of China. This is a "return to balance" in the sense that there is more than one major great power in the region. The United States now has a great power competitor. China is a rising power that is making new geopolitical claims in the region and seeking to establish itself as a regional leader. This development is creating more thinking within the capitals of the region about power balance, alliance commitment, counter-weights, and great power politics.<sup>11</sup> Second, there is an expansion of the geopolitical playing field for regional alliance and great power politics. East Asia is no longer a fuller-contained region or sub-region. Increasingly, it is Asia or the Asia-Pacific that is the relevant geographic expanse for politics and economics. India, Australia, and the United States are all in the region. It is Asia — not East Asia — that defines the region. The East Asia Summit is increasingly the diplomatic body that fully encompasses that states that are relevant to regional governance. Out of these developments and shift, it is easy to see why observers are worried about a full "return" to

balance of power politics and great power rivalry. There are more states that are relevant to the maintenance of stable order. The distribution of power is shifting, which creates worries, insecurity, and new possibilities for miscalculations. There is more competition — either bipolar competition between the United States and China or a wider multipolar balance of power dynamic. In a competitive balancing of power system, the “problems of anarchy” threaten to return. **These are problems of arms racing, security dilemma-driven conflict, risk-taking, and the possibility of war.** If the region truly is shifting from a U.S.-led hegemonic order to a more free-wheeling balancing of power order, the dangers will no doubt mount.

### **Maintenance of US Hegemony paves the way for World War 3 – Military officials will provoke China to hold primacy**

**Whitney, 6-17** – [Mike Whitney, Correspondent at the Centre for Research on Globalization, 6-17-2015, Seven Days in May? US Global Hegemony, “Asymmetric Warfare” Directed against China, Global Research | Centre for Research on Globalization, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/seven-days-in-may-us-global-hegemony-asymmetric-warfare-directed-against-china/5456358>] Jeong

“Since its founding, the United States has consistently pursued a grand strategy focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals, first on the North American continent, then in the Western hemisphere, and finally globally.” -Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, The Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, March 2015 “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” -Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China **The United States will do whatever is necessary to maintain its dominant position in the world.** Less than two years ago, no one thought that Washington would topple a regime on Moscow’s doorstep, insert a US-backed stooge in Kiev, arm and train neo-Nazi extremists in the Ukrainian Army, instigate and oversee a vicious war of aggression in the East, threaten to deploy NATO to within five hundred miles of the Russian capital, reassemble the Iron Curtain by building up forces, weaponry and missile systems in E. Europe and the Balkans, and repeatedly provoke a nuclear-armed adversary (Russia) by launching asymmetrical attacks on its economy, its financial system and its currency. The reason Washington pursued such a risky strategy is because EU-Russian economic integration posed a direct threat to US global hegemony, so steps had to be taken to thwart the project. The US used all the tools at its disposal to drive a wedge between Brussels and Moscow, to sabotage the plan to create a free trade zone from “Lisbon to Vladivostok”, and to prevent the emergence of a new rival. Washington powerbrokers did what they felt they had to do to preserve their lofty position in the current world order. Now their focus has shifted to the Asia-Pacific where they intend to take similar action against another potential rival, China. According to the Economist, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will surpass that of the United States by 2021. In

other words, if present trends persist, China will become the world's biggest economy in less than a decade. But what are the chances that present trends will continue if Beijing is embroiled in a conflagration with the US; a conflagration where the US turns China's trading partners against Beijing like it did with Moscow, a conflagration in which more of China's resources are devoted to national defense rather than economic growth, a conflagration in which oil shipments from the Middle East are interrupted or cut off completely? If any of these things were to happen, China would probably slip into recession dashing its chances of becoming the world's biggest economy. The point here is that China's rise is not inevitable as many people seem to think. It depends on things that China cannot completely control, like Washington's provocations in the Spratly Islands which are designed to slow China's growth by isolating Beijing and drawing it into a confrontation that saps its energy and depletes its resources. There was an interesting article on the US Naval Institute's website titled "Asymmetric Warfare, American Style" that explains in part what the Pentagon may be trying to achieve by harassing Beijing over its harmless land reclamation activities in the Spratlys. Here's a clip from the article: "In the nuclear age, guarding the homeland from an unlimited counterstroke is about more than merely preventing invasion. Forestalling nuclear escalation means keeping the scope and duration of combat operations low enough—and thus unprovocative enough—that Beijing would not countenance using doomsday weapons to get its way. It is important, then, for Washington to limit its efforts through the type and amount of force deployed, staying below the nuclear threshold. American strategists' goal should be to design operations that insert "disposal" forces....to support allies while making life difficult for China's People's Liberation Army (PLA)" (Asymmetric Warfare, American Style, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, US Naval Institute) This, I imagine, is the objective of the current policy; to inflict maximum punishment on China without actually triggering a nuclear war. It's a tightrope act that Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter feels he can manage judging by the way he has gradually increased the pressure on China and then watched to see what the reaction is. And there are indications that the Carter method is working too. On June 16, China's Foreign Ministry announced that it planned to complete land reclamation projects within days. While the announcement is a clear stand-down on Beijing's part, it did include one face-saving proviso that "China would follow up by building infrastructure to carry out functions ranging from maritime search and rescue to environmental conservation and scientific research." The carefully-worded statement will be taken by Washington as a sign that Beijing is looking for a way to end the crisis without appearing like it's caving in. China's reaction is likely to convince Carter that his approach is working, that China can be bullied into making concessions in its own backyard, and that more pressure can be applied without risking a nuclear war. Thus, rather than ending the dispute, the Foreign Ministry's announcement has paved the way for an escalation of hostilities. Carter's approach to China is not particularly unique, in fact, it has a lot in common with the Soviet containment strategy propounded by the late George F. Kennan who said: The U.S. "has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which

Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” While it’s clear that US policy relies heavily on coercion, the US is being far more reckless in its dealings with China than it was with the Soviet Union. Sec-Def Carter made his demands on China (to end all land reclamation activities) without ever seeking a settlement through normal diplomatic channels. This suggests that the US doesn’t really want peace, but wants to use the Spratly’s for some other purpose, as a pretext for ratcheting up the tensions, for demonizing China in the media, for cobbling together an anti-China coalition in the region, and for encircling China to the West. Keep in mind, that the so called pivot to Asia –which President Obama referred to as the United States “top priority”– is, at its heart, a plan for economic supremacy. The foofaraw in the Spratlys is just the military component of the broader “Grand Strategy” which is aimed at dominating the prosperous Asian markets for the next century. Carter admitted as much in a speech he gave at the McCain Institute earlier in the year where he said the rebalance was about “access to growing markets” ..”to help boost our exports and our economy” ...”and cement our influence and leadership in the fastest-growing region in the world.” These are Carter’s own words, and they help to explain why the US is hectoring China. Washington needs an excuse for intensifying hostilities in the South China Sea so it can use its military to achieve its political and economic goals. At the same time, any retaliation on China’s part will be used as a justification for upping the ante; for deploying more troops to the region, for enlisting proxies to challenge Beijing in its own territorial waters, and for tightening the naval cordon to the West. The Obama administration is fully committed to the new policy, in fact, there was an interesting report in last week’s Washington Times about the sacking of high-ranking government officials who were insufficiently hostile towards China. Here’s a clip from the article: **“The Obama administration appears to be in the early phase of a policy shift on China.** Tougher rhetoric and policies, most recently demonstrated by remarks in Asia from Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, coincide with the departures of two key officials long known for advocating more conciliatory policies toward Beijing... Paul Heer, who for years held the influential post of national intelligence officer for East Asia....was known for a steadfast bias that sought to play down the various threats posed by China in favor of more conciliatory views (while) A second major personnel change was the departure last week of the White House’s senior China specialist, Evan Medeiros, who ....was regarded by critics as among the most pro-China policymakers in the White House’s highly centralized foreign policy and national security power structure.” (Ashton Carter’s remarks suggest an Obama policy shift on China, Washington Times) This is what’s going on behind the scenes. The doves are getting their pink slips while the hawks are sharpening their knives. If it looks like the uber-confident Carter is setting policy, it’s because he is. Obama seems to have been sidelined while the Pentagon is calling the shots. Does the name “Seven Days in May” ring a bell? So what can we expect now that foreign policy is in the hands of a hawkish neocon who believes that the US

must preserve its dominant position in the world by quashing all potential rivals? What we can expect is **more military adventurism, more needlessly provocative displays of force which increase the probability of another world war.** Carter's belief that the military can be used to achieve political objectives suggests that he would not be opposed to implementing a risky plan to lure China into a conflict that would exhaust its resources while "tying down significant portions of its war-fighting capacity". Authors Yoshihara and Holmes describe this very scenario in the piece cited above. Check it out: "Landing forces in China is a clear nonstarter, but introducing ground troops at select points along Asia's offshore island chain or in continental Southeast Asia would help fulfill Washington's modest goals. A limited maritime campaign would afflict China with a nagging "ulcer," much as the Duke of Wellington's 1807–14 campaign in Portugal and Spain...inflicted on France what Napoleon termed a "Spanish ulcer."... Consider one scenario—The Ryukyu Islands, a chain stretching from Japan's Kyushu Island to Taiwan, stand out as a prime candidate for waging war by contingent. The islands straddle critical sea lines of communication connecting the Yellow and East China seas to the open waters of the Pacific.....the archipelago's strategic location offers the United States and Japan a chance to turn the tables on China. By deploying anti-access and area-denial units of their own on the islands, American and Japanese defenders would slam shut an important outlet for Chinese surface, submarine, and air forces into the Pacific high seas. Effective blocking operations would tempt PLA commanders to nullify these allied disposal forces. Such exertions, however, would tie down significant portions of China's war-fighting capacity while depleting manpower and matériel... Abundant, survivable, inexpensive weaponry such as the Type 88, then, could coax China into exhausting expensive and scarce offensive weapons for meager territorial gain and uncertain prospects of a breakthrough into Pacific waters. Relatively modest investments in disposal forces could spread Chinese forces thin—helping the allies reclaim command of the commons as envisioned by AirSea Battle... In the best case from Washington's standpoint, Beijing might desist from ever attempting to upend the U.S.-led order in the region... The allies' capacity to foreclose Chinese military options—and give China a debilitating ulcer—offers perhaps the surest way of deterring Chinese aggression before it happens... Would a puffed-up neocon like Carter be willing to initiate a plan that would weaken China militarily while forcing it to "desist from ever attempting to upend the U.S.-led order in the region" again? You bet he would

### **U.S-China war causes extinction**

**Lieven 12** – Professor in War S Studies Department – King's College and Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Anatol, "Avoiding US-China War," New York Times, June 12, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html>, tony)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, **“Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.”** To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic



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damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, **modern civilization would be wrecked**. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America's global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington's neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

## **--great power war**

### **Pursuit of US Primacy guarantees Chinese and Russian Aggression – That goes nuclear**

**Roberts 14** – [Paul Craig Roberts, Chairman of The Institute for Political Economy, Senior Research Fellow in the Hoover Institution, Georgetown University where he held the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy in the Center for Strategic and International Studies, US hegemonic drive makes war with Russia/China inevitable, PressTV, <http://jhaines6.wordpress.com/2014/05/27/presstv-us-hegemonic-drive-makes-war-with-russiachina-inevitable-by-paul-craig-roberts>] Jeong

Professor Samuel Walker concluded that President George W. Bush used the “war on terror” for an across the board assault on US civil liberty, making the Bush regime the greatest danger American liberty has ever faced. Lincoln forever destroyed states’ rights, but the suspension of habeas corpus and free speech that went hand in hand with America’s three largest wars was lifted at war’s end. However, President George W. Bush’s repeal of the Constitution has been expanded by President Obama and codified by Congress and executive orders into law. Far from defending our liberties, our soldiers who died in “the war on terror” died so that the president can indefinitely detain US citizens without due process of law and murder US citizens on suspicion alone without any accountability to law or the Constitution. The conclusion is unavoidable that America’s wars have not protected our liberty but, instead, destroyed liberty. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said, “A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny.” Southern secession did pose a threat to Washington’s empire, but not to the American people. Neither the Germans of WWI vintage nor the Germans and Japanese of WWII vintage posed any threat to the US. As historians have made completely clear, Germany did not start WWI and did not go to war for the purpose of territorial expansion. Japan’s ambitions were in Asia. Hitler did not want war with England and France. Hitler’s territorial ambitions were mainly to restore German provinces stripped from Germany as WWI booty in violation of President Wilson’s guarantees. Any other German ambitions were to the East. Neither country had any plans to invade the US. Japan attacked the US fleet at Pearl Harbor hoping to remove an obstacle to its activities in Asia, not as a precursor to an invasion of America. Certainly the countries ravaged by Bush and Obama in the 21st century—Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen posed no military threat to the US. Indeed, these were wars used by a tyrannical executive branch to establish the basis of the Stasi State that now exists in the US. The truth is hard to bear, but the facts are clear. America’s wars have been fought in order to advance Washington’s power, the profits of bankers and armaments industries, and the fortunes of US companies. Marine General Smedley Butler said, “I served in all commissioned ranks from a second Lieutenant to a Major General. And during that time, I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism.” It is more or less impossible to commemorate the war dead without glorifying them, and it is impossible to glorify them without glorifying their wars. For the entirety of the 21st century the US has been at war, not war against massed armies or threats to American freedom, but wars against civilians, against women, children, and village elders, and wars against our own liberty. Elites with a vested interest in these wars tell us that the wars will have to go on for another 20 to 30 years before we defeat “the terrorist threat.” This, of course, is nonsense. There was no terrorist threat until Washington began trying to create terrorists by military attacks, justified by lies, on Muslim populations. Washington succeeded with its war lies to the point that Washington’s audacity and hubris have outgrown Washington’s judgment. By overthrowing the democratically elected government in Ukraine, Washington has brought the United States into confrontation with Russia. **This is a confrontation that could end badly, perhaps for Washington and perhaps for the entire world. If Gaddafi and Assad would not roll over for Washington, why does Washington think Russia will?** The Bush and Obama regimes have destroyed America’s reputation with their incessant lies and violence against other peoples. The world sees Washington as the prime threat. Worldwide polls consistently show that people around the world regard the US and Israel as posing the greatest threat to

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peace. (see here and here) The countries that Washington's propaganda declares to be "rogue states" and the "axis of evil," such as Iran and North Korea, are far down the list when the peoples in the world are consulted. It could not be more clear that the world does not believe Washington's self-serving propaganda. The world sees the US and Israel as the rogue elements. The US and Israel are the only two in the world that are in the grip of ideologies. The US is in the grip of the Neoconservative ideology which has declared the US to be the "exceptional, indispensable country" chosen by history to exercise hegemony over all others. This ideology is buttressed by the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines that are the basis of US foreign policy. The Israeli government is in the grip of the Zionist ideology that declares a "greater Israel" from the Nile to the Euphrates. Many Israelis themselves do not accept this ideology, but it is the ideology of the "settlers" and those who control the Israeli government. Ideologies are important causes of war. Just as the Hitlerian ideology of German superiority is mirrored in the Neoconservative ideology of US superiority, the Communist ideology that the working class is superior to the capitalist class is mirrored in the Zionist ideology that Israelis are superior to Palestinians. Zionists have never heard of squatters' rights and claim that recent Jewish immigrants into Palestine – invaders really – have the right to land occupied by others for millennia. Washington's and Israel's doctrines of superiority over others do not sit very well with the "others." When Obama declared in a speech that Americans are the exceptional people, Russia's President Putin responded, "God created us all equal." To the detriment of its population, the Israeli government has made endless enemies. Israel has effectively isolated itself in the world. Israel's continued existence depends entirely on the willingness and ability of Washington to protect Israel. This means that Israel's power is derivative of Washington's power. Washington's power is a different story. As the only economy standing after WWII, the US dollar became the world money. This role for the dollar has given Washington financial hegemony over the world, the main source of Washington's power. As other countries rise, Washington's hegemony is imperiled. To prevent other countries from rising, Washington invokes the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines. To be brief, the Brzezinski doctrine says that in order to remain the only superpower, Washington must control the Eurasian land mass. Brzezinski is willing for this to occur peacefully by suborning the Russian government into Washington's empire. "A loosely confederated Russia . . . a decentralized Russia would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization." In other words, break up Russia into associations of semi-autonomous states whose politicians can be suborned by Washington's money. Brzezinski propounded "a geo-strategy for Eurasia." In Brzezinski's strategy, China and "a confederated Russia" are part of a "transcontinental security framework," managed by Washington in order to perpetuate the role of the US as the world's only superpower. I once asked my colleague, Brzezinski, that if everyone was allied with us, who were we organized against? My question surprised him, because I think that Brzezinski remains caught up in Cold War strategy even after the demise of the Soviet Union. In Cold War thinking it was important to have the upper hand or else be at risk of being eliminated as a player. The importance of prevailing became all consuming, and this consuming drive survived the Soviet collapse. Prevailing over others is the only foreign policy that Washington knows. The mindset that America must prevail set the stage for the Neoconservatives and their 21st century wars, which, with Washington's overthrow of the democratically elected government of Ukraine, has resulted in a crisis that has brought Washington into direct conflict with Russia. I know the strategic institutes that serve Washington. I was the occupant of the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, for a dozen years. The idea is prevalent that Washington must prevail over Russia in Ukraine or Washington will lose prestige and its superpower status. The idea of prevailing always leads to war once one power thinks it has prevailed. The path to war is reinforced by the Wolfowitz Doctrine. Paul Wolfowitz, the neoconservative intellectual who formulated US military and foreign policy doctrine, wrote among many similar passages: "Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere [China] that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." In the Wolfowitz Doctrine, any other strong country is defined as a threat and a power hostile to the US regardless of how willing that country is to get along with the US for mutual benefit. The difference between Brzezinski and the Neoconservatives is that Brzezinski wants to suborn Russia and China by including them in the empire as important elements whose voices would be heard, if only for diplomatic reasons, whereas the Neoconservatives are prepared to rely on military force combined with internal subversion orchestrated with US financed NGOs and even terrorist organizations. Neither the US nor Israel is embarrassed by their worldwide reputations as posing the greatest threat. In fact, both are proud to be recognized as the greatest threats. The foreign policy of both is devoid of any diplomacy. US and Israeli foreign policy rests on

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violence alone. Washington tells countries to do as Washington says or be “bombed into the stone age.” Israel declares all Palestinians, even women and children, to be “terrorists,” and proceeds to shoot them down in the streets, claiming that Israel is merely protecting itself against terrorists. Israel, which does not recognize the existence of Palestine as a country, covers up its crimes with the claim that Palestinians do not accept the existence of Israel. “We don’t need no stinking diplomacy. **We got power.” This is the attitude that guarantees war, and that is where the US is taking the world**. The prime minister of Britain, the chancellor of Germany, and the president of France are Washington’s enablers. They provide the cover for Washington. Instead of war crimes, Washington has “coalitions of the willing” and military invasions that bring “democracy and women’s rights” to non-compliant countries. China gets much the same treatment. A country with four times the US population but a smaller prison population, China is constantly criticized by Washington as an “authoritarian state.” China is accused of human rights abuses while US police brutalize the US population. The problem for humanity is that Russia and China are not Libya and Iraq. These two countries possess strategic nuclear weapons. Their land mass greatly exceeds that of the US. The US, which was unable to successfully occupy Baghdad or Afghanistan, has no prospect of prevailing against Russia and China in conventional warfare. Washington will push the nuclear button. What else can we expect from a government devoid of morality? The world has never experienced rogue elements comparable to Washington and Israel. Both governments are prepared to murder anyone and everyone. Look at the crisis that Washington has created in Ukraine and the dangers thereof. On May 23, 2014, Russia’s President Putin spoke to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a three-day gathering of delegations from 62 countries and CEOs from 146 of the largest Western corporations. Putin did not speak of the billions of dollars in trade deals that were being formalized. Instead Putin spoke of the crisis that Washington had brought to Russia, and he criticized Europe for being Washington’s vassals for supporting Washington’s propaganda against Russia and Washington’s interference in vital Russian interests. Putin was diplomatic in his language, but the message that powerful economic interests from the US and Europe received is that it will lead to trouble if Washington and European governments continue to ignore Russia’s concerns and continue to act as if they can interfere in Russia’s vital interests as if Russia did not exist. The heads of these large corporations will carry this message back to Washington and European capitals. Putin made it clear that the lack of dialogue with Russia could lead to the West making the mistake of putting Ukraine in NATO and establishing missile bases on Russia’s border with Ukraine. Putin has learned that Russia cannot rely on good will from the West, and Putin made it clear, short of issuing a threat, that Western military bases in Ukraine are unacceptable. Washington will continue to ignore Russia. However, European capitals will have to decide whether Washington is pushing them into conflict with Russia that is against European interests. Thus, Putin is testing European politicians to determine if there is sufficient intelligence and independence in Europe for a rapprochement. If Washington in its overbearing arrogance and hubris forces Putin to write off the West, the Russian/Chinese strategic alliance, which is forming to counteract Washington’s hostile policy of surrounding both countries with military bases, will harden into preparation for the inevitable war. The survivors, if any, can thank the Neoconservatives, the Wolfowitz doctrine, and the Brzezinski strategy for the destruction of life on earth. The American public contains a large number of misinformed people who think they know everything. These people have been programmed by US and Israeli propaganda. They are led to believe that Islam, a religion, is a militarist doctrine that calls for the overthrow of Western civilization, as if anything remains of Western civilization. Many believe this propaganda. The US has departed Iraq, but the carnage today is as high as or higher than during the US invasion and occupation. The daily death tolls from the conflict are extraordinary. The West has overthrown itself. In the US the Constitution has been murdered by the Bush and Obama regimes. Nothing remains. As the US is the Constitution, what was once the United States no longer exists. A different entity has taken its place. Europe died with the European Union, which requires the termination of sovereignty of all member countries. A few unaccountable bureaucrats in Brussels have become superior to the wills of the French, German, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese peoples. Western civilization is a skeleton. It still stands, barely, but there is no life in it. The blood of liberty has departed. Western peoples look at their governments and see nothing but enemies. Why else has Washington militarized local police forces, equipping them as if they were occupying armies? Why else has Homeland Security, the Department of Agriculture, and even the Postal Service and Social Security Administration ordered billions of rounds of ammunition and even submachine guns? What is this taxpayer-paid-for arsenal for if not to suppress US

citizens? As the prominent trends forecaster Gerald Celente spells out in the current Trends Journal, “uprisings span four corners of the globe.” Throughout Europe angry, desperate and outraged peoples march against EU financial policies that are driving the peoples into the ground. Despite all of Washington’s efforts with its well funded fifth columns known as NGOs to destabilize Russia and China, both the Russian and Chinese governments have far more support from their people than do the US and Europe. In the 20th century Russia and China learned what tyranny is, and they have rejected it. In the US tyranny has entered under the guise of the “war on terror,” a hoax used to scare the sheeple into abandoning their civil liberties, thus freeing Washington from accountability to law and permitting Washington to erect a militarist police state. Ever since WWII, Washington has used its financial hegemony and the “Soviet threat,” now converted into the “Russian threat,” to absorb Europe into Washington’s empire. Putin is hoping that the interests of European countries will prevail over subservience to Washington. This is Putin’s current bet. This is the reason Putin remains unprovoked by Washington’s provocations in Ukraine. If Europe fails Russia, Putin and China will prepare for the war that Washington’s drive for hegemony makes inevitable.

### **The pursuit of U.S. Primacy leads to war with Russia and China – That escalates and goes nuclear**

**Roberts, 6-2** – [Paul Craig Roberts, Senior Research Fellow in the Hoover Institution, PhD in Economic Policies from the University of Virginia, 6-2-2015, “Nuclear War our Likely Future”: Russia and China won’t accept US Hegemony, Paul Craig Roberts, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nuclear-war-our-likely-future-russia-and-china-wont-accept-us-hegemony-paul-craig-roberts/5453098>] Jeong

The White House is determined to block the rise of the key nuclear-armed nations, Russia and China, neither of whom will join the “world’s acceptance of Washington’s hegemony,” says head of the Institute for Political Economy, Paul Craig Roberts. The former US assistant secretary of the Treasury for economic policy, Dr Paul Craig Roberts, has written on his blog that Beijing is currently “confronted with the Pivot to Asia and the construction of new US naval and air bases to ensure Washington’s control of the South China Sea, now defined as an area of American National Interests.” Roberts writes that Washington’s commitment to contain Russia is the reason “for the crisis that Washington has created in Ukraine and for its use as anti-Russian propaganda.” “How America Was Lost” among the latest titles, says that US “aggression and blatant propaganda have convinced Russia and China that Washington intends war, and this realization has drawn the two countries into a strategic alliance.” Dr Roberts believes that neither Russia, nor China will meanwhile accept the so-called “vassalage status accepted by the UK, Germany, France and the rest of Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia.” According to the political analyst, the “price of world peace is the world’s acceptance of Washington’s hegemony.” “On the foreign policy front, the hubris and arrogance of America’s self-image as the ‘exceptional, indispensable’ country with hegemonic rights over other countries means that the world is primed for war,” Roberts writes. He gives a gloomy political forecast in his column saying that “unless the dollar and with it US power collapses or Europe finds the courage to break with Washington and to pursue an independent foreign policy, saying good-bye to NATO, nuclear war is our likely future.” Russia’s far-reaching May 9 Victory Day celebration was

meanwhile a “historical turning point,” according to Roberts who says that while Western politicians chose to boycott the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, “the Chinese were there in their place,” China’s president sitting next to President Putin during the military parade on Red Square in Moscow. A recent poll targeting over 3,000 people in France, Germany and the UK has recently revealed that as little as 13 percent of Europeans think the Soviet Army played the leading role in liberating Europe from Nazism during WW2. The majority of respondents – 43 percent – said the US Army played the main role in liberating Europe. “Russian casualties compared to the combined casualties of the US, UK, and France make it completely clear that it was Russia that defeated Hitler,” Roberts points out, adding that “in the Orwellian West, the latest rewriting of history leaves out of the story the Red Army’s destruction of the Wehrmacht.”

### **Heg makes nuclear war with China and Russia inevitable – No guarantee of deterrence**

**Porter, 14** – [Tom Porter, Correspondent at International Business Times, 11-8-2014, US and Nato Quest For Hegemony Risks Provoking Nuclear Conflict, Claims Noam Chomsky, International Business Times, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-nato-quest-hegemony-risks-provoking-nuclear-conflict-claims-noam-chomsky-1473831> ] Jeong

Leading US dissident Noam Chomsky has argued that the US and Nato's quest for global hegemony has provoked international tensions, and **risks tipping the world into nuclear war.** Speaking to the Kremlin-funded RT news channel, Chomsky argued that after the collapse of the Soviet Union Nato had sought to control global energy supplies, **exacerbating tensions with Russia to the extent that it could accidentally spark a nuclear conflict.** In recent months, relations between Russia and the West have hit lows not seen since the Cold War, as Russia accused the West of helping to topple a pro-Kremlin government in Ukraine as the West accused Russia of illegally seizing Crimea. "There have been many cases, not that serious, but pretty close, where human intervention with a few-minutes choice has prevented a nuclear war. **You can't guarantee that's going to continue,**" said Chomsky, an Emeritus Professor of Linguistics at MIT. "When you play a game like that, with low probability risks of disaster over and over again, you're going to lose. And now, especially in the crisis over Ukraine, and so-called missile-defense systems near the borders of Russia, it's a threatening situation." This week, the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported that Nato was discussing creating a new missile defense shield aimed at protecting Europe from an attack by Russia. Chomsky argued that in the '90s, with its main rival the Soviet Union out of the picture, the focus of Nato changed. "The official mission of Nato became to control the international, the global energy system, pipelines. That means, to control the world," said Chomsky. He said that current sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and EU following the Ukraine crisis were actually serving to undermine US power, by pushing Russia into an alliance with China. "Current Western policies are driving Russia towards closer interaction with the Chinese-based system. In this interaction Russia is actually the weaker partner, so it's making concessions,

but the US is openly creating a system of power, which could significantly diminish US domination in the world."

### **Trying to sustain hegemony incites Sino-Russian counterbalancing**

**Posen 14** – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," Cornell University Press, p. 21-31, June 24, 2014, tony)

Most observers agree that the United States has faced little balancing. 11 Why might this have been the case? Because the United States is at a great distance from other states, true conquest of others is a costly matter, which both mutes U.S. ambitions and increases its costs, so its power may appear less threatening. Other factors, such as the nuclear weapon, also defend weaker powers against the risk that the United States could turn highly aggressive. The U.S. strategy has not aimed for formal empire or territorial conquest and annexation. Finally, the distribution of capabilities among other states has made the formation of balancing coalitions difficult. At present, the aggregate capabilities of three disparate states would be required to arithmetically exceed U.S. capabilities (see table 2 ). In the real world of alliance management, this is problematical. It is also the case that the rest of the consequential powers in the world are concentrated in Eurasia, which tends to make them more fearful of one another than they are of the powerful, but distant United States. 12 Balancing efforts have occurred, however, **and more are to be expected**. The level of U.S. power, as well as the activist strategy that it enables, are likely to be **perceived as a problem by other independent actors**. At the same time, a "diffusion of power" is underway, as China and India ascend to the top ranks of world powers, and a handful of states such as Russia, Japan, and perhaps Brazil remain sufficiently capable to matter as allies. Thus some states will be more able to tilt with the United States on their own, or more able to **form** smaller and more manageable **balancing coalitions**. Scholars following the trajectory of the "unipolar moment" have debated whether or not balancing is present. A new, somewhat useful distinction has been drawn between "soft" and "hard" balancing. "Soft balancing" captures concerted behavior by other states to increase the costs of the activist hegemon, short of the use or threat of violence, or the mobilization of material capabilities. 13 Many scholars have observed that hegemon typically attempt to legitimate their power position. 14 They would like others to believe that their might is also right. This helps the hegemon control costs. Soft balancing aims to deprive the hegemon of that legitimacy. Thus it consists mainly of diplomacy, particularly in venues that the hegemon hopes to employ to legitimate its action. The United States, as a liberal hegemon, is particularly vulnerable to this kind of action. Students of soft balancing point to action by Russia and France to deprive the United States of a U.N. security council resolution to authorize Operation Iraqi Freedom as an example. One could argue that China is engaged in soft balancing in its effort to protect traditional norms of sovereignty versus new interpretations advanced by the United States and other Western states. 15 China has used its position in the U.N. Security Council to slow U.S.-led efforts to pressure Iran into giving up its nuclear enrichment projects. Iran is a close associate of China. Given China's growing dependence on oil and gas imports from the Persian Gulf, it is plausible that Beijing is balancing U.S. power in that region. Russia and China have collaborated to keep the Syrian civil war off the agenda of the UN Security Council. Soft balancing is consistent with its modifier, and it is difficult to argue that it has done much to slow U.S. behavior. That said, the practice is a leading indicator that U.S. hegemony does not sit well, sometimes **even with its friends**. "Hard balancing," the assemblage of military capability, provides the real energy in international politics. "External" balancing aims to concert hard power, or the threat of hard power, through alliances. International diplomacy is often about generating the concern in the bumptious target state

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that a coalition could be formed against it. 16 At some future point, that potential coalition could be a military coalition. But developments need not go that far. Balance of power diplomacy has usually stopped short of building formal alliances. During the Cold War, analysts accustomed themselves to the notion that balancing coalitions would be accompanied by formal institutions such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact with bureaucracies, command structures, and permanently stationed military forces, or the elaborate U.S. base structure that had become attached to the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty. In the past this kind of institutionalization has not occurred until well into a war, if at all. Today balance of power diplomacy is already widely practiced. Russia and China do have a weak standing institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 17 More remarkable has been the significant sales of top-of-the-line Russian armaments to China. 18 Students of the Cold War will recall that the Soviet Union and China became bitter enemies, and the United States profited from this under President Nixon. The end of the Cold War precipitated a shift of affections, even as tensions between the United States and China quickly developed. 19 Despite the obvious fact that those parts of Russia bordering China are quite vulnerable to Chinese military action, and are the subject of long-standing irredentist claims, Russia has sold China advanced fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, warships, and naval weapons. Of course, some of this is merely a business proposition; Russia wants to keep its arms industry viable and exports are a way to do so. But it is equally clear that Russia is happy to help China create risks for the United States and probably views the sale of arms to China as less risky to itself due to the evolving tension between China and the United States. Russia has also done what it can to limit the extent of U.S. penetration of their former republics in Central Asia. More generally, Russia has become assertive and is trying with some success to build a sphere of influence on its periphery. And it has used force in one case, Georgia, to make the point that it believes it has a droit de regard in these regions. United States strategists see Russian behavior of this kind as aggressive. The possibility that prior Western activities are prompting a Russian balancing response is seldom conceded. NATO "enlargement" is conveniently forgotten; Russia should not mind that the alliance that crushed its Soviet parent has been picking up all the chips on Europe's poker table and moving its frontier inexorably in Russia's direction. Moreover, diplomatic historian Mary Sarotte finds that U.S. and German officials verbally assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not do this, though the assurances were never written into a treaty. 20 So to the evident creep of NATO's power in an easterly direction was added the experience of bad faith. Balance of power theorists would have expected Russia to push back as soon as it had the power; it has a little power, and it is pushing back. The Western powers themselves have not been immune to the lure of balance of power diplomacy. Even U.S. allies in Europe have done what they can to punch up the capacity of the European Union for independent foreign policy action, including the development of a shadow military command structure outside of NATO. 21 The purpose here is limited, to have a capability in reserve against the possibility that the United States could prove capricious, and the Europeans would have to go it alone. This should not be exaggerated; progress on EU integration is slow. What is surprising is that it has happened at all in an institution whose members typically find the very question of military force to be distasteful.

### **That risks World War III**

**Lukin 14** -- Associate Professor and Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies at Far Eastern Federal University (Artyom, "Sino-Russian Entente Would Move the World a Step Closer to 1914," [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artiom-lukin/china-russia-world-war-three\\_b\\_5625485.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artiom-lukin/china-russia-world-war-three_b_5625485.html), July 28, tony)

Artyom Lukin says the U.S. policy of containment is pushing China and Russia ever closer to forming a powerful anti-Western alliance, greatly raising the possibility



**of a Third World War** VLADIVOSTOCK -- Whereas the first two world wars broke out and were fought mainly in Europe, the Third World War, if it is not avoided, will most probably erupt in the Asia-Pacific region. Quite a few scholars and political leaders have found striking similarities between what took place in Europe before the First World War and what we are now witnessing in Asia. The current security situation in the Asia-Pacific -- **with competing sovereignty claims, the rise of nationalism among both major and lesser countries, and great power rivalry** -- increasingly resembles Europe a century ago. A world war is a very special kind of military conflict -- one which features a clash of two mighty coalitions led by great powers and possessing roughly comparable strategic resources, so that one side will not easily and swiftly prevail over the other. Are we going to see this sort of war breaking out in the Asia-Pacific? China is, of course, the rising power whose growing ambitions put it straight on a collision course with the incumbent hegemon -- the United States -- much like Anglo-German antagonism set the stage for the First World War. However, even if China becomes, as widely predicted, the No 1 economy and manages to close the military gap with the U.S., this will not be nearly enough to mount a viable challenge to U.S. hegemony. For China would have to confront not the U.S. alone but the U.S.-led bloc, counting, among others, Japan, Canada, Australia, and perhaps India. Beijing currently has just one formal ally -- North Korea, while Pakistan can be viewed as something of a de facto ally, at least vis-à-vis India. Although valuable to China, these countries can hardly be regarded as huge strategic assets. China lacks a dependable ally of a truly great power standing. The only plausible candidate is Russia. **An alliance with Moscow would** no doubt **embolden Beijing.** With Moscow as a close friend, China could be confident about the security of its northern borders and could count on unimpeded access to Russia's natural resources. Thus, Beijing would be much less vulnerable to naval blockades that the U.S. and its maritime allies would be sure to use in case of a serious confrontation. Should they form an entente, Moscow and Beijing could have Central Asia, as well as Mongolia, to themselves, effectively shutting out all external powers from the heart of Eurasia. An alliance with Moscow would also put Russia's military-industrial complex and its vast military infrastructure in Eurasia at Beijing's service. What might ultimately emerge is a Eurasian league, which, in controlling the continental heartland, would be reminiscent of the Central Powers alliance formed in the middle of Europe by Imperial Germany and the Habsburg empire. There is a strong tendency in the West to underestimate the potential for a Russia-China entente. A Sino-Russian strategic partnership is often portrayed as an "axis of convenience" founded on a shaky basis. Moscow, the argument goes, will be loath to form an alliance with Beijing because it distrusts and fears a rising China. The main problem with such thinking is that the U.S.-led West is seen by Moscow as a much bigger threat than China. The consensus in the Kremlin is that, for at least the next 20 years, China will not pose a threat to Russia, Beijing's and Moscow's common foe being the U.S. It would not be accurate to describe the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as an alliance yet, but the relationship is certainly growing stronger, evidenced by, among other things, the recent mega gas deal, Russia's willingness to sell China its most advanced arms and the expanding scale of bilateral military exercises. The Ukraine crisis may well become a tipping point, sealing the fate of Eurasian alignments. The Western push to punish and isolate Russia is drawing Moscow closer to Beijing, which, tellingly, has taken a stance of benevolent neutrality towards the Kremlin's actions in Ukraine and its takeover of Crimea. One may suspect that, in exchange, Beijing would expect from Moscow the same kind of "benevolent neutrality" regarding its assertions in East Asia and the Western Pacific. The personalities of the Russian and Chinese leaders, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, are going to be a major factor in deciding the Russo-Chinese alignment. They are two autocratic chief executives who have concentrated in their hands almost exclusive powers to make foreign policy decisions. Putin and Xi seem to get along quite well and share a flair for hardball realpolitik. Matched against contemporary Western leaders with underwhelming foreign policy performances, the Putin-

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Xi duo is going to be a formidable force. It is significant that Putin and Xi will be here for a long time: Putin is likely to seek, and win, re-election in 2018, while Xi will not quit until 2022 and may continue to serve as paramount leader beyond then. The international system is at a critical juncture with U.S. unipolarity waning and the contours of the new order taking shape. The crucial question is whether this emerging order will be one of multipolarity and a flexible balance of power or one divided into two hostile alliances. It takes two to tango -- it takes two grand alliances to unleash a world war. In fact, one alliance has already been in place for over 60 years. Or, rather, the network of alliances led by Washington - NATO in the western part of Eurasia and the "hub-and-spoke" security pacts in East Asia. Whether the opposing bloc -- that of Russia and China -- ever comes into being depends to a large degree on Washington. If America continues its present policy of dual containment -- against both Russia and China -- it will be hard for them to resist the temptation of forming an anti-Western alliance. There were many ingredients that went into the mix that finally burst into the First World War. However, that mix became truly explosive once Europe split into two opposing alliances -- the triple entente of France, Russia and Britain versus the triple alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. If, a century later, we again fall into the trap of hostile alliance politics, the consequences may be no less tragic.

### **War is ensured to go nuclear – Russia and China posturing**

**RT 5-15** (RT, 'Nuclear war our likely future': Russia & China won't accept US hegemony, Reagan official warns," <http://rt.com/news/257841-russia-china-us-hegemony/>, May 15, 2015, tony)

The White House is determined to block the rise of the key nuclear-armed nations, Russia and China, neither of whom will join the "world's acceptance of Washington's hegemony," says head of the Institute for Political Economy, Paul Craig Roberts. The former US assistant secretary of the Treasury for economic policy, Dr Paul Craig Roberts, has written on his blog that Beijing is currently "confronted with the Pivot to Asia and the construction of new US naval and air bases to ensure Washington's control of the South China Sea, now defined as an area of American National Interests." Roberts writes that Washington's commitment to contain Russia is the reason "for the crisis that Washington has created in Ukraine and for its use as anti-Russian propaganda." The author of several books, "How America Was Lost" among the latest titles, says that US "aggression and blatant propaganda have convinced Russia and China that Washington intends war, and this realization has drawn the two countries into a strategic alliance." Dr Roberts believes that neither Russia, nor China will meanwhile accept the so-called "vassalage status accepted by the UK, Germany, France and the rest of Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia." According to the political analyst, the **"price of world peace is the world's acceptance of Washington's hegemony."** "On the foreign policy front, **the hubris and arrogance of America's self-image as the 'exceptional, indispensable' country with hegemonic rights over other countries means that the world is primed for war,**" Roberts writes. He gives a gloomy political forecast in his column saying that "unless the dollar and with it US power collapses or Europe finds the courage to break with Washington and to pursue an independent foreign policy, saying good-bye to NATO, nuclear war is our likely future." Russia's far-reaching May 9 Victory Day celebration was meanwhile a "historical turning point," according to Roberts who says that while Western politicians chose to boycott the 70th anniversary

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of the defeat of Nazi Germany, "the Chinese were there in their place,"  
China's president sitting next to President Putin during the military parade on  
Red Square in Moscow. A recent poll targeting over 3,000 people in France, Germany and the UK has recently revealed that as little as 13 percent of Europeans think the Soviet Army played the leading role in liberating Europe from Nazism during WW2. The majority of respondents – 43 percent – said the US Army played the main role in liberating Europe. "Russian casualties compared to the combined casualties of the US, UK, and France make it completely clear that it was Russia that defeated Hitler," Roberts points out, adding that "in the Orwellian West, the latest rewriting of history leaves out of the story the Red Army's destruction of the Wehrmacht." Read more Perverting history: Europeans think US army liberated continent during WW2 The head of the presidential administration, Sergey Ivanov, told RT earlier this month that attempts to diminish the role played by Russia in defeating Nazi Germany through rewriting history by some Western countries are part of the ongoing campaign to isolate and alienate Russia. Dr Roberts has also stated in his column that while the US president only mentioned US forces in his remarks on the 70th anniversary of the victory, President Putin in contrast "expressed gratitude to 'the peoples of Great Britain, France and the United States of America for their contribution to the victory.'" The political analyst notes that America along with its allies "do not hear when Russia says 'don't push us this hard, we are not your enemy. We want to be your partners.'"

### **US-Russia war causes extinction**

**Helfand 14** (Ira Helfand, M.D, past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, co-president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. "Another View: Ukraine crisis puts focus on danger of nuclear war" May 3, 2014, <http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/05/04/another-view-ukraine-crisis-danger-nuclear-war/8665185/>)

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has made it clear that the danger of nuclear war is still with us and may be greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. What does that mean for United States nuclear policy? There are today more than 15,000 nuclear warheads in the world. The vast majority, more than 95 percent, are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. Some 3,000 of these warheads are on "hair-trigger" alert. They are mounted on missiles that can be fired in 15 minutes and destroy their targets around the world less than 30 minutes later. During the Cold War, there was a widespread understanding of what nuclear weapons could do. That is not true today. Those who lived through the Cold War have put this painful information out of mind, and a generation has come of age that never learned about the terrible effects of nuclear war. This must change if we are to make rational decisions about nuclear policy. Over the last few years, new information has emerged that underlines the danger posed by even the limited use of nuclear weapons. Studies published in 2006 by Rutgers University's Alan Robock and his colleagues examined the effects of a "limited" nuclear war involving just 100 small nuclear weapons, the size of the Hiroshima bomb, less than 0.5 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals. The specific scenario they examined involved a war between India and Pakistan. The two nations have fought three wars in the last 70 years, have come close to war on two other occasions, engage in daily skirmishes across their contested border in Kashmir, and have more than 200 nuclear weapons in their arsenals, many much larger than the weapons used in the study. The effects in India and Pakistan are horrific. In the first week more than 20 million people are killed by blast, fire and radiation as the great cities of South Asia are destroyed. But the global impact is far worse. As the cities burn, the fires loft 5 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere, blocking out sunlight. Across the globe, temperatures fall an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius, and precipitation declines as less water evaporates into the cooler atmosphere to fall back as rain. This climate disruption has a catastrophic impact on food production around the world. In Iowa, as across the entire U.S. Corn Belt, soy production declines an average of 7 percent for a full decade, and corn production declines an average of 12 percent. In China, rice production declines an average of 17 percent

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and the equally important wheat crop declines a staggering 31 percent. "Nuclear Famine," a report issued last year by Physicians for Social Responsibility, explored the impact this decline in food production would have on human health. The world is not prepared to withstand a fall in food production of this magnitude. World grain reserves amount to only some 70 days of consumption and would quickly be exhausted. There are already 870 million people in the developing world who are malnourished today. They get just enough food to maintain their body mass and do a little work to gather or grow food. There are also 300 million people who get adequate nutrition today but live in countries that depend on imported food. All of these people, more than 1 billion, many far removed from the actual conflict, would be at risk of starvation in the event of even this very "limited" use of nuclear weapons. Another 1.3 billion people in China might also starve given the enormous shortfalls in Chinese grain production. And no one has yet studied the effects of climate disruption on other food crops in other countries. Will U.S., Canadian and European wheat production fall as dramatically as in China? A famine of this magnitude is unprecedented in human history. Never have we faced the possible death of 15 percent to 30 percent of the human race in the course of a single decade. Such a catastrophe would not mean the extinction of our species, but it would almost certainly bring about the end of modern civilization as we know it. These data make clear that even the smaller nuclear weapons states, countries that might well go to war, and over whose nuclear arsenals the U.S. has no direct control, pose a threat to all mankind. But the danger posed by the U.S. and Russian arsenals is even greater. A single U.S. Trident submarine carries 96 warheads, each 10 to 30 times larger than the bombs used in the South Asia scenario. That means that each Trident can cause the nuclear famine scenario many times over. We have 14 of them, and that is only one-third of our nuclear arsenal, which also includes land-based missiles and long-range bombers. The Russians have the same incomprehensible level of overkill capacity. What would happen if there were a large nuclear war? A 2002 report by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the 1,500 warheads in the Russian arsenal got through to targets in the United States, up to 100 million people would die in the first 30 minutes. The entire economic infrastructure on which we depend — the public health system, banking system, communications network, food distribution system — would be destroyed. In the months following this attack, most of the rest of the population would also die, from starvation, exposure to cold, epidemic disease and radiation poisoning. The global climate disruption would be even more catastrophic. Limited war in South Asia would drop global temperatures 1.3 degrees Celsius. A war between the United States and Russia, using only those weapons they will still possess when the New START treaty is fully implemented in 2017, drops temperatures an average of 8 degrees Celsius. In the interior of Eurasia, North America and in Iowa, temperatures drop 20 to 30 degrees Celsius to a level not seen in 18,000 years — since the coldest time of the last Ice Age. Agriculture stops, ecosystems collapse, the vast majority of the human race starves and many species, perhaps including our own, become extinct. As events in Ukraine have made clear, there is still a very real possibility that the United States and Russia may find themselves on opposite sides of an armed conflict, and that means that these vast nuclear arsenals might be used. Even if there is not a deliberate use of nuclear weapons, there is the danger of an accidental nuclear war.

### --laundry list

**Hegemony drains the economy, risks great power war from rising powers, incites terrorists, undermines diplomacy and causes imperial overstretch— turns the aff – this card is almost as fire as my mixtape**

**Posen 14** – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, “Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy,” Cornell University Press, p. 65-68, June 24, 2014, tony)

Liberal Hegemony is a **costly, wasteful, and self-defeating** grand strategy. The strong inherent security position of the United States makes it unnecessary. The United States has spent vast sums to sustain omnidirectional military superiority. The United States has endeavored to reassure wealthy and prosperous allies and to deter former, present, and potential future adversaries. It has waged war to reorganize the internal politics of other states, usually weak ones that constituted little threat to the United States or its interests. Liberal Hegemony is not making the United States more secure. The huge global military presence and the frequent resort to force produce several unfortunate outcomes. First, the United States is **causing countervailing behavior**. The United States has stimulated actions great and small from the world's middle powers, which increase U.S. costs, or aim to erode U.S. advantages. Most of this activity has not quite risen to the level of true “balancing,” but rather constitutes a kind of erratic but sustained obstructionism. China, however, is **developing the underlying economic power to permit true balancing** and is building up its military capability. It is the nature of a competitive anarchical system that what one side does to defend itself often has offensive potential versus others. So it is hard to tell how much Chinese military activity is balancing, and how much is the common phenomenon of a rising power developing sharper elbows. At the same time, Russia which is not a rising power, and which has reason to fear China, nevertheless often makes common cause with it. This looks more like old-fashioned balancing. So-called “rogue” states also do what they can to build their capability—some is for mischief but some is a search for a deterrent against future U.S. intervention. As other states grow in capacity relative to the United States, which seems to be in the cards, there will likely be more balancing if the United States remains so energetic. As others build their capabilities, the Liberal Hegemony project will become even more costly. Second, the common response by U.S. allies to the U.S. project has been to “cheap ride” or “reckless drive.” Most allies have cut their defense efforts since the end of the Cold War. This is understandable in Europe, where the direct threat from Russia is difficult to discern. Nevertheless, the continuing U.S. commitment to NATO makes this an easy choice for the Europeans. Japan is the more striking free rider. Its low defense spending is noteworthy given the oft expressed concerns of Japanese policymakers about the rise of China. Jawboning by the United States of its allies—asking for higher defense spending and more efficient defense efforts—has for the most part **failed to elicit** much cooperation. Advocates of Liberal Hegemony may argue that this makes the case for continuing the strategy. The liberal democratic allies of the United States are somehow unwilling to look after themselves, so the United States must, in its own interest. This ignores the fact that they make their defense decisions in the face of extravagant United States promises to defend them. They will not do more

**unless the United States credibly commits to doing less.** And in the case of Europe, we must acknowledge that they may simply have gauged the security situation on their continent better than has the United States. Be that as it may, underdefended allies mean more work for the United States. Reckless driving by U.S. allies is also a significant problem. Secure in the knowledge that the United States will serve as the military lender of last resort, they invest in policies that redound to the political disadvantage of the United States, which can ultimately precipitate real military costs. Israel is the easiest example; its policies in the occupied territories contribute to the negative image of the United States in the Arab world, complicating both the struggle with Al-Qaeda and now the effort to contain Iran. Many would argue that Israeli policies are not even good for Israel. United States military backing makes the costs of this policy low for Israel. Indeed the U.S. security subsidy probably demobilizes potential domestic opposition in Israel, because the financial costs are not fully realized by Israelis. It is not easy to translate these political costs into explicit security costs for the United States. We only have the testimony of U.S. diplomats and soldiers that these Israeli policies complicate efforts to cooperate with Arab states. Another kind of reckless driving emerges among the domestic partners found by the United States in its counterinsurgency and statebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. relationship with the Maliki government and the Karzai government reveals a long-understood tension in counterinsurgency conducted by outside powers, waged on behalf of internal political factions. Counterinsurgency depends for its success on a combination of tactical “best practices” and political solutions. But the regimes backed by the United States mainly have an interest in perpetuating their hold on power. Moreover, these dependencies are slower to reform their own militaries, because the United States is there to take up the slack. If the United States is fighting their enemies, then they can focus on their internal friends. If negotiations with insurgents are launched, they have an equal interest in securing the most favorable deal for themselves. The politics of the arrangement works against internal reforms that would win “hearts and minds,” and against negotiated solutions. This puts a heavier burden on the outside military effort, which in these cases means the United States. It also ultimately renders the military effort somewhat futile. Third, Liberal Hegemony is insufficiently sensitive to identity politics. Nation, ethnicity, and religion remain strong forces in the world today, especially in areas experiencing rapid social and economic change. Identity politics has posed three large problems for the strategy of Liberal Hegemony. First, in some parts of the world there is simply great opposition to the very presence of the United States. This is particularly true in the Arab world. Second, a good deal of internal violence is associated with identity politics, which complicates the U.S. effort to install liberal institutions as part of a peace-making, nation- and state-building strategy. Power sharing is more easily mobilized in principle than in practice. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq testify to the difficulty of installing a working “consociational democracy” as a solution to civil wars embedded in identity politics. Finally, the U.S. experience in Iraq and now Afghanistan demonstrates that small numbers of motivated militants with roots in local society can mount very effective violent resistance movements on thin resource bases. While many members of these societies, perhaps most, would rather sit out a violent insurgency, the local fighters nevertheless have a home court advantage. That the United States managed to suppress the Iraqi insurgencies, build a semicompetent Iraqi security force, and install a ramshackle system of governance should not blind us to [make us ignore] the mediocrity of the outcome and the high costs in blood

**and treasure** it took to get there. The Expansionist Dynamic Liberal Hegemony cannot rest on its laurels. It is inherently expansionist and seems destined to **drift regularly into military action**. According to one analysis, measured by months, the United States has been at war nearly twice as often since the Cold War ended as it was during the Cold War.<sup>135</sup> The United States has expanded its formal alliances, taking on new responsibilities in the former Warsaw Pact states invited into NATO. The geographic scope of U.S. security interests now encompasses most of the globe. The United States is very powerful, and the Cold War ended with U.S. alliances and forces far forward in the world. With the collapse of Soviet power, the areas just beyond the frontiers came to seem both unstable and open to U.S. action. Realist theorists have coined the phrase “imperialism of great power” to explain the consequences that arise from this opportunity.<sup>136</sup> Great states tend to dominate weak ones. To this basic dynamic is added an obsession with credibility, which arises in part from the sheer magnitude of U.S. commitments, and the fear that any sign of weakness could produce more simultaneous challenges than even U.S. power could manage. There is also a great fear that the power advantage, which is unusual, could prove precarious. So the United States goes to great lengths to preserve it; the obsession with nuclear proliferation and the consideration of preventive war to stop it flows naturally from this concern. Finally, because liberalism is embedded in the hegemonic project, both as purpose and source of legitimacy, the U.S. policy community feels obliged to take up the question of whether military intervention is necessary in the bloody civil wars that emerge from time to time beyond the borders of the U.S. alliance system, and which challenge liberal principles.<sup>137</sup> Involvement in each of these wars is far from inevitable, but involvement in some of them is all but assured. For all these reasons, **Liberal Hegemony tends toward political expansion, high defense spending, and war. It is not a status quo policy.**

## **--middle eastern instability**

### **Increased US influence causes Middle East terrorism, regional economic decline, and Iranian backlash**

**Kim '14** (Aejung Kim, Department of Political Science, Kent State University, "The Effects of the U.S. Hegemony on Economic Growth in East Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa", 2/28/14, *wcp*)

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Inappropriately adopted economic policies, poor governance, and "Rentier state" epitomizing the MENA do not completely provide the compelling argument of the reason for poor economic performance in the region. Some literature has sought to explain why the economy of the MENA countries is not successful with business groups in the region. They argue that business groups were newly established under the state-led growth economy in the Middle East. New social interest groups benefited from state policies impeded the way of economic development. However, the lack of these arguments worthy to point out is the significance of the hegemonic system indicated in the case of East Asia. They do not devote much attention to the hegemonic role. **The weak economic developments in the MENA region were generated by the U.S. hegemon with the geostrategic motivation of the regional Islamic movement threat posed by Iran, and energy security. The doctrine of the new government launched by the 1979 Iranian revolution emphasizing Islamic ideology debilitated the Western socio, cultural, and economic ideologies dominated in the Muslims of regions. The potential influence of anti-Western policy of the Iranian revolutionary government on other Muslims areas threatened the interest of the United States in the Muslim regions, and undermined its pro-Western policies in the regions**<sup>20</sup>. In particular, tensions between Iran and the U.S. have increased since the end of the Cold War by confronting in some issues such as Iran's support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, its antagonism policy against Israel, and human rights. Above all, Iran's nuclear program has been the hottest issue between Iran and the U.S. by claiming different purposes or consequences of the nuclear program <sup>21</sup>. Political economy of the Middle East is usually described as the politics of oil. The United States has attempted to protect the oil supply in the global level by securing the system of scarcity. This system of scarcity was achieved by creating the antimarket arrangement such as the exclusive control of oil production and limits to quantity of oil<sup>22</sup>. It has been argued that oil has had a great impact on the U.S. policy in the MENA such as the CIA's involvement in the overthrow of the Mussadeq government in Iran, and the close alliance with Saudi Arabia<sup>23</sup>. **The U.S. owned companies have concentrated on having a large number of contracts regarding oil industries such as exploration, production, and refining with several countries in the MENA, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**<sup>24</sup>. **In order to fulfill their own needs of containing regional power and securing energy, the U.S. has supported and exploited illegitimate, dictatorial and economically bankrupt regimes. The U.S. support for the authoritarian regimes has affected the economy in the Middle East by tolerating the mismanagement and corruption of regimes.** Since authoritarian regimes with abundant natural resource lowered taxes



and perform welfare policies, there was little pressure on economic policies from the opposition groups<sup>25</sup>. The Arab Spring of 2011 was ignited with public fury partially caused by authoritarian regimes' poor economic performances with low growth rate, and high rate of unemployment<sup>26</sup>. Another way of weakening the MENA's economy is to sanction the regional power, Iran. Since the 1979 Revolution, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Iran by banning the import of Iranian crude oil, and non-oil products into the U.S. The sanctions have led to depreciation of Iran's currency, the rise in inflation, shortages of medicines, and international restrictions in financial and business sectors<sup>27</sup>. While national economic growth in East Asia helped the U.S. to prevent the spread of communism, support for authoritarian regimes in the MENA indifferent to national economic performance, and sanction against Iran promoted the U.S. to contain the regional power and obtain energy security in the region. The U.S. was also allied with the authoritarian regimes in boosting its own oil companies and other manufacturers to gain enormous benefits. While strong national economic relationship was built between East Asia and the United States, corporate economic relationship was constructed between the MENA and the U.S. based on different motivations. Economic development and economic growth generally have a negative effect on conflict by decreasing the likelihood of conflict<sup>28</sup>. No economic development is possible without peace and stability. The major powers paid more attention to their own interests based on the geostrategic motive rather than strengthening social, political and economic progress<sup>29</sup>. Considering that economic power allows countries to be stabilized, national economic growth in the MENA does not satisfy the U.S. geostrategic desire. **Here, the hegemon influences not to provide the productive economic performance.**

### **US influence in Middle East causes regional instability and terrorism**

**Nasser '11** (Nicola Nasser, Veteran Arab journalist based in the West Bank, "The Middle East at a Strategic Crossroads: Threat to US Hegemony", 1/31/11, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-middle-east-at-a-strategic-crossroads-threat-to-us-hegemony/23021>, wcp)

The Arab world is the beating heart of the overwhelmingly Muslim Middle East, and the Arab masses are angrily moving for a change in the status quo, practically dictated by the military, economic or political hegemony of the United States, which in turn is whipped by the regional power of the Israeli U.S. strategic ally. But any change in the regional status quo would place the Middle East at a strategic crossroads that is not expected to be viewed tolerantly by the U.S. – Israeli alliance, a fact which expectedly would warn of a fierce struggle to come. Despite the U.S. rhetorical defense of the "universal rights" in the region, it is still premature to conclude that this hegemonic alliance will allow the Arab move for change to run its course, judging by the historic experiences of the last century as well as by the containment tactics the United States is now adopting to defuse whatever strategic changes might

be created by the revolting Arab masses. The U.S. war on terror has preoccupied U.S. decision makers and embroiled regional rulers in their preoccupation to overlook the tinderbox of the double digit unemployment rate among Arab youth, double and in some cases triple the world average, according to the most conservative estimates, which under the U.S. – supported authoritarian regimes has been a ticking time bomb for too long. Now, the “demographic tsunami to the south of the Mediterranean,” as described by Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, has overtaken the west, but in particular the U.S. – Israeli alliance, by surprise, sending shock waves across the Middle East, shaking the pillars of what this alliance has taken for granted as a guaranteed geopolitical stability reinforced by the Israeli 34 – year old military occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Syrian Golan Heights and parts of southern Lebanon and the U.S. invasion then the ongoing occupation of Iraq. But “the Arab world’s Berlin moment” has come and the U.S. – supported “authoritarian wall has fallen,” professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics, Fawaz Gerges, told Reuters. Unlike in Tunisia, the U.S. regional strategy cannot afford a strategic change of regime in a pivotal regional country like Egypt. U.S. senior officials’ appeals for President Hosni Mubarak to respect the “universal rights” of the Egyptian people and their right in “peaceful” protests, for reforms that should be “immediately” undertaken by the ruling regime, and their calls for “restraint” and non-violence by both the regime and protesters are all smoke-screening the fact that the United States is siding with what President Barak Obama hailed as “an ally of ours on a lot of critical issues” and his spokesman, Robert Gibbs, described as “a strong ally” – - which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wishfully described his government as “stable” on Wednesday, despite the roaring demands on the streets for its change – - at least because “a more representative government drawn from the diversity of Egypt’s political opposition will be much more inclined to criticize American and Israeli policies,” according to Bruce Riedel, a former long-time CIA officer and a senior fellow of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, on January 29. The U.S. posturing as neutral, “not taking sides,” could appease and mislead American public opinion, but to Arab and especially to Egyptian public opinion even neutrality is viewed as hostile and condemned in the region as a double standard when compared with the U.S. siding with similar moves for change elsewhere in the world, let alone that this neutrality contradicts the western highly valued democratic values at home. On Friday night, Obama called for “a meaningful dialogue between the (Egyptian) government and its citizens,” who insist on staying on the streets until the regime, and not only its government, is changed and Mubarak leaves. On January 28, Vice President Joe Biden told PBS NewsHour that Mubarak should not step down. When asked whether time had come for Mubarak to go, he said: “No. I think the time has come for President Mubarak to begin to move – to be more responsive to some .. of the needs of the people out there.” Nothing would be more clear – cut, but nothing would be more counterproductive to both Egyptian and American interests on the background of footages on the screens of satellite TV stations showing protesters condemning Mubarak as a “U.S. agent” or showing live bullets or

“made in U.S.A.” tear gas canisters, reported by ABC News, which were used against them. It seems the en masse Arab popular protests in Egypt that no party in the opposition could claim to be the leader are confusing the senior officials of the Obama administration who “have no idea of exactly who these street protesters are, whether the protesters are simply a mob force incapable of organized political action and rule, or if more sinister groups hover in the shadows, waiting to grab power and turn Egypt into an anti-Western, anti-Israeli bastion.” in the words of the U.S. commentator Leslie H. Gelb, the former New York Times columnist and senior government official. The U.S. confusion is illustrated by the stark contradiction between the realities on the ground in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen and, for instance, what the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeffrey Filtman, told Josh Rogin of Foreign Policy: “What happened in Tunisia strikes me as uniquely Tunisian. That the events that took place here over the past few weeks derive from particularly Tunisian grievances, from Tunisian circumstances by the Tunisian people.” How farthest cut off from reality a senior U.S. official could be! “The White House will have to be forgiven for not knowing whether to ride the tiger or help put him back in a cage,” Gelb wrote. White House Press Secretary, Robert Gibbs, said the U.S., in view of the protests, will “review” its two – billion annual assistance to Egypt. This “threat” is understood among Arab and Egyptian audiences as targeted not against Mubarak to pressure him on reforms, but against whatever anti – U.S regime might succeed him. Arab en masse protests, especially in Egypt, are cornering the United States in a bind, tortured between maintaining “an ally” and respecting his people’s “universal rights” in expressing their “legitimate grievances,” according to Obama. What message would the United States be sending to the majority of Arab allied or friendly rulers if it opts to dump the most prominent among them? Would AIPAC and other American Jewish and Zionist lobbyists allow their government to facilitate the ousting of the 30 –year old guarantor of the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel? It’s almost a forgone conclusion that Obama’s decision is already made to once again give priority to the stability of U.S. “vital interests” in Middle East while in public giving lip service to Americans’ most cherished democratic values. **This translates into a naïve American recipe for preserving the status quo by some cosmetic reforms.** But “Those who stick to the status quo may be able to hold back the full impact of their countries’ problems for a little while, but not forever,” Clinton warned in Qatar on January 13, otherwise, she added, the foundations of their rule will be “sinking into the sand,” but she did not announce the fears of her country that the pillars of the U.S. hegemony would be then crumbling too, **anti – Americanism exacerbated and in turn fueling the only alternative to democracy in the Arab Middle East, i.e. terrorism.** Egyptian former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, whom some of the protesters have chosen to head a delegation to represent them on Sunday and who is seen as a potential presidential challenger to Mubarak, warned in Newsweek before his return to Egypt last week, that it was too late to believe reforms were still possible under the 82- year-old Mubarak, who

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has held “imperial power” for three decades and presides over a legislature that is a “mockery.”

## --north korean prolif

### **U.S. Primacy threatens North Korea and drives them to proliferate – that ensures conflict**

**Cho 14** – Prof. Department of Political Science, St Francis Xavier University (Youngwon, “Method to the madness of Chairman Kim: The instrumental rationality of North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons,” International Journal, March 2014 vol. 69 no. 1, tony)

North Korea is broke and has been so for a very long time. Its conventional military preparedness is qualitatively degraded. It confronts a hostile and far more powerful alliance whose combined military strength dwarfs Pyongyang’s. Even as it is facing an adversary that has continuously and explicitly identified it as a potential target for a nuclear strike, its own nuclear umbrella has been yanked away and Pyongyang stands alone. North Korea, in short, has neither the economic capacity to engage in internal balancing through conventional arms buildup nor the diplomatic means to engage in external balancing through alliance formation.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, it should be hardly surprising, or at least not so irrational, that Pyongyang would see nuclear weapons, the great equalizer and the only weapons system that can truly level the playing field for the humble and the haughty alike, **as the singular source of salvation.** Any other state facing a similarly dire strategic situation would likely have found nuclear weapons equally irresistible. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that South Korea, in a counterfactual scenario where the Cold War is presumed to have been won by the Soviet Union and it is the ROK that is facing an existential crisis, would have behaved any better than its northern brother. States have sought nuclear weapons for far lesser reasons—for something as vain as international prestige and nationalist pride. By comparison, **survival is all the more compelling a reason for going nuclear.**<sup>39</sup> Not only are nuclear weapons the most reassuring means to ensure North Korea’s survival, they are also the cheapest, which makes them even more appealing for a country as broke as the DPRK. The cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons is widely known. Because the bang produced by nuclear weapons is so big, both literally for its destructiveness and figuratively for its wider strategic impact, the economic cost of nuclearization can be easily justified in terms of return on investment. Relative to the spending requirements of upgrading its decaying conventional forces, the financial cost of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and the related missile program has in fact been very low. According to one estimate, North Korea’s core spending on nuclear weapons and missile programs in 2010 and 2011 was around US\$0.5 billion each.<sup>40</sup> While half a billion dollars is a large sum of money for a desperately poor country, as a proportion of North Korea’s total military expenditures, it is not such a huge sum, falling well within a single digit range of around 6 to 8 percent in the most recent years. Another estimate, coming from sources within the ROK government, puts the total cumulative cost of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, including its long-range ballistic missile test in March of 2012, at around US\$3.1 billion (see Table 3 for details). The expenditure on the strictly nuclear side has been surprisingly small, costing Pyongyang only US\$1 billion

for initial development and production, and less than half a billion dollars for the first two nuclear tests.<sup>41</sup> About US\$0.8 billion was spent on the two Taepodong missile launches conducted in 2006 and 2009, and the Unha-2 launched in April 2012 is estimated to have cost Pyongyang another US\$0.8 billion. The expenditure will surely go up as North Korea attempts to miniaturize its nuclear warheads and fine-tune its ballistic missiles, but overall, the financial burden borne by North Korea in its nuclear pursuit has not been excessively punishing. On the other hand, the bang produced by it is undoubtedly much bigger than anything North Korea could have accomplished by spending the equivalent sum on conventional weaponry. A US\$3.1 billion investment in nuclear weapons and delivery systems has enabled the DPRK to come very close to bridging a cumulative defence spending gap of nearly US\$200 billion since 1992, restoring parity to the overall military balance in the Korean peninsula, and potentially acquiring deterrence capabilities against the US. By comparison, South Korea spent almost US\$3 billion, about the same amount North Korea has spent on its nuclear and missile development, on just three Aegis-equipped destroyers. While these KD-III destroyers are no doubt significant enhancements to the force level of the ROK navy, their strategic impact pales in comparison to that of North Korea's nuclear weapons. The ultimate vindication for the DPRK's pursuit of nuclear weapons is the very fact that the Kim regime has defied all odds and repeated predictions of an inevitable collapse to hang on to its half of the Korean peninsula on an arguably much stronger strategic footing. Of course, the debacle that is the North Korean economy continues, as does the untold suffering of North Koreans. However, in terms of its external security situation, it cannot be denied that North Korea's strategy of pursuing internal balancing asymmetrically—that is, by going nuclear—has produced tangible and substantial results. The numerous concessions and assistance that Pyongyang managed to extract from the international community, while significant, are secondary benefits. The most obvious and important outcome is the irrefutable reality that instead of being destroyed by the US as was Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or sharing East Germany's fate of being absorbed out of existence, the DPRK continues to exist as an independent state. As Kim Jong Un recently declared in his first public speech, "Superiority in military technology is no longer monopolized by imperialists, and the era of enemies using atomic bombs to threaten and blackmail us is forever over."<sup>42</sup> This declaration, while exaggerated, as one would expect from the DPRK, is not mere grandstanding and bravado; there is a significant kernel of truth in Kim's claim, **in that nuclearization has in fact enhanced North Korea's security.** This is not to suggest that the DPRK is now secure. On the contrary, **the incomplete weaponization of its nuclear devices and its lack of a credible long-range delivery system mean that North Korea's deep-seated insecurity is yet to be put permanently to rest.** Nonetheless, Pyongyang's nuclear quest has achieved the singular objective sought by North Korea, its survival, at a bargain price equivalent to just three destroyers. It is in this Herculean achievement, the fact that the world is still grappling with the headache that is the DPRK two decades after the demise of the Cold War, that we can locate

the method in the madness of Chairman Kim and the instrumental rationality of Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

### **U.S. primacy has empirically driven rising states to proliferate – counterbalancing**

**Cho 14** – Prof. Department of Political Science, St Francis Xavier University (Youngwon, “Method to the madness of Chairman Kim: The instrumental rationality of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons,” International Journal, March 2014 vol. 69 no. 1, tony)

Despite recent mumblings in some quarters about the impending decline of American hegemony, the US remains the sole superpower, and its military primacy is not questionable. While the unsurpassed military power of the US may be only mildly irksome to some countries, it is disconcerting to more than a few states and profoundly threatening to others. North Korea belongs to the last category. Having fought, and almost lost, a war against a US-dominated UN force, ever since the Armistice Agreement of 1953 brought the Korean War to what is technically a suspension rather than a definite end, the DPRK has been acutely worried about the possibility of facing the military might of the US once again. If South Korea has been living under the constant shadow of a possible invasion from North Korea, so North Korea has been living under the unrelenting shadow of a potential military confrontation with the combined forces of the ROK and the US. Quite apart from the lopsided nature of the conventional military balance between the two sides, deeply worrisome to Pyongyang have been stockpiles of American nuclear weapons and the hostile nuclear posture of the US, which has a long history of issuing subtle and not-so-subtle nuclear threats against the North.<sup>26</sup> During the Korean War, the military and political leadership in Washington openly floated the idea of using nuclear weapons to end the war.<sup>27</sup> Then, in January 1958, less than five years after the Armistice Agreement, the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea in clear violation of the terms of the ceasefire, which explicitly prohibited the introduction of “qualitatively new weapons systems.”<sup>28</sup> The number and variety of the US nuclear arsenal in the ROK continued to grow over the following decades to reach almost 1000 devices at its height, and from the mid-1960s until the end of the Cold War, the American war strategy against North Korea was “pinned on routine plans to use nuclear weapons very early in any new war.”<sup>29</sup> The US, in fact, used nuclear threats in more than one crisis involving the DPRK, including its 1968 seizure of the American spy-ship Pueblo and the 1976 axe murder incident in the DMZ.<sup>30</sup> Washington did decide in 1991 to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula as part of its (and the Soviets') worldwide retrenchment of theatre nuclear weapons with the end of the Cold War.<sup>31</sup> This denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, however, did not end Pyongyang's threat-perception of Washington's nuclear posture, since the US never fully renounced its “first use” option even against a non-nuclear state, and its military continued to run exercises rehearsing long-range nuclear strikes on the DPRK, and to retain an arsenal of thousands of strategic nuclear

weapons, including ballistic missiles, that could easily destroy North Korea.<sup>32</sup> As Gavin McCormack observes, “in Pyongyang the US nuclear threat has been the issue for the past fifty years. North Korea’s uniqueness in the nuclear age lies first of all in the way it has faced and lived under the shadow of nuclear threat for longer than any other nation.”<sup>33</sup> It is in the context of a looming and persistent US nuclear threat that even in the 1960s North Korea showed an intense interest in acquiring its own nuclear weapons **to level the playing field**, approaching the Soviet Union and China for technical assistance. Both powers consistently rebuffed Kim Il Sung’s requests, bringing to naught the DPRK’s earliest nuclear ambitions.<sup>34</sup> **The nuclear threat posed by the US was taken so seriously** by Pyongyang that even in the days when the DPRK enjoyed a relatively balanced conventional parity with its enemies south of the DMZ, and even as it was basking in Soviet and Chinese security commitments, it still sought its own nuclear capability. Pyongyang’s earliest attempt to acquire its own version of force de frappe was driven by its “deep-seated twin fears of a renewed US military attack and abandonment by allies in Moscow and Beijing.”<sup>35</sup> In many ways, North Korea’s aborted quest for nuclear weapons in the 1960s mirrors South Korea’s own nuclear quest. In the 1970s, the Park Chung Hee regime faced a sharply deteriorating external security environment precipitated largely by Washington’s reorientation of its Cold War strategy in Asia that entailed, among other things: seeking rapprochement with China; accepting defeat in Vietnam; calling on its Asian allies to bear a greater share of the burden of defence; under the Nixon administration, cutting back on US military deployment in the ROK; and, in keeping with Carter’s campaign pledge, eventually withdrawing all US ground forces completely (a pledge that was abandoned once Carter was elected).<sup>36</sup> Intense fear of the adversary, disquieting doubt about the true commitment of their respective allies, and a nagging uncertainty over extended deterrence pushed both the DPRK and the ROK to seek their own nuclear deterrence capability. Pressured by their respective allies, Seoul and Pyongyang had to give up on this option rather quickly and find consolation under the nuclear umbrellas offered by their backers; but the fact that both Koreas were tempted to seek nuclear weapons as early as the 1960s and 1970s illustrates the persistent security anxiety felt by the two sides, which, for North Korea, was exacerbated many-fold by the US nuclear threat. If Pyongyang’s fear of abandonment by its Soviet and Chinese allies fuelled its earlier desire for nuclear weapons, the sudden, profound structural change that the end of the Cold War wrought to the international system merely confirmed what Kim Il Sung had long suspected, that for both Moscow and Beijing North Korea’s security might be expendable. The “Great Leader” was spectacularly and tragically wrong on myriad accounts, but he had been right all along about one thing: the problematic reliability of his allies. North Korea was indeed totally abandoned by Moscow and thoroughly “betrayed” by its socialist big brother in Beijing, at about the worst time imaginable, when South Korea was well past the point of catching up and the object of its greatest fear, the US, was more powerful than ever. For Pyongyang, the unipolar reconfiguration of the international system under US preponderance meant a security environment that was going from bad to worse, and then to intolerable. Just



as North Korea was left to its own devices by its erstwhile allies—one out of sheer exhaustion and implosion, and the other out of a newfound and relentless appetite for profit—the US, freed from the systemic constraints of bipolarity, began to indulge in triumphant unilateralism and military adventurism, an escalating propensity that was turned into a veritable art form by the George W. Bush administration

### **That guarantees nuclear conflict with the U.S. and the widespread nuclearization of Iran and surrounding regions**

**Suri 13** -- Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin (Jeremy, “Bomb North Korea, Before It’s Too Late,” [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-before-its-too-late.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-before-its-too-late.html?_r=1), April 12, 2013, tony)

AUSTIN, Tex. SINCE February, the North Korean government has followed one threatening move with another. The spiral began with an underground nuclear test. Then the North declared the armistice that ended the Korean War invalid. The young dictator Kim Jong-un followed with a flurry of threats to attack civilian targets in South Korea, Japan and the United States. Earlier this week, North Korea closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only facility where citizens from North and South Korea work together. **And now the North is openly threatening** (and visibly preparing) **to fire a mobile-launcher-based Musudan missile** with a range that could reach many of the places Mr. Kim has menaced in his public statements. American intelligence agencies believe that North Korea is working to prepare even longer-range delivery systems to carry the nuclear warheads already in its arsenal. Contrasting Views on North Korea Underscore Sensitivities and Lack of Evidence The Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. **The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched.** The United States should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable. President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. **He should give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting.** And he should explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an operation that poses no threat to civilians — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present danger. That is all. Editorial: The North Korea Problem APRIL 12, 2013 **If North Korea is left to continue its threatening behavior, it will jeopardize the fragile economies of the region and it will encourage South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons — a policy already advocated by hawks in both countries.** Most of all, North Korean threats will encourage isolated states across the world to follow suit. **The Iranians are certainly watching.** If North Korea can use its small nuclear arsenal to blackmail the

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region with impunity, why shouldn't the mullahs in Tehran try to do the same? The United States and its allies in East Asia have a legitimate right to self-defense and they have a deep interest in deterring future threats on this scale. Thanks to precise satellite reconnaissance, striking the North Korean missile on the ground would be much easier than after it was launched. Since the United States cannot possibly know the missile's trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is targeting America and its allies, we have reason to believe that civilians face serious danger. **Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely undefended target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve regional stability and the safety of our allies.** An American pre-emptive strike would also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea and other countries in similar circumstances

## --overstretch

### **Attempts to sustain hegemony cause imperial overstretch – causes war with rising powers**

**Herrington '13** (Luke Herrington, Has an MA in Global and International Studies from the University of Kansas, "Syria and the Hegemon's Dilemma: Ontological Insecurity vs. Imperial Overstretch", 9/10/13, *wcp*)

In Progress The Hegemon's Dilemma: Imperial Overstretch War fatigue may not be an excuse for inaction in Syria, but what about imperial overstretch? Secretary Kerry seems like he's forgotten the same lesson of hegemonic stability theory (HST) that neoconservatives[1] missed in the run up to wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, that a hegemon too eager to overextend its military resources will ultimately precipitate its own decline. This is, as historian Paul Kennedy has termed, the problem of "imperial overstretch." A hegemon thus has the responsibility to avoid unnecessary forays into international conflict, for doing so will be a drain on its abilities, and ultimately diminish its ability to intervene in future conflict situations that have a real bearing on international stability. This is a source of hegemonic decline, which, according to HST, can lead to larger, global wars. Of course, I am not saying that U.S. action in Syria will lead to World War III as some in social media have naively (and hyperbolically) suggested. What I am suggesting though is that after two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, after a campaign in Libya, after a pivot to the Pacific which involves hedging the U.S. military and its allies against the People's Republic of China, and given the continuation of the global war on terror in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, attacking Syria could be a real drain on U.S. military resources that could ultimately undermine the U.S.'s ability to maintain international stability in the future. Some, like my colleague Robert Murray, assume that President Obama has intentionally eroded U.S. hegemony. I disagree with such declinist notions, but the U.S. has nevertheless been at war for almost the entirety of the 21st century, and both the public and military are tired of conflict. Even if Secretary of State John Kerry is right, and this war fatigue is not an excuse for inaction in Syria, the implications of imperial overstretch very well may be. Especially given the widespread international opposition to military strikes in Syria mentioned above, this is a question to which U.S. policymakers and IR theorists must give serious consideration both before and after the U.S. makes its ultimate decision, for it will ultimately bear on the discussion of U.S. hegemonic decline for years to come.

## **--prolif**

### **Hegemony causes prolif – nations want to check U.S. power**

**Posen 14** – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," Cornell University Press, p. 31-33, June 24, 2014, tony)

Internal balancing aims to strengthen a state militarily or deliberately to improve a state's economic position to mobilize military power at a later date. Efforts to dull the U.S. military advantage are widespread. Nuclear proliferation in some cases is motivated primarily by fear of the United States. North Korea seems to want nuclear weapons in part because it has no other answer to U.S. military superiority. Iran pursues "near nuclear weapons" status to improve its power in the Persian Gulf, a region the United States has strategically dominated since the end of the Cold War. China has taken Iran's part in its dispute with the United States over its efforts to master the technology that would permit it to build atomic weapons. Both Russia and China have sold advanced weaponry to Iran. China is working very hard to improve the quality of its military forces, technologically and professionally. Aside from its imports from Russia, its domestic arms industry strives to produce more internationally competitive weapons, and judging from appearances it is having some success. China is also developing strategic materials and energy stockpiles, presumably to allow it to ride out a U.S. blockade, enabled by U.S. command of the sea. 23 On a smaller scale, Iran too has tried to develop a capable independent arms industry. Though its products are much less advanced than those of the top producers, they seem to have made important progress, especially in their ability to produce unguided and guided rockets and missiles. There is also some evidence that they are producing night vision devices, portable surface to air missiles, and signals intelligence gear. 24 The performance of their clients, especially Hizbollah in its 2006 war with Israel, and the so-called "special groups" in Iraq, both suggest some impressive skills in Iran's military. The trade in expertise is likely two way; Iran teaches others some techniques but itself profits from the combat experience of its friends. 25 Thus far the combination of soft and hard, external and internal balancing encountered by the United States has been inconvenient, but not deadly. The diplomatic resistance to the United States over Iraq cast a shadow over the U.S. effort, making it harder for some allies to sign up and easier for them to leave. It also helped shape the backdrop of politics across the Arab world, legitimating assistance to Iraqi insurgents opposed to the United States. We cannot measure this, however, and the actual impact may be slight, given the expected patriotic opposition of at least some Arab Iraqis to the United States, and the particular opposition of Sunni Arab Iraqis, whose hold on power the United States broke. In the world of hard balancing, China's internal improvements are the most decisive. Its overall economic progress, however, cannot be attributed to a desire to balance the United States per se, but rather to a larger desire to build China's wealth and prosperity. As many have observed, China's export-led growth strategy depends in part on the liberal international economy that U.S. hegemony aims to sustain and protect. At the same time, however, China is working steadily to improve its military power. And it is hard to see any immediate object of this buildup other than the United States. United States strategic planners have taken note. China is making it very difficult for the U.S. military to reach the Asian littorals. The debate on "anti-access area denial capabilities" in the U.S. defense community, and the emergence of the "air-sea battle" concept, with its concomitant requirement for significant expenditures on the most advanced offensive capabilities, testifies to the military progress China has already made and is expected to make. 26 As China improves its littoral warfare capabilities, U.S. projection assets may simply be pushed

**away.** I expect this to occur, but only after the United States spends a great deal of money trying to prevent it.

### **Prolif spirals out of control – states engage in preemptive nuclear war with biological weapons**

**Utgoff 02** – Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor, “Survival: Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions,” p. 87-88, tony)

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. **Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons.** Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. **Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous.** Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be **very rapid.** While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. **Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does.** Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider **preemptive nuclear war**

before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons.

### **Nuclear proliferation ensures global nuclear war – the risk is high and extinction is uniquely probable**

**Kroenig 12** -- Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (Matthew, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?," [http://www.npolicy.org/article\\_file/The\\_History\\_of\\_Proliferation\\_Optimism.pdf](http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism.pdf), June 4, 2012, p. 25-31, tony)

Why **Nuclear Proliferation Is a Problem** The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national security including: **nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation.** This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, 26 someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War **could have arguably resulted in human extinction** and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.<sup>53</sup> This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, secondstrike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and

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survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. 53 Steven Weber, "The End of the Business Cycle?" *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 4 (July/August 1997), p. 65-82. 27 In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran's nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel's aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use 'em or loose 'em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, **nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.**54 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, **there is a risk of nuclear war.** Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran's theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. 54 Thomas Schelling, "Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack," (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Paper, 1958). 28 One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you credibly threaten to attack a nuclear-armed opponent? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.55 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO's conventional inferiority. As Russia's conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of

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nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan's military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a "threat that leaves something to chance."<sup>56</sup> They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented 55 Klaus Knorr, *Limited Strategic War*, 1962. <sup>56</sup> Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1966. <sup>29</sup> historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.<sup>57</sup> When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, meaning that **there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.** Nuclear terrorism. The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.<sup>58</sup> It used to be said that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead," but the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed expert perceptions of the terrorist threat.<sup>59</sup> September 11th demonstrated that Al Qaeda and other modern terrorist groups are interested in imposing massive casualties and there are few better ways of killing large numbers of civilians than detonating a nuclear weapon in a major metropolitan area. While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden been able to acquire nuclear weapons. Osama Bin Laden declared it a "religious duty" for Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.<sup>60</sup> Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them. Indeed, in recent years, many U.S. politicians and security analysts have agreed that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security.<sup>61</sup> Wanting nuclear weapons and actually possessing them, however, are two different things and many analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to <sup>57</sup> See, for example, Scott Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton University Press, 1993). <sup>58</sup> On nuclear terrorism, see, for example, Michael Levi, *On Nuclear Terrorism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). <sup>59</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, "The New Age of Terrorism," Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006. <sup>60</sup> Fissile Materials Working Group, "After Bin Laden: Nuclear Terrorism Still a Top Threat," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* May 13, 2011. <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* <sup>30</sup> overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that a leader might



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someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hezbollah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan's atomic energy establishment met with Al Qaeda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.<sup>63</sup> Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nuclear weapons problem. U.S. officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washing has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a break down in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran's nuclear arsenal. Regional instability: **The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional instability.** States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from <sup>62</sup> Michael Levi, *On Nuclear Terrorism*, 2007. <sup>63</sup> David Albright, *Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies* (New York: Free Press, 2012). <sup>31</sup> other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, **nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression.** Indeed, international relations theories about the "stability-instability paradox" maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.<sup>64</sup> Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.<sup>66</sup>

## **--russia relations**

### **Hegemony causes decline in relations and Russia backlash – all action perceived as U.S. expansionism**

**Suslov 14** – National Research University Higher School of Economics (Dmitry, “US Global Leadership Dilemma as a Challenge for the US-Russia Relations,” p. 11, February 20, 2014, tony)

But there was a systemic reason as well. The US-Russia “reset” started to crumble soon after the US started to exert the leadership component of its strategy more explicitly. Indeed, the “reset” was about the US leadership from the onset, but as long as the interests of the sides converge, its impact on the bilateral relations was negligible. Whereas on diverging interests the leadership problem came on the surface. It manifested itself in the US persistence rejection of the Russian – and any other – agenda and insistence that only its own agenda, decisions and vision should be the basis for cooperation and collective action. This was the case with the missile defense talks, when the Russian proposal was rejected at the onset, and the only possible term of cooperation was Russia joining the US project without any decision-making powers, while the project would remain unchanged. This was also the case with Libya, when the US used Russia (Medvedev’s decision to abstain at the UN SC on the 1973 resolution) to what turned out to be a US (plus European and Saudi), not a joint or truly multilateral agenda, and then effectively sidelined Moscow from decision-making over Libya when it was no longer needed and expressed disagreement with the US agenda of regime change. Finally, the same is with Syria, when Russia is again just invited to implementation of an American (as well as Saudi, Qatari, Turkish and European’s) decision that Assad should get out, while the opposition must capture power, and all the arguments in favor of a different approach are rejected and ignored.

### **High Relations necessary to combat disease internationally**

**Rojanksy 13** -- Deputy director for the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, JD from Stanford University (Matthew, “The Latent Power of Health Cooperation in U.S.-Russian Relations,” <http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2013/latent-power>, May 5, 2013, tony)

Cooperation on healthcare and biomedical sciences has been a feature of U.S.-Russian relations since the early years of the Cold War. Despite political tensions, scientific collaboration proceeded—leading, in some cases, to impressive results, such as the clinical trial and widespread use of the Sabin polio vaccine and the eradication of smallpox.<sup>1</sup> Over the years, U.S.-Russian health diplomacy has drawn praise for its ability to transcend politics and unite the two countries around a common cause. However, the full potential of U.S.-Russian health engagement has not yet been reached. The two countries possess unrivaled scientific resources that, if combined, could drive innovation and economic growth for both. Joint efforts to fight

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noncommunicable **diseases**—which include heart disease, diabetes, and cancer and are critical factors of mortality and morbidity in both countries—could improve and prolong the lives of tens of millions of Americans and Russians. And with their combined population of 450 million, the United States and Russia are well positioned to become leaders in personalized medicine and gene therapies, which require access to large patient-data pools. Successful U.S.-Russian healthcare cooperation could have a ripple effect beyond the borders of these two countries—and even beyond health and science. At a time of unprecedented pandemic threats, Washington and Moscow can work together to alleviate the suffering caused by disease worldwide while contributing to the creation of a more stable and prosperous world. ... governmental institutions must join forces with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral organizations, and other professional and community resources. Unlocking this latent potential requires leadership, resources, know-how, and strong institutional foundations. As the two countries grapple with crises in their respective healthcare systems, governmental institutions must join forces with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral organizations, and other professional and community resources. Bilateral structures must be strengthened and supported.

## --south china sea

### **Drive for US Hegemony guarantees South China Sea conflict**

**Minghao, 6-4** –[ Zhao Minghao, Research fellow with the Charhar Institute and an adjunct fellow with the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, 6-4-2015, US interference worsens maritime row, Global Times, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/925469.shtml>] Jeong

The South China Sea issue is gradually becoming a thorny problem that threatens the relationship between Beijing and Washington. China has enough strategic will to safeguard its sovereign rights as well as maritime rights and interests. At the same time, it is working hard to promote a "dual-track approach." As Beijing continues to attach importance to bilateral negotiations, it has also expressed its desire to jointly maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. China's construction on the islands does not violate international law, and will help carry out international responsibilities such as conducting maritime search and rescue operations. As for the US, what role it can play over the South China Sea issue is closely related to its primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The alliance system is the foundation of US primacy, and the space for maneuver and dominance over global commons is what Washington really cares about. The South China Sea issue is nothing but leverage to expand US regional primacy. It has been increasingly linking its credibility to the confrontation against China in the area, which is definitely not a wise move, given the complexity of the South China Sea issue and Washington's lack of control over the claimant states. China and the US desperately need to find a way of peaceful coexistence in maritime Asia. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong voiced strong worries of Southeast Asian nations over the issue during his keynote speech at the just concluded Shangri-La Dialogue, urging restraints from both countries without forcing other regional countries to choose sides between the two powers. Dealing with the South China Sea issue and other bigger Asian maritime disputes is a huge test for building a shared regional architecture. It is a tricky challenge that requires the efforts of both Beijing and Washington. But the recent actions of the US have led to high risks of militarizing regional disputes. Therefore, if Washington wants Beijing to be restrained, it needs to restrain itself in the first place. According to international law, bilateral negotiations are the primary way of settling conflicts. Interference from the US will only make things trickier. China has never claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, and the freedom of navigation of commercial vessels has never been sabotaged. The US should stop slandering China's policy in this area. Nor should it keep giving distorted and self-serving explanations of international law. Maritime Asia has long been a place where the US could maneuver, but now the space has to accommodate more players. Just as Michael Swaine, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said, the US should seriously ponder the possibility of its primacy in Asia-Pacific over the next 10 years. The emerging powers in the region, including China, are enormously changing the strategic landscape of maritime Asia. The US and China, together with other stakeholders, should come up with more pragmatic and creative thinking to deal with it. However, the US has always been focusing on strengthening its alliance system, which is characterized by the recent promotion of its alliance with Japan, and its persistence of deploying THAAD missile defense systems in South Korea. All these indicate that the US is not maintaining its status quo, but is busy reshaping the region's security and economic arrangements. In other words, it shows US revisionism at a systemic level. There is no point in expecting China to remain indifferent. Beijing's rights and concerns should be respected by Washington. But one thing should not be ignored is that both China and the US are trying to prevent bilateral ties from entering the state of confrontation, especially after the two sides have achieved some accomplishments in the military relationship in recent years. What both countries need is to come to an agreement on bilateral interactions within maritime Asia, and to provide joint strategic reassurance for other regional nations, who, in turn, should not provoke conflicts between China and the US.

## --author indict

### **Prefer our evidence – their authors inflate threats to satisfy constituencies**

**Fettweis 14** – associate professor of political science and statistics at Tulane University (Christopher, “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in US Foreign Policy,” *A Dangerous World?: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, October 7, 2014, p. 548-53. Tony)

Anxiety in the public can be at least partially explained by inadequate information about the level of risk that America faces today and perhaps by the lingering effects of 9/11. The beliefs of those who ought to know better, however, often remain immune to the facts. To take but one example, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully aware of the statistics concerning conflict and threats in April 2012 when he gave an address to Harvard’s Kennedy School. The general began by reviewing Steven Pinker’s *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, perhaps the best-known review of the decline of violence worldwide, and then went on to explain how its findings—although empirically indisputable—are functionally irrelevant. His reexamination of the evidence led Dempsey to argue that although the world “seems less dangerous,” it is “actually more dangerous.” That “security paradox,” as he called it, was due to the proliferation of destructive technologies such as ballistic missiles, exploding fertilizer, and computer viruses. “More people have the ability to harm us or deny us the ability to act than at any point of my life,” he argued. 28 So although those technologies have yet to affect U.S. security or international politics in any meaningful way, the general believed that catastrophe was right around the corner. The message coming from the top is that danger still exists, so no one should relax. Dempsey’s remarks might be dismissed as merely the cynical obfuscation of someone with a professional interest in denying safety. Indeed, a number of institutions provide their members with a vested interest in identifying threats and then exaggerating them when necessary. The budget and overall raison d’être of the military, for instance, would be called into question in a fundamentally safe world. The intelligence services issue quarterly assessments of the security environment that regularly foresee drastically worse futures than the present; only the degree and form of chaos change. 29 **Geopolitical fear has** a number of institutional constituencies, in other words, that are professionally inclined to detect threats whether or not they exist. “It is difficult to get a man to understand something,” Upton Sinclair famously noted, “when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” 30 That statement is not to imply that leaders are always, or even usually, insincere when they issue warnings about the various present dangers. People are quite capable of aligning their political interests with their beliefs about security. “Humans are compulsive rationalizers,” wrote the journalist Daniel Gardner in his review of the psychology literature on that issue. “Self-interest and sincere belief seldom part company.” 31 Even initially disingenuous motivations quickly become the truth, as a result of every human being’s desire to be internally consistent. No matter what President George W. Bush’s initial calculations were regarding Iraq, for example, one should have little doubt that he truly believed (and continues to, despite all evidence to the contrary) that Saddam Hussein represented a clear and present danger and that removing him was the right thing to do. To believe otherwise would be cognitively unacceptable for almost anyone who had ordered men into battle. Although

manipulation of the evidence by elites with vested interests can account for a portion of America's geopolitical fear, for a complete explanation of its existence one must look elsewhere. **The belief in the inherent dangers of the outside world has deep historical roots in the United States.** It persists in the post-Cold War era because of a number of factors, at least four of which are worthy of brief mention. First, their high levels of religiosity compared with the rest of the Western world make the people of the United States more prone to moralism and Manichaeism, as well as more likely to be comfortable with the existence of evil as a palpable force in constant struggle with good. 32 Second, because no other state has a political movement quite like neoconservatism in the United States, nowhere else is fear given such promotion in the marketplace of ideas. 33 One of the central, defining features of neoconservatives is their **enthusiasm for identifying threats.** Though hawks exist in every country, no other ideological group advocates quite the same mixture of evangelical **faith in democracy and pathological fear of the other.** In particular, neoconservatives construct a complex, completely **misleading web of danger** with every speech they give and op-ed they write. 34 Third, the American media have little incentive to present the public with realistic information on risk when **impending catastrophe sells more papers** and attracts the most viewers. Glenn Beck, who is almost a parody of the kind of person Richard Hofstadter had in mind when he wrote "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," consistently attracts more listeners than does NPR. 35 And fourth, **the relative power of the United States predisposes its people to geopolitical fear.** Unipolar powers are, by nature, supporters of the status quo, any alteration of which can appear to threaten their position. Rich people worry a great deal about their security. They build tall fences, install motion detectors, and hire private security guards to protect themselves and their belongings from the throngs of have-nots they assume are plotting to take what is theirs. **Wealth creates insecurity** in individuals, and it seems to do so **in states** as well. Those who have more than what could be considered **their fair share**, perhaps bothered a bit by subconscious guilt, **worry about losing what they have more than those who live in relative penury.** In international politics, the United States has the most and fears the most too. "America may be uniquely powerful in its global scope," former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski believes, so as a result "its homeland is also **uniquely insecure.**" 36 That kind of thinking has a certain amount of intuitive appeal, even if it is utterly devoid of logic; **if unchecked, it can lead to disaster.** Persistent geopolitical fear filters out of U.S. foreign policy debates any news regarding the decline of warfare, of the miniscule risks to individuals from terrorism, of the deep divides among even Islamic fundamentalists, and of **the essential safety of the United States.** The notion that the world is a fundamentally dangerous place has long ago **passed into the realm of belief,** especially among foreign policy elites, where it is rarely subjected to evaluation. Mere reviews of facts are unlikely to change minds on that issue. Those who matter most in the foreign policy process—the elites across the political and strategic spectra, inside and outside of government—rarely give the possibility of fundamental safety much of a hearing. **For them, the world is likely to remain a dark place, full of terrors.**

**--at: solves econ**

**Heg cant solve economic security – mutual deterrence checks trade imbalance**

**Posen 14** – Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," Cornell University Press, p. 62-64, June 24, 2014, tony)

The transformation of hegemonic stability theory into a foreign policy doctrine is problematical. First, **if there is a gain to having a global hegemon, we do not know its magnitude**, and we do not know whether the gains to the United States are commensurate with the costs to the United States. I argue they are not. It is easy enough to imagine that the Great Depression could have been avoided had there been a leader in the 1931 banking crisis; it could also have been avoided, as we saw in 2007, had the central bankers of a handful of major states had a better understanding of economics and banking. Second, the theory tells us that the hegemon must have both the power and the will to sustain the system. **How much power is an open question**; I doubt that the United States actually has enough power to fulfill its appointed role in this system, **especially its appointed economic role.** For example, theorists argue that the hegemon must be both the lender and the market of last resort to perform its stabilizing role in crisis. The United States can no longer do either. Third, **the question of how much of the hegemon's power needs to be economic**, and how much needs to be military is not a settled matter. This is particularly important given that the U.S. share of global GDP is destined to diminish; can the United States protect its hegemonic position by simply hyperinvesting in military power and deploying it around the world? Does the provision of military security provide a level of stability that inherently supports a global economic system, which would otherwise collapse? Is the existence of that global economy so central to U.S. economic power that if it did collapse, the United States would suffer disproportionately? 130 Because U.S. economic performance is connected to U.S. power, a realist ought to be concerned if there is some strong connection between Liberal Hegemony, international trade, and relative U.S. economic power. Two points are in order. The United States does not depend very much on international trade; imports and exports made up about 29 percent of GDP in 2010, among the smallest shares of advanced economies. 131 Moreover, nearly a third of that trade is with Canada and Mexico, states the United States secures inherently by securing itself. 132 China, at 13 percent, ranks as one of the top three U.S. trading partners, even as the U.S. Department of Defense begins to view it as a near-peer strategic competitor. Another third of U.S. trade is spread among a dozen nation states across the globe, and the rest is scattered across many more. It would take an unusual series of capitulations, conquests, or just plain market closures to close down enough trade to affect greatly the U.S. economy. A security hegemon is, in any case, unnecessary to insure international trade. Liberal Hegemonists worry that if states feel insecure, their concern about relative gains from trade, and the effect of those relative gains on relative power, will drive out

trade. But **states have traded with one another under a variety of power constellations.** Though political scientists—especially hegemonic stability theorists—and historians view Britain as the global hegemon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was at best “first among equals” in a multipolar great power system, and its grand strategy looks much more like “offshore balancing” or Restraint than it does Liberal Hegemony. Britain was not the day-to-day global security provider. Rather it was the balancer of last resort. Peter Liberman notes that in this period, British-German trade climbed, despite the fact that each came to identify the other as their principal naval rival. Similarly, U.S.-Japan trade grew in the interwar period, even as U.S.-Japan relations deteriorated. 133 States trade with one another due to mutual commercial interest; it seems to take quite a lot of fear and hostility to change the calculus. It is also likely, as Liberman suggests, that the existence of nuclear weapons has reduced whatever relative gains concerns there once might have been, insofar as great powers armed with nuclear weapons do not really depend on economic autonomy for their military power and hence their security. **It is therefore improbable that a less militarily activist United States would lead to a collapse of international trade.** Some argue that a global military hegemon is necessary to secure peace and order in the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyberspace—to enable international trade and globalization. As a global naval power, Britain did bring a measure of peace and order to the global commons for most of the nineteenth century. But by the early twentieth century all great trading states had navies capable of securing their merchant ships against any predator who was not a great power. And the fact that other great powers might interfere with this trade did not prevent them from trading with one another, because such interference would have meant war. Mutual deterrence protected the global trade routes. In any event, as I will be argue in chapter 3, the military strategy of Restraint is committed to maintaining what I have called “command of the commons.” That is the bedrock military capability needed by the United States to influence geopolitical events abroad, should that prove necessary. Whatever side benefits for world trade that might arise from the capability to keep order in the commons would still be present. **The U.S. interest in maintaining command of the commons is premised on its contribution to U.S. national security,** not its contribution to global trade.



**--at: solves peace**

**Their authors don't assume the flaws with maintain primacy – Unipolarity isn't effective**

**Preble, 3-23** – [Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in History from Temple University, Our Unrealistic Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/our-unrealistic-foreign-policy/>] Jeong

U.S. foreign policy is crippled by a dramatic disconnect between what Americans expect of it and what the nation's leaders are giving them. If U.S. policymakers don't address this gap, they risk pursuing a policy whose ends don't match with the means the American people are willing to provide. What is our foreign policy? Leadership. That word appears 35 times in President Obama's latest National Security Strategy. His predecessors have all wanted the same thing, although most managed to work in a few more synonyms. At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, officials in the George H.W. Bush administration aspired for the United States to be the sole global power. Now that the nation's long-time rival had disappeared, the object of U.S. foreign policy, according to an early draft of the Defense Planning Guidance, was to "prevent the re-emergence of a new rival" capable of challenging U.S. power in any vital area, including Western Europe, Asia, or the territory of the former Soviet Union. To accomplish this task, the United States would retain preponderant military power, not merely to deter attacks against the United States, but also to deter "potential competitors" – including long-time U.S. allies such as Germany and Japan – "from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." Echoing those sentiments a few years later, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan characterized the proper U.S. role in the world as "benevolent global hegemony." "The aspiration to benevolent hegemony," they conceded in their famous Foreign Affairs essay from 1996, **"might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect.** But a hegemon is nothing more or less than a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain." Kristol and Kagan claimed, "Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives." Indeed, they continued, "The principal concern of America's allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw." That latter point has never been tested: U.S. troops have remained in Europe and Asia, and the U.S. military presence expanded in other regions. But whether it is good for others doesn't necessarily make it good for us. For the most part, American taxpayers, and especially American troops, have borne the burdens of "benevolent hegemony," while U.S. allies have been content to focus their attention on domestic spending, while their underfunded defenses languish. Modern-day advocates of our current foreign policy opt for a less grandiose name – "deep engagement" – but the substance is the same as that advocated by Kristol and Kagan from nearly two decades ago. And the fact that U.S. foreign policy encourages other countries to neglect their defenses continues to be its key selling point. "By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations," Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth explain, "Washington dampens

competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities." According to this view, the fact that U.S. allies have chosen not to invest in their own defenses is the clearest sign that the strategy is working as intended. "Since 1991," Brooks and his co-authors enthuse, U.S. allies "have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows." **Curb Your Enthusiasm Because U.S. security guarantees to wealthy allies have caused them to under-provide for their own defense, they also have less capacity to deal with common security challenges, from ethnic violence in the Balkans in the late 1990s to combatting terrorism and piracy in the Middle East, South Asia, or the Horn of Africa today. But that isn't the main flaw underlying U.S. foreign policy today.** Cheerleaders for benevolent hegemony contend that Americans are inclined to carry these burdens indefinitely, a function of American exceptionalism combined with a pervasive culture of weakness among our allies. "The American people can be summoned to meet the challenges of global leadership," Kristol and Kagan concluded in 1996, "if statesmen make the case loudly, cogently, and persistently." American "statesmen" have typically opted for a different approach. They tend to sell U.S. foreign policy through misdirection and subterfuge to the extent that they ever talk about it at all. Astute observers of U.S. foreign policy understand why elites have neglected to make the case loudly, cogently, or persistently; the American people haven't bought into this ambitious global mission, and they are unlikely to ever do so. Nor is it clear that other countries welcome U.S. leadership as much as the advocates of global hegemony contend. The key problem with "benevolent hegemony," Francis Fukuyama explained in his book, *America at the Crossroads*, is that it "rests on a belief in American exceptionalism that most non-Americans simply find not credible." He continued, "The idea that the United States behaves disinterestedly on the world stage is not widely believed because it is for the most part not true and, indeed, could not be true if American leaders fulfill their responsibilities to the American people." Even strong advocates of **global hegemony concede that it might not be realistic to expect Americans to bear the burdens of global governance indefinitely.** For Americans, Michael Mandelbaum grudgingly admitted in his book, *The Case for Goliath*, our own "nation's interests have priority." This "does not bespeak unusual financial stinginess or moral callousness: Americans approach the world much as other people do....For the American public, foreign policy, like charity, begins at home." For that reason, above all others, Mandelbaum predicted, "the American role in the world may depend in part on Americans not scrutinizing it too closely."

### **Great power peace is flawed – Their authors exploit public irrationality and threat inflation**

**Preble, 3-23** – [Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in History from Temple University, *Our Unrealistic Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks*, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/our-unrealistic-foreign-policy/>] Jeong

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The inclination to conceal the true object of U.S. foreign policy has a long pedigree. When the Truman administration was pondering ways to rally public support for the nascent Cold War, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan advised Secretary of State Dean Acheson to “scare hell out of the American people” by painting a picture of the global communist menace that was, in Acheson’s telling, “clearer than the truth.” **It isn’t necessarily wrong to believe that U.S. foreign policy can be sustained by obfuscation, threat inflation, and the hope that the public won’t pay attention. Americans are “rationally ignorant” about most public policies, and especially so when it comes to foreign policy.** There are occasions, however, when the public rises up – as it did in the late summer of 2013, when nearly everyone in Washington was making the case for strikes against Bashar Assad’s government and military in Syria, and nearly everyone outside of the Beltway’s pleasant environs was screaming “Hell no.” Still, on the whole, information asymmetry works to the advantage of those calling for a hegemonic global posture and frequent foreign intervention. The explosion on the USS Maine in 1898 and a curious episode involving U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, were sufficient to rally the public to the war hawks’ cries. The truth about those incidents was revealed long after. We can expect similar murky incidents to serve as the rationale for attacks on any number of modern-day boogeymen: from Iran’s mad mullahs to North Korea’s crazy Kims. But foreign policy should be communicated honestly and openly to the people who will pay its costs. For example, can we create and sustain occasional alliances with less-than-perfect allies, without having to claim falsely that they are, in fact, perfect? And that their interests always align perfectly with our own? Can our leaders make the case for a hegemonic grand strategy without resorting to threat inflation? Or must every tin-pot dictator (at least the ones we don’t actively support) be the next Adolf Hitler? Must every possible cyber-/bio-/WMD-incident be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor? Must every negotiation be Munich? Can U.S. elites credibly claim that the economic benefits of U.S. foreign policy greatly outweigh the costs? **The assertion that U.S. hegemony delivers a net gain to the U.S. economy was always on shaky ground – and is shakier still.** In short, if the core rationale of our grand strategy remains, as it has been, to discourage other countries from defending themselves, can our leaders explain it that way to the American people and sustain popular support? And if there is a risk that a particular policy or military operation abroad, undertaken primarily to defend allied interests, will undermine U.S. security or prosperity, or threaten major restrictions on Americans’ domestic liberty, can our leaders definitively demonstrate that the risks are heavily offset by the rewards?

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**misc.**

## --realism

### **Realism dictates state action – states are self-interested and want nothing else other than survival**

**Mearsheimer 14** -- Professor of political science at the University of Chicago, PhD in international relations (John J., "Realism Reader," edited by Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen, London ; New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 179-188, tony)

Great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. This perspective does not allow for status quo powers, except for the unusual state that achieves preponderance. Instead, the system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core. This chapter presents a theory that explains this competition for power. Specifically, I attempt to show that there is a compelling logic behind my claim that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power. . . Why states pursue power My explanation for why great powers vie with each other for power and strive for hegemony is derived from five assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone mandates that states behave competitively. Taken together, however, they depict a world in which states have considerable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively. In particular, the system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states. . . Bedrock assumptions The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.<sup>2</sup> Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system. <sup>3</sup> There is no "government over governments."<sup>4</sup> The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state's military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, **for every neck, there are two hands to choke it.** The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. <sup>5</sup> There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. <sup>6</sup> Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state 's intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next.

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Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. The fourth assumption is **that survival is the primary goal of great powers.** Specifically **states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political ... order.** Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: "We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist."<sup>7</sup> States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective. The fifth assumption is that **great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it.** In particular, **they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival.** Moreover, **states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions.** As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule should behave aggressively toward each other. **There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive,** which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, **when the five assumptions are married together. They create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.**

## **Ethics Approaches**

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## **Consequentialism**



## Consequentialism Good

### **Public officials have a responsibility to evaluate consequences**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

As, an Account of the peculiar role responsibilities of public officials (and, by extension, of ordinary individuals in their public capacities as citizens) that vice becomes a virtue, though. Those agents, too, have to come from somewhere, bringing with them a whole raft of baggage of personal attachments, commitments, principles and prejudices. In their public capacities, however, we think it only right and proper that they should stow that baggage as best they can.

Complete neutrality might be an impossible ideal. That is another matter." But it seems indisputable that that is an ideal which people in their public capacities should strive to realize as best they are able. That is part (indeed, a central part) of what it is to be a public official ,it all. It is the essence of public service as such that public servants should serve the public at large. Public servants must not play favorites.

Or consider, again, criticisms revolving around the theme that utilitarianism is a coldly calculating doctrine.<sup>23</sup> In personal affairs that is an unattractive feature. There, we would like to suppose that certain sorts of actions proceed immediately from the heart, without much reflection much less any real calculation of consequences. Among intimates it would be extremely hurtful to think of every kind gesture as being contrived to produce some particular effect.

The case of public officials is, once again, precisely the opposite. There, it is the height of irresponsibility to proceed careless of the consequences. Public officials are, above all else, obliged to take care: not to go off half cocked, not to let their hearts rule their heads. In Hare's telling example, the very worst thing that might be said of the Suez misadventure was not that the British and French did some perfectly awful things (which is true, too) but that they did so utterly unthinkingly.<sup>24</sup>

Related to the critique of utilitarianism as a calculating doctrine is the critique of utilitarianism as a consequentialist doctrine. According to utilitarianism, the effects of an action are everything. There are no actions which are, in and of themselves, morally right or wrong, good or bad. The only things that are good or bad are the effects that actions produce.<sup>25</sup>

That proposition runs counter to certain ethical intuitions which, at least in certain quarters, are rooted deeply. Those who harbor a Ten Commandments view of the nature of morality see a moral code as being essentially a list of "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" a list of things that are right or wrong in and of themselves, quite regardless of any consequences that might come from doing them.<sup>26</sup>

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That may or may not be a good way to run one's private affairs.<sup>1</sup> Even those who think it is, however, tend to concede that it is no way to run public affairs. It is in the nature of public officials' role responsibilities that they are **morally obliged to "dirty their hands"** - make hard choices, do things that are wrong (or would ordinarily be wrong, or would be wrong for ordinary private individuals) in the service of some greater public good.<sup>2</sup> It would be simply irresponsible of public officials (in any broadly secular society, at least) to adhere mindlessly to moral precepts read off some sacred list, literally "whatever the consequences."<sup>3</sup> Doing right though the heavens may fall is not (nowadays, anyway) a particularly attractive posture for public officials to adopt.

### **Consequentialism is simpler and more plausible than non-consequentialist theories**

**Pettit 91** – Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and also Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University (Philip, "Consequentialism," From Stephen Darwall's *Consequentialism*, Print)BC

Our key proposition motivates an argument for consequentialism because it shows that the non-consequentialist is committed to a theory which is seriously defective in regard to the methodological virtue of simplicity. It is common practice in the sciences and in intellectual disciplines generally to prefer the more simple hypothesis to the less, when otherwise they are equally satisfactory. Consequentialism, it turns out, is indisputably a simpler hypothesis than any form of non-consequentialism and that means that, failing objections such as those rejected in the last section it ought to be preferred to it. If non-consequentialists have not seen how much their view loses on the side of simplicity, that may be because they do not generally assent to our key proposition. They imagine that there are certain values which are susceptible only to being promoted, others that are susceptible only to being honoured.

There are at least three respects in which consequentialism scores or simplicity. The first is that whereas consequentialists endorse only one way of responding to values, non-consequentialists endorse two. Non-consequentialists all commit themselves to the view that certain values should be honoured rather than promoted: say, values like those associated with loyalty and respect. But they all agree, whether or not in their role as moral theorists, that certain other values should be promoted: values as various as economic prosperity, personal hygiene, and the safety of nuclear

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installations. Thus where consequentialists introduce a single axiom on how values justify choices, non-consequentialists must introduce two.

But not only is non-consequentialism less simple for losing the numbers game. It is also less simple for playing the game in an ad hoc way. Non-consequentialists all identify certain values as suitable for honouring rather than promoting. But they do not generally explain what it is about the values identified which means that justification comes from their being honoured rather than promoted. And indeed it is not clear what satisfactory explanation can be provided. It is one thing to make a list of the values which allegedly require honouring: values, say, like personal loyalty, respect for others, and punishment for wrongdoing. It is another to say why these values are so very different from the ordinary run of desirable properties. There may be features that mark them off from other values, but why do those features matter so much? That question typically goes unconsidered by non-consequentialists. Not only do they have a duality then where consequentialists have a unity; they also have an unexplained duality.

The third respect in which consequentialism scores on the simplicity count is that it fits nicely with our standard views of what rationality requires, whereas non-consequentialism is in tension with such views. The agent concerned with a value is in a parallel position to that of an agent concerned with some personal good: say, health or income or status. In thinking about how an agent should act on the concern for a personal good, we unhesitatingly say that of course the rational thing to do, the rationally justified action, is to act so that the good is promoted. That means then that whereas the consequentialist line on how values justify choices is continuous with the standard line on rationality in the pursuit of personal goods, the non-consequentialist line is not. The non-consequentialist has the embarrassment of having to defend a position on what certain values require which is without analogue in the non-moral area of practical rationality.

If these considerations of simplicity are not sufficient to motivate a consequentialist outlook, the only recourse for a consequentialist is probably to draw attention to the detail of what the non-consequentialist says, inviting reflection on whether this really is plausible. In the second section above we saw that non-consequentialists have to deny either that the values they espouse determine values for the prognoses of an option or that the value of an option is a function of the values associated with those different prognoses. The consequentialist can reasonably argue that either claim is implausible. If one prognosis realizes my values more than another then that surely fixes its value. And if one option has prognoses such that it represents a better gamble than another with those values, then that surely suggests that it is the best option for me to take. So how can the non-consequentialist think otherwise?

**Only consequentialism can apply to collective action**

**Pettit 91** – Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and also Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University (Philip, “Consequentialism,” From Stephen Darwall’s *Consequentialism*, Print)BC

The second observation is one that we have not made explicitly before and it offers a good ending note. This is that many deontological theories come from acknowledging the force of the consequentialist point about justification but then containing it in some way. One example is the rule- consequentialist who restricts his consequentialism to choices between rules, arguing that behavioural choices are justified by reference to the rules so chosen. Another example, more significantly, is the non- consequentialist who holds that each agent ought to choose in such a way that were everyone to make that sort of choice then the value or values in question would be promoted. Here the thought is that consequentialism is suitable for assessing the choices of the collectivity but not of its members. The collectivity ought to choose so that the values are promoted, the individual ought to choose, not necessarily in the way that actually promotes the values, but in the way that would promote them if everybody else made a similar choice. Here as in the other case the non- consequentialist position is motivated by the consequentialist thought. That will not make it congenial to the consequentialist, who will think that the thought is not systematically enough applied: the consequential- ist will say that it is as relevant to the individual agent as to the collectivity. But the observation may help consequentialists to make sense of their opponents and thereby reinforce their own position. They can argue that they are not overlooking any consideration that non-consequentialists find persuasive. What non-consequentialists find persuasive is something which consequentialists are able to understand, and to undermine.

## **Consequentialism Bad**

**Overwhelming public commitment to consequentialist ethics necessities that you err towards deontology – structural contradictions about the role of the person within consequentialism means that it tears itself apart.**

**Hurley 11** [Paul, Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, “Beyond Consequentialism”, Oxford University Press, 6-10-11, Pg. 1-3]

Morality requires agents to perform the act that promotes the best overall state of affairs—it never permits us to bring about a worse state of affairs when a better one is available. To endorse this claim is to be committed to the paradigmatic version of consequentialism. upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs.<sup>1</sup> Such moral theories, and variations upon them, can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy.<sup>2</sup> All roads to a systematic theoretical understanding of our moral practices can seem to lead down slippery slopes to consequentialism. Other approaches can appear upon reflection to smack of post hoc intuition mongering, or to run afoul of Occam's razor. Beyond philosophy consequentialism is rarely mentioned but widely used. Its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the more striking developments of the last century and a half. In public policy, for example, it is now commonplace to rank policies in terms of the better or worse consequences that will result overall from their implementation, often measured in monetary terms of benefits vs. costs.\* In economics the rational course of action by an agent is taken to be the one that maximizes that agent's own welfare, utility\*, or preference satisfaction, but the moral course of action is often taken to be that of maximizing overall social welfare, utility, or preference satisfaction.<sup>4</sup> In many areas of contemporary jurisprudence, particularly in the United States, the right strategy is taken to be that which maximizes overall benefit. Markets are taken to be the most effective tools for implementing this consequential strategy, hence the role of the laws and the courts is taken to be that of mimicking the market (hence maximizing benefit) in areas in which markets (due to externalities, etc.) fail.<sup>5</sup> Even most of its advocates readily concede that the theory has a host of counter-intuitive implications and conflicts with many of our deeply held moral judgments. Yet efforts to supply such judgments with an underlying rationale can seem to lead ineluctably away from such intuitions and particular judgments and back towards consequentialism.

Much recent work in ethics has consisted of efforts either to mitigate the counter-intuitiveness of generally consequentialist approaches to ethics, or to strike against the fundamental theoretical challenge that consequentialism is taken to provide to considered moral judgments and alternative moral theories. It is the thesis of this book that these discussions of the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. My project is to demonstrate that the traditional considerations that are taken to drive the challenge of consequentialism collapse in the face of this challenge to consequentialism.

Many others have raised objections to consequentialism. but it is often open to the consequentialist to respond that such criticisms beg certain of the crucial questions at issue. Critics argue that consequentialists cannot

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take persons or rights seriously, for example, but consequentialists respond that it is precisely their view that treats each and every person with full and equal seriousness. If rights are to be taken seriously, isn't the right approach to maximize the extent to which they are upheld overall? My approach, by contrast, identifies certain tensions within the consequentialist approach itself. An appreciation of the nature of these tensions grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. Plausible steps for meeting this challenge, I will argue, lead us naturally beyond consequentialism; indeed, lead us to certain distinctly non-consequentialist commitments.

**Consequentialism is void of morality because it is overly concerned with state of affairs at the expense of evaluating ethics – prefer deontological methods.**

**Hurley 11** [Paul, Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, “Beyond Consequentialism”, Oxford University Press, 6-10-11, Pg. 3-6]

The fundamental challenge to consequentialism can be introduced by way of two claims. These claims are typically endorsed not only by advocates of consequentially moral theories, but by defenders of the standard Aristotelian, Hobbesian and Kantian alternatives to consequentialism as well. The first claim is that there are some acts that morality prohibits, and others that it requires of us. The second is that we should do what morality requires; we typically have decisive reasons to act in accordance with such moral requirements and prohibitions.<sup>8</sup> The standard alternatives to consequentialism are theories both of the standards set by morality and of the decisive reasons that we have to conform to such standards. In particular, each is a theory of the relationship between reasons and rightness (or “moral” virtues) upon which we have decisive reasons to do what the correct standards for right or virtuous action require of us and to avoid doing what they prohibit. None of these traditional approaches challenges these claims that morality establishes contentful standards of conduct (that morality is contentful) and that we have decisive reasons to do what such standards require (that morality’ is in this sense rationally authoritative). Rather, they are attempts to provide theories of the relationship between what we have reasons to do and what it is right or virtuous to do that supply rationales for both the content that they take moral standards to have and the rational authority of such standards.

Consequentialism is often presented as an alternative in kind to such theories. But this is misleading. Like advocates of these other approaches, standard act consequentialists often appeal to both the claim that morality is contentful and the claim that morality is authoritative. But, unlike these alternatives, consequentialist moral theories are not in the first instance theories of the relationship between reasons to act and right actions. They are instead theories of the relationship between right actions and good overall states of affairs, upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The traditional alternatives are fundamentally theories of the relationship between reasons to act and right (or virtuous) action; consequentialism is fundamentally a theory of the relationship between right action and good states of affairs. Consequentialism thus provide a rationale for the content of morality, but such a rationale can be embraced without taking up any position at all concerning the authoritativeness of such moral standards. Unlike the alternatives, such a theory can be embraced by someone who rejects the claim that moral standards are authoritative. Do the ends justify the means? The consequentialist answer can be deceptively nuanced:

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their moral standards for right action are only satisfied if an agent acts to promote the best overall state of affairs, but this consequentialist theory' of the content of moral standards is agnostic as to whether agents ever have even sufficient (much less decisive) reasons to do what is morally right.

This contrast between consequentialism and the other traditional approaches can be brought into focus with the example of Carl the card-carrying consequentialist. Let us assume that Carl accepts one from among the accounts of practical reason that can be and frequently are espoused by consequentialists, for example that the rational agent has decisive reasons to pursue her own happiness, or the maximal satisfaction of her preferences, or her own well-being, or the effective satisfaction of her plans, projects, and commitments. As a card-carrying consequentialist, he also accepts that the morally right action for him to perform is the action that brings about the best overall state of affairs, for example that maximizes overall happiness or maximizes the overall satisfaction of people's projects and commitments. Carl farther accepts the plausible claim that what furthers his own happiness or individual preference satisfaction or the satisfaction of his plans and projects often diverges from what maximizes overall happiness or aggregate preference satisfaction. Carl, while continuing to be a card-carrying consequentialist, draws the obvious conclusion from these commitments: he clearly has decisive reasons not to do the right thing in such routine cases. Carl is crystal clear about the action on his part that would be necessary' to conform to what he as a card-carrying consequentialist, recognizes as the correct moral standards. It is equally clear that he routinely has decisive reasons to do what such standards identify as wrong, and should not perform the right action in such cases. Because Harry\* the Hobbesian and Kate the Kantian espouse theories of the relationship between reasons to act and right actions, theories that purport to provide a rationale for both claims, such a result—that agents routinely have decisive reasons not to do what their theories identify as right—would constitute a devastating objection to their theories. By contrast, Carl can proceed blithely on as a card-carrying consequentialist while embracing such a result. Indeed, he can cite whatever grounds he takes there to be for the truth of his theory of the content of moral standards as providing grounds for rejection of the claim that morality is rationally authoritative. Carl might even conclude that the only reason the authoritativeness of morality has seemed plausible is that we have not recognized the full implications of the truth of consequentialism, and the stark contrast that in fact routinely obtains between what is morally right and wrong (properly, consequentially understood) and what we have decisive or sufficient reasons to do or not to do.<sup>9</sup> This consequence that is blithely accepted by Carl would of course be rejected by virtually all actual consequentialists. To surrender the rational authority of their moral standards as the price for the vindication of their account of the content of such standards would be for them a pyrrhic victory, losing the war as a cost of winning one battle. I will argue in what follows that consequentialism loses both the battle and the war.

### **Consequentialism ignores the lives of the moral agents**

**Mulgan 1** – Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews (Tim, "The Demands of Consequentialism," Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, <http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5280V.pdf>)BC

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### 1.3. Related Objections to Consequentialism

The Demandingness Objection is often linked to several other common objections to Consequentialism. In this section I distinguish these objections and explore their interconnections.

#### 1.3.1. The Integrity Objection

Another common objection to Consequentialism is the 'integrity' or 'alienation' objection. The classic formulation is due to Bernard Williams: 'how can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard as one satisfaction among others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which he has built his life. . . '33

Williams suggests that, by requiring every agent to take no more account of her own welfare than of the welfare of others, Consequentialism undermines the integrity of the agent's life. The Consequentialist agent must view every life from the outside, seeing it only in terms of the value it adds to the overall value of the universe. We might refer to this as the impersonal value of a life. The charge is that Consequentialism requires us to view our lives only from the impersonal perspective. Williams suggests that no agent can view her own life in this way and flourish.

Peter Railton expresses a similar objection in terms of alienation, which 'can be characterized . . . as a kind of estrangement . . . resulting in some sort of loss'.<sup>34</sup> By requiring us always to adopt the impersonal perspective, Utilitarianism threatens to alienate us from our own lives. If, following Susan Wolf, we define a meaningful life as a life 'of active engagement in projects of worth',<sup>35</sup> then we might object that no agent who followed Consequentialist moral theory could live a meaningful life, as she would be unable to identify with her own projects.

It is important not to be misled by the term 'integrity'. This does not refer to a separable valuable component of a good life, or to moral uprightness. Rather, Williams speaks of the integrity of a human life in the same way that we might speak of the integrity of a work of art.<sup>36</sup> The integrity of a life is its wholeness, unity, or shape.

The Integrity Objection is logically distinct from the Demandingness Objection. A moral theory could violate integrity without making any strong demands in the ordinary sense. For instance, we might imagine a theory, let us call it Impartial Spectatorism, requiring agents to view the world from the impersonal perspective at all times, but with no obligation to act in the world. Alternatively, a moral theory could be very demanding without violating anyone's integrity. For instance, a theory telling agents to devote their lives to a religious vocation might foster highly unified integral lives, while making great demands on each agent's resources (although this degree of religious devotion might itself become alienating).

Despite their distinctness, however, the two objections are closely related. In the first place, the violation of integrity is a striking example of the unreasonable demands of Consequentialism. A naive Consequentialist might



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argue that his theory only requires Affluent to give up money, which is not a vital component of human flourishing. A Marxian Consequentialist might even suggest that Affluent is better off without the distractions of consumer society. Opponents of Consequentialism will reply that Consequentialism not only requires Affluent to sacrifice resources she could have devoted to her own projects, it also requires her to be prepared to abandon those projects immediately should they cease to be her most effective way of maximizing the impersonal good.

This is a very significant point. The force of the Demandingness Objection is a function, not only of the number of demands a given theory makes, but also of the moral significance of each demand to the individual agent. Some components or aspects of well-being may be more significant than others. For instance, we may judge the demand that I give up my freedom more harshly than the demand that I relinquish most of my worldly possessions, even though the latter leaves me worse off than the former. (I explore such possibilities at some length in the final part of this book.)

Alternatively, the notion of integrity might provide not only an example of the unreasonableness of Consequentialism, but also an explanation of that unreasonableness. Why does Consequentialism make such demands? Because it ignores the moral significance of integrity. Consequentialism makes extreme demands because it requires us always to view the world from the impersonal perspective, and ignore our own personal point of view. This is unreasonable because, unless we are allowed to view the world from a perspective granting special weight to our own concerns, we cannot live recognizably human lives.

### **Consequentialism fails to understand differences in people**

**Mulgan 1** – Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews (Tim, “The Demands of Consequentialism,” Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, <http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5280V.pdf>)BC

#### 1.3.2. Separateness of Persons

Another common objection to Consequentialism is that it ‘ignores the separateness of persons’.<sup>37</sup> In other words, Consequentialism pays insufficient attention to the fact that each person has a separate and unique life to live. For instance, traditional Utilitarianism seeks to maximize the sum total of hedonic units. It is uninterested in how these units are combined into lives, and is thus willing to sacrifice one person’s life to provide a small amount of happiness to a large enough number of people. Because it ignores questions regarding the distribution of utility across lives, Utilitarianism permits unacceptable levels of uncompensated sacrifice, and pays inadequate regard to the separateness of persons.

Taken to the extreme, this objection would rule out all redistribution and all obligations to come to the aid of others. After all, uncompensated sacrifice occurs whenever a moral principle requires one agent to give something up to

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further the interests of another.<sup>38</sup> Such an extreme position does not seem plausible. The complaint against Consequentialism cannot be simply that it requires the agent to balance her own needs against those of others. Every plausible moral theory involves some such balancing. Rather, the objection is presumably that Consequentialism offers an inaccurate account of this balance. The complaint is not that Consequentialism makes demands, but that it makes too many demands, or the wrong demands.

The integrity and separateness objections are clearly related. Part of what it is to see one's life as an integrated whole is precisely to see it as distinct from the lives of others. The two notions are thus two sides of the same coin. If Consequentialism ignores one, then it is not surprising that it overlooks the other.

At this point we need to ask two questions: (1) how should agents balance their own interests against those of others, and (2) how might Consequentialism balance them? Until we have answered these questions, we cannot assume that Consequentialists cannot provide an adequate account of the balance between the agent's own interests and the impersonal good. The main task of this book is to seek answers to these two questions, and to demonstrate that the Consequentialist solution is acceptable. Once again, we can see this complaint as providing a striking example of the unreasonable demands of Consequentialism. Consequentialism requires the agent to ignore the fact that her life is separate from the lives of others.

The notion of separateness also explains the failure of Consequentialism. Consequentialism demands too much because it ignores the separateness of persons. Lacking an adequate theory of human nature, Consequentialism cannot even see why its demands are unreasonable. It places unreasonable demands on moral agents simply because it does not understand what moral agents are like.

This line of argument suggests two further questions. Can one acquire an adequate understanding of humanity, morality, and agency and still be a Consequentialist? If so, what form will one's Consequentialism take? This book seeks to motivate an affirmative answer to the first question by exploring several possible answers to the second.

### **Consequentialism causes alienation**

**Railton 84** – Gregory S. Kavka Distinguished University Professor, and John Stephenson Perrin Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (Peter, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 134-171, JSTOR, PDF)BC

Of course, one has adopted no morality in particular even in adopting consequentialism unless one says what the good is. Let us, then, dwell briefly on axiology. One mistake of dominant consequentialist theories, I believe, is their failure to see that things other than subjective states can have intrinsic

value. Allied to this is a tendency to reduce all intrinsic values to one-happiness. Both of these features of classical utilitarianism reflect forms of alienation. First, in divorcing subjective states from their objective counterparts, and claiming that we seek the latter exclusively for the sake of the former, utilitarianism cuts us off from the world in a way made graphic by examples such as that of the experience machine, a hypothetical device that can be programmed to provide one with whatever subjective states he may desire. The experience machine affords us decisive subjective advantages over actual life: few, if any, in actual life think they have achieved all that they could want, but the machine makes possible for each an existence that he cannot distinguish from such a happy state of affairs. Is Despite this striking advantage, most rebel at the notion of the experience machine. As Robert Nozick and others have pointed out, it seems to matter to us what we actually do and are as well as how life appears to us.<sup>20</sup> We see the point of our lives as bound up with the world and other people in ways not captured by subjectivism, and our sense of loss in contemplating a life tied to an experience machine, quite literally alienated from the surrounding world, suggests where subjectivism has gone astray. Second, the reduction of all goals to the purely abstract goal of happiness or pleasure, as in hedonistic utilitarianism, treats all other goals instrumentally. Knowledge or friendship may promote happiness, but is it a fair characterization of our commitment to these goals to say that this is the only sense in which they are ultimately valuable? Doesn't the insistence that there is an abstract and uniform goal lying behind all of our ends bespeak an alienation from these particular ends?

### **Consequentialism inevitably causes negative responsibility – this creates self-alienation**

**Railton 84** – Gregory S. Kavka Distinguished University Professor, and John Stephenson Perrin Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (Peter, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 134-171, JSTOR, PDF)BC

Before ending this discussion of consequentialism, let me mention one other large problem involving alienation that has seemed uniquely troubling for consequentialist theories and that shows how coming to terms with problems of alienation may be a social matter as well as a matter of individual psychology. Because consequentialist criteria of rightness are linked to maximal contribution to the good, whenever one does not perform the very best act one can, one is "negatively responsible" for any shortfall in total well-being that results. Bernard Williams has argued that to accept such a burden of responsibility would force most of us to abandon or be prepared to abandon many of our most basic individual commitments, alienating ourselves from the very things that mean the most to us.<sup>3'</sup>

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**Utilitarianism is the only ethical way to evaluate action because it is indifferent to temporal distance.**

**Davidson 15** (Marc D. Davidson, researcher and lecturer, University of Amsterdam environmental ethics and economics "Climate change and the ethics of discounting" WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:401–412. doi: 10.1002/wcc.347 .nt)

Welfarist Consequentialism Utilitarianism The most common approach to discounting in the climate debate is (classical) utilitarianism. According to **utilitarianism, the right act is the one that maximizes utility** (or happiness, well-being, or some other comparable measure) **for all concerned. The utilitarian approach has two consequences for discounting.** The first of these is that **time as such is irrelevant.** Sidgwick,<sup>61</sup> one of the founding fathers of utilitarianism, already observed that **'the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his [their] contemporaries.'** In other words: **changes in future utility count as much as changes in present utility.**<sup>c</sup> The second consequence is that, **given the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, discounting is indeed required if future generations are expected to be wealthier than we are today.**<sup>d</sup> According to Marshall,<sup>64</sup> 'a pound's worth of satisfaction to an ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than a pound's worth of satisfaction to an ordinary rich man.' According to utilitarianism, we should therefore discount future climate damage at a rate equal to the expected growth rate of consumption times the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility: the Ramsey formula with the pure rate of time preference set to zero. This is the approach followed by e.g., Ramsey,<sup>20</sup> Pigou,<sup>56</sup> and Harrod<sup>65</sup> in the general discounting debate and by e.g., Cline,<sup>32</sup> Schelling,<sup>53</sup> Azar & Sterner,<sup>66</sup> Broome,<sup>67,68</sup> and Stern<sup>6</sup> in the climate debate.

### **Utilitarianism should be applied to politics**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory with political consequences. It is an ethical theory, in the sense that it tells us what is right and wrong, good and bad. It is political, in that some of its most central pronouncements touch upon the conduct of public life. Indeed, it purports to provide a complete political theory, a complete normative guide for the conduct of public affairs.

An "ethic" is, strictly speaking, a theory of the good and bad, right and wrong quite generally. The term has, however, come primarily to connote more narrowly a theory of right conduct at the level of personal conduct. Ethics has come to be seen, quintessentially, as an answer to the question of "what should I do?" What is central to ethics thus understood is our intimate, individual affairs. What it is that is right for us to do jointly, in the conduct of our public lives, is seen to be basically derivative from that.

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Of course this line of thought is quite right, in one sense. From most modern perspectives, if not from certain more ancient ones, The Politics always has to be parasitic upon The Ethics. Any political theory that purports to tell us what we should do (in more than a crassly prudential or pragmatic sense of "should") needs an ethical theory of some sort or another to provide its normative bite. What I shall here be disputing is whether that normative theory necessarily has to be parasitic upon - to be rooted in, to have its primary application to, to be tested first and foremost against its implications for - personal conduct.

"The thesis of this book is that at least one normative theory, utilitarianism, can be a good normative guide to public affairs without its necessarily being the best practical guide to personal conduct. It is right there, too, after a fashion. But special circumstances confound the direct application of utilitarianism to personal affairs, and in such circumstances utilitarianism itself recommends that people's conduct be guided by more indirectly utilitarian mechanisms - obeying rules of conduct or developing traits of character, themselves chosen on utilitarian bases, rather than trying to apply the utilitarian calculus directly in each instance.

There are special circumstances governing public life, too, however, just as the special circumstances of private life are such as to drive us away from utilitarianism in any direct form, so too are the special circumstances of public life such as to drive us toward it. Those **special circumstances make public life particularly conducive to the forthright application of utilitarian doctrine.** Indeed, in my view, they make it almost indecent to apply any other.

### **Pioneers of utilitarianism applied it to politics**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Perhaps it is novel nowadays to look at utilitarianism as essentially a public philosophy. If, so, the novelty is itself wholly new. In earlier

times it was much more of a commonplace to suggest that utilitarianism constitutes a solution to public rather than personal moral problems, to defend it as a public philosophy rather than as a personal moral code.

That much is clearly suggested by reflection upon the corpus and the personal history of the founders of the utilitarian tradition.<sup>11</sup> Jeremy Bentham was famous in his own day primarily as a reformer of legal systems; James Mill as an essayist on government; John Stuart Mill as an essayist, social reformer and parliamentarian; John Austin as a jurist. The bulk of Bentham's large corpus is given over to constitutional codes, systems for penal reform, and such like. The two Mills fixed their focus equally firmly on public affairs ranging from histories of British India to political economy and women's suffrage.

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Lest all that seem to amount to a post hoc reconstruction of what the nineteenth-century utilitarians were up to, consider the younger Mill's self-conscious reflection upon the utilitarian tradition which he inherited. In his memorial essay on Bentham, John Stuart Mill writes,

It is fortunate for the world that Bentham's taste lay rather in the direction of jurisprudential than of properly ethical inquiry. Nothing expressly of the latter kind has been published under his name, except the "Deontology" - a book scarcely ever ... alluded to by any admirer of Bentham without deep regret that it ever saw the light.

Turning from what Bentham did badly to what he did well, Mill continues,

If Bentham's theory of life can do so little for the individual, what can it do for society? It will enable a society... to prescribe the rules by which it may protect its material interests. It will do nothing ... for the spiritual interests of society ... [What a philosophy like Bentham's can do [is to] teach the means of organizing and regulating the merely business part of the social arrangements.<sup>14</sup>

That is a fair assessment of Bentham, and of the tradition to which he gave rise. And although the younger Mill himself aspired to do better, it is in the end fair reflection, too, of John Stuart Mill's utilitarian accomplishments.

### **Public debate makes utilitarianism effective**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

That concession, if true, means that there will inevitably be some (perhaps substantial) imprecision in our public utility calculations. It follows that utilitarian policy recommendations will therefore still be somewhat indeterminate. That is not necessarily a telling criticism of utilitarianism, though. It merely amounts to saying that utilitarianism leaves some room for public debate and deliberation - in other words, for politics as it is ordinarily conceived. We would, I think, worry about any political theory that did not do that.<sup>63</sup>

Furthermore, even where utilitarianism proves indeterminate, it sets the terms of that public debate. It tells us what sorts of considerations ought to weigh with us, often while allowing that how heavily each of them actually weighs is legitimately open to dispute. Even where utilitarianism is indeterminate, it is not silent. To fill in those lacunae, we do not need to turn to some other principles altogether. Rather, in such cases utilitarianism speaks with many voices, and political argument in such a setting can (utilitarians would say "should") consist simply in a debate among them.

Once we have at least rough-and-ready interpersonal comparisons on the table, we can resume discussing the utilitarian merits of alternative

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distributions of the national dividend. Of course, which distribution utilitarianism recommends naturally depends upon certain crucial empirical facts of the matter. That in itself has long been taken to be a criticism of utilitarianism. If the facts of the matter turn out one particular way, utilitarianism might find itself recommending distributional policies that are intuitively outrageous.

'Utilitarianism might recommend feeding of Christians to lions, if it so happens that the utilities of the spectators enjoying the show (plus that of the lions enjoying the meal) exceed the disutilities of the Christians being sacrificed. Or utilitarianism might recommend dissecting one person and distributing her body parts to various others in need of transplants, if it so happens that the utilities of the recipients exceed the disutility of the "donor."<sup>4</sup> Or utilitarianism might recommend the hanging of an innocent person to assuage an angry mob, if it so happens that the utilities of those spared the mob's wrath exceed the disutility of the hanging victim.<sup>5</sup> Or utilitarianism might recommend giving all resources to a handful of people, if it so happens that those people are "super efficient pleasure machines" capable of translating resources into satisfaction at a fantastic rate; or it might recommend giving no resources to the handicapped, if it so happens that those people are particularly inept at translating resources into satisfaction.<sup>6</sup>

There is no denying that utilitarian prescriptions might turn out that way, in any particular instance. There is no telling how the numbers will come up in each and every case. But, again, advocating utilitarianism as a public philosophy spares us the burdens associated with maximizing at the margins in each and every case. It involves instead adopting institutions and practices and policies, on a utilitarian basis; and those must, by their nature, be publicly accessible and relatively long lasting. That in turn means that in choosing institutions and practices and policies we cannot maximize at the margins, adapting our choices to peculiarities of utility mixes in particular cases. We must instead adapt our choices to standard situations recurring across protracted periods, and do so in full knowledge that the nature of our choices will sooner or later become common knowledge.

That fact goes some way toward ensuring that utilitarianism, practiced as a public philosophy, will have few of the grievous distributional consequences commonly supposed. Many of the cases involving sacrificing the interests of the few to the many (or of the many to the few) generate the purported utilitarian payoffs only if it never becomes public knowledge what we are doing. Once it becomes public knowledge that, as a matter of policy, we are willing to hang innocent people to assuage a baying mob or to carve up one person to generate spare parts for others, then everyone starts worrying: Who will be next? The anxieties associated with such thoughts systematically

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occurring across the whole population will more than suffice to cancel the utility advantages of carving up one person or throwing one prisoner to the mob on any given occasion. Utilitarianism, employed as a public philosophy, must by its nature adopt institutions and practices and policies suited to recurring situations and standard individuals. There may be a very few people who are vastly better and a very few who are vastly worse than others at translating resources into utility. But if one assumes, with Bentham and his followers, that most people are pretty much alike in this respect and, further, that most goods display "diminishing marginal utility" (so the more you have of something, the less utility you derive from the next increment of it you are given) - then the utility-maximizing distribution of resources is inevitably going to be a broadly egalitarian one.

### **Utilitarianism encompasses separateness of persons**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Anti-utilitarians complain loudly and often that utilitarianism disregards the morally crucial fact of the "separateness" of persons.<sup>67</sup> That complaint, fair enough in a way, is however untrue in two crucial respects. First, utilitarians regard each person as a distinct locus of value. In generating the utilities that end up being aggregated, "each counts for one and no one counts for more than one," in Bentham's famous phrase. Of course, in the process of aggregating, the boundaries between you and me, your utilities and mine, get lost. But, second, empirical assumptions of broad similarity among people and generally diminishing marginal utility across all resources lead utilitarians to embrace policies and practices and institutions that are broadly egalitarian in form. That ensures that there will be a strong utilitarian presumption against exploiting some people for the benefit of others.<sup>VI</sup>

### **Utilitarianism is the best framework for formalistic approaches to policy**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Intemperate though his language may be, Macaulay clearly has a point. One of the great advantages of utilitarianism has always been that it promises to yield determinate, no-nonsense advice on practical matters of what one should do. One of its great disadvantages has always been that it has a tendency to do so (at least in the hands of its most brusque, no-nonsense practitioners) in a singularly formalistic way. List the alternatives, list the consequences, attach utility numbers to each and crank the adding machine's

handle. Nothing could be easier. But, critics say (with some considerable justification), nothing quite so easy could possibly be right.<sup>7</sup>

There is no denying that many of the applications of utilitarianism to problems of public policy are just as rote as that. In a way, though, it is a virtue of utilitarianism that it is an ethic which admits of rote learning of that sort. Better that an ethic be applied by rote than not at all, if (or where) those are the only options - as often they are, given the limits to policy-makers' time, attention and talents.

In any case, utilitarianism of the most formulistic sort is sometimes transparently the right way to approach a policy problem. Suppose we are trying to assess the economic effects of income transfer programs, for example. Then balance-sheet thinking is precisely what we need. The traditional complaint against generous income support programs is that if people can get something for nothing then they will not bother working for a living in the present or saving for the future. But the magnitudes here clearly matter. American evidence suggests, for example, that in exchange for a 4.8 percent reduction of labor supply (and a reduction in private savings of between 0 and 20 percent) we get a 75 percent reduction in poverty and a 19 percent increase in equality (measured by the Gini coefficient).<sup>70</sup> Whether we think on balance the gains are worth the costs is an open question. That depends on the relative weights we attach to each of those factors. But whichever way we go on that concrete case, listing the various effects and weighing them against one another surely is the right way to go about making that an economic assessment of that sort.

**Utilitarianism can function as a framework for creative policies – empirics prove**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Transparently right though such formulistic approaches to policy puzzles sometimes are, however, it would be wrong to judge utilitarianism wholly in light of them. In coming to an overall assessment of utilitarianism as a public philosophy, it would be wrong to fixate exclusively upon the most formulistic derivations of its least imaginative practitioners. We should attend at least as much to the more creative uses that can be made of the tools with which utilitarianism provides us, to possibilities that arise from working "in the shadows of utilitarianism," in Hart's phrase.<sup>71</sup> In the examples that follow, I attempt time and again to show how utilitarianism's central concepts might, given certain features of the problem at hand, yield determinate policy advice - without resorting to simpleminded, and often simply impossible, cranking

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through the formula to reach a direct determination of what is likely to maximize sum-total utility.

Thus, in the example of Chapter 17, it is possible to say in the spirit of utilitarianism that unilateral nuclear disarmament would have been a good policy in an essentially bipolar world - not because that would maximize utility (absent probability numbers, that is a sum that cannot be done), but rather because it would make a modal change in the possibility of truly awful outcomes. It is possible to say, in the example of Chapter 14, that an unconditional income guarantee (negative income tax, basic income, call it what you will) is a good thing not because that would necessarily maximize overall social utility in the presently prevailing circumstances, but rather because that polity would be minimally sensitive to shifts in prevailing social circumstances which always change far more rapidly than social policy. For that reason, unconditional income guarantees would be more likely to maximize utility across that wide range of changing circumstances. Or, in the examples running through Chapters 10 to 13, policies to buffer people against radical changes to the course of their lives would be a good thing - not because those are the most satisfying lives that people might live, but rather because the chopping and changing required to get to something else would be profoundly disruptive of what people find ultimately satisfying in their lives.

Of course, the bottom line in all those cases is that the policies are justified because ultimately they are utility-maximizing in some sense or another. Mine would hardly be a utilitarian theory at all, were it otherwise. Invariably, though, those are judgments made employing the apparatus of utilitarianism but without having recourse to finegrained calculations of sums. The considerations that are deemed decisive there for policy questions are indisputably utilitarian- style considerations, bearing directly upon the preference satisfaction (somehow conceived) of people (somehow specified). The point just is that those considerations can indeed prove determinative as regards utilitarians' policy recommendations, well ahead of doing a full-dress utility count.

### **Individuals act in their self-interest – this makes utilitarian policy-making necessary**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Utilitarians, and consequentialists more generally, are outcome- oriented. In sharp contrast to Ten Commandment-style deontological approaches, which specify certain actions to be done as a matter of duty, utilitarian theories assign people responsibility for producing certain results, leaving the individuals concerned broad discretion in how to achieve those results. The same basic difference in the two theories' approaches to assigning moral jobs

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reappears across all levels of moral agency, from private individuals to collective (especially state) actors.

The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to international protection of the ozone layer is to assign states responsibilities for producing certain effects, leaving them broad discretion in how they accomplish it (Chapter 18). The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to the ethical defense of nationalism is couched in terms of delimiting state boundaries in such a way as to assign particular responsibility for every particular person to some particular organization (Chapter 16). And, at a more domestic level of analysis, the distinctively utilitarian approach to the allocation of legal liabilities is to assign them to whomsoever can best discharge them (Chapters 5 through 7).

The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows.

The reason public action is required at all arises from the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain morally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level - the same thing that relieves individuals of responsibility - makes it morally incumbent upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not.

When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different circumstances, and their conclusions inevitably take very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. And those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. **Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.**<sup>72</sup>

### **Criticisms of utilitarianism apply to personal conduct not public policy**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

That, I submit, is a fallacy. It does matter who is using the utilitarian calculus, in what circumstances and for what purposes. Using the felicific calculus for micro-level purposes of guiding individuals' choices of personal conduct is altogether different from using it for macro-level purposes of guiding public officials' choices of general social policy. A different menu of options - in some respects greater, in others, less, but in any case different - is available to public and private choosers.

Those differences are such as to neutralize, in the public sphere, most of the objections standardly lodged against utilitarianism in the private sphere. True though such complaints may be as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of personal conduct, they are irrelevant (or anyway much less problematic) as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of public policy. Or so I shall argue.

### **Utilitarianism is necessary in public policy-making**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

A. The argument from necessity

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices public and private alike - are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all.

That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus - if they want to use it at all - to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

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For an example, consider the case of compulsory seat belt legislation. Policy-makers can say with some confidence that, on aggregate, more lives would be saved than lost if all automobile drivers and passengers were required to wear seat belts. As always, that aggregate conceals the fact that some gain while others lose. Some people would be trapped by seat belts in fiery crashes who would otherwise have been thrown to safety by the force of the impact, after all. The point is that policy-makers, contemplating seat belt legislation, have no way of knowing who those individuals are, exactly, or on what occasions, exactly, that might occur. All they can know is that, on aggregate, far fewer people would be saved than killed by being thrown clear of their cars upon impact.

Furthermore, the argument from necessity would continue, the instruments available to public policy-makers are relatively blunt. They can influence general tendencies, making rather more people behave in certain sorts of ways rather more often. But perfect compliance is unrealistic. And (building on the previous point) not knowing particular circumstances of particular individuals, rules and regulations must necessarily be relatively general in form. They must treat more people more nearly alike than ideally they should, had we perfect information.

The combined effect of these two factors is to preclude public policy-makers from fine-tuning policies very well at all. They must, of necessity, deal with people in aggregate, imposing upon them rules that are general in form. Nothing in any of this necessarily forces them to be utilitarian in their public policy-making, of course. What it does do, however, is force them – if they are inclined to be utilitarian at all – away from direct (act) utilitarianism and toward something more indirect, like rule-utilitarianism.<sup>8</sup> The circumstances surrounding the selection and implementation of public policies simply do not permit the more precise calculations required by any decision rule more tailored to peculiarities of individuals or situations.

### **Utilitarianism is the most desirable political framework – it allows for the use of general rules**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

#### B. The argument from desirability

The argument from desirability picks up where the argument from necessity leaves off. It is a familiar principle of natural justice that people ought to be governed according to laws that are general in form, rather than through particularized edicts applying to small subsets of the population alone (the limiting case of which is the much maligned “bill of attainder”). Of course, a utilitarian is in no position to help himself to principles of justice willy-nilly,

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without offering some broadly utilitarian account of the wisdom of those principles.<sup>9</sup> However, such an account can, I think, be given.

The more high-minded version is this. If laws have to be general in form, and apply to everyone alike, then we can make some pretty shrewd guesses as to what sorts of future laws might be enacted; and we can plan our own affairs accordingly. If particularized rules (or substantial discretions in applying the rules) are permitted, then anyone and everyone might be made an exception to the general rule. Under such circumstances, no one can know for sure what will be required of him in the future.<sup>10</sup> Yet there are substantial utilitarian gains - both to the individuals themselves, and to others whose own plans depend for their success upon the actions of those individuals from being able to enter into long-term commitments in some confidence that they will indeed be carried out.<sup>11</sup> From all that, it follows that there are substantial utility gains from requiring that laws be relatively general in their form and hence relatively predictable in their content.

Another way of arguing for the desirability of that practice, still thoroughly utilitarian in form, is this. Enforcement costs are in utilitarian terms a deadweight loss to be minimized insofar as possible. One way to minimize such costs is through the self-regulation of people's conduct. If people can be brought to internalize social norms, adopting them as their own and shaping their conduct accordingly, there would be no need for expensive enforcement measures, with obvious utilitarian advantages. But for principles of conduct to be easily internalized in this way, they must be few in number and general in form. If the idea is to let people govern their own conduct in line with rules, then they must be able, first, to learn and recall all the relevant rules when the occasion demands; and, second, to apply the rules to particular situations for themselves, without the aid of authoritative guidance in each instance.<sup>11</sup> All of that is easier, and hence the utilitarian payoffs higher, the less numerous and less complex the rules are.

Whereas the classic argument from justice is that it is "only fair" that people be governed according to general rules, the utilitarian argument from desirability is that it is "only prudent" to do so. In that way, people can largely anticipate what the rules will require of them, and apply the rules for themselves without expensive social enforcement.

### **Utilitarianism doesn't ask too much when applied to politics**

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University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

That is where public officials are in a different position. They can choose how much we, collectively, will give to the Third World; and those choices can be made binding on the rest of us. Certainly by utilitarian standards, and probably by most others as well, public officials may legitimately compel us all to play our required parts in coordination schemes for the discharge of our shared moral duties.<sup>12</sup> Given this fact, it is much less likely that utilitarian public policies, enforced upon all alike, will "ask too much" of any one of us. Since others will be required to do their share, too, the demand laid upon any one person will be considerably less than it would have been had the burden been shared only among the relatively few who would have contributed voluntarily.<sup>13</sup>

### **Utilitarianism doesn't ask too little and isn't mutually exclusive with deontology – policy-makers won't violate rights to maximize utility**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Again, I would like to leave it as an open question what is the right thing to do in those circumstances. If the circumstances were really as described, then they are very different indeed from those around which our ordinary intuitions of right and wrong have been framed; and, counterintuitive as it seems, it may well be right for us to do precisely what utilitarians recommend in such strange cases.<sup>22</sup> There is, after all, a certain moral preciousness involved in arguments about people's "integrity" and "clean hands." To paraphrase Brian Barry, if I were one of the nineteen Indians Jim could have saved, I would not think much of this moral dandy who prates on about his integrity while people die needlessly.<sup>23</sup> So even at the personal level, it may not be so obviously wrong to do as utilitarians recommend.

My main argument, though, is that at the level of social policy the problem usually does not even arise. When promulgating policies, public officials must respond to typical conditions and common circumstances. Policies, by their nature, cannot be case-by-case affairs. In choosing general rules to govern a wide range of circumstances, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the greatest happiness can ever be realized by systematically violating people's rights,

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**liberties or integrity** - or even, come to that, by systematically contravening the Ten Commandments. The rules that maximize utility over the long haul and over the broad range of applications are also rules that broadly conform to the deontologists' demands.

This point is as old as the original utilitarian fathers who, while denying received moral rules any ultimate authority, nonetheless conceded that they might have derivative force insofar as they (or something very much like them) are sanctioned by the utility principle. In our own day, Richard Brandt has plausibly argued that the rules of war that we have inherited from the fundamentally deontological "just war" tradition are all broadly in line with what rule- utilitarianism would recommend.<sup>24</sup>

Note carefully what I am arguing here. It is not that public officials will never experience utilitarian temptations to violate people's rights. The standard example for showing that concerns the case in which the only way to prevent a race riot that would kill dozens is by hanging someone whom we know to be innocent of any crime. My point is not that public officials will never face such situations, nor is it that they do not experience utilitarian temptations to violate people's rights (hanging innocent people, etc.) in such situations. My point is instead that public officials cannot systematically violate people's rights, as a matter of policy, and expect that policy to continue yielding the same utility payoffs time and again. Take the case of punishing criminal offenders, for example. The criminal sanction deters crime only in so far as it is imposed on the guilty and only the guilty. Introducing any probability that the innocent will be punished along with the guilty narrows the expected utility gap between criminal and noncriminal conduct, and increases the temptation for everyone to commit a crime. Thus, if we were as a matter of policy to punish people whether or not they were guilty, just according to some utilitarian calculation of public convenience on a case-by-case basis, then the utilitarian advantages of punishing the occasional innocent person would quickly diminish, and probably soon vanish altogether.<sup>14</sup>

The reason utilitarian policy-makers are precluded from violating the rights of the innocent, as a matter of policy, is that policies soon become public knowledge. If nothing else, they are easily inferred from past practices. Once news of such a policy gets out, people revise their expectations in the light of it - in the case of criminal punishment, their expectations of being punished even if not guilty. There are major utilitarian payoffs to be had from sustaining certain sorts of expectations and from avoiding others. Settled policies of one sort or another are characteristically required to produce socially optimal effects in both directions.<sup>26</sup> That is one reason for utilitarian policymakers to abide by settled policies, even when greater utility gains might be achieved in any given instance by deviating from them.

Another, more pragmatic reason derives from "the argument from necessity." Policy-makers, by reason of the circumstances under which they have to make their choices and the mechanisms they have available to implement

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them, are of necessity precluded from making any very fine-grained calculations. At most, they might make some very broad distinctions between different classes of cases; but picking out one particular case for special treatment is usually just not feasible. Policy-makers treat all cases according to some general rules because, in practice, they have little choice but to do so.

In response to the challenge that utilitarianism asks too little of us, then, it can be said that - at least as regards public policy-makers - utilitarianism demands not only about as much but also virtually the same things as deontologists would require. If they are going to decide cases according to general rules, rather than on a case-by-case basis, **then the rules that utilitarians would adopt are virtually identical to those that deontologists recommend**. And public policy-makers will indeed decide matters according to rules rather than on a case-by-case basis, either because the utility costs of doing otherwise are too high or else because as a purely practical matter more fine-grained assessments are impossible to make or to act upon.

### **Utilitarianism encompasses agent-relative duties**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

#### C. Utilitarianism is too impersonal

A third line of criticism protests the impersonality of the utilitarian injunction. What should be done, according to its dictates, is simply "maximize utility." Who should do it is simply everyone and anyone who is able to do so. On the face of it, at least, the utilitarian formula leaves little room for considerations of agency and virtually none at all for notions of "my station and its duties." Capacities might vary, of course, and utilitarians could well understand how duties might naturally vary with them. But at root, utilitarian injunctions are utterly neutral with respect to agents. Utilitarianism supposes that, ultimately, the same injunctions apply to all alike.

Critics of utilitarianism find this disturbing. Some duties, they say, must surely be agent-relative, with their content fundamentally (and not just derivatively) depending upon the agent to whom the demands are being addressed. I have a special duty to feed my own child, over and above (and separate from) whatever general, agent neutral duty I might have to feed any hungry child that I might happen across. And so on.<sup>15</sup>

How seriously this challenge should be taken, even at the micro- level, is once again open to question. Suppose that it is true that certain socially desirable consequences can be obtained only by assigning particular responsibility for certain particular performances to certain particular people. Then, clearly,

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utilitarianism would commit us to instituting just such a scheme to assign those particular responsibilities to those particular people. The duty to set up such a scheme in the first place might be a classically utilitarian one, a perfectly general duty shared by all alike. Once such a scheme is in place, though, the responsibilities assigned to particular people under it look very much like the "agent-relative special duties" that personalists so cherish.

They are not exactly alike, of course. But in so far as they differ at all, they differ principally in the very abstract matter of the ultimate source of their moral authority. For personalists, such agent-relative duties are something like moral primitives; for utilitarians, their moral force is derivative instead from the broader utilitarian considerations that guided their creation and allocation in the first place. Still, if the challenge is simply to account somehow for an obvious, first-order fact of moral phenomenology - namely, that each of us does indeed feel himself under different, special moral duties, over and above our more general duties of a baldly utilitarian form - then utilitarianism can indeed provide some such account.<sup>28</sup>

### **Personal, agent-relative duties are compatible with a utilitarian framework**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy," Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

The precise content of these supposed agent-relative duties, whether at the micro- or macro-level, has always been somewhat unclear. Depending upon what precise content they are given, advocates of agent- relative duties might find their case slipping away.<sup>3°</sup> The particular distinction I would point to is between a duty "to do X" or "not to do Y," on the one hand, and a duty "to see to it that X is done" or "to see to it that Y is not done," on the other. As a shorthand, let us call the former "first-order duties" and the latter "second-order duties."<sup>31</sup>

The examples usually given of agent-relative duties are of the first- order kind. It is said to be an agent's duty to feed his own children, or not himself to kill or maim people, or some such. Indeed, the standard examples are emphatically not of the second-order sort. A parent who saw to it that his child was well fed by giving it up for adoption would be thought to have failed (or, anyway, repudiated) his agent- relative responsibilities in the matter altogether. Or, again, take someone who, like Jim in Bernard Williams' fanciful tale, saw to it that many people are not killed by himself killing one person. He would not ordinarily be said to have discharged his agent-relative duties on balance; indeed, he would not ordinarily be said to have discharged them at all.

Still, those are examples of agent relativity at the micro-level of personal conduct. Shifting to duties at the macro-level of public policy, agent relativity suddenly becomes much more of the second-order kind. No one seriously

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expects political leaders - even fabulously rich ones, like Kennedy, Rockefeller or Hoover - to feed starving compatriots out of their own larders. They are not expected to do it themselves, but merely to see to it that it be done. Neither, come to that, are we as a people necessarily expected to discharge our agent-relative duties toward compatriots through our own first-order actions. If the Dutch can manage to con the Americans into paying the whole cost of Holland's flood defenses, as some sort of NATO overhead, then the Dutch can hardly be said to have failed their agent-relative duties with respect to one another's physical security; rather, they have discharged them splendidly well. Thus, it seems that agent-relative duties, at the macro-level at least, require people to see to it that something be done or not done, not (necessarily) to do or refrain from doing it themselves.

Yet if the duty is merely to see to it that certain socially desirable consequences come about, then that duty fits perfectly well with a utilitarian ethic. What made special, agent-relative duties of the first order incompatible with utilitarianism was the insistence that you do or not do something, regardless of the larger consequences. The problem was that, in minimizing the evil done by your own hand, you may (if in the position of Jim or George) maximize the harm that comes about through others' hands. What makes special, agent- relative duties of the second order compatible with utilitarianism is their insistence that you do or not do something because of the consequences. Responsibilities to see to it that good outcomes obtain or bad ones are avoided - the sort of second-order special responsibilities that public officials ordinarily bear - are not counterexamples to utilitarianism. Instead, they are instances of it.

Having come this far, the only force now left to the impersonality criticism would derive from the fact that public officials are assigned special responsibilities for such matters, whereas utilitarians should presumably say that those are responsibilities which everyone should share. But utilitarians would insist only that everyone share them in the first instance, and in the last. In the first instance, everyone shares a utilitarian responsibility to maximize good. But if it turns out that more good could be done by assigning special responsibility to some particular agents for some particular matters, then that is what utilitarianism recommends be done. In the last instance, everyone is responsible for the consequences of sharing out responsibility in these ways; and if that moral division of labor has not worked successfully, then everyone shares the blame. In an ongoing social system, however, utilitarians usually will have rightly decided to appoint particular people to positions of special responsibility for certain morally important tasks. Public officials are a case in point. In ongoing systems, they will indeed have been assigned special, agent-relative responsibilities for seeing to it that certain morally desirable outcomes obtain or that certain morally undesirable outcomes be avoided, in a way that can be perfectly well rationalized on basic utilitarian principles.

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**Utilitarianism is the best framework for societies**

**Rawls 71** – held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University and the Fulbright Fellowship at Christ Church, Oxford (John, “Classical Utilitarianism,” From Stephen Darwall’s “Consequentialism, Print)BC

We may note first that there is, indeed, a way of thinking of society which makes it easy to suppose that the most rational conception of justice is utilitarian. For consider: each man in realizing his own interests is certainly free to balance his own losses against his own gains. We may impose a sacrifice on ourselves now for the sake of a greater advantage later. A person quite properly acts, at least when others are not affected, to achieve his own greatest good, to advance his rational ends as far as possible. Now why should not a society act on precisely the same principle applied to the group and therefore regard that which is rational for one man as right for an association of men? Just as the well-being of a person is constructed from the series of satisfactions that are experienced at different moments in the course of his life, so in very much the same way the well-being of society is to be constructed from the fulfillment of the systems of desires of the many individuals who belong to it. Since the principle for an individual is to advance as far as possible his own welfare, his own system of desires, the principle for society is to advance as far as possible the welfare of the group, to realize to the greatest extent the comprehensive system of desire arrived at from the desires of its members. Just as an individual balances present and future gains against present and future losses, so a society may balance satisfactions and dissatisfactions between different individuals. And so by these reflections one reaches the principle of utility in a natural way: a society is properly arranged when its institutions maximize the net balance of satisfaction. The principle of choice for an association of men is interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for one man. Social justice is the principle of rational prudence applied to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the group (§30).<sup>2</sup>

### **Utilitarianism can be applied at the societal level**

**Rawls 71** – held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University and the Fulbright Fellowship at Christ Church, Oxford (John, “Classical Utilitarianism,” From Stephen Darwall’s “Consequentialism, Print)BC

The most natural way, then, of arriving at utilitarianism (although not of course, the only way of doing so) is to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man. Once this is recognized, the place of the impartial spectator and the emphasis on sympathy in the history of utilitarian thought is readily understood. For it is by the conception of the impartial spectator and the use of sympathetic identification in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is applied to society. It is this spectator who is conceived as carrying out the requires organization of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into one. Endowed with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own. In this way he ascertains the intensity of these desires and assigns them their appropriate weight in the one system of desire the satisfaction of which the ideal legislator then tries to maximize by adjusting the rules of the social system. On this conception of society separate individuals are thought of as so many different lines along which rights and duties are to be assigned and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in accordance with rules so as to give the greatest fulfillment of wants. The nature of the decision made by the ideal legislator is not, therefore, materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize his profit by producing this or that commodity, or that of a consumer deciding how to maximize his satisfaction by the purchase of this or that collection of goods. In each case there is a single person whose system of desires determines the best allocation of limited means. The correct decision is essentially a question of efficient administration. This view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator. Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.

## Util Bad

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**Utilitarian value judgements are not neutral –  
overwhelmingly used by the social elite and those with  
weak moral intuition.**

**Côté, Piff and Willer 13** [Stéphane, Paul and Robb, Joseph L.  
Rotman School of Management and Department of Psychology,  
University of Toronto, Department of Sociology, University of California,  
Berkeley, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley,  
“For Whom Do the Ends Justify the Means? Social Class and Utilitarian  
Moral Judgment”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol  
104(3), Mar, 2013. pp. 490-503.]

Utilitarian judgment maximizes the greatest good for the greatest number on the basis of “cost–benefit” analysis (Baron, 1993; Baron & Ritov, 2009; Bentham, 1948; Cushman & Greene, 2012). Examples of utilitarian judgments include decisions to donate resources to cure several sick children rather than a single sick child (Loewenstein & Small, 2007) and demote an employee whose performance is damaging to his or her team so that the team can attain better performance (Margolis & Molinsky, 2008). Utilitarian judgment often conflicts with deontological judgment, which gives priority to rights and duties (Kant, 1785/1959). Under a deontological approach, individuals make moral judgments on the basis of rules and what seems fair to the people involved, even when those judgments do not provide the greatest value for the most people.

Utilitarian judgment also differs in meaningful ways from prosocial behavior–actions that benefit others (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Although prosocial behavior and utilitarian judgment both relate to enhancing others' welfare, prosocial acts differ from utilitarian judgments in that the former does not necessarily provide the greatest good for the greatest number. For example, participation in intergroup conflict or acts of parochial altruism could be viewed as prosocial by fellow group members, but neither provides the greatest good for the largest number of people. Conversely, utilitarian acts do not necessarily benefit the target of the act. Incarcerating a criminal to prevent him or her from recidivating maximizes the greatest good by protecting society, but reduces the criminal's welfare. In support of the distinction between prosocial behavior and utilitarian judgment, past research finds that they have distinct correlates. For example, the personality trait of Machiavellianism is negatively associated with prosocial behavior (Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996) but positively associated with utilitarian judgment (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). These different associations likely owe to the fact that utilitarian judgment is more clearly based in calculation and consideration of different



outcomes. Consistent with this notion, past research finds that cognitive load interferes with the formation of utilitarian judgments (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008) but increases the likelihood of prosocial behavior (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012).

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Among the factors that influence the likelihood of forming utilitarian judgments is the presence of visceral moral intuitions—quick, automatic, evaluative feelings of what is right or wrong (Haidt, 2001; Zhong, 2011). In high-conflict moral dilemmas, in which individuals decide whether to cause harm to certain others to benefit the greater good (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007), contemplating the utilitarian option typically elicits strong, aversive moral intuitions. In neural imaging studies, regions of the brain involved in emotion (e.g., the ventral medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) became activated when individuals formed decisions in high-conflict moral dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene et al., 2004). This pattern of findings suggests that visceral moral intuitions may shape whether an individual will make a utilitarian judgment or not.

Along these lines, research finds that the more strongly individuals experience visceral moral intuitions in high-conflict moral dilemmas, the less likely they are to make utilitarian judgments (Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007). In one study, higher levels of distress led participants to donate more money to help a single identified sick child (the least utilitarian option) than a group of sick children (the most utilitarian option; Kogut & Ritov, 2005, Study 3). In another study, encouraging participants to adopt a feelings-based approach (by asking them to answer some unrelated questions on the basis of how they felt) decreased utilitarian decisions about who should receive monetary donations, compared with encouraging participants to adopt a calculative approach (by asking them to work carefully and deliberately to answer mathematical questions; Small et al., 2007, Study 4). In addition, manipulations that suppress or override moral intuitions, such as inductions of mirth (the emotion associated with humor; Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) and cognitive reappraisal (Feinberg, Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012) increased utilitarian judgments. Other studies found that patients with emotional deficits due to ventromedial prefrontal lesions (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Lavadas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) or frontotemporal dementia (Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) also favor utilitarian options. The findings suggest that factors that reduce the strength of moral intuitions, such as higher social class, as we argue below, should increase utilitarian judgment in high-conflict moral dilemmas.

By contrast, in low-conflict moral dilemmas—in which a person decides whether to cause harm to others to benefit the greater good, but the harm is less direct and often caused by deflecting an existing threat to a third party (Greene et al., 2004)—considering the utilitarian option typically elicits relatively weak moral intuitions. In past research, areas of the brain involved in emotion showed relatively weak activation when individuals formed decisions in low-conflict moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004, 2001). As a result, moral intuitions do not play a pivotal role in moral judgments in these types of dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007). Thus, factors that systematically influence the strength of moral intuitions should have weaker

influences on utilitarian judgment in low-conflict moral dilemmas that do not strongly engage such intuitions.

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**Utilitarian calculations are fundamentally immoral – murder, even to save a life, is an unethical and justifies mass violence.**

**Kramer 11** [Nicholas Kramer, former associate investigator for an oversight & investigations committee in the United States Senate, “Murdering Some to Save Others”, <http://original.antiwar.com/nkramer/2011/04/12/murdering-some-to-save-others/>, 4-12-11]

In my ongoing quest to understand how morality and justice apply in a complex society, I have recently been watching a series of lectures on these topics available online from Harvard University’s Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel begins the series by posing two scenarios to his audience of Harvard undergraduates. In the first, Sandel suggests that a surgeon has a choice between saving five moderately injured patients at the cost of not saving one severely wounded patient, or saving the one at the cost of the five. When asked which choice they would make, by a show of hands the students almost unanimously indicate their preference for saving the most people possible. In Sandel’s second scenario, the choice is the same, but the surgeon must actually kill the one patient in order to save the rest (in this case, to harvest the vital organs necessary to keep the others alive). This time, not a single student supports the principle of saving the many at the cost of the one. Sandel then asks members of his audience to explain the apparent inconsistency in their collective logic; although these future leaders of our political and economic systems seem to have a very difficult time articulating their rationales, the difference between the scenarios is obvious, and the implications should be heartening to us all.

Murdering some people to save others is fundamentally immoral. When this principle is put before us in a hypothetical example such as Professor Sandel’s, it is easy to understand, even instinctual. I believe that, with the possible exceptions of serial killers, psychopaths, narcissists, and other outliers, the vast majority of people left to their own devices would not follow the cold calculations of utilitarianism to the extreme of murdering another person even if that action would benefit many others. I will leave it to the philosophers to determine why this is so, but most of us know such murders to be wrong and would not participate in them.

If that is the case, what then explains the recent line of “moral” reasoning expressed by liberals and neoconservatives alike in favor of the

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“humanitarian” bombing of Libya? There are only two explanations I can imagine: either the interventionists are among the outliers mentioned above, or there is something about murder by the state that allows people to circumvent their own innate moral instincts. During a recent discussion I had with a favorite college professor, he wondered how different our moral view of war would be if we had not developed the technology and mindset that allows for mass murder from afar. For instance, he asked rhetorically, “Would we really have gone into Hiroshima with broadswords and hacked to death 100,000 people of all ages, sizes, and shapes?” Yet we dropped a single bomb on them, and those who lose sleep over that fact are considered so far out of the mainstream as to not be taken seriously.”

The simple and uncomfortable truth is that murder is murder, regardless of whether we do it with a 1,000-lb. explosive delivered via cruise missile or with a broadsword. As much as I would like to blame the pro-war liberals and neoconservatives for the horrors they support, the reality is that it is the state that allows and perpetuates the limitless destruction brought about by war in our name. The appeal of this destruction is so powerful that even people (such as Nicholas Kristof) who generally seem not to be mass murderers or overall “bad” folks can be seduced into blind support of absolutely immoral actions. If we accept that otherwise “good” people cannot be relied upon to maintain their moral principles when it comes to the actions of the state, the only way we can hope to inoculate ourselves against the temptations of state violence for “humanitarian” causes is to adopt a strictly non-interventionist foreign policy. I would not want to live in a society that condoned surgeons actively murdering some patients in order to save others; likewise, I despise and regret my implicit support for a government that murders Libyans to theoretically prevent the deaths of other Libyans. As heart-breaking as it is when people on the other side of the world kill each other, it is indeed better to save no one if that is the only way to avoid committing murder.

### **Utilitarianism can't coherently guide action – too many competing risks.**

**Read 9** [Rupert, Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia, “The difference principle is not action-guiding”, <http://www.rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/The%20difference%20principle%20is%20not%20action%20guiding.doc>]

There is a flaw in Utilitarianism that is one step beyond the problem mentioned above. It is a deeper, more ‘constitutive’ version of the ‘no stable rules’ problem. It is one of the most widely-touted serious flaws in Utilitarianism (at least, in Act Utilitarianism) that it is ultimately not merely liable to defy our moral intuitions and produce social uncertainty, but is not action-guiding at all. Any course of action can be justified, given uncertainties about others’ reactions,

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other's expectations, and so forth, with a good enough story to tell, and a long enough view of the consequences. Utilitarianism, in other words, never rules out any choice since it makes permissibility always depend on consequences in a manner that is in-terminable. When agents are act-utilitarians, they need to undertake an endlessly iterable process of trying to determine how they will react to one another's actions.

This is a particular, very damaging version of the 'calculation problem' in Utilitarianism. How can we really calculate utility, when it depends upon the consequences of our actions, and these depend upon other people's reactions to those? Gigantic, impenetrable co-ordination problems result.

### **Util is void of empathy**

**Côté, Piff and Willer 13** [Stéphane, Paul and Robb, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management and Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, "For Whom Do the Ends Justify the Means? Social Class and Utilitarian Moral Judgment", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 104(3), Mar, 2013. pp. 490-503.]

Past theory and research on the psychological manifestations of social class suggest that higher-class standing could reduce visceral moral intuitions and, in turn, increase utilitarian judgment in high-conflict moral dilemmas. Psychologists view social class as a relatively stable individual-level characteristic that is rooted in objective, socially valued resources (e.g., income, education, and occupational prestige) and corresponding subjective perceptions of rank vis-à-vis others (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012; Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Differences between lower- and upper-class individuals in the environments that they inhabit and in the resources that they possess lead them to develop unique mindsets and to perceive, interpret, and react to various situations differently (Côté, 2011; Kraus et al., 2012). Past theory and evidence suggest that lower-class individuals exhibit different patterns of emotional reactivity than their upper-class counterparts. In particular, lower-class individuals are exposed to more of the sort of threats to health and well-being that are common in resource-poor environments (e.g., poorly funded schools, a higher incidence of crime), threats that upper-class individuals are typically more insulated from (Chen & Matthews, 2001; Kraus et al., 2012; Stellar et al., 2012). Furthermore, lower-class individuals possess fewer resources (e.g., money, insurance) to cope with these threats. Given their more

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threatening environments and relative lack of material resources, lower-class individuals engage in a variety of adaptive social-cognitive processes. One such process is heightened vigilance, which can cause lower-class individuals to have stronger negative emotional reactions to stressors than their upper-class counterparts. In past studies, lower-class respondents reacted more strongly to stressors such as threatening and ambiguous written social scenarios (Chen & Matthews, 2001) and undesirable life events and health problems (Kessler & Cleary, 1980), compared with upper-class respondents. Lower-class individuals also respond adaptively to threats in their environments by building supportive, interdependent networks that they can draw on to confront threats when they arise (Stellar et al., 2012). In support of this reasoning, in one investigation, lower-class individuals described a larger proportion of their relationships as close and performed better on a Stroop test of sensitivity to socioemotional cues than upper-class individuals (Na et al., 2010). In another investigation, lower-class students endorsed more interdependent motives (e.g., helping their families, giving back to their communities) for attending university than upper-class students (Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012). Sociological research has found spontaneous resource sharing among the urban poor as a collectivistic strategy to manage unemployment (e.g., Uehara, 1990). To facilitate the development of supportive, interdependent bonds, lower-class individuals exhibit stronger empathic responses to others in the social environment. By contrast, greater independence and reduced reliance on others lead upper-class individuals to feel relatively lower levels of empathy, defined as “a set of congruent vicarious emotions... that are more other-focused than self-focused, including feelings of sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like” (Batson, 1991, p. 86). In one investigation, lower-class individuals reported feeling more compassion and exhibited stronger physiological signs of compassion after watching a video of a child suffering from cancer, relative to upper-class participants (Stellar et al., 2012). In another study, upper-class participants were less likely to help a stranger in need relative to lower-class participants, and this tendency was driven by lower levels of compassion (Piff et al., 2010, Study 4). In sum, past theory and evidence suggest that upper-class individuals feel less empathy for others than their lower-class counterparts and also that empathy reduces utilitarian judgment. Thus, we hypothesize that upper-class individuals should be more likely to choose utilitarian options that maximize the greatest good for the greatest number in high-conflict moral dilemmas that pit moral intuitions against consequentialist calculations, relative to lower-class individuals. We further hypothesize that this association is driven, in part, by reduced empathy for those harmed by utilitarian judgments.

**Utilitarianism is trapped in self-referential ethics – justifies apartheid.**

**Velasquez et al 12** [Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre Thomas Shanks Michael J. Meyer, Charles J. Dirksen Professor of Management at Santa

Clara University , Applied Ethics Associate Director at Santa Clara University , Senior Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences at Santa Clara University , Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara University ,  
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<http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/calculating.html>, 2012]

While utilitarianism is currently a very popular ethical theory, there are some difficulties in relying on it as a sole method for moral decision-making.  
First, the utilitarian calculation requires that we assign values to the benefits and harms resulting from our actions and compare them with the benefits and harms that might result from other actions. But it's often difficult, if not impossible, to measure and compare the values of certain benefits and costs. How do we go about assigning a value to life or to art? And how do we go about comparing the value of money with, for example, the value of life, the value of time, or the value of human dignity? Moreover, can we ever be really certain about all of the consequences of our actions? Our ability to measure and to predict the benefits and harms resulting from a course of action or a moral rule is dubious, to say the least. Perhaps the greatest difficulty with utilitarianism is that it fails to take into account considerations of justice. We can imagine instances where a certain course of action would produce great benefits for society, but they would be clearly unjust. During the apartheid regime in South Africa in the last century, South African whites, for example, sometimes claimed that all South Africans—including blacks—were better off under white rule. These whites claimed that in those African nations that have traded a whites-only government for a black or mixed one, social conditions have rapidly deteriorated. Civil wars, economic decline, famine, and unrest, they predicted, will be the result of allowing the black majority of South Africa to run the government. If such a prediction were true—and the end of apartheid has shown that the prediction was false—then the white government of South Africa would have been morally justified by utilitarianism, in spite of its injustice. If our moral decisions are to take into account considerations of justice, then apparently utilitarianism cannot be the sole principle guiding our decisions. It can, however, play a role in these decisions. The principle of utilitarianism invites us to consider the immediate and the less immediate consequences of our actions. Given its insistence on summing the benefits and harms of all people, utilitarianism asks us to look beyond self-interest to consider impartially the interests of all persons affected by our actions. As John Stuart Mill once wrote: The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not...(one's) own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In an era today that some have characterized as "the age of self-interest," utilitarianism is a powerful reminder that morality calls us to look beyond the self to the good of all.

H

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## **Utilitarianism is an incoherent political strategy**

**Davidson 15** (Marc D. Davidson, researcher and lecturer, University of Amsterdam environmental ethics and economics “Climate change and the ethics of discounting” WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:401–412. doi: 10.1002/wcc.347 .nt)

A common criticism of **the utilitarian approach** is that it **would be overdemanding to treat other people’s happiness as being fully on par with one’s own and would alienate people from their personal projects and commitments** (see e.g., Ref 50; Ref 69, p. 277; Ref 70; see Ref 71 for a defense of the demands of utilitarianism). **If applied across the board in intergenerational policy making**, i.e., beyond climate policy as well, **it would require governments to tax away present consumption to the benefit of future consumption**; see e.g., Refs 7, 41, 72–75; Ref 26, p. 155; Ref 76, p. 47. If applied across the board in intra-generational policy, **utilitarianism would require a massive redistribution from the currently rich to the currently poor**. However, **if the utilitarian approach is restricted to climate policy, it may be queried whether such an approach is coherent** (see e.g., Ref 9, p. 230). The objection is not that utilitarianism does not correspond to revealed public preferences, an objection refuted in the section on the prescriptive-descriptive debate, but that **it is incoherent if the same government advocates fundamentally different moral principles in different policy areas**.

## **Utilitarianism can’t be applied to private conduct**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

'The strength of utilitarianism, the problem to which it is a truly compelling solution, is as a guide to public rather than private conduct. There, virtually all its vices - all the things that make us wince in recommending it as a code of personal morality - loom instead as considerable virtues. Consider first the raft of criticisms couched in terms of the impersonality of utilitarianism. Like all universalist

philosophies, utilitarianism asks us to take "the view from nowhere."<sup>1</sup>  
There is **no** obvious **place** within utilitarian theories **for people's**  
**idiosyncratic perspectives, histories, attachments, loyalties or**  
Consequentialism 13 **personal commitments.** That rings untrue to certain essential qualities  
of personal life. The essence of the communitarian challenge is that  
everyone comes from somewhere. There are no free-floating  
individuals, of the sort with which liberals generally, and utilitarians  
paradigmatically, populate their moral theories.<sup>2</sup> People have, and  
upon reflection we think they should have, principled commitments  
and personal attachments of various sorts.<sup>21</sup>



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# Deontology

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## Death (Deontology Good)

Consequentialism<sup>49</sup> **The source of value comes from the way we spend our lives rather than their continuation – utilitarian focus on death impact obscures the ability to construct meaningful existences through an irrational fear of death.**

--- Death can only be evil if it deprives us of the good things about life

--- Utilitarian calculations that require a sacrifice about the positive things about life therefore are counterintuitive

**Nagel 12** [Thomas, University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, “Mortal Questions”, Cambridge University Press, Mar 26, 2012, Pg.1-3]

If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question arises whether it is a bad thing to die.

There is conspicuous disagreement about the matter: some people think death is dreadful; others have no objection to death per se, though they hope their own will be neither premature nor painful. Those in the former category tend to think those in the latter are blind [not privy] to the obvious, while the latter suppose the former to be prey to some sort of confusion. On the one hand it can be said that life is all we have and the loss of it is the greatest loss we can sustain. On the other hand it may be objected that death deprives this supposed loss of its subject, and that if we realize that death is not an unimaginable condition of the persisting person, but a mere blank, we will see that it can have no value whatever, positive or negative.

Since I want to leave aside the question whether we are, or might be, immortal in some form, I shall simply use the word ‘death’ and its cognates in this discussion to mean permanent death, unsupplemented by any form of conscious survival. I want to ask whether death is in itself an evil; and how great an evil, and of what kind, it might be. The question should be of interest even to those who believe in some form of immortality, for one’s attitude toward immortality must depend in part on one’s attitude toward death.

If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positive features, but only because of what it deprives us of. I shall try to deal with the difficulties surrounding the natural view that death is an evil because it brings to an end all the goods that life contains. We need no: give an account of these goods here, except to observe that some of them, like perception, desire, activity, and thought, are so general as to be constitutive of human life. They are widely regarded as formidable benefits in themselves, despite the fact that they are conditions of misery as well as of happiness, and that a sufficient quantity of more

particular evils can perhaps outweigh them. That is what is meant, I think, by the allegation that it is good simply to be alive, even if one is undergoing terrible experiences. The situation is roughly this: There are elements which, if added to one's experience, make life better; there are other elements which, if added to one's experience, make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its contents.

I shall not discuss the value that one person's life or death may have for others, or its objective value, but only the value it has for the person who is its subject. That seems to me the primary case, and the case which presents the greatest difficulties. Let me add only two observations. First, the value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening. And second, like most goods, this can be multiplied by time: more is better than less. The added quantities need not be temporally continuous (though continuity has its social advantages). People are attracted to the possibility of long-term suspended animation or freezing, followed by the resumption of conscious life, because they can regard it from within simply as continuation of their present life. If these techniques are ever perfected, what from outside appeared as a dormant interval of three hundred years could be experienced by the subject as nothing more than a sharp discontinuity in the character of his experiences. I do not deny, of course, that this has its own disadvantages. Family and friends may have died in the meantime; the language may have changed; the comforts of social, geographical, and cultural familiarity would be lacking. Nevertheless these inconveniences would not obliterate the basic advantage of continued, though discontinuous, existence.

If we turn from what is good about life to what is bad about death, the case is completely different. Essentially, though there may be problems about their specification, what we find desirable in life are certain states, conditions, or types of activity. It is being alive, doing certain things, having certain experiences that we consider good. But if death is an evil, it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or nonexistent, or unconscious, that is objectionable. This asymmetry is important. If it is good to be alive, that advantage can be attributed to a person at each point of his life. It is a good of which Bach had more than Schubert, simply because he lived longer. Death, however, is not an evil of which Shakespeare has so far received a larger portion than Proust. If death is a disadvantage, it is not easy to say when a man suffers it.

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**Non-existence is nothing to fear – adversity to death stems from an irrational line of thought that conflates assumptions about good and evil.**

**Nagel 12** [Thomas, University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, "Mortal Questions", Cambridge University Press, Mar 26, 2012, Pg. 3-4]

There are two other indications that we do not object to death merely because it involves long periods of nonexistence. First, as has been mentioned, most of us would not regard the temporary suspension of life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a misfortune. If it ever happens that people can be frozen without reduction of the conscious lifespan, it will be inappropriate to pity those who are temporarily out of circulation. Second, none of us existed before we were born (or conceived), but few regard that as a misfortune. I shall have more to say about this later.

The point that death is not regarded as an unfortunate state enables us to refute a curious but very common suggestion about the origin of the fear of death. It is often said that those who object to death have made the mistake of trying to imagine what it is like to be dead. It is alleged that the failure to realize that this task is logically impossible (for the banal reason that there is nothing to imagine) leads to the conviction that death is a mysterious and therefore terrifying prospective state. But this diagnosis is evidently false, for it is just as impossible to imagine being totally unconscious as to imagine being dead (though it is easy enough to imagine oneself, from the outside, in either of those conditions). Yet people who are averse to death are not usually averse to unconsciousness (so long as it does not entail a substantial cut in the total duration of waking life).

If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad, it must be on the ground that life is a good and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss', bad not because of any positive features but because of the desirability of what it removes. We must now turn to the serious difficulties which this hypothesis raises, difficulties about loss and privation in general, and about death in particular.

Essentially, there are three types of problem. First, doubt may be raised whether anything can be bad for a man without being positively unpleasant to him: specifically, it may be doubted that there are any evils which consist merely in the deprivation or absence of possible goods, and which do not depend on someone's minding that deprivation. Second,

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there are special difficulties, in the case of death, about how the supposed misfortune is to be assigned to a subject at all. There is doubt both as to who its subject is, and as to when he undergoes it. So long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists; so there seems to be no time when death, if it is a misfortune, can be ascribed to its unfortunate subject. The third type of difficulty concerns the asymmetry, mentioned above, between our attitudes to posthumous and prenatal nonexistence. How can the former be bad if the latter is not?

It should be recognized that if these are valid objections to counting death as an evil, they will apply to many other supposed evils as well. The first type of objection is expressed in general form by the common remark that what you don't know can't hurt you. It means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends, ridiculed behind his back, and despised by people who treat him politely to his face, none of it can be counted as a misfortune for him so long as he does not suffer as a result. It means that a man is not injured if his wishes are ignored by the executor of his will, or if, after his death, the belief becomes current that all the literary works on which his fame rests were really written by his brother, who died in Mexico at the age of 28. It seems to me worth asking what assumptions about good and evil lead to these drastic restrictions.

## Deontology First

**Equality is a side constraint – regardless of consequences – we cannot take any action that is unjust**

**Rawls 1971** (John, philosopher, A Theory of Justice, p. 3-4)

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by the many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising.

**Even if consequentialism is generally good, we must have moral side constraints – some immoral actions must never be allowed no matter what the consequences are**

**Nagel 1979** (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 58-59)

Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that something has gone seriously wrong when certain measures are admitted into consideration in the first place. The fundamental mistake is made there, rather than at the point where the overall benefit of some monstrous measure is judged to outweigh its disadvantages, and it is adopted. An account of absolutism might help us to understand this. If it is not allowable to do certain things, such as killing unarmed prisoners or civilians, then no argument about what will happen if one does not do them can show that doing them would be all right. Absolutism does not, of course, require one to ignore the consequences of one's acts. It operates as a limitation on utilitarian reasoning, not as a substitute for it. An absolutist can be expected to try to maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not require him to transgress an absolute prohibition like that against murder. But when such a conflict occurs, the prohibition takes complete precedence over any consideration of consequences. Some of the results of this view are clear enough. It

requires us to forgo certain potentially useful military measures, such as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to reduce the enemy population by starvation, epidemic infectious diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means that we cannot deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the fact that they will avert still greater evils, for as intentional measures they cannot be justified in terms of any consequences whatever. Someone unfamiliar with the events of this century might imagine that utilitarian arguments, or arguments of national interest, would suffice to deter measures of this sort. But it has become evident that such considerations are insufficient to prevent the adoption and employment of enormous antipopulation weapons once their use is considered a serious moral possibility. The same is true of the piecemeal wiping out of rural civilian populations in airborne antiguerrilla warfare. Once the door is opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations about the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies.

### **Utilitarianism may be generally correct, but moral side constraints are critical for the theory to work – the alternative is large-scale murder**

**Nagel 1979** (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 56)

In the final analysis, I believe that the dilemma cannot always be resolved. While not every conflict between absolutism and utilitarianism creates an insoluble dilemma, and while it seems to me certainly right to adhere to absolutist restrictions unless the utilitarian considerations favoring violation are overpoweringly weighty and extremely certain – nevertheless, when that special condition is met, it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist position. What I shall offer, therefore, is a somewhat qualified defense of absolutism. I believe it underlies a valid and fundamental type of moral judgment – which cannot be reduced to or overridden by other principles just as fundamental, it is particularly important not to lose confidence in our absolutist intuitions, for they are often the only barrier before the abyss of utilitarian apologetics for large-scale murder.

### **The threat of extinction cannot outweigh morality – survival**

**Callahan 1973** (Daniel, institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3)



The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in *Korematsu v. United States* (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in *Chance and Necessity*, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human

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achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

## Deontology First – Hunger

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**Children suffering from hunger are innocent – we have an obligation to help**

**LaFollette and May 1996** ("Suffer the Little Children"; Hugh LaFollette and Larry May, Cole Chair in Ethics at University of South Florida St. Petersburg and Professor of Philosophy at Washington University at St. Louis ; "World Hunger and Morality" ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1996; Accessed: June 23, 2009; z.w. <http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/suffer.htm>)

Children are the real victims of world hunger: at least 70% of the malnourished people of the world are children. By best estimates forty thousand children a day die of starvation (FAO 1989: 5). Children do not have the ability to forage for themselves, and their nutritional needs are exceptionally high. Hence, they are unable to survive for long on their own, especially in lean times. Moreover, they are especially susceptible to diseases and conditions which are the staple of undernourished people: simple infections and simple diarrhea (UNICEF 1993: 22). Unless others provide adequate food, water, and care, children will suffer and die (WHO 1974: 677, 679). This fact must frame any moral discussions of the problem. And so it does -- at least pre-philosophically. When most of us first see pictures of seriously undernourished children, we want to help them, we have a sense of responsibility to them, we feel sympathy toward them (Hume 1978: 368-71). Even those who think we needn't or shouldn't help the starving take this initial response seriously: they go to great pains to show that this sympathetic response should be constrained. They typically claim that assisting the hungry will demand too much of us, or that assistance would be useless and probably detrimental. The efforts of objectors to undermine this natural sympathetic reaction would be pointless unless they saw its psychological force. We want to explain and bolster this sympathetic reaction - - this conviction that those of us in a position to help are responsible to the malnourished and starving children of the world. We contend that we have this responsibility to starving children unless there are compelling reasons which show that this sympathetic reaction is morally inappropriate (Ibid.: 582). This requires, among other things, that we seek some "steady and general point of view" from which to rebut standard attempts to explain away this instinctive sympathetic response. By showing that assistance is neither too demanding nor futile, we think more people will be more inclined to act upon that pre-philosophical sense of responsibility. And, by philosophically championing that sense of responsibility, we will make most people feel more justified in so acting. Our initial sense of responsibility to the starving and malnourished children of the world is intricately tied to their being paradigmatically vulnerable and innocent. They are paradigmatically vulnerable because they do not have the wherewithal to care for themselves; they must rely on others to care for them. All children are directly dependent on their parents or guardians, while children whose parents cannot provide them food -- either because of

famine or economic arrangements -- are also indirectly dependent on others: relief agencies or (their own or foreign) governments. Children are paradigmatically innocent since they are neither causally nor morally responsible for their plight. They did not cause drought, parched land, soil erosion, and over-population; nor are they responsible for social, political, and economic arrangements which make it more difficult for their parents to obtain food. If anyone were ever an innocent victim, the children who suffer and die from hunger are. Infants are especially vulnerable. They temporarily lack the capacities which would empower them to acquire the necessities of life. Thus, they are completely dependent on others for sustenance. This partly explains our urge to help infants in need. James Q. Wilson claims that our instinctive reaction to the cry of a newborn child is demonstrated quite early in life. As early as ten months of age, toddlers react visibly to signs of distress in others, often becoming agitated; when they are one and a half years old they seek to do something to alleviate the other's distress; by the time they are two years old they verbally sympathize ... and look for help (Wilson 1993: 139-40). Although this response may be partly explained by early training, available evidence suggests that humans have an "innate sensitivity to the feelings of others" (Wilson 1993: 140). Indeed, Hans Jonas claims the parent-child relationship is the "archetype of responsibility," where the cry of the newborn baby is an ontic imperative "in which the plain factual 'is' evidently coincides with an 'ought'" (1983: 30). This urge to respond to the infant in need is, we think, the appropriate starting point for discussion. But we should also explain how this natural response generates or is somehow connected to moral responsibility.

**We must refuse to sacrifice one group to prevent a bad consequence – intervening actors mean that our responsibility does not extend to the effects of the plan – only the moral act of feeding hungry people**

**Gewirth 1983** (Alan, philosopher, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, p 230-231)

A third distinction is between respecting other persons and avoiding bad consequences. Respect for persons is an obligation so fundamental that it cannot be overridden even to prevent evil consequences from befalling some persons. If such prevention requires an action whereby respect is withheld from persons, then that action must not be performed, whatever the consequences. One of the difficulties with this important distinction is that it is unclear. May not respect be withheld from a person by failing to avert from him some evil consequence? How can Abrams be held to respect the thousands of innocent persons or their rights if he lets them die when he could have prevented this? The distinction also fails to provide for degrees of moral urgency. One fails to respect a person if one lies to him or steals from him; but sometimes

the only way to prevent the death of one innocent person may be by stealing from or telling a lie to some other innocent person. In such a case, respect for one person may lead to disrespect of a more serious kind from some other innocent person. 7. None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose of defending the absolutist against the consequentialist. They do not show that the son's refusal to torture his mother to death does not violate the other persons' rights to life and that he is not morally responsible for their deaths. Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does serve to establish these conclusions. The required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action. According to this principle, when there is a causal connection between some person A's performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person C's incurring a certain harm Z, A's moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who produces Z through recklessness. The reasons for this removal is that B's intervening action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike A's action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was King's opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks.

**The argument that survival outweighs sharing food relies on a misunderstanding of moral agency – this view justifies infinite atrocities – because no such agent as “The Human Species” exists, then we are responsible only to individuals who are starving**

**Watson 77** (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, p. 121-123)

Given that the human species has rights as a fictional person on the analogy of corporate rights, it would seem to be rational to place the right of survival of the species above that of individuals. Unless the species survives, no individual will survive, and thus an individual's right to life is subordinate to the species' right to survival. If species

survival depends on the unequal distribution of food to maintain a healthy breeding stock, then it is morally right for some people to have plenty while others starve. Only if there is enough food to nourish everyone well does it follow that food should be shared equally. This might be true if corporate entities actually do have moral status and moral rights. But

Consequentially, the legal status of corporate entities as fictional persons does not make them moral equals or superiors of actual human persons. Legislators might profess astonishment that anyone would think that a corporate person is a *person* as people are, let alone a moral person. However, because the legal rights of corporate entities are based on individual rights, and because corporate entities are treated so much like persons, the transition is often made. Few theorists today would argue that the state of the human species is a personal agent. But all this means is that idealism is dead in theory. Unfortunately, its influence lives, so it is worth giving an argument to show that corporate entities are not real persons. Corporate entities are not persons as you and I are in the explicit sense that we are self-conscious agents and they are not. Corporate entities are not agents at all, let alone moral agents. This is a good reason for not treating corporate entities even as fictional persons. The distinction between people and other things, to generalize, is that people are self-conscious agents, whereas things are not. The possession of rights essentially depends on an entity's being self-conscious, i.e., on its actually being a person. If it is self-conscious, then it has a right to life. Self-consciousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an entity's being a moral equal of human beings; moral equality depends on the entity's also being a responsible moral agent as most human beings are. A moral agent must have the capacity to be responsible, i.e., the capacity to choose and to act freely with respect to consequences that the agent does or can recognize and accept as its own choice and doing. Only a being who knows himself as a person, and who can effect choices and accept consequences, is a responsible moral agent. On these grounds, moral equality rests on the actuality of moral agency based on reciprocal rights and responsibilities. One is responsible to something only if it can be responsible in return. Thus, we have responsibilities to other people, and they have reciprocal rights. If we care for things, it is because people have interests in them, not because things in themselves impose responsibilities on us. That is, as stated early in this essay, morality essentially has to do with relations among people, among persons. It is nonsense to talk of things that cannot be moral agents as having responsibilities; consequently, it is nonsense to talk of whatever is not actually a person as having rights. It is deceptive even to talk of legal rights of a corporate entity. Those rights (and reciprocal responsibilities) actually pertain to individual human beings who have an interest in the corporate entity. The State or the human species have no rights at all, let alone rights superior to those of individuals. The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However, although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that people's interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race. Is there no way to produce enough food to nourish everyone well? Besides cutting down to the minimum, people in the West might quit feeding such nonhuman animals as cats and dogs. However, some people (e.g., Peter Singer) argue that mere sentience—the capacity to suffer pain—means that an animal is the moral equal of human beings. I argue that because nonhuman animals are not moral agents, they do not share the rights of self-conscious responsible persons. And considering the profligacy of nature, it is rational to argue that if nonhuman animals have any rights at all, they include not the right to life, but merely the right to fight for life. In fact, if people in the West did not feed grain to cattle, sheep, and hogs, a considerable amount of food would be freed for human consumption. Even then, there might not be enough to nourish everyone. Let me remark that Stone and Singer attempt to break down the distinction between people on the one hand, and certain things (corporate entities) and nonhuman animals on the other, out of moral concern. However, there is another, profoundly antihumanitarian movement also attempting to break down the distinction. All over the world, heirs of Gobineau, Goebbels, and Hitler practice genocide and otherwise treat people as non-human animals and things in the name of the State. I am afraid that the

consequences of treating entities such as corporations and nonhuman animals—that are not moral agents—as persons with rights will not be that we will treat national parks and chickens the way we treat people, but that we will have provided support for those who would treat people the way we now treat nonhuman animals and things. The benefits of modern society depend in no small part on the institution of corporate law. Even if the majority of these benefits are to the good—of which I am by no means sure—the legal fiction of corporate personhood still elevates corporate needs above the needs of people. In the present context, reverence for corporate entities leads to the spurious argument that the present world imbalance of food and resources is morally justified in the name of the higher rights of sovereign nations, or even of the human species, the survival of which is said to be more important than the right of any individual to life. This conclusion is morally absurd. This is not, however, the fault of morality. We *should* share all food equally, at least until everyone is well-nourished. Besides food, *all* the necessities of life should be shared, at least until everyone is adequately supplied with a humane minimum. The hard conclusion remains that we should share all food equally even if this means that everyone starves and the human species becomes extinct. But, of course, the human race would survive even equal sharing, for after enough people died, the remained could be well-nourished on the food that remained. But this grisly prospect does not show that anything is wrong with the principle of equity. Instead, it shows that something is profoundly wrong with the social institutions in which sharing the necessities of life equally is “impractical” and “irrational.”

### **Giving food is a moral responsibility – we are obligated to ensure access to food even in the face of human extinction**

**Watson 77** (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)

These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human *equity per se*. Consequently, the moral action is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—supersede those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice one’s life or one’s nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save one’s life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one’s life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside many questions of

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detail—such as the mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does not alter the stark conclusion. If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one's life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even if the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation—for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an individual standpoint, the human species—like the nation—is of no moral relevance. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior.



## Deontology Bad

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**Deontologists have a misunderstanding of intrinsic properties – this undermines deontological theory**

**Spielthener 5** – University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies (Georg, “Consequentialism or Deontology?” *Philosophia*, December 2005, Vol. 33, Issue 1-4, p.217-235, Springer)BC

For the reasons given above, deontological theories seem to me preferable to narrow consequentialist views. The problem, however, is that their proponents do not clarify what properties make actions right or wrong. Deontologists tend to claim that these properties are not only the causal consequences of actions but also (or only) their intrinsic properties. This, however, raises two problems. First, the notion of intrinsic properties is quite unclear. I think it is fair to say that when deontologists hold that the right-making property can be intrinsic, they mean that the action has this property by virtue of itself, depending on no other thing. But this is not much more than a platitude. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, even though it is popular in ethics, becomes quite unclear when we look more closely at it. For example, deontologists hardly ever make the distinction between whether a property is intrinsic or whether an action that has a property has it intrinsically, which are different issues. A thing can have an extrinsic property intrinsically. Some deontologists seem to have used 'intrinsic' to mean 'essential' which is a misuse of the term; others tend to use 'intrinsic' as the opposite of 'relational', which is also incorrect. Properties can be both, relational and intrinsic. The second problem is that even if we concede that deontologists can sufficiently clarify the notion of an intrinsic property, what they claim to be intrinsic properties, are often clearly extrinsic qualities. W. Frankena (1973), for instance, holds that the fact that I keep a promise or that an action is commanded by God are intrinsic properties. But on any reasonable account of 'intrinsic', they are not. In what follows, I will attempt to show that deontologists do not need the elusive notion of intrinsic properties by arguing that what they mean by this concept are implications of actions.

## **Paradoxes undermine deontology – consequences will inevitably be considered**

Consequentialism **Brook 7** – Emeritus Professor Department of Philosophy at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania (Richard, “Deontology, Paradox, and Moral Evil,” *Social Theory and Practice*, Vol. 33, No. 3, July 2007, p.431-440, JSTOR)BC

Although this paper isn't a defense of deontology, I have argued the following: If deontology contains a special paradox, one distinct from prohibiting some optimific actions, then preventing moral evil would be a proper goal of action in addition to preventing harm. That may well be true, and if so, would be an important result. In fact, such a result would undermine deontology itself, since general commitments to constraints would entail permission to violate them simply to minimize the number of identical violations. However, if, to get a total measure of an act's badness, we must sum the moral evil and harm of constraint violations, then there should be some account of how to do that. Why again shouldn't the badness of one murder equal the badness of ten or fifteen accidental deaths? Why not save one triplet from murder rather than her two sisters threatened by an avalanche? We wish to know, even roughly, how much moral evil trumps prospective harm in rescue decisions.<sup>24</sup>

## **The deontological focus on motivation undermines deontology**

**Goodin 95** – professor of government at the University of Essex, and professor of philosophy and social and political theory at Australian National University (Robert E., “Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy,” Cambridge University Press, Print)BC

Chapter 3 Do motives matter?

Utilitarian schemes for state intervention to promote the common good are opposed not only by libertarians opposed to state intervention as a matter of principle but also by deontologists opposed to the utilitarian fixation with good outcomes. What matters much more to them are individuals' motives and intentions. It is not enough, for them,

that the right thing be done. They also insist that it be done, and be seen to be done, for the right reasons.

Consequentialists for example, deontological moralists and social critics under their sway are anxious to know whether we are sending food to starving Africans out of genuinely altruistic concern or merely to clear domestic commodity markets, for one particularly topical example. Or, for another example, critics of the Brandt Commission's plea for increased foreign aid more generally say, in stinging rebuke: "Many of those who support the proposal. ...do so out of genuine humanitarian concern about... poverty. But it is doubtful whether this is the main concern of its authors, and it certainly is not their only concern.

They are, instead, primarily concerned with the preservation of the existing world economic order."<sup>2</sup>

What is common to all such cases is an attempt at motive differentiation. Any particular piece of behavior might have sprung from any of a number of different underlying motives; commentators (moralists, social critics) want to know which was the real motive. Here I shall show that this characteristic quest for motive differentiation is misguided. In most of the standard social situations, it makes no material difference to agents' actions whether they act from one sort of motive or another. And in such circumstances, pressing the motivational issue will usually lead only to mischief, of both a pragmatic and a moral sort.

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# Risk Calculus

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# Body Counts

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## Body Counts Good

### **Our body counts are good—the alternative is a dehumanized world of endless bloodshed without responsibility to the dead or the living**

**CHERNUS 2003** (Ira, Prof of Religious Studies at UC Boulder, "Bring Back the Body Count," April 1, <http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0401-12.htm>)

"We don't do body counts," says America's soldier-in-chief, Tommy Franks. That's a damn shame. During the Vietnam war, the body count was served up every day on the evening news. While Americans ate dinner, they watched a graphic visual scorecard: how many Americans had died that day, how many South Vietnamese, and how many Communists. At the time, it seemed the height of dehumanized violence. Compared to Tommy Franks' new way of war, though, the old way looks very humane indeed. True, the body count turned human beings into abstract numbers. But it required soldiers to say to the world, "Look everyone. I killed human beings today. This is exactly how many I killed. I am obliged to count each and every one." It demanded that the killers look at what they had done, think about it (however briefly), and acknowledge their deed. It was a way of taking responsibility. Today's killers avoid that responsibility. They perpetuate the fiction so many Americans want to believe—that no real people die in war, that it's just an exciting video game. It's not merely the dead who disappear; it's the act of killing itself. When the victim's family holds up a picture, U.S. soldiers or journalists can simply reply "Who's that? We have no record of such a person. In fact, we have no records at all. We kill and move on. No time to keep records. No inclination. No reason." This is not just a matter of new technology. There was plenty of long-distance impersonal killing in Vietnam too. But back then, the U.S. military at least went through the motions of going in to see what they had done. True, the investigations were often cursory and the numbers often fictional. No matter how inaccurate the numbers were, though, the message to the public every day was that each body should be counted. At some level, at least, each individual life seemed to matter. The difference between Vietnam and Iraq lies partly in overall strategy. In Vietnam, there was no territory to be conquered and occupied. If U.S. forces seized an area, they knew that sooner or later the Viet Cong would take it back. The only way to measure "victory" was by killing more of them than they killed of us. In Iraq, the goal is control of place. U.S. forces can "take" Basra or Nassiriya and call it a victory, without ever thinking about how many Iraqis had to be killed in the process. So the body count matters less. However, the end of body counts can not be explained simply by the difference in strategy. The old-fashioned body counts disappeared during the first war against Iraq, when the goal was still defined by territory: pushing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. So it's much more likely that "we don't do body counts" because Vietnam proved how embarrassing they could be. As the U.S. public turned against that war, the body count became a symbol of everything that was inhumane and irrational about that war. The Pentagon fears that the same might happen if the Iraq war bogs down. How much simpler to deny the inhumanity and irrationality of war by denying the obvious fact of slaughter. What I fear is a world where thousands can be killed and no one is responsible, where deaths are erased from history as soon as they happen. The body count was more than an act of responsibility. It was a permanent record. It made each death a historical fact. You can go back and graph those Vietnam deaths from day to day, month to month, year to year. That turns the victims into nameless, faceless abstractions. But it least it confirms for ever and ever that they lived and died, because someone took the time to kill and count them. In Iraq, it is as if the killing never happened. When a human being's death is erased from history, so is their life. Life and death together vanish without a trace. The body count has one other virtue. It is enemy soldiers, not civilians, who are officially counted. Antiwar activists rightly warn about civilian slaughter and watch the toll rise at [www.iraqbodycount.org](http://www.iraqbodycount.org). It is easy to forget that the vast majority of Iraqi dead and wounded will be soldiers. Most of them were pressed into service, either by brute force or economic necessity. As the whole world has been telling us for months, there is no good reason for this war, no good reason for those hapless Iraqi foot-soldiers to die. They are victims of brutality-inflicted by their own government and by ours—just as much as the civilians. They deserve just as much to be counted So let us bring back the body count. If we must kill, let us kill as one human being to another, recognizing the full humanity of our victims. Without a body count, our nation becomes more of a robotic killing machine. As we dehumanize Iraqis, we slip even further into our own dehumanization. Let us bring back the body count. if only to recover our own sense of responsibility to the world's people, to history, to our own humanity.

## Body Counts Bad

**Death counts are bad—they obscure moral calculus and render life meaningless—they are also inaccurate**

**HOLT 2006** (Jim, frequent NYT contributor, "Math Murders," New York Times, March 12)

Counting the dead is a paradoxical business. Suppose I told you that around 150 million people have died over the last century in wars, genocides, man-made famines and other atrocities. This number might evoke in you a certain horror. But it is, of course, only a wild guess. Its very vagueness lends consequentialism. Yet what purpose would be served by making it more precise? Where mass death is concerned, the moral significance of scale seems to be one of those things that our brains aren't equipped to handle. A single life may have infinite value, but the difference between a million deaths and a million and one strikes us as negligible. The moral meaning of death counts is further obscured by their apparent lack of objectivity. Take the war in Iraq. How many Iraqi civilians have died as a consequence of the American invasion? Supporters of the war say 30,000, a number that even President Bush finally brought himself to utter late last year. Opponents of the war say more than 100,000. Surely there must be a fact of the matter. In practice, though, there are only competing methodologies and assumptions, all of which yield different numbers. Even if we could put politics aside and agree on one, it would be hard to say what it meant. Does it matter, for instance, that the higher estimate of 100,000 is the same order of magnitude as the number of Iraqi Kurds that Saddam Hussein is reckoned to have killed in 1987 and 1988, in a genocidal campaign that, it has been claimed, justified his forcible removal? "It is painful to contemplate that despite our technologies of assurance and mathematics of certainty, such a fundamental index of reality as numbers of the dead is a nightmarish muddle," wrote Gil Elliot in his 1972 volume, "The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead." Figuring out the number of man-caused deaths is rarely as straightforward as counting skulls in a mass grave. You can kill people with bombs, guns and machetes, but there are also more indirect ways: causing them to die of starvation, say, or of exposure or disease. (The disease need not be indirect -- witness the radiation victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) Of the nearly two million Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge, for instance, perhaps half were executed outright. By contrast, in the ongoing civil war in the Congo -- the deadliest conflict since World War II -- 2 percent of the estimated 3.9 million victims have died of direct violence; the rest perished when their subsistence-level lives were disrupted by the war. Quantifying man-made death thus means, at the very least, having an idea of the rate at which people die naturally. And that entails recordkeeping. In 17th-century Europe, registers kept by church parishes -- dates of baptisms, marriages and burials -- made it possible to gauge the devastation caused by the Thirty Years' War, which was deadlier for civilians than for soldiers. The last century, strange to say, has not always matched this level of demographic sophistication. Even in the case of Nazi Germany, supposedly a model of efficiency, the implementation of the Final Solution was so chaotic that the number of victims can be known only to the nearest million. If our methodology of counting man-made deaths is crude, our moral calculus for weighing the resulting numbers is even cruder. Quantification, it is often thought, confers precision and objectivity. Yet it tells us very little about comparative evil. We feel that Hitler was every bit as evil as Stalin, even though Stalin was far more successful in murdering people (in part because he had a longer run). Mao may have been more successful still; in their recent book, "Mao: The Unknown Story," Jung Chang and Jon Halliday estimate that the Chinese leader was responsible for "well over 70 million deaths," which would come to nearly half of the total number of man-made deaths in the 20th century. In relative terms, however, Mao is easily eclipsed by Pol Pot, who directed the killing of more than a quarter of his fellow Cambodians. Raw death numbers may not be a reliable index of evil, but they still have value as a guide to action. That, at least, is the common-sense view. It is also part of the ethical theory known as utilitarianism, which holds that sacrificing  $x$  lives to save  $y$  lives is always justified as long as  $y$  is greater than  $x$ . This utilitarian principle is often invoked, for example, in defense of President Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed between 120,000 and 250,000 Japanese civilians, on the assumption that the death toll would have been worse had the war been prolonged. Yet some thinkers (like the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe) have questioned whether, morally speaking, numbers really count. In a choice between saving 5 lives and saving 10, they ask, why should we be dutybound to act in behalf of the greater number? Because, you say, it would be worse for 10 people to die than for 5 people. They reply: Worse for whom? Arithmetic misleads us into thinking that deaths aggregate the way numbers do. Yet in reality there are only individuals suffering. In a dilemma where the deaths of one group of people or another is unavoidable, why should someone have to die merely by reason of being in the smaller group? This sort of skepticism about the significance of numbers has some perverse consequences. It implies that all atrocities have an equal command on our moral attention, regardless of scale. Yet a refusal to aggregate deaths can also be ethically salubrious. It helps us realize that the evil of each additional death is in no way diluted by the number of deaths that may have preceded it. The ongoing bloodbath



in Darfur has, all agree, claimed an enormous number of victims. Saying just how many is a methodological nightmare; a ballpark figure is a quarter of a million, but estimates range up to 400,000 and beyond. Quantitatively, the new deaths that each day brings are absorbed into this vast, indeterminate number. Morally, they ought to be as urgent as those on the first day of the slaughter. "What is the moral context in which we should see those killed by violence? There exists a view that one violent death has the same moral value as a thousand or a million deaths. . . . The killer cannot add to his sin by committing more than one murder. However, every victim of murder would claim, if he could, that his death had a separate moral value." Source: "The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead," by Gil Elliot (1972)

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# Extinction

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## Extinction First

### **Preventing extinction is the most ethical outcome**

**Bostrom 13** (Nick, Professor at Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Director, Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology University of Oxford, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority”, Global Policy Volume 4, Issue 1, February 2013 // AKONG)

Some consequential perspectives We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. ... Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it (Adams, 1989, pp. 472–473). Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams' view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favour existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world's population would come to favour such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.<sup>23</sup> We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).<sup>24</sup> We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong.<sup>25</sup> And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.

## Extinction outweighs

**Bostrom and Cirkovic** (Nick, Professor at Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Director, Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology University of Oxford, Milan, Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and Assistant Professor of the Department of Physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, “Global Catastrophic Risks” // AKONG)

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A subset of global catastrophic risks is existential risks. An existential risk is one that threatens to cause the extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or to reduce its quality of life (compared to what would otherwise have been possible) permanently and drastically. 1Existential risks share a number of features that mark them out as deserving of special consideration. For example, since it is not possible to recover from existential risks, we cannot allow even one existential disaster to happen; there would be no opportunity to learn from experience. Our approach to managing such risks must be proactive. How much worse an existential catastrophe would be than a non-existential global catastrophe depends very sensitively on controversial issues in value theory, in particular how much weight to give to the lives of possible future persons. 2 Furthermore, assessing existential risks raises distinctive methodological problems having to do with observation selection effects and the need to avoid anthropic bias. One of the motives for producing this book is to stimulate more serious study of existential risks. Rather than limiting our focus to existential risk, however, we thought it better to lay a broader foundation of systematic thinking about big risks in general.

## Extinction outweighs – future generations

**Matheny 7** (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007 // AKONG)

Discussing the risks of “nuclear winter,” Carl Sagan (1983) wrote: Some have argued that the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the difference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number of people in **future generations** who would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. In a similar vein, the philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) wrote: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1. Peace 2. A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population 3. A nuclear war that kills 100% 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater.

.. The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. Human extinction in the next few centuries could reduce the number of future generations by thousands or more. We take extraordinary measures to protect some endangered species from extinction. It might be reasonable to take extraordinary measures to protect humanity from the same.<sup>19</sup> To decide whether this is so requires more discussion of the methodological problems mentioned here, as well as research on the extinction risks we face and the consequences.<sup>75</sup>

## **Extinction is the most important consideration**

**Baum and Wilson 13** (Seth, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science and an Affiliate Researcher at the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Grant, Outreach and Policy Coordinator at the Earth Law Center. He holds a J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School (2012) and a B.A. in Environmental Policy from Western Washington University, “The Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering”, Ethics in Biology, Engineering & Medicine - An International Journal, 4(1): 59–72 // AKONG)

### **\*GCR = Global Catastrophic Risk**

The importance of GCR is fundamentally an ethics question. Different ethical views can reach different conclusions about GCR. Many views treat GCR reduction as an important goal or even a top priority for humanity today. However, some views are neutral to GCR, and some views would even seek to increase GCR. Here, we review key ethical issues related to GCR and argue that GCR reduction should be the top priority today. The views most closely associated with GCR are certain forms of consequentialism,<sup>12</sup> including common variants of utilitarianism.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the concept of risk itself is commonly understood in consequentialist terms: Risk is commonly defined as the possibility of an event that has bad consequences (but there are deontological conceptions of risk).<sup>13</sup> The size of a risk is typically defined as the probability of that event multiplied by the magnitude of harm associated with the consequences if the event occurs. For example, the risk of a disease outbreak is the probability of the outbreak multiplied by the harms of the deaths, illnesses, and other consequences of the outbreak if the outbreak occurs. GCRs are risks of the highest magnitude, regardless of probability. The magnitude of global catastrophe has several definitions. Atkinson proposes a definition of global catastrophe as an event in which more than one quarter of the human population dies.<sup>14,15</sup> Bostrom and Ćirković define a global catastrophe as an event causing at least X deaths or Y monetary damages, with  $104 < X < 107$  and  $1010 < Y < 1013$ .<sup>2</sup> Scholars have often emphasized the particular importance of global catastrophes that would cause human extinction or other permanent declines of human civilization.<sup>1,3,5–7</sup> Consequentialism comprises a broad set of ethical views. For GCR, two aspects of consequentialism merit attention: intrinsic value and space–time universalism. A. Intrinsic Value Intrinsic value is defined as that which is valuable for its own sake.<sup>16</sup> In consequentialism, intrinsic value is the consequence to be promoted. For example, in utilitarianism, utility holds intrinsic value. Different variants of utilitarianism define utility differently, for example, as happiness or as the satisfaction of preferences. They also differ on questions of whose utility to count, for example, whether to count the utility of sentient non-human animals. Outside of utilitarianism, other consequentialist views include biocentric ethics, which places intrinsic value on life itself, and ecocentric ethics, which places intrinsic value on ecosystems. The relationship between intrinsic value and GCR depends on how GCR is defined. While GCR could be defined otherwise, existing definitions define GCR specifically in anthropocentric terms, that is, as a catastrophe to humans. With this definition, GCR would be considered very important if intrinsic value is placed on some property of humans (i.e., human utility, human lives, etc.) because a global catastrophe would result in a large loss of this intrinsic value (or perhaps a large gain, see below). However, a biocentric or ecocentric notion of intrinsic value could be indifferent to some GCRs. Consider a pandemic that kills all humans and leaves other species intact. This event could cause minimal change in biocentric or

ecocentric intrinsic value. Indeed, the event could even cause an increase in biocentric or ecocentric intrinsic value, in which case biocentric or ecocentric consequentialism would recommend trying to increase certain GCRs. Thus, it would seem that much is at stake regarding what we place intrinsic value on. However, these different conceptions of intrinsic value (i.e., anthropocentric, biocentric, and ecocentric) may all point toward decreasing GCR, if they are universalist across space-time (see the following discussion). Another important consideration related to intrinsic value is whether existence is a net positive or a net negative. To clarify, let X be whatever we place intrinsic value on—human utility, ecosystems, etc. The question this is simply this: Is it better for X to exist? This might seem an obvious question; of course, we want what we value to exist. But there are arguments to the contrary, arguments that it would be better to not exist. Consider negative utilitarianism, the view that what matters is negative utility. Here, the goal regards minimizing pain or suffering, perhaps inspired by a ‘do no harm’ principle. Benatar<sup>17</sup> and Mayerfeld<sup>18</sup> articulated views that include aspects of negative utilitarianism. But all people experience pain in their lives. The only way to guarantee the absence of pain is to guarantee the absence of people—that is, to kill everyone. The fact that this would also eliminate pleasure and happiness and all the other aspects of humanity we might consider good is irrelevant, because in negative utilitarianism, only the negative utility matters. Thus, negative utilitarianism could be interpreted as concluding that we should increase GCR. The same logic also applies for certain applications of the maxi-min principle.<sup>4,17</sup> Suppose the aim is to maximize the minimum well-being of any member of society, which suggests that we should focus our efforts on helping the worst-off members. Suppose also that some members will have lives of net negative well-being, but we do not know who this will be. In this case, the minimum well-being would be maximized by killing everyone, thereby removing negative well-being from all lives and increasing the minimum well-being to zero. Alternatively, suppose the aim is to maximize the minimum level of well-being within each individual’s life. But everyone probably has at least some moments of negative value—moments of pain or suffering. Again, the minimum level of well-being could thus be increased by killing everyone. Thus, maxi-min can also conclude in favor of increasing GCR. These two anti-existence views, negative utilitarianism and maxi-min, both suffer from the problem that they recommend nonexistence no matter how much pleasure any given life might hold, as long as it also contains at least a tiny amount of pain. Would we prefer to die now, thereby denying ourselves a good life, to avoid a brief moment of suffering? We think not.<sup>19,20</sup> Without denying the importance of pain and suffering, we would not give them total priority over everything else. Overall, we believe existence to be a net positive. The exception would be for events that cause a significant increase in total suffering, so as to outweigh what pleasures may still exist. We would consider these events, if they are at the global scale, to be global catastrophes as well. B. Space–Time Universalism In consequentialism, universalism can be defined as the view that any given phenomenon holds the same intrinsic value, regardless of when or where it exists.<sup>21</sup> For example, universalist anthropocentric utilitarianism would value all human utility equally, regardless of where or when that utility exists. The utility of someone in India or Paraguay would hold the same intrinsic value as the utility of someone in Denmark or Senegal. Likewise, the utility of someone alive in 2013 would hold the same intrinsic value as the utility of someone alive in 2014 or 2114 or even year 21114. Strong arguments can be made in favor of universalism. The simplest is to use a ‘God’s eye view,’ looking at the world from ‘above.’ From this standpoint, there is no reason to value anyone any more or less than anyone else. Similar is the ‘veil of ignorance,’ in which decisions are made as if the decision maker does not know which member of society she will end up being.<sup>22,23</sup> In this case, the decision maker is forced to be equally fair to everyone because she has an equal chance of being any of these individuals. Universalism also has a material logic: The same material phenomenon should have the same value in each of its instantiations, because each is materially identical. Finally, one might ask: Why is location in time or space a morally relevant criterion? Why should someone be intrinsically valued any differently just because of where or when she lives? We object to such bias,<sup>24,25</sup> and, indeed, it reminds us of other objectionable biases such as racism and sexism. We therefore conclude in favor of universalism. Universalism is important to GCR because global catastrophes affect so many people, or ecosystems, however global catastrophe is defined. Suppose global catastrophes are defined in the usual anthropocentric fashion, wherein global catastrophes affect millions or even billions of people throughout the world. Furthermore, global catastrophes (especially the largest ones) can affect future generations, denying many people the chance to exist. The extreme case of human extinction would kill everyone around the world and prevent everyone in all future generations from existing. A selfish person would care about none of this loss of life, except her own. A global catastrophe would be no more important than her own death. A car accident that kills her would be equally tragic as a nuclear war from which humanity never recovers. On the other hand, a universalist would care deeply about global catastrophes. Indeed, the universalist would not care much about her own death relative to all the others dying in a global catastrophe. As long as other people continue to exist, her values would be realized. A global catastrophe would prevent many other people from continuing to exist, so she would care deeply about this. An important result

is that GCR is considered equivalently for universalist variants of anthropocentric utilitarianism and several non-anthropocentric consequentialisms, including non-anthropocentric utilitarianism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. As long as each ethical view places positive intrinsic value on the continued existence of Earth-life (in contrast to, e.g., negative utilitarianism), then these views all reach the same conclusion about GCR, namely that preventing the permanent destruction of human civilization is the key priority for this era. Reaching this conclusion requires looking to the very far future. First, note that life on Earth has the potential to continue to exist for approximately five billion more years, until the Sun becomes too hot and large for Earth life. Second, note that the rest of the galaxy could support life for many orders of magnitude longer,<sup>26</sup> if Earth-originating life is able to colonize elsewhere in space. A similar orders-of-magnitude difference exists across space between Earth and the galaxy. If we are truly universalist, that is, if we truly do assign intrinsic value equally for all locations in space and time, then this includes spaces and times beyond that of this planet. Most of the opportunity for intrinsic value exists beyond Earth, so space colonization becomes a crucial objective, to spread intrinsic value throughout the galaxy.

### **Prefer extinction level impacts – stopping extinction is the most ethical action.**

**Matheny 2007** (Jason G. Matheny, P.hD is a Program Manager at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007 Pg. 1335-1344 .nt)

5. DISCOUNTING An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we value future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or hazardous waste storage. Individuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether future lives matter, but on how much they matter.<sup>6</sup> Valuing future lives less than current ones (“intergenerational discounting”) has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption, uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. I will argue that none of these justifications applies to the benefits of delaying human extinction. Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now. The typical justification for time preference is descriptive—most people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods more than future ones. However, it may be that people’s time preference applies only to instrumental goods, like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. In fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is not clear how this would ethically justify discounting across different lives and generations (Frederick, 2006; Schelling, 2000). In practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic value than a billion lives 400 years hence (Cowen&Parfit, 1992). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and philosophers recognize that this preference for ourselves over our descendents is unjustifiable and agree that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporal discounting, and assign equal value to human lives, whatever their temporal distance from us. I Parfit (1984), Cowen (1992), and Blackorby et al. (1995) have similarly argued that time preference across generations is not ethically defensible.<sup>7</sup> There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000). This principle makes sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerational transfers of existence. There is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed. There is no reason to believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence.

## Extinction comes first – ethical responsibility to address

**Matheny 7** – formerly at Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, focused on existential risk [Jason, PhD in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins University, MPH from Johns Hopkins, MBA from Duke University, BA from the University of Chicago, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1335, October 2007, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

INTRODUCTION Projections of climate change and influenza pandemics, coupled with the damage caused by recent tsunamis, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks, have increased interest in low-probability, high-consequence catastrophic risks. Richard Posner (2004) has reviewed a number of these risks and the failures of policy and traditional risk assessment to address them. Richard Horton (2005), editor of The Lancet, has recommended creating an international body to rationally address catastrophic risks. The World Economic Forum (2006) recently convened a panel to catalog global catastrophic risks. The OECD (2003) has completed a similar exercise. And national research centers have emerged to study responses to catastrophe—the U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently funded a Center for the Study of High Consequence Event Preparedness and Response that involves 21 institutions. In this article, I discuss a subset of catastrophic events—those that could extinguish humanity. 1 It is only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that some of these events can be both caused and prevented by human action. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are so grave that it could be cost effective to prevent them. A search of EconLit and the Social Sciences Citation Index suggests that virtually nothing has been written about the cost effectiveness of reducing human extinction risks. 2 Maybe this is because human extinction seems impossible, inevitable, or, in either case, beyond our control; maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to the other social issues to which cost-effectiveness analysis has been applied; or maybe the methodological and philosophical problems involved seem insuperable. Certainly, the problems are intimidating. Because human extinction is unprecedented, speculations about how and when it could occur are highly subjective. To efficiently spend resources in reducing extinction risks, one needs to estimate the probabilities of particular extinction events, the expected duration of humanity in an event’s absence, the costs of extinction countermeasures, and the relative value of current and future human lives. Here, I outline how one might begin to address these problems.

## Your epistemology is flawed – extinction comes first

**Ćirković 12** – Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade [Milan, Assistant Professor of the Department of Physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, “Small Theories and Large Risks—Is Risk Analysis Relevant for Epistemology?,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 2001-2003, October 18, 2012, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

4. DISCUSSION In the preceding, I have tried to sketch some reasons for trying to ensure that our epistemological apparatus does not suffer from faults with potentially catastrophic consequences. This may require large or small modifications in the routine procedures of hypothesis evaluation and scrutiny, as well as the derivation of specific quantitative models based on particular hypotheses regarding global catastrophic risks. To the extent to which we can identify and precisely formulate particular “risky” theories, we need an additional level of systematic scrutiny in order to avoid the philosophical failure of scientific analysis and policies based on a traditional scientific approach. In other words, this may involve additions to or modification of our epistemological practices. Although this may sound dramatic, one should keep in mind, for example, that the threat of global catastrophes—in particular those related to anthropogenic activities in this century (like global warming or pandemics)—has already prompted calls for legal and judicial reforms;(47) many other alarm bells are calling for reassessments and reforms in other fields because of global threats. Why should we find our epistemological practices to be a priori less amenable to change in the face of the same challenges? It is hard to avoid the impression, after considering the above and many other similar examples (which are often to be found in less-understood and less-publicized areas of science), that an additional dimension of analysis is needed, logically



orthogonal to the standard one of computing the probabilities inline image and inline image, and evaluating the expectation in number of deaths or some other convenient metric, in order to capture full complexity of such problem situations. Teasing out intuitions about what should constitute that additional dimension in specific and quantitative terms is, however, a formidable task still to be done. One possibility for such an additional criterion could be, for instance, how much of a relative Bayesian probability shift of the risk expectation value would a nonfalsifying, but pertinent, empirical test of a risky hypothesis would cause (roughly speaking, this would correspond to searching for an inflexion point on a curve representing the idealized “total” risk function for a system under consideration). A more radical possibility could be to assign a numerical value or a grade to the present “level of understanding” of the space of possible outcomes as an additional weight; however, it is not clear how this could be done in a nonsubjective manner. In any case, one could argue for the need for a “normative shift” in the practice of risk analysis, compared to what is done in pure science. Due to the extremely high stakes involved in studying and possibly mitigating global catastrophic risks, obtaining the best explanation by developing the most probable theory in all details cannot be allowed to circumscribe other insights and efforts. “Residuals” or “other scenarios” in the terminology of Kaplan and Garrick(13) might indeed dominate the spectrum of global catastrophic risks. This approach might be related to the phantom system modeling (PSM) approach in systems engineering, pioneered by Haimes.(48,49) This is a sort of multidisciplinary, multiscale approach that generates many models of each system under consideration. In accordance with a postpositivistic approach to hypothesis building,(50,51) PSM replaces the emphasis on “deep” truth of explanatory hypotheses with optimization of the overall, holistic picture. Haimes(49) emphasizes that with different modeling and simulation tools, PSM legitimizes the exploration and experimentation of out-of-the-box and seemingly “crazy” ideas and ultimately discovers insightful implications that otherwise would have been completely missed and dismissed. Some of the “phantoms” considered within PSM may correspond to fictitious systems described by our risky theories, others to those described by risk-neutral alternatives. By adopting a multiple-model approach to address the same system from different viewing angles, we may identify entire spectra of risks involved. An interesting question is why this approach is relatively noncontroversial in engineering circles, whereas it is at best contentious in the domain of “pure” science? One may speculate that highly complex, unpredictable, holistic, and historically contingent behavior is unavoidable in considering modern engineering and economic systems, whereas science is still strongly influenced by the notions of determinism, predictability, reductionism, and repeatability inherited from the world of classical physics and the period of logical positivism in epistemology. From the point of view of risk analysis, it is clear that the former type of behavior is closer to what is needed to encompass the truth about hazards, especially global catastrophic ones.<sup>7</sup> The fact that a holistic approach still has an overtone of heresy in many scientific circles must not cloud our insight into the importance of such unconventional thinking. More than any other field, risk analysis prompts constant rethinking and reevaluation of its epistemological and methodological foundations. In this sense, the answer to the question posed in the title of this article is emphatically affirmative: risk analysis could and should have a say in epistemological deliberations associated with the assessment of hypotheses about the world. The clear and obvious danger is that a pseudoscientific “fringe” might be encouraged to produce extravagant hypotheses with little or no empirical support if they contain an element of risk in the sense discussed here. However, I find too much emphasis on that danger to be illogical and self-defeating. In the wise words of G. David Brin: “Aversion to an idea, simply because of its long association with crackpots, gives crackpots altogether too much influence.”(52) Here, we need to be quite clear on moral implications of both horns of the dilemma: both a hypothetical boost to pseudoscience and a hypothetical neglect of a source of global risk are undesirable, but there are no further similarities. Global catastrophic risks certainly present many orders of magnitude larger societal danger than pseudoscience—and no amount of self-righteousness on the part of scientific orthodoxy will change that. We should keep in mind the outcome of the 19th-century debate between gradualists and catastrophists in Earth sciences, when the former gained the upper hand by associating their opponents with discredited biblical literalism, which resulted in a century and a half of gradualist dogma. In that period, it was exactly the association with catastrophism (thus, indirectly, with pseudoscience) that obstructed scientific progress on several promising theories, like the plate tectonics or importance of impacts for the history of life. Only after 1980, did this dogma begin to loosen its grip on earth and planetary sciences. Similarly, it is easy to imagine a situation in which people tend to downplay the work on some of the more exotic global catastrophic risks in fear of being stigmatized and ridiculed as pseudoscientists (which actually happens all the time when accelerator risk discussions are

concerned). All this may have important implications for interdisciplinary work in the field of risk analysis—and even in STS studies. According to Bauer,(11) some of the largest obstacles to truly interdisciplinary research come from the different methodologies and effective languages of different disciplines. This may present a fatal obstacle in our attempts to reach efficient management of global catastrophic risks. Because the methodologies of different fields are often entrenched in incomplete and artificially bounded epistemologies, the conclusion that corrective factors are necessary in the epistemology itself seems inescapable. Among directions for further work, I shall mention several rather straightforward issues: (i) we need to negotiate and discuss a set of at least rough guidelines for dealing with “risky” outliers in the space of explanatory theories, perhaps searching for an additional criterion for hypothesis evaluation in risk analysis; (ii) the search for epistemic approaches such as the precautionary principle(53) in parsing the “risky” parts of the parameter space needs to be elucidated; (iii) a conventional mechanism for discussing probability estimates reached by different fields and using varied methodologies would be desirable in striving for successful risk management; and (iv) the public and media image of science needs to be improved in order to achieve increased confidence in science as the general path for studying and handling universally undesirable outcomes. Under the item (iii), there has to be more deliberation about the decision making on investments in studying and testing unorthodox or maverick theories. In any case, the efficient management of global catastrophic risks, perhaps the foremost task that humanity faces in this millennium, clearly requires a degree of open-mindedness and critical spirit that is too often sorely lacking in the contemporary public and cultural discourse.

## **Extinction from warming comes first – irreversible and high probability**

**Friedman 9** – columnist at New York Times and 3-time Pulitzer Prize winner [Thomas, “Going Cheney on Climate,” New York Times, December 8, 2009, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\\_r=2&](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=2&), Accessed 6/26/15]

In 2006, Ron Suskind published “The One Percent Doctrine,” a book about the U.S. war on terrorists after 9/11. The title was drawn from an assessment by then-Vice President Dick Cheney, who, in the face of concerns that a Pakistani scientist was offering nuclear-weapons expertise to Al Qaeda, reportedly declared: “If there’s a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.” Cheney contended that the U.S. had to confront a very new type of threat: a “low-probability, high-impact event.” Soon after Suskind’s book came out, the legal scholar Cass Sunstein, who then was at the University of Chicago, pointed out that Mr. Cheney seemed to be endorsing the same “precautionary principle” that also animated environmentalists. Sunstein wrote in his blog: “According to the Precautionary Principle, it is appropriate to respond aggressively to low-probability, high-impact events — such as climate change. Indeed, another vice president — Al Gore — can be understood to be arguing for a precautionary principle for climate change (though he believes that the chance of disaster is well over 1 percent).” Of course, Mr. Cheney would never accept that analogy. Indeed, many of the same people who defend Mr. Cheney’s One Percent Doctrine on nukes tell us not to worry at all about catastrophic global warming, where the odds are, in fact, a lot higher than 1 percent, if we stick to business as usual. That is unfortunate, because Cheney’s instinct is precisely the right framework with which to think about the climate issue — and this whole “climategate” controversy as well. “Climategate” was triggered on Nov. 17 when an unidentified person hacked into the e-mails and data files of the University of East Anglia’s Climatic Research Unit, one of the leading climate science centers in the world — and then posted them on the Internet. In a few instances, they revealed some leading climatologists seemingly massaging data to show more global warming and excluding contradictory research. Frankly, I found it very disappointing to read a leading climate scientist writing that he used a “trick” to “hide” a putative decline in temperatures or was keeping contradictory research from getting a proper hearing. Yes, the climate-denier community, funded by big oil, has published all sorts of bogus science for years — and the world never made a fuss. That, though, is no excuse for serious climatologists not adhering to the highest scientific standards at all times. That said, be serious: The evidence that our planet, since the Industrial Revolution, has been on a broad warming trend outside the normal variation patterns — with periodic micro-cooling phases — has been documented by a variety of independent

research centers. As this paper just reported: "Despite recent fluctuations in global temperature year to year, which fueled claims of global cooling, a sustained global warming trend shows no signs of ending, according to new analysis by the World Meteorological Organization made public on Tuesday. The decade of the 2000s is very likely the warmest decade in the modern record." This is not complicated. We know that our planet is enveloped in a blanket of greenhouse gases that keep the Earth at a comfortable temperature. As we pump more carbon-dioxide and other greenhouse gases into that blanket from cars, buildings, agriculture, forests and industry, more heat gets trapped. What we don't know, because the climate system is so complex, is what other factors might over time compensate for that man-driven warming, or how rapidly temperatures might rise, melt more ice and raise sea levels. It's all a game of odds. We've never been here before. We just know two things: one, the CO2 we put into the atmosphere stays there for many years, so it is "irreversible" in real-time (barring some feat of geo-engineering); and two, that CO2 buildup has the potential to unleash "catastrophic" warming. When I see a problem that has even a 1 percent probability of occurring and is "irreversible" and potentially "catastrophic," I buy insurance. That is what taking climate change seriously is all about. If we prepare for climate change by building a clean-power economy, but climate change turns out to be a hoax, what would be the result? Well, during a transition period, we would have higher energy prices. But gradually we would be driving battery-powered electric cars and powering more and more of our homes and factories with wind, solar, nuclear and second-generation biofuels. We would be much less dependent on oil dictators who have drawn a bull's-eye on our backs; our trade deficit would improve; the dollar would strengthen; and the air we breathe would be cleaner. In short, as a country, we would be stronger, more innovative and more energy independent. But if we don't prepare, and climate change turns out to be real, life on this planet could become a living hell. And that's why I'm for doing the Cheney-thing on climate — preparing for 1 percent.

## **Extinction outweighs everything else—every other impact is included in and outweighed by ours**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

In addition to standard biases, I have personally observed what look like harmful modes of thinking specific to existential risks. The Spanish flu of 1918 killed 25-50 million people. World War II killed 60 million people. 107 is the order of the largest catastrophes in humanity's written history. Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of thinking - enter into a "separate magisterium". People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, "Well, maybe the human species doesn't really deserve to survive." There is a saying in heuristics and biases that people do not evaluate events, but descriptions of events - what is called non-extensional reasoning. The extension of humanity's extinction includes the death of yourself, of your friends, of your family, of your loved ones, of your city, of your country, of your political fellows. Yet people who would take great offense at a proposal to wipe the country of Britain from the map, to kill every member of the Democratic Party in the U.S., to turn the city of Paris to glass - who would feel still greater horror on hearing the doctor say that their child had cancer - these people will discuss the extinction of humanity with perfect calm. "Extinction of humanity", as words on paper, appears in fictional novels, or is discussed in philosophy books - it belongs to a different context than the Spanish flu. We evaluate descriptions of events, not extensions of events. The cliché phrase end of the world invokes the magisterium of myth and dream, of prophecy and apocalypse, of novels and movies. The challenge of existential risks to rationality is that, the catastrophes being so huge, people snap into a different mode of thinking. Human deaths are suddenly no longer bad, and detailed predictions suddenly no longer require any expertise, and whether the story is told with a happy ending or a sad ending is a matter of personal taste in stories. But that is only an anecdotal observation of mine. I thought it better that this essay should focus on mistakes well-documented in the literature - the general literature of cognitive psychology, because there is not yet experimental literature specific to the psychology of existential risks. There should be. In the mathematics of Bayesian decision theory there is a concept of information value - the expected utility of knowledge. The value of information emerges from the value of whatever it is information about; if you double the stakes, you double the value of information about the stakes. The value of rational thinking works similarly - the value of performing a computation that integrates the evidence is calculated much the same way as the value of the evidence itself. (Good 1952; Horvitz et. al. 1989.) No more than Albert Szent-Györgyi could multiply the suffering of one human by a hundred million can I truly understand the value of clear thinking about global risks. Scope neglect is the hazard of being a biological human, running on an analog brain; the brain cannot multiply by six billion. And the stakes of existential risk extend beyond even the six billion humans alive today, to all the stars in all the galaxies that humanity and humanity's descendants may some day touch. All that vast potential hinges

on our survival here, now, in the days when the realm of humankind is a single planet orbiting a single star. I can't feel our future. All I can do is try to defend it.

## **Uncertainty doesn't matter—any risk of extinction outweighs any other impact**

**SHELL 1982** (Jonathan, Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96)

To say that human extinction is a certainty could, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as

yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty,

and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of "the basic power of the universe" – and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some

twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the

zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life;

extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this

limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say

that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we

have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world

between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we

knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.

## **Extinction outweighs everything else—if our probability is greater than a billionth of one percent we should win**

**BOSTROM 2011** (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>)

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Holding probability constant, risks become more serious as we move toward the upper-right region of figure 2. For any fixed probability, existential risks are thus more serious than other risk categories. But just how much more serious might not be intuitively obvious. One might think we could get a grip on how bad an existential catastrophe would be by considering some of the worst historical disasters we can think of—such as the two world wars, the Spanish flu pandemic, or the Holocaust—and then imagining something just a bit worse. Yet if we look at global population statistics over time, we find that these horrible events of the past century fail to register (figure 3). But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existential

catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world's existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. (10: 453-454) To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literally astronomical. One gets a large number even if one confines one's consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least  $10^{18}$  human lives. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is  $10^{34}$  years.[10] Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of  $10^{54}$  human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or  $10^{71}$  basic computational operations).[4][11] If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realized.[12] Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of  $10^{18}$  human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of  $10^{54}$  human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or  $10^{52}$  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any "ordinary" good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

## Extinction outweighs genocide

**BOSTROM 2011** (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>)

We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong.[26] And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.

## Human extinction destroys the value to life

**BOSTROM 2011** (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>)

We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project.

So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. ... Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population- at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams' view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world's population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]

## Value-to-life only works one way—our impact would reduce it much more than they would increase it

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 148-149)

1. Human happiness is easily impaired by an increase in the death rate due to war or disease, or by a decline in the standard of living, and a fortiori would be impaired by the sort of catastrophes with which this book is concerned. It is much more difficult to raise the happiness level. This is suggested by the fact that while wealthier people are usually happier (as measured, very imperfectly to be sure, by responses to survey questions) than poorer people in the same country, an increase in an individual's income tends not to produce a proportionate increase in his happiness, and average happiness is only slightly greater in wealthier than in poorer countries. The fact that increases in a country's wealth, which are a function to a significant extent of technological progress, produce at most only slight increases in the average happiness of the

population implies that technological progress is, to a degree anyway, a running-in-place phenomenon so far as generating human happiness is concerned. Remember from the introduction “the conversion of humans to more or less immortal near-gods” that David Friedman described as the upside of galloping twenty-first-century scientific advance? It seems rather a dubious plus, and certainly less of one than extinction would be a minus, especially since changing us into “near-gods” could be thought itself a form of extinction rather than a boon because of the discontinuity between a person and a near-god. We think of early hominids as having become extinct rather than as having become us.

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### Extinction Outweighs Probability

**The burden is on them to prove that extinction is impossible—no matter how unlikely, we can't bet the future of the species on it**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 32-33)

It is tempting to dismiss the risk of a strangelet disaster on the ground that the mere fact that a risk cannot be shown to be precluded by a law of nature is not a sound reason to worry about it. Should I be afraid to swim in Loch Ness lest I be devoured by Nessie? This question was put to me by a physicist who is deeply skeptical about the strangelet scenario. The question is not well formed. The interesting question is whether a sea "monster" of some sort, perhaps a dinosaur that managed to avoid extinction, or, more probably, some large sea mammal, may be lurking somewhere in the lake. No law of nature forbids that there shall be such a creature in a deep Scottish lake, and although none has been found despite extensive searches, and many fraudulent sightings have been unmasked, it is unclear whether the entire lake has been searched. It seems extraordinarily unlikely that there is anything that would qualify as a "Loch Ness Monster"—but would one want to bet the planet that there is not? Or consider the proposition that no human being has ever eaten an entire adult elephant at one sitting. Philosophers use such propositions to argue that one can have empirical certainty without a confirming observation. Yet although there is no known instance of such a meal, it is conceivable that modern technology could so compact an elephant as to make it digestible in one sitting, and it is also conceivable, though only barely, that someone, somewhere, has successfully employed that technology. It is exceedingly unlikely (even if one throws in the possibility that someone has succeeded in breeding a miniature elephant), but, again, one wouldn't want to be the planet on its not having occurred.

**Extinction is unique—if you think there's a one in 75 million chance of our disad you should vote neg**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 249-250)

Even if our insouciant reaction to small probabilities of great losses is accepted as an authentic basis for estimating the value of life in most such situations, the reaction may not generalize to ones in which the loss, should it materialize, would be the near or total extinction of the human race. If the annual probability of an asteroid collision that would kill 6 billion people is only 1 in 75 million, the expected number of deaths worldwide is only 80 per year, which may not seem a large enough number to justify the expense of an effective defense against an asteroid collision. (This of course ignores smaller but still lethal collisions; but read on.) But if there is a minute chance that the entire human race, both current and future, would be wiped out, together with all or most of the world's animal population, we (the ambiguous "we" of policy analysis, but there it may represent dominant public opinion) may think that something should be done to eliminate or reduce the risk, slight as it is, beyond what a standard cost-benefit analysis would imply; may be willing, if the risk and the possible responses are explained carefully, to incur some cost in higher taxes or otherwise to reduce the risk.

**Uncertainty doesn't matter—any risk of extinction outweighs any other impact**

**SCHELL 1982** (Jonathan, Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96)

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a



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holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of "the basic power of the universe" – and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.

### **Extinction risks outweigh everything else regardless of probability**

**MATHENY 2007** (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, "Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction," Risk Analysis, Vol 27, No 5)

Even if extinction events are improbable, the expected values of countermeasures could be large, as they include the value of all future lives. This introduces a discontinuity between the CEA of extinction and nonextinction risks. Even though the risk to any existing individual of dying in a car crash is much greater than the risk of dying in an asteroid impact, asteroids pose a much greater risk to the existence of future generations (we are not likely to crash all our cars at once) (Chapman, 2004). The "death-toll" of an extinction-level asteroid impact is the population of Earth, plus all the descendants of that population who would otherwise have existed if not for the impact. There is thus a discontinuity between risks that threaten 99% of humanity and those that threaten 100%.

## Nothing can outweigh extinction even if the risk is miniscule

**MATHENY 2007** (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, "Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction," Risk Analysis, Vol 27, No 5)

We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good at grasping the significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers (probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprecedented events (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political administrations and rarely do risk assessments value the existence of future generations.<sup>18</sup> We may unjustifiably discount the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect. It might be feared that consideration of extinction risks would lead to a reductio ad absurdum: we ought to invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of AIDS, pollution, world hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and content global population are likely to reduce the probability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects. Discussing the risks of "nuclear winter," Carl Sagan (1983) wrote: Some have argued that the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the difference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. In a similar vein, the philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) wrote: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1. Peace 2. A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world's existing population 3. A nuclear war that kills 100% 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater. . . . The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. Human extinction in the next few centuries could reduce the number of future generations by thousands or more. We take extraordinary measures to protect some endangered species from extinction. It might be reasonable to take extraordinary measures to protect humanity from the same.<sup>19</sup> To decide whether this is so requires more discussion of the methodological problems mentioned here, as well as research on the extinction risks we face and the costs of mitigating them.<sup>20</sup>

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## The probability that we can solve existential risks matters

**BOSTROM 2011** (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>)

These considerations suggest that the loss in expected value resulting from an existential catastrophe is so enormous that the objective of reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration whenever we act out

of concern for humankind as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for such impersonal moral action: Maxipok. Maximize the probability of an “OK outcome,” where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe. At best, maxipok is a rule of thumb or a prima facie suggestion. It is not a principle of absolute validity, since there clearly are moral ends other than the prevention of existential catastrophe. The principle’s usefulness is as an aid to prioritization. Unrestricted altruism is not so common that we can afford to fritter it away on a plethora of feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy. If benefiting humanity by increasing existential safety achieves expected good on a scale many orders of magnitude greater than that of alternative contributions, we would do well to focus on this most efficient philanthropy. Note that maxipok is different from the popular maximin principle (“Choose the action that has the best worst-case outcome”).<sup>[14]</sup> Since we cannot completely eliminate existential risk—at any moment, we might be tossed into the dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum phase transition triggered in some remote galaxy a billion years ago—the use of maximin in the present context would entail choosing the action that has the greatest benefit under the assumption of impending extinction. Maximin thus implies that we ought all to start partying as if there were no tomorrow. While perhaps tempting, that implication is implausible.

## AT Extinction First

### **Extinction is always possible**

**Tonn and Stiefel 13** – professors of political science at University of Tennessee [Bruce and Dorian, “Evaluating Methods for Estimating Existential Risks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1782-1783, October 2013, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

Fig. 5 presents a graphical depiction of a human extinction scenario developed by Tonn and MacGregor. (59) A series of consequential events lead to a rapid decrease in human population. Societies become balkanized; the previous “Haves” retreat to enclaves and destroy the technological infrastructures outside of the enclaves that could be used by the “Have-nots” to threaten the enclaves. Over time, the enclaves themselves perish because inhabitants outlive their capacity for fertility and human cloning fails. Resources available to the “Have-nots” continue to collapse. A series of natural disasters then befall the earth and the remaining humans. Due to rapid cooling and the oxidation of suddenly exposed rock from falling sea levels, the level of oxygen in the atmosphere drops below the level needed to sustain human life. The last humans asphyxiate. This scenario posits a long chain of unlikely events. Our own estimation is that the likelihood of this scenario is much less than the  $10^{-20}$  ethical threshold. On the other hand, the series of events leading to a major decline in population seem plausible and could happen in any number of orders. The question is whether humans have the capacity to adapt. If one answers yes, then the indicativeness of this scenario would be low. If one doubts human adaptability, then the indicativeness of this scenario would be high. The Tonn and MacGregor (59) scenario was published in a special issue of the journal Futures on the topic of human extinction. Other scenarios published in this issue had related themes: (1) Human fertility rates continue to decline and humans die out naturally; (60) (2) Catastrophic global warming increases atmospheric temperatures beyond the range of human survival; (61) (3) Catastrophic climate change leads to biological terrorism, weakening human populations in the face of a series of natural disasters; (62) (4) Human civilization fails to prevent an all-out nuclear war; (63) (5) A miracle cancer vaccine miraculously administered to every human turns out to have fatal consequences for all humans; (64) and (6) Systemic failures to adapt to the plethora of challenges currently facing human societies lead to extinction. (65) Our review of this set of human extinction scenarios suggests that they are broadly indicative of potential human futures. While additional reflection is warranted to provide even lower and upper probabilities on the event of human extinction, we do believe that the lower probability of human extinction, based on these scenarios, greatly exceeds the 10 –20 ethical threshold. The primary strength of the extinction scenario method is that well-crafted scenarios will explicitly describe how the last human perishes. Another strength is that the stories depicted in the scenarios ought to be easy to communicate to the general public. Its primary weakness is that, other than in the futures studies community, scenario methods do not appear to have wide acceptance in the academic community.

### **Our method is comprehensive – trillions of scenarios considered**

**Tonn and Stiefel 13** – professors of political science at University of Tennessee [Bruce and Dorian, “Evaluating Methods for Estimating Existential Risks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1774-1775, October 2013, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

2. OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA There are many ways to subjectively estimate the risk of human extinction. The most straightforward is through a simple, direct probability elicitation (see Section 3). A probability assessor must estimate a risk based on his or her own knowledge, the essentials of which do not necessarily need to be revealed. Indeed, as discussed below, many researchers have published their own subjective estimates, usually in conjunction with a review of the important factors that contributed to their assessment. These holistic

direct assessments could be considered deficient because the assessors do not indicate how each factor contributes to the final overall probability assessment. To remedy this, a method must aggregate the contributions of the individual factors to yield a final risk assessment. We can do this with the whole evidence Bayesian method or evidential reasoning based on elicitation and combination of imprecise probabilities (see Sections 4 and 5, respectively). Methods that aggregate contributing factors could still be judged deficient because they do not capture a model of how the factors interrelate with and/or influence each other. One method that requires a model of the relationships between factors is known as Bayesian networks (see Section 6). The environmental scanning method also requires a causal model (see Section 7). Still, even these last two methods do not encompass a complete description of events that could lead to human extinction. <sup>91</sup>How exactly the human population drops from 7 billion to the death of the last individual). The extinction scenario anchoring method (see Section 8) involves presenting human extinction [sic] scenarios (i.e., written stories) to probability assessors to help them calibrate their probability assessments based on the likelihood of the scenarios coming to pass. As one can imagine, there are billions, if not trillions, of paths humanity could take over the next millennia. In the human extinction scenarios approach, assessors are only given a few examples of extinction paths to consider. We conclude with a method that relies on computationally intensive algorithms to generate trillions of scenario paths into the future and to identify those that end in human extinction (see Section 9). These seven methods do not exhaust all potential methods to estimating the risk of human extinction, but they do cover the range of methods that could be used—from a simple elicitation exercise to a sophisticated, computationally intensive approach. Together, they provide a framework for identifying and evaluating the types of strengths and weaknesses that could concern us with respect to any method for subjectively assessing the risk of human extinction. To guide our evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the seven methods, we use these nine criteria (our evaluations are summarized in Section 10): (1) Level of effort required by the probability assessors; (2) Level of effort needed to implement the approach, including updating; (3) Ability of each method to model the human extinction event; (4) Ability to incorporate scientific estimates of contributory events; (5) Transparency of the inputs and outputs; (6) Acceptability to the academic community (e.g., with respect to intellectual soundness, familiarity, verisimilitude); (7) Credibility and utility of the outputs of the method to the policy community; (8) Ease of communicating the approach's processes and output to nonexperts; and (9) Accuracy in other contexts. The level of effort required by the probability assessors refers to the demands the method places on the assessors. Similarly, the level of effort needed to implement the approach, including updating, refers to the amount of work needed to identify and aggregate the relevant information required by the method. These are relevant because a method that requires too little effort may have the appearance of being unbelievable while a method that requires too much effort may yield inconsistencies or inaccuracies if the probability assessor chooses not to engage in the type of work required to produce a useful result. The ability of each method to model the human extinction event refers to how well the method describes in mathematical and scientific language the potential event, including multiple causal pathways. A related criterion, ability to incorporate scientific estimates of contributory events, acknowledges the fact that human extinction could be the result of some contributory events and actions about which we do have some knowledge about their probability of occurrence. Together, these two criteria are relevant because they address the logical and scientific characteristics of the methods. The next four criteria—transparency of the inputs and outputs, acceptability to the academic community, credibility of the outputs to the policy community, and difficulty of communication—all relate to the ability to recreate and defend the results. If the inputs and outputs are unclear or untraceable, or the methodologies are not acceptable or credible, then the results have no value because scientists or policymakers will not appreciate them. Similarly, if it is difficult to communicate the results, they will not be understood and thus will not be used. Clearly, we cannot completely gauge the accuracy [sic] of any method for a human extinction event because we have no historic data upon which to base such judgments. Therefore, accuracy in other contexts captures the method's observed capability to yield accurate assessments of risks in other contexts. The implication is that successful application of a method in other contexts suggests that its application to the existential context should be given due consideration. It is important to emphasize that we do not assume that there is one right way, such as Bayesianism, to represent and reason about uncertainty with respect to human extinction. Not only are the academic arguments concerning the best way to deal with extreme uncertainties unresolved, and likely to remain unresolved, it is more prudent for humanity to adopt multiple methods given the stakes involved. We therefore provide an introduction to each method and note that it will be beneficial to find ways to distill and synthesize insights gained from multiple approaches. Along these lines, we conclude with recommendations for integrating the seven methods to estimate the risk of human extinction (Section 11).

## Extinction is acceptable below $10^{-20}$ chance

**Tonn and Stiefel 13** – professors of political science at University of Tennessee [Bruce and Dorian, “Evaluating Methods for Estimating Existential Risks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1772-1774, October 2013, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

1. INTRODUCTION I don't think the human race will survive the next thousand years, unless we spread into space. There are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet. Stephen Hawking(1) Catastrophic climate change, nuclear and biological wars, and pandemics threaten the continued existence of our species.(2-9) More exotic existential risks such as asteroids, super-volcanic eruptions, and potentially dangerous future technologies like runaway nanotechnology(10) and a singularity brought about by super-computer intelligences also deserve attention. (11) Fig. 1 presents a set of existential risks by source and interaction, along with a range of potential prevention and adaptation options. “How safe is safe enough?” is a seminal question posed within the field of risk analysis. (12) In response to this question, a research industry has grown to provide answers for a wide range of contexts. With respect to an individual's involuntary risks of death due to environmental risks, for example, an ad hoc risk level of  $10^{-6}$  has emerged as one answer. (13,14) Based on this ad hoc threshold, environmental policies are assessed and adopted. One could argue that the existence of even an ad hoc threshold serves to focus environmental policy discussions, analyses, decision making, and regulation. “How safe is safe enough?” has not been definitively answered with respect to global catastrophic risks (e.g., climate change), and with respect to the risk of human extinction. Tonn (15) is one of the first to tackle the question of what might be an acceptable risk of human extinction. Based on three statements of obligations to future generations, he derived an acceptable threshold of  $10^{-20}$ . Intuitively, this thresh- old seems logically compatible with the  $10^{-6}$  threshold for an individual death because the extinction of humanity may involve as many as eight to ten orders of magnitude more individuals, and many more if the nonexistence of future generations is also considered. As researchers continue to suggest acceptable risk thresholds, research is needed to develop methods to actually estimate larger scale risks. What, for example, is the risk of human extinction over the next several thousand years? Subject to concerns about scientific status, utility, and credibility, (16) well-known methods exist for estimating the risks of environmental hazards to individuals. In some cases, enough epidemiological data are available to estimate dose-response curves. When these data are not available, animal studies are often conducted, with the understanding that the results may be general- izable to humans under certain, well-specified condi- tions. Observational data are also routinely collected on the reliability of technical systems and their sub- systems (e.g., nuclear power plants), the frequency of occurrences of natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes), and the rate of accidents (e.g., automobiles). This is not the case with respect to existential risks. There is no database of previous human extinction events on earth or elsewhere in the universe that can be used to objectively estimate the probability of human extinction. There are many pieces of evidence, however, that can be brought to bear on this question. Reasonable individuals can be expected to disagree on the importance of any piece of evidence and also may differ on how best to structure methods to organize the evidence to best provide insights into the risks of human extinction. Thus, fundamentally, estimating the risk of human extinction is an essentially subjective exercise.

## Litany of paths to extinction – it's a question of probability

**Matheny 7** – formerly at Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, focused on existential risk [Jason, PhD in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins University, MPH from Johns Hopkins, MBA from Duke University, BA from the University of Chicago, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1336, October 2007, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

2. HUMANITY'S LIFE EXPECTANCY We have some influence over how long we can delay human extinction.

Cosmology dictates the up- per limit but leaves a large field of play. At its lower limit, humanity could be extinguished as soon as this century by succumbing to near-term extinction risks: nuclear detonations, asteroid or comet

impacts, or volcanic eruptions could generate enough atmospheric debris to terminate food production; a nearby supernova or gamma ray burst could sterilize Earth with deadly radiation; greenhouse gas emissions could trigger a positive feedback loop, causing a radical change in climate; a genetically engineered microbe could be unleashed, causing a global plague; or a high-energy physics experiment could go awry, creating a “true vacuum” or strangelets that destroy the planet (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2007; Leslie, 1996; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003). Farther out in time are risks from technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed in the next century or centuries. For instance, self-replicating nanotechnologies could destroy the ecosystem; and cognitive enhancements or recursively self-improving computers could exceed normal human ingenuity to create uniquely powerful weapons (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2007; Ikle, 2006; Joy, 2000; Leslie, 1996; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003). Farthest out in time are astronomical risks. In one billion years, the sun will begin its red giant stage, increasing terrestrial temperatures above 1,000 degrees, boiling off our atmosphere, and eventually forming a planetary nebula, making Earth inhospitable to life (Sackmann, Boothroyd, & Kraemer, 1993; Ward & Brownlee, 2002). If we colonize other solar systems, we could survive longer than our sun, perhaps another 100 trillion years, when all stars begin burning out (Adams & Laughlin, 1997). We might survive even longer if we exploit nonstellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how humanity will survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in  $10^{32}$  to  $10^{41}$  years (Adams & Laughlin, 1997). <sup>3</sup> Physics seems to support Kafka’s remark that “[t]here is infinite hope, but not for us.” While it may be physically possible for humanity or its descendents to flourish for  $10^{41}$  years, it seems unlikely that humanity will live so long. Homo sapiens have existed for 200,000 years. Our closest relative, homo erectus, existed for around 1.8 million years (Anton, 2003). The median duration of mammalian species is around 2.2 million years (Avise et al., 1998). A controversial approach to estimating humanity’s life expectancy is to use observation selection theory. The number of homo sapiens who have ever lived is around 100 billion (Haub, 2002). Suppose the number of people who have ever or will ever live is 10 trillion. If I think of myself as a random sample drawn from the set of all human beings who have ever or will ever live, then the probability of my being among the first 100 billion of 10 trillion lives is only 1%. It is more probable that I am randomly drawn from a smaller number of lives. For instance, if only 200 billion people have ever or will ever live, the probability of my being among the first 100 billion lives is 50%. The reasoning behind this line of argument is controversial but has survived a number of theoretical challenges (Leslie, 1996). Using observation selection theory, Gott (1993) estimated that humanity would survive an additional 5,000 to 8 million years, with 95% confidence. <sup>3</sup> ESTIMATING THE NEAR-TERM PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION It is possible for humanity (or its descendents) to survive a million years or more, but we could succumb to extinction as soon as this century. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. President Kennedy estimated the probability of a nuclear holocaust as “somewhere between one out of three and even” (Kennedy, 1969, p. 110). John von Neumann, as Chairman of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, predicted that it was “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war; and (2) that everyone would die in it” (Leslie, 1996, p. 26).

## **Extinction doesn’t outweigh everything—the quest for survival shouldn’t be allowed to destroy other values**

**CALLAHAN 1973** (Daniel, Institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in *Korematsu v. United States* (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in *Chance and Necessity*, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a “tyranny of survival.” There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of

course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

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## Extinction Inevitable

**Extinction inevitable – probably coming in the next 100 years.**

**Matheny 2007** (Jason G. Matheny, P.hD is a Program Manager at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007 Pg. 1335-1344 .nt)

2. HUMANITY’S LIFE EXPECTANCY We have some influence over how long we can delay human extinction. <sup>Consequentialism 95</sup> Cosmology dictates the upper limit but leaves a large field of play. At its lower limit, **humanity could be extinguished as soon as this century** by succumbing to near-term extinction risks: **nuclear detonations, asteroid or comet impacts, or volcanic eruptions could generate enough atmospheric debris to terminate food production; a nearby supernova or gamma ray burst could sterilize Earth with deadly radiation; greenhouse gas emissions could trigger a positive feedback loop, causing a radical change in climate; a genetically engineered microbe could be unleashed, causing a global plague; or a highenergy physics experiment could go awry, creating a “true vacuum” or strangelets that destroy the planet** (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2007; Leslie, 1996; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003). **Farther out in time are risks from technologies that** remain theoretical but **might be developed in the next century or centuries**. For instance, **self-replicating nanotechnologies could destroy the ecosystem; and cognitive enhancements or recursively self-improving computers could exceed normal human ingenuity to create uniquely powerful weapons** (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2007; Ikle, 2006; Joy, 2000; Leslie, 1996; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003). **Farthest out in time are astronomical risks. In one billion years, the sun will begin its red giant stage,** increasing terrestrial temperatures above 1,000 degrees, boiling off our atmosphere, and eventually forming a planetary nebula, **making Earth inhospitable** to life (Sackmann, Boothroyd, & Kraemer, 1993; Ward & Brownlee, 2002). If we colonize other solar systems, we could survive longer than our sun, perhaps another 100 trillion years, when all stars begin burning out (Adams & Laughlin, 1997). We might survive even longer if we exploit nonstellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how humanity will survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams & Laughlin, 1997).<sup>3</sup> Physics seems to support Kafka’s remark that “[t]here is infinite hope, but not for us.”

## Sub-extinction Events Good

### **Sub-extinction catastrophes are good—they buy time and prevent total extinction**

**WELLS 2009** (Dr. Willard Wells, Consultant, Applied Physics, Communication, Chief Scientist Emeritus, L-3 Photonics, Apocalypse when?: calculating how long the human race will survive, p. 5)

As we shall see, numerical results show that the risk of extinction is currently 3% per decade, while the risk of a lesser apocalyptic event, the collapse of civilization, is triple that, about 10% per decade, or 1% per year. The magnitude of these risks is comparable to ordinary perils that insurance companies underwrite. (Perhaps they should offer extinction insurance!) Both risks are proportional to world population. Every time the population doubles, so does our risk. Unless the population plummets soon, a near-extinction event will likely occur during the lifetime of today's infants. The collapse of civilization will be almost as deadly as extinction. However, for those who do survive, the aftermath will be a very safe time. Sparse population will protect outlying villages from epidemics. The biosphere will recover from human degradation, although perhaps with a changed climate and extinction of many species. Ironically, humanity's long-term survival requires a worldwide cataclysm. Without it we are like the dinosaurs. They seem to have expired because the big bolide (meteoric fireball) hit first without warning. Had there been precursors, near-extinctions, many species might have adapted well enough to survive the big one. Since humankind will likely suffer a near-extinction event: the probability of long term survival is encouragingly high, roughly 70%.

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## Magnitude Framing Good

### **High magnitude impacts must come first, even if they're improbable**

**Sandberg et al. 8** (Anders, Ph.D. in computational neuroscience from Stockholm University, and currently a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, Milan Cirkovic, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. He is also an assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, Jason Matheny, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, "How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?" [// AKONG](http://thebulletin.org/how-can-we-reduce-risk-human-extinction))

Humanity could be extinguished as early as this century by succumbing to natural hazards, such as an extinction-level asteroid or comet impact, supervolcanic eruption, global methane-hydrate release, or nearby supernova or gamma-ray burst. (Perhaps the most probable of these hazards, supervolcanism, was discovered only in the last 25 years, suggesting that other natural hazards may remain unrecognized.) Fortunately the probability of any one of these events killing off our species is very low--less than one in 100 million per year, given what we know about their past frequency. But as improbable as these events are, measures to reduce their probability can still be worthwhile. For instance, investments in asteroid detection and deflection technologies cost less, per life saved, than most investments in medicine. While an extinction-level asteroid impact is very unlikely, its improbability is outweighed by its potential death toll. The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law. Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations.

**High magnitude impacts are the most important - a one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point that extinction happens quantitatively outweighs their impacts**

**Bostrom 13** (Nick, Professor at Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Director, Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology University of Oxford, "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority", Global Policy Volume 4, Issue 1, February 2013 // AKONG)

But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in Figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1. Peace. 2. A nuclear war that kills 99 per cent of the world's existing population. 3. A nuclear war that kills 100 per cent. 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater. The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilisation began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilised human history. The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second (Parfit, 1984, pp. 453–454). To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literally astronomical. One gets a large number even if one confines one's consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least  $10^{16}$  human lives of normal duration. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is  $10^{34}$  years.<sup>7</sup> Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations) (Bostrom, 2003).<sup>8</sup> If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilisations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realised.<sup>9</sup> Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonisation and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of  $10^{16}$  human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilisation a mere 1 per cent chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere **one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point** is worth a **hundred billion times** as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even **the tiniest reduction** of existential risk has an expected value **greater than that of the definite provision of any 'ordinary' good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives.** And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.<sup>10</sup>

## High magnitude impacts outweigh high probability impacts – the risk of catastrophic harm like our impacts is uniquely pressing

**Sunstein 9** (Cass, Robert Walmsley University Professor and Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, “Worst Case Scenarios” // AKONG)

A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, of the modest kind just sketched, raises several questions. The most obvious is whether a low-probability risk of catastrophe might not deserve more attention than higher-probability risks, even when the expected value appears to be equal. The reason is that the loss of 200 million people may be more than 1,000 times worse than the loss of 2,000 people. Pause over the real-world meaning of a loss of 200 million people in the United States. The nation would find it extremely hard to recover. Private and public institutions would be damaged for a long time, perhaps forever. What kind of government would emerge? What would its economy look like? Future generations would inevitably suffer. The effect of a catastrophe greatly outruns a simple multiplication of a certain number of lives lost. The overall "cost" of losing two-thirds of the American population is far more than 100,000 times the cost of losing 2,000 people. The same point holds when the numbers are smaller. Following the collapse of a dam that left 120 people dead and 4,000 homeless in Buffalo Creek, Virginia, psychiatric researchers continued to find significant psychological and sociological changes two years after the disaster occurred. Survivors still suffered a loss of direction and energy, along with other disabling character changes.<sup>41</sup> One evaluator attributed this "Buffalo Creek Syndrome" specifically to "the loss of traditional bonds of kinship and neighborliness."<sup>42</sup> Genuine catastrophes, involving tens of thousands or millions of deaths, would magnify that loss to an unimaginable degree. A detailed literature on the "social amplification of risk" explores the secondary social losses that greatly outrun the initial effects of given events.<sup>43</sup> The harm done by the attacks of 9/11, for instance, far exceeded the deaths on that day, horrendous as those were. One telling example: Many people switched, in the aftermath of the attack, to driving long distances rather than flying, and the switch produced almost as many highway deaths as the attacks themselves, simply because driving is more dangerous than flying.<sup>44</sup> The attacks had huge effects on other behaviors of individuals, businesses, and governments, resulting in costs of hundreds of billions of dollars, along with continuing fear, anxiety, and many thousands of additional deaths from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. We might therefore identify a second version of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, also attuned to expected value but emphasizing some features of catastrophic risk that might otherwise be neglected: Regulators should consider the expected value of catastrophic risks, even when the worst-case scenario is highly unlikely. In assessing expected value, regulators should consider the distinctive features of catastrophic harm, including the "social amplification" of such harm. Regulators should choose cost-effective measures to reduce those risks and should attempt to compare the expected value of the risk with the expected value of precautionary measures.

## Our framing independently solves harms – overinvestment deters attacks

**Cox 8** – Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from MIT [Anthony, Editor-in-Chief of Risk Analysis: An International Journal, honorary full professor of Mathematics at University of Colorado, and President of Cox Associates, a Denver-based applied research company specializing in quantitative risk analysis, causal modeling, advanced analytics, and operations research, “Some Limitations of “Risk=Threat×Vulnerability× Consequence” for Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1754, December 2008, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

5.1. “Threat” Is Not Necessarily Well Defined Equation (1) assumes that a Threat probability number exists, at least in principle, reflecting the probability of an attack in a stated interval of time. However, if the attack probability in that interval depends on the assessed Threat number, then any estimate of Threat may be self-defeating. This occurs if attacker’s response to the Threat estimate (or to defender’s actions based on it) invalidates the estimate. In general, any

threat estimate that does not model how attackers respond to the threat estimate (and resulting defender actions) may be unreliable. This holds no matter how the threat estimates are arrived at, e.g., whether by Bayesian, frequentist, or other (e.g., game-theoretic) threat assessment. 5.1.1. Example: Self-Defeating Threat Predictions Suppose that two players, Attacker and Defender, engage in the following game. Stage 1: Defender estimates the Threat (=attack probability), Vulnerability, and Consequence values for each of M facilities. Defender identifies the N top-ranked (highest Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence values) facilities, where N < M reflects Defender's resource constraints. Stage 2: Attacker randomly selects K > 0 of the other (M - N) facilities to attack, with probabilities proportional to their Vulnerability × Consequence values (and independent of their estimated Threat probability numbers). (K reflects Attacker's resource constraints.) In this setting, assigning a high enough Threat value to a facility to place it in the top N facilities guarantees that it will not be attacked (true Threat and Risk = 0, conditioned on estimated Threat and Risk being sufficiently high). Thus, estimating a threat as high makes the true threat low. The concept of a threat as a static probability number that is "out there" to be estimated is fundamentally inadequate for protecting against informed, intelligent attackers if the threat estimate itself affects the threat being estimated. Although this example has used a deliberately simple pair of decision rules for Defender and Attacker, it illustrates that Attacker's strategy may exploit Defender's own threat estimates and ranking, thus undermining their predictive validity.

## **Large impacts should always outweigh small ones—their argument is an example of illogical scope neglect**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Three groups of subjects considered three versions of the above question, asking them how high a tax increase they would accept to save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds. The response - known as Stated Willingness-To-Pay, or SWTP - had a mean of \$80 for the 2,000-bird group, \$78 for 20,000 birds, and \$88 for 200,000 birds. (Desvousges et. al. 1993.) This phenomenon is known as scope insensitivity or scope neglect. Similar studies have shown that Toronto residents would pay little more to clean up all polluted lakes in Ontario than polluted lakes in a particular region of Ontario (Kahneman 1986); and that residents of four western US states would pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in those states than to protect a single area (McFadden and Leonard, 1995). The most widely accepted explanation for scope neglect appeals to the affect heuristic. Kahneman et. al. (1999) write: "The story constructed by Desvousges et. al. probably evokes for many readers a mental representation of a prototypical incident, perhaps an image of an exhausted bird, its feathers soaked in black oil, unable to escape. The hypothesis of valuation by prototype asserts that the affective value of this image will dominate expressions of the attitude to the problem - including the willingness to pay for a solution. Valuation by prototype implies extension neglect." Two other hypotheses accounting for scope neglect include purchase of moral satisfaction (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) and good cause dump (Harrison 1992). Purchase of moral satisfaction suggests that people spend enough money to create a 'warm glow' in themselves, and the amount required is a property of the person's psychology, having nothing to do with birds. Good cause dump suggests that people have some amount of money they are willing to pay for "the environment", and any question about environmental goods elicits this amount. Scope neglect has been shown to apply to human lives. Carson and Mitchell (1995) report that increasing the alleged risk associated with chlorinated drinking water from 0.004 to 2.43 annual deaths per 1,000 (a factor of 600) increased SWTP from \$3.78 to \$15.23 (a factor of 4). Baron and Greene (1996) found no effect from varying lives saved by a factor of ten. Fetherstonhaugh et. al. (1997), in a paper entitled "Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing", found evidence that our perception of human deaths, and valuation of human lives, obeys Weber's Law - meaning that we use a logarithmic scale. And indeed, studies of scope neglect in which the quantitative variations are huge enough to elicit any sensitivity at all, show small linear increases in Willingness-To-Pay corresponding to exponential increases in scope. Kahneman et. al. (1999) interpret this as an additive effect of scope affect and prototype affect - the prototype image elicits most of the emotion, and the scope elicits a smaller amount of emotion which is added (not multiplied) with the first amount. Albert Szent-Györgyi said: "I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the possible pulverization of our big cities, with a hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one man's suffering by a hundred million." Human emotions take place within an analog brain. The human brain cannot

release enough neurotransmitters to feel emotion a thousand times as strong as the grief of one funeral. A prospective risk going from 10,000,000 deaths to 100,000,000 deaths does not multiply by ten the strength of our determination to stop it. It adds one more zero on paper for our eyes to glaze over, an effect so small that one must usually jump several orders of magnitude to detect the difference experimentally.

**The fact that their impact is already happening causes us to overestimate it—every high magnitude impact should be seen as highly probable**

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**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Hindsight bias is when subjects, after learning the eventual outcome, give a much higher estimate for the predictability of that outcome than subjects who predict the outcome without advance knowledge. Hindsight bias is sometimes called the I-knew-it-all-along effect. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) presented students with historical accounts of unfamiliar incidents, such as a conflict between the Gurkhas and the British in 1814. Given the account as background knowledge, five groups of students were asked what they would have predicted as the probability for each of four outcomes: British victory, Gurkha victory, stalemate with a peace settlement, or stalemate with no peace settlement. Four experimental groups were respectively told that these four outcomes were the historical outcome. The fifth, control group was not told any historical outcome. In every case, a group told an outcome assigned substantially higher probability to that outcome, than did any other group or the control group. Hindsight bias is important in legal cases, where a judge or jury must determine whether a defendant was legally negligent in failing to foresee a hazard (Sancho 2003). In an experiment based on an actual legal case, Kamin and Rachlinski (1995) asked two groups to estimate the probability of flood damage caused by blockage of a city-owned drawbridge. The control group was told only the background information known to the city when it decided not to hire a bridge watcher. The experimental group was given this information, plus the fact that a flood had actually occurred. Instructions stated the city was negligent if the foreseeable probability of flooding was greater than 10%. 76% of the control group concluded the flood was so unlikely that no precautions were necessary; 57% of the experimental group concluded the flood was so likely that failure to take precautions was legally negligent. A third experimental group was told the outcome and also explicitly instructed to avoid hindsight bias, which made no difference: 56% concluded the city was legally negligent. Judges cannot simply instruct juries to avoid hindsight bias; that debiasing manipulation has no significant effect. Viewing history through the lens of hindsight, we vastly underestimate the cost of preventing catastrophe. In 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded for reasons eventually traced to an O-ring losing flexibility at low temperature. (Rogers et. al. 1986.) There were warning signs of a problem with the O-rings. But preventing the Challenger disaster would have required, not attending to the problem with the O-rings, but attending to every warning sign which seemed as severe as the O-ring problem, without benefit of hindsight.

**The magnitude of our impact causes underestimation—we don't want to believe the worst outcomes so we give defense more credibility than it deserves**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Wason's 2-4-6 task is a "cold" form of confirmation bias; people seek confirming but not falsifying evidence. "Cold" means that the 2-4-6 task is an affectively neutral case of confirmation bias; the belief held is logical, not emotional. "Hot" refers to cases where the belief is emotionally charged. Such as political argument. Unsurprisingly, "hot" confirmation biases are stronger - larger in effect and more resistant to change. Active, effortful confirmation biases are labeled motivated cognition (more ordinarily known as "rationalization"). As put by Brenner et. al. (2002) in "Remarks on Support Theory": Clearly, in many circumstances, the desirability of believing a hypothesis may markedly influence its perceived support... Kunda (1990) discusses how people who are motivated to reach certain conclusions attempt to construct (in a biased fashion) a compelling case for their favored hypothesis that would convince an impartial audience. Gilovich (2000) suggests that conclusions a person



does not want to believe are held to a higher standard than conclusions a person wants to believe. In the former case, the person asks if the evidence compels one to accept the conclusion, whereas in the latter case, the person asks instead if the evidence allows one to accept the conclusion. When people subject disagreeable evidence to more scrutiny than agreeable evidence, this is known as motivated skepticism or disconfirmation bias. Disconfirmation bias is especially destructive for two reasons: First, two biased reasoners considering the same stream of evidence can shift their beliefs in opposite directions - both sides selectively accepting only favorable evidence. Gathering more evidence may not bring biased reasoners to agreement. Second, people who are more skilled skeptics - who know a larger litany of logical flaws - but apply that skill selectively, may change their minds more slowly than unskilled reasoners. Taber and Lodge (2000) examined the prior attitudes and attitude changes of students when exposed to political literature for and against gun control and affirmative action. The study tested six hypotheses using two experiments: 1. Prior attitude effect. Subjects who feel strongly about an issue - even when encouraged to be objective - will evaluate supportive arguments more favorably than contrary arguments. 2. Disconfirmation bias. Subjects will spend more time and cognitive resources on contrary arguments than supportive arguments. 3. Confirmation bias. Subjects free to choose their information sources will seek out supportive rather than contrary sources. 4. Attitude polarization. Exposing subjects to an apparently balanced set of pro and con arguments will exaggerate their initial polarization. 5. Attitude strength effect. Subjects voicing stronger attitudes will be more prone to the above biases. 6. Sophistication effect. Politically knowledgeable subjects, because they possess greater ammunition with which to counter-argue incongruent facts and arguments, will be more prone to the above biases. Ironically, Taber and Lodge's experiments confirmed all six of the authors' prior hypotheses. Perhaps you will say: "The experiment only reflects the beliefs the authors started out with - it is just a case of confirmation bias." If so, then by making you a more sophisticated arguer - by teaching you another bias of which to accuse people - I have actually harmed you; I have made you slower to react to evidence. I have given you another opportunity to fail each time you face the challenge of changing your mind. Heuristics and biases are widespread in human reasoning. Familiarity with heuristics and biases can enable us to detect a wide variety of logical flaws that might otherwise evade our inspection. But, as with any ability to detect flaws in reasoning, this inspection must be applied evenhandedly: both to our own ideas and the ideas of others; to ideas which discomfort us and to ideas which comfort us. Awareness of human fallibility is a dangerous knowledge, if you remind yourself of the fallibility of those who disagree with you. If I am selective about which arguments I inspect for errors, or even how hard I inspect for errors, then every new rule of rationality I learn, every new logical flaw I know how to detect, makes me that much stupider. Intelligence, to be useful, must be used for something other than defeating itself. You cannot "rationalize" what is not rational to begin with - as if lying were called "truthization". There is no way to obtain more truth for a proposition by bribery, flattery, or the most passionate argument - you can make more people believe the proposition, but you cannot make it more true. To improve the truth of our beliefs we must change our beliefs. Not every change is an improvement, but every improvement is necessarily a change. Our beliefs are more swiftly determined than we think. Griffin and Tversky (1992) discreetly approached 24 colleagues faced with a choice between two job offers, and asked them to estimate the probability that they would choose each job offer. The average confidence in the choice assigned the greater probability was a modest 66%. Yet only 1 of 24 respondents chose the option initially assigned the lower probability, yielding an overall accuracy of 96% (one of few reported instances of human underconfidence). The moral may be that once you can guess what your answer will be - once you can assign a greater probability to your answering one way than another - you have, in all probability, already decided. And if you were honest with yourself, you would often be able to guess your final answer within seconds of hearing the question. We change our minds less often than we think. How fleeting is that brief unnoticed moment when we can't yet guess what our answer will be, the tiny fragile instant when there's a chance for intelligence to act. In questions of choice, as in questions of fact. Thor Shenkel said: "It ain't a true crisis of faith unless things could just as easily go either way." Norman R. F. Maier said: "Do not propose solutions until the problem has been discussed as thoroughly as possible without suggesting any." Robyn Dawes, commenting on Maier, said: "I have often used this edict with groups I have led - particularly when they face a very tough problem, which is when group members are most apt to propose solutions immediately." In computer security, a "trusted system" is one that you are in fact trusting, not one that is in fact trustworthy. A "trusted system" is a system which, if it is untrustworthy, can cause a failure.

When you read a paper which proposes that a potential global catastrophe is impossible, or has a specific annual probability, or can be managed using some specific strategy, then you trust the rationality of the authors. You trust the authors' ability to be driven from a comfortable conclusion to an uncomfortable one, even in the absence of overwhelming experimental evidence to prove a cherished hypothesis wrong. You trust that the authors didn't unconsciously look just a little bit harder for mistakes in equations that seemed to be leaning the wrong way, before you ever saw the final paper. And if authority legislates that the mere suggestion of an existential risk is enough to shut down a project; or if it becomes a de facto truth of the political process that no possible calculation can overcome the burden of a suggestion once made; then no scientist will ever again make a suggestion, which is worse. I don't know how to solve this problem. But I think it would be well for estimators of existential risks to know something about heuristics and biases in general, and disconfirmation bias in particular.

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### **The magnitude of our impact justifies evaluation even if the probability is very low**

**RESCHER 2003** (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, *Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy*, p. 51)

This is clearly not something that can be resolved in a once-and-for-all manner. It may vary from case to case and possibly even from individual to individual, changing with the "cautiousness" of the person involved, representing an aspect of an individual's stance toward the whole risk-taking process. And it may also be taken to vary with the magnitude of the stake at issue. It seems plausible to allow the threshold of effective zerohood to reflect the magnitude of the threat at issue, taking lower values as the magnitude of the stake at issue increases. (Such a policy seems in smooth accord with the fundamental principle of risk management that greater potential losses should be risked only when their chances for realization are less.)

## Magnitude Framing Bad

**Reject their magnitude first claims – can't calculate effects with low probability and not real world**

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6.2. Assessing the Probability for Harm Ultimately the issue of probability is fundamental for assessing risks. Within formal cost-benefit analysis it seems necessary not only to identify some increased possibility of some adverse effect, but to be able to give a reasonably precise estimate of that increase, both for the contemplated course of action and for its alternatives. For otherwise it would simply be impossible to know which course of action gives the greatest net expected benefits (Hansson 1993, 2009). However, as we have already seen in the discussion of Perry's argument above, the notion of probability is not unproblematic. After all, any action or event either will, or will not, in fact cause an adverse consequence. How then, should we understand the idea that an event increases the probability of another event? It appears that there is no metaphysical property of actions themselves that are of the kind 'to cause a 0.1 probability of death'. Actions are not metaphysical entities that have perfectly calibrated roulette guns attached to them that, with mathematical precision, will release, or shoot off, a certain effect at a fixed percentage of the times it is performed. In some areas it is in principle possible to apply a frequency theory of probability, for there are large data sets with fairly stable frequencies, in such areas as transport safety, although we must acknowledge the 'problem of the reference class' identified above. In other areas, such as nuclear power, it appears that there is a potential for a particular type of catastrophic event which in its precise details has happened perhaps only once (e.g., Chernobyl, or the very different circumstances at Fukushima). For other types no such incident has occurred, but it would be quite wrong to conclude that their probability is zero. To try to estimate probabilities it is sometimes possible to undertake a 'critical factor' analysis, looking at the probability of failure of critical components and the probability of several failing at once to create a disastrous result. For some factors frequency data may exist, but for others not, and estimates for new technology may be over-optimistic, so we return to the same problem. And we can never be sure that we have identified all the possible sources of failure (Shrader-Frechette 1990 for a similar point, and see also Chs 5, 6 in ShraderFrechette 1985a and 1980: 83ff for discussion about estimating probabilities in risk assessments). In the end, analysts will depend on estimates based on theory and judgement which may have a confidence interval of orders of magnitude. In such circumstances, cost-benefit analysis, or indeed any form of quantified risk assessment, is highly problematic as it will rest on risk assessments that can be highly contentious. 6.3. Valuing Risk/Life Perhaps even more problematic than the estimation of probabilities is the numerical evaluation of magnitude of the possible adverse outcome, or as this amounts to in most cases, deciding how much money should be spent to save a life, however cold and inhumane this may seem. In order to make such a programme appear less objectionable it is often pointed out that, first, in risk cost-benefit the cost is not actual death, but small risks of deaths spread out over many people (Schelling 1968/1984), and, second, in real life we are prepared to increase our risk of death for the sake even of the trivial benefit of crossing a road a few seconds before the signal indicates it is safer to do so. Equally, we are prepared to pay money to increase our safety, in buying smoke alarms, better quality products, and so on. Hence paying to reduce risk, or trading risk for convenience, is a perfectly ordinary part of life. It is this observation that lies behind Leonard and Zeckhauser's suggestion above that risk management should seek to mimic the market as far as possible (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1986). In the UK at the present time regulations suggest that if a safety modification would save a 'statistical life' (i.e. one fewer death can be expected) at a cost of less than about £1.3m then there is a statutory duty to introduce it. (For further discussion see Wolff 2006, 2007, Hansson 2007b.) One issue that immediately arises is how to put a financial value on risks to life and health. To pursue that in detail is beyond the scope of the present paper, but in brief, common methods base valuations on what individuals are prepared to pay to reduce small risks (willingness to pay—WTP), or the compensation they need to run them (willingness to accept

compensation—WTA), either as revealed in their market behaviour (revealed preferences) or through hypothetical scenarios revealed in laboratory conditions. None of this, of course, is entirely straightforward (Jones-Lee et al. 1985) and as even advocates of such approaches have pointed out, it is possible to get a very wide range of values from studies, and hence the robustness of any particular figure is highly questionable, even if, as may not be the case, the general method is accepted (Beattie et al. 1998, Wolff and Orr 2009). In sum, then, consequentialist approaches to risk face two types of difficulties. First, there are philosophical doubts about the ethics of maximization given concerns about fair distribution of risk. Second there are a range of technical and philosophical questions about the derivation of the various numbers that need to be used in making the analysis of expected costs and benefits. This problem is amplified by Hansson's claim that in practice we generally face questions of uncertainty rather than risk, and in such cases cost-benefit analysis appears little help (Hansson 2009).

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## **Magnitude first impact framing regresses into inaction and will never be real world**

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Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment ([http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1)) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements for example the early Jesus movement have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action. None of this is to deny at least this is my current sense that human action is contributing to global warming. But what our response to this news should be is another matter entirely.

## **Magnitude-first framing sacrifices the future to the present – preserves the status quo at the cost of freedom**

**Wildavsky 79** – professor of Political Science on leave at UC Berkeley [Aaron, president of the Russell Sage Foundation, former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley, “No Risk Is the Highest Risk of All: A leading political scientist postulates that an overcautious attitude toward new technological developments may paralyze scientific endeavor and end up leaving us less safe than we were before,” American Scientist, pp. 32-35, January 1979, JSTOR, Accessed 6/29/15]//schnall

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Will you and I be able to breathe amidst the noxious fumes of industrial pollution? Will we be able to eat with poisonous substances entering our orifices? How can we sleep knowing that the light of the life giving sun may be converted into death rays that burn our bodies to a crisp? How do we know that our mother's milk does not contain radiation or our meats putrefaction or our water cancer-causing chemicals? Should people be allowed to take risks? Or should cars and factories be engineered so that risks can't be taken? Seat belts do increase driver and passenger safety; is it enough to tell people about them or must cars be required to have them or, since belts can be circumvented, should air bags be installed that inflate upon impact, whether the driver wants them or not? Deodorant commercials may urge, "Don't be half-safe!" but is it possible or desirable to be all safe? What sort of society raises these questions insistently everywhere one turns? How extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best-protected, most resourceful civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its way to becoming the most frightened. Has there ever been, one wonders, a society that produced more uncertainty more often about everyday life? It isn't much, really, in dispute—only the land we live on, the water we drink, the air we breathe, the food we eat, the energy that supports us. **Chicken Little is alive and well in America.** Evidently, a mechanism is at work ringing alarms faster than most of us can keep track of them. The great question is this: Is there something new in our environment or is there something new in our social relations? Is it our environment or ourselves that have changed? Would people like us have had this sort of concern in the past? Imagine our reaction if most of modern technology were being introduced today. Anyone aware of the ambience of our times must be sensitive to the strong possibility that many risks, such as endless automotive engine explosions, would be postulated that need never occur, or, if they did, would be found bearable. Wouldn't airliners crash into sky scrapers that would fall on others, killing tens of thousands? Who could prove otherwise? Even today there are risks from numerous small dams far exceeding those from nuclear reactors. Why is the one feared and not the other? Is it just that we are used to the old or are some of us looking differently at essentially the same sorts of experience? The usual way to resolve differences about the effects of technology is to rely on expert opinion—but the experts don't agree. Experts are used to disagreeing but they are hot so used to failing to understand why they disagree. The frustration of scientists at the perpetuation rather than the resolution of disputes over the risks of technology is a characteristic feature of our time. So is the complaint of citizens that they no longer feel they are in touch with a recognizable universe. Unable or unwilling to depend on governmental officials or acknowledged experts, beset by the "carcinogen-of-the-month club," people see their eternal verities turn into mere matters of opinion. Is it the external environment that creates uncertainty over values, or is it a crisis in the culture that creates the values? Physical harm or nervous trauma caused by accident or attack was either less prevalent in the past or no worse than it is now. Each generation is richer in human ingenuity and purchasing power than its predecessor. People at the same ages are healthier than they once were—except possibly at the oldest ages, because so few made it that far in the good old days.

Industrial accidents occurred more often and with greater severity and were attended to less frequently and with little success. Anyone who thinks otherwise knows little of the disease-ridden, callous, and technically inept past. As Aharoni has said (1): The hazards to health in the last century, or even a few decades ago, were many times greater than they are today; the probability of a deep depression fifty years ago was much greater than that of a much smaller recession today; water pollution in <sup>107</sup>some lakes at the beginning of the century was at such a high level that no fish could exist in the water, and pollution and sanitary conditions in the cities often caused epidemics. Pneumonia, influenza and tuberculosis were fatal diseases at the beginning of the century and the majority of the population suffered many hazards almost unknown today, such as spoiled food, nonhygienic streets, recurring waves of diphtheria, dangerously exposed machinery in factories, a variety of hazards in the rural areas with almost no doctors around, and so on. Why is it that so much effort is put into removing the last few percent of pollution or the last little bit of risk? Why do laws insist on the best available technology rather than the most

cost-effective? Is it that we are richer and more knowledgeable and can therefore afford to do more? Why, then, if accidents or health rates are mainly dependent on personal behavior, does the vast bulk of governmental resources go into engineering safety in the environment rather than inculcating it into the individual? Perhaps the answer is that government can compel a limited number of companies, whereas it cannot coerce a multitude of individuals. This answer is its own question: Why aren't individuals encouraged or allowed to face or mitigate their own risks? The great question asked here might be rephrased to inquire why risk is no longer individualized but is socialized, requiring a collective governmental response. Put this way, the question turns into an anomaly: since another important answer to the expansion of concern about risk is the decline of trust in government to give appropriate warning, why is risk being collectivized at the same time as the collective responsive mechanism is thought defective? Even if the theory of increasing risk were reasonable, so many evils appear to lurk about us that it would, in any event, be necessary to choose among them. Since the awful things that do occur must be vastly exceeded by the virtually infinite number that may occur, societies might well exhaust their energies in preventive measures. Risks as well as resources must be allocated.

Reducing risks is not riskless **Risk cannot be reduced for everyone. The sheer supply of resources that have to be devoted to minimizing risk means** that surpluses are less likely to be available for unforeseen shocks. What is spent to lessen risk cannot be used to increase productivity. Since there is a scheme of progressive taxation (and perhaps regressive tax avoidance), the **costs are borne disproportionately by classes of people whose ability to meet other contingencies must be proportionately reduced. Rather than rely on a priori argument, however, it is desirable to distinguish various ways in which attempting to lower risks** actually raises them or, alternatively, **displaces them on to other objects.** Risk displacement has, in fact, become routine. When the conditions for certifying drugs are made difficult, a consequence is that far more tests are done on foreigners, who are generally poorer and possess far fewer resources with which to alleviate any unfortunate consequences. **Resistance to nuclear power** and other forms of energy **does not necessarily mean that the demand for energy decreases but may well signify that energy must be imported,** thereby, for example, **flooding Indian lands to create dams in Canada.** Eliminating certain pesticides and fertilizers in the United States may result in less food and higher food prices in countries that import from us. Alternatively, food might be favored at the expense of flying, as a National Academy of Science News Report expressed it (2): Clearly, food production is more vital to society than stratospheric aviation ..., and limiting the use of nitrogen in food production [if both nitrogen fertilizer and jet fuel damage the atmosphere] would not appear to be an acceptable [control] strategy. In one area after another the possible personal risk must be weighed against the probable personal harm. Nitrates might cause cancer, but they are also preservatives that guard against botulism. Early and frequent sexual intercourse with plenty of partners appears related to cervical cancer (hence the low reported rate among nuns), but the same phenomenon may be linked to lesser rates of breast cancer (hence the higher rates among nuns). Women who suffer frequent hot flashes relieved by estrogens must choose between probable relief now or possible cancer later. The trade-offs become apparent when different government agencies, each in charge of reducing a single risk, insist on opposing policies. In order to reduce accidents, for instance, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ordered the meat industry to place guardrails between carcasses and the people who slaughtered them; but the Food and Drug Administration forbade guard rails because they carry disease to the workers. Risk management would be easy if all you had to do was reduce one risk without worrying about others. If it were merely a matter of being cautious, all of us might do well to err on the safe side. However, not only do we not know or agree on how safe is safe, but **by trying to make ourselves super-safe, for all we know, we may end up super-sorry.** Not only are there risks in reducing risks, but safety features themselves, as with catalytic converters on cars, may become a hazard. The more safeguards on line in an industrial plant, the greater the chance that something will go wrong. **Safety may become its own defect,** and the new "safe" technologies may turn out to be more harmful than the ones they replaced. The superior safety of solar versus nuclear energy, for example, has become virtually an article of faith. Yet, as a Canadian study shows, if the entire production process (not merely the day-to-day workings) are considered, nuclear is considerably safer than solar, with natural gas the safest of all. How could that be? Solar energy is inefficient compared to nuclear. Since so much more effort per kilowatt generated is involved in producing solar panels and piping, the normal relative accident rate in industry is far greater for solar than for nuclear power production—and the evidence for the number of people falling off roofs or chemicals leaking into heated water is not in yet (3)! The dilemma of risk is the inability to distinguish between risk reduction and risk escalation. Whether there is risk of harm, how great it is, what to do about it, whether protective measures will not in fact be counterproductive are all in contention. So far the main product of the debate over risk appears to be uncertainty. Analyzing the argument in the abstract, divorced from confusing content, may help us understand its central tendencies. Planet Earth has a fragile life-support system whose elements are tightly linked and explosive and whose outcomes are distant and uncertain. Because the effects of current actions have long lasting future consequences, the interests of future generations have to be considered. **Because the outcomes are uncertain, calculations have to be conservative:** when in doubt, don't. If the moral is "Don't start what you can't stop," the conclusion will probably be "This trip isn't strictly necessary." Indeed, **this is the central tendency: under most circumstances most of the time doing little is safer than risking much.** The consequence for scientists is that you can't do anything that won't have unanticipated effects. If required to give a guarantee that future generations will be better off in regard to every individual action, the scientist (or the businessman or the politician) cannot so certify. **By what right,** one may ask, **does anyone enrich himself by endangering future**

generations? By what right, it may be asked in return, does anyone impoverish the future by denying it choice? What would you have to believe about the future to sacrifice the present to it? It is not necessary to postulate a benevolent social intelligence that is a guarantee of good no matter what happens in order to believe that a capable future will be able to take care of itself. The future can acquire new strengths to compensate for old weaknesses; it can repair breakdowns, dampen oscillations, divert difficulties to productive paths. Not to be able to do this implies that consequences which current actions create are both unique and irreversible, so that acceptable alternatives are no longer available and cannot be created. Without more knowledge than anyone possesses about most phenomena, it is difficult to see how this claim could be made with confidence. Rather, the reverse appears plausible: **the future is being sacrificed to the present.** Fear of the future is manifested by preempting in the present what would otherwise be future choices. The future won't be allowed to make mistakes because the present will use up its excess resources in prevention. One way of looking at this is that cocoonlike concern for the future leads to sacrifice of present possibilities; another way is that **the purveyors of prevention want not only to control the present but, by preempting its choices, the future as well.** The politics of prevention **Reducing risk for some people some place requires increasing it for others elsewhere.** For if risk is not in infinite supply, it also has to be allocated, and less for me may mean more for you. The distribution of risk, like the allocation of uncertainty, becomes an ordinary object of political contention (4). **Insofar as the argument over risk is about power** (who will bear the costs of change?), **the observation that it occasions political passions is less surprising.** Most accidents occur at home and most industrial accidents are traceable to individual negligence. Yet remedies are sought in governmental regulation of industry, and the onus for adverse experience is increasingly placed on manufacturers, not on users of products. Indeed, product liability insurance has become such a major impediment to doing business, especially for small firms, that Congress is considering subsidizing the cost. The risks of carelessness in use and/or in manufacture are thus spread among the population of taxpayers. But is a political approach mandated when individuals do not choose to follow healthy habits? If individuals eat regularly, exercise moderately, drink and smoke little, sleep six to eight rather than four to fourteen hours a night, worry a little but not too much, keep their blood pressure down, drive more slowly, wear seat belts, and otherwise take care of themselves, they would (on the average) live longer with far fewer illnesses. Evidently, they don't do these things, but they are increasingly asking government to constrain their behavior (mandating seat belts, imposing speed limits) or to insure them against the consequences (by paying medical bills or providing drug rehabilitation programs). Politicization follows socialization, and politicization is not inadvertent but is a direct consequence of attempting to shift the burden of risk. Most of the time most decisions are reactions to what has already happened. Within changing circumstances, **security depends on our collective capacity to cope**—after the fact—**with various disasters.** Suppose, however, that collective confidence wanes, either because of decreasing trust in internal social relations or increasing menace from without. The institutions through which people relate may be in disrepute, or the environment perceived as precarious, so that the slightest error spreads, causing catastrophe throughout the system. **The evils that do crop up are limited,** if by nothing else, **by our capacity to recognize them.** But the evils that might come about are potentially limitless. **Shall we err by omission, then, taking the chance that avoidable evils if anticipated might overwhelm us? Or shall we err by exhaustion, using up our resources to forestall the threat of possible evils that might never have occurred in order to anticipate unperceived but actual disasters that might do us in?** The centerpiece of the call to swift, centralized action is the domino theory—generalized to include the evils of domestic policy. Once we feared that an unfriendly regime in Laos would bring the inevitable "fall" of Vietnam and Cambodia, which in turn would undermine Thailand, and then the Philippines, then even Japan or West Berlin. Our alliances appeared a tightly linked, explosive system, in which every action carried a cumulative impact, so that if the initial evil were not countered, the international system would explode. As in the past we saw the inevitability of the balance of power, so **now we see each domestic action linked inextricably to the next.** **When all systems are interrelated, a single mistake opens the door to cumulative evils.** The variety of areas to which **this approach** might be applied **can be seen from the numerous calls for impact statements.** Inflation, energy, health, research, safety, and now war **impact statements have permeated the smallest segments of governmental activity.** Understanding the impacts in any one of these areas could be effective. But **identifying impacts, in essence, is a claim for special priority.** **To include all possible impacts makes for a world of all constants** and no variables, **with no room for trade-offs,** bargaining, or judgment. **If all policy areas could be subject to interrelated impact statements, we would achieve an anticipatory democracy.** In that world we would expect each policy area to take on those same characteristics prominent at the height of the cold war: secrecy, "cooperation" with or **deference to executive leadership,** and an insistence on the moral authority of **the president to make these (unending) crucial choices.** **A preventive policy,** in fact, **could succeed only if it were invested with enormous faith** (action in the absence of things seen), **for that is what is required to trust**

leadership when it acts to control dangers that cannot yet be observed by the rest of us. This pattern might be called the collectivization of risk: citizens may not choose what dangers they will face. Individual judgment and choice is replaced by governmental action that wards off potential evils automatically before they materialize. Yet if leaders act to avoid every imagined evil, where will their control end—or begin? What will the fight be over? Money, naturally. The politics of prevention is expensive. The cost of anticipating evils, whether or not they materialize, is enormous. (Biologists tell of organisms that die not so much because of invasion by lethal foreign bodies but rather because the attack arouses all defense mechanisms of the organism at once, thereby leading to annihilation by exhaustion.) Ways must be found, therefore, either to raise huge sums by taxation or to get citizens to bear the cost personally.

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#### **No-risk society is a daydream and trades away our freedom**

**Wildavsky 79** – professor of Political Science on leave at UC Berkeley [Aaron, president of the Russell Sage Foundation, former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley, “No Risk Is the Highest Risk of All: A leading political scientist postulates that an overcautious attitude toward new technological developments may paralyze scientific endeavor and end up leaving us less safe than we were before,” American Scientist, pp. 37, January 1979, JSTOR, Accessed 6/29/15]//schnall

Reprise **The vision of a no-risk society may be considered a caricature.** What about risks of the middle range? No one wants to get hurt by a product that contains hidden dangers. Thalidomide that deforms babies is a case in point. Nor would anyone relish the thought of delayed effects, like black lung diseases from coal mining or radiation from plutonium piling, debilitating our bodies. Error, ignorance, and avarice may combine to cause harm. Identifying and eliminating or modifying these effects is evidently in order. When harmful effects are immediate, obvious, and traceable to the substance, regulatory action can be relatively straightforward. But when hazards are hidden, or caused by unforeseen combinations, or delayed over long periods of time, correction involves compromise between safety and stultification. When most substances are assumed safe and only a few are judged harmful, the line may be drawn against risking contact. But when the relationship is reversed, when most substances are suspect and few are safe, refusing risk may become ruinous. It is not, in other words, the individual instance but the across-the-board concern with contamination that is of cultural significance. Theodore Roosevelt was fond of dividing people into those who pointed with pride or viewed with alarm. On an a priori basis, without understanding, there should at any time be ample reason to do both. What I want to know is why the most resourceful society of all times does so little pointing and so much viewing, for asking others to take over risks may be tantamount to inviting them to take away our freedom.

#### **Reject their framing – probability neglect destroys cost-benefit analysis**

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 62-63, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

If someone is predisposed to be worried, degrees of unlikeliness seem to provide no comfort, unless one can prove that harm is absolutely impossible, which itself is not possible.<sup>1</sup> Affect-rich outcomes yield pronounced overweighting of small probabilities ...<sup>2</sup> On Sept. 11, Americans entered a new and frightening geography, where the continents of safety and danger seemed forever shifted. Is it safe to fly? Will terrorists wage germ warfare? Where is the line between reasonable precaution and panic? Jittery, uncertain and assuming the worst, many people have answered these questions by forswearing air travel, purchasing gas masks and radiation detectors, placing frantic calls to pediatricians demanding vaccinations against exotic diseases or rushing out to fill prescriptions for Cipro, an antibiotic most experts consider an unnecessary defense against anthrax. I. RISKS, NUMBERS, AND



REGULATION Consider the following problems: \* People live in a community near an abandoned hazardous waste site. The community appears to suffer from an unusually high number of deaths and illnesses. Many members of the community fear that the hazardous waste site is responsible for the problem. Administrative officials attempt to offer reassurance that the likelihood of adverse health effects, as a result of the site, is extremely low.<sup>4</sup> The reassurance is met with skepticism and distrust. \* An airplane, carrying people from New York to California, has recently crashed. Although the source of the problem is unknown, many people suspect terrorism. In the following weeks, many people who would otherwise fly are taking trains or staying home. Some of those same people acknowledge that the statistical risk is exceedingly small. Nonetheless, they refuse to fly, in part because they do not want to experience the anxiety that would come from flying. \* An administrative agency is deciding whether to require labels on genetically modified food. According to experts within the agency, genetically modified food, as such, poses insignificant risks to the environment and to human health. But many consumers disagree. Knowledge of genetic modification triggers strong emotions, and the labeling requirement is thought likely to have large effects on consumer choice, notwithstanding expert claims that the danger is trivial. How should we understand human behavior in cases of this sort? My principal answer, the thesis of this Essay, is that when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not on its likelihood. That is, they are not closely attuned to the probability that harm will occur. At the individual level, this phenomenon, which I shall call "probability neglect," produces serious difficulties of various sorts, including excessive worry and unjustified behavioral changes. When people neglect probability, they may also treat some risks as if they were nonexistent, even though the likelihood of harm, over a lifetime, is far from trivial. Probability neglect can produce significant problems for law and regulation. As we shall see, regulatory agencies, no less than individuals, may neglect the issue of probability, in a way that can lead to either indifference to real risks or costly expenditures for little or no gain. If agencies are falling victim to probability neglect, they might well be violating relevant law.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, we shall see that the idea of probability neglect helps illuminate a number of judicial decisions, which seem implicitly attuned to that idea, and which reveal an implicit behavioral rationality in important pockets of federal administrative law. As we shall also see, an understanding of probability neglect helps show how government can heighten, or dampen, public concern about hazards. Public-spirited political actors, no less than self-interested ones, can exploit probability neglect so as to promote attention to problems that may or may not deserve public concern. It will be helpful to begin, however, with some general background on individual and social judgments about risks.

## **Imagining their scenario has already made you biased – err on the side of probability**

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, "Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 70, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

II. PROBABILITY NEGLECT: THE BASIC PHENOMENON When it comes to risk, a key question is whether people can imagine or visualize the worst-case outcome.<sup>39</sup> When the worst case produces intense fear, surprisingly little role is played by the stated probability that that outcome will occur.<sup>40</sup> An important function of strong emotions is thus to drive out quantitative judgments, including judgments about probability, by making the best case or the worst case seem highly salient.<sup>41</sup> But it is important to note that probability neglect can occur even when emotions are not involved. A great deal of evidence shows that whether or not emotions are involved, people are relatively insensitive to differences in probabilities, at least when the relevant probabilities are low.

## Reject their casino dialogue – invoking images of terrorism is throwing you off your game

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 80-83, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

E. Other Evidence Probability neglect, when strong emotions are involved, has been confirmed in many studies.<sup>93</sup> Consider, for example, experiments designed to test levels of anxiety in anticipation of a painful electric shock of varying intensity, to be administered after a “countdown period” of a stated length. In these studies, the stated intensity of the shock had a significant effect on physiological reactions. But the probability of the shock had no effect. “Evidently, the mere thought of receiving a shock is enough to arouse individuals, but the precise likelihood of being shocked has little impact on level of arousal.”<sup>94</sup> A related study asked people to provide their maximum buying prices for risky investments, which contained different stated probabilities of losses and gains of different magnitudes.<sup>95</sup> Happily for the standard theory, maximum buying prices were affected by the size of losses and gains and also by probabilities. (Note that for most people, this experiment did not involve an affect-rich environment.) But—and this is the key point—reported feelings of worry were not much affected by probability levels.<sup>96</sup> In this study, then, probability did affect behavior, but it did not affect emotions. The point has independent importance: Worry is an individual loss, even if it does not influence behavior.<sup>97</sup> And in most of the cases dealt with here, intense emotions drive out concern about probability, and hence both behavior and worry are affected. Several studies have attempted to compare how people respond to differences in the probability of harm with how people respond to differences in the emotions associated with certain risks.<sup>98</sup> These studies hypothesized that certain low-probability risks, such as those associated with nuclear waste radiation, produce outrage, whereas other low-probability risks, such as those associated with radon exposure, do not. A central finding is consistent with that stressed here: A large difference in probability had no effect in the “high outrage” condition, with people responding the same way to a risk of 1/100,000 as to a risk of 1/1,000,000.<sup>99</sup> More striking still: Even when the risk was identical in the nuclear waste (high outrage) and radon (low outrage) cases, people in the nuclear waste case reported a much greater perceived threat and a much higher intention to act to reduce that threat.<sup>100</sup> Indeed, “the effect of outrage was practically as large as the effect of a 4000-fold difference in risk between the high-risk and low-risk conditions.”<sup>101</sup> Efforts to communicate the meaning of differences in risk levels, by showing comparisons to normal risk levels, reduced the effect of outrage, but even after those efforts, outrage had nearly the same effect as a 2000-fold increase in risk.<sup>102</sup> A great deal of information appears to be necessary to counteract the effects of strong emotions—showing that people are not impervious to such information, but that when emotions are involved, a great deal of careful work has to be done.<sup>103</sup> It should not be surprising, in this light, that visualization or imagery matters a great deal to people’s reactions to risks.<sup>104</sup> When an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly concerned about a risk, holding probability constant.<sup>105</sup> Consider the fact that when people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses resulting from “terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance from all causes.<sup>106</sup> The evident explanation for this peculiar result is that the word “terrorism” evokes vivid images of disaster, thus crowding out probability judgments. Note also that when people discuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the likelihood of harm really is infinitesimal.<sup>107</sup> One reason is that the discussion makes it easier to visualize the risk and hence to fear it. Note that if probability neglect is involved, this is not a point about the availability heuristic, which leads people not to neglect probability, but to answer the question of probability by substituting a hard question (What is the statistical risk?) with an easy question (Do salient examples readily come to mind?).<sup>108</sup> The point here is not that visualization makes an event seem more probable (though this is also often true), but that visualization makes the issue of probability less relevant or even irrelevant. In theory, the distinction between use of the availability heuristic and probability neglect should not be obscure. In practice, of course, it will often be hard to know whether the availability heuristic or probability neglect is driving behavior. Emotional reactions to risk, and probability neglect, also account for “alarmist bias.”<sup>109</sup> When

presented with competing accounts of danger, people tend to move toward the more alarming account.<sup>10</sup> In the key study demonstrating alarmist bias, W. Kip Viscusi presented subjects with information from two parties, industry and government. Some subjects were given low-risk information from government and high-risk information from industry; other subjects were given high-risk information from government and low-risk information from industry. The basic result was that people treated "the high risk information as being more informative."<sup>11</sup> This pattern held regardless of whether the low-risk information came from industry or from government. Thus, people show "an irrational asymmetry."<sup>12</sup> If the discussion here is correct, one reason for this asymmetry is that information, whatever its content, makes people focus on the worst case. There is a lesson for policy: It might not be helpful to present people with a wide range of information, containing both more assuring and less assuring accounts. The most sensible conclusion is that with respect to risks of injury or harm, vivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can "crowd out" other kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is very small."<sup>13</sup> "If someone is predisposed to be worried, degrees of unlikelihood seem to provide no comfort, unless one can prove that harm is absolutely impossible, which itself is not possible."<sup>14</sup> With respect to hope, those who operate gambling casinos and state lotteries are well aware of the underlying mechanisms. They play on people's emotions in the particular sense that they conjure up palpable pictures of victory and easy living. With respect to risks, insurance companies and environmental groups do exactly the same. The point explains "why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear power and exposure to extremely small amounts of toxic chemicals fail to recede in response to information about the very small probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards."<sup>15</sup>

# Overarching

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## Risk Calculus Bad

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### \*\*\*Bias

**Risk calculus is functionally useless – it's impossible to have a holistic and unbiased perspective on all the factors.**

**Whipple 81** (Chris Whipple PhD 40 years of experience in managing risks to human health and the environment, "Energy Production Risks: What Perspective Should We Take?" Risk Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1981 .nt)

2. ~~CALCULATING THE RISKS~~ <sup>Consequentialism 116</sup> As C. Northcote Parkinson pointed out, ' **people** have a tendency to **allocate excessive time and attention to** analytically **tractable or familiar problems, and insufficient time to intuitively important yet analytically difficult problems**. This observation seems particularly appropriate for energy risk analysis- where, for example, the health risks of low-level radiation have received several orders of magnitude more attention than the risks of war over oil resources.<sup>01</sup> There are many aspects of the problem of assessing energy risks which reflect this tendency. 2.1 Omitted Effects **Risks involving social interactions are** in general **more difficult to analyze than those which are more technical** (i.e., requiring analysis in the physical sciences, engineering, or the medical sciences). **Examples** of these complex risks **include sabotage and the international political risks** associated with energy, such as **nuclear weapons proliferation** and **energy embargos**. The difficulty in assessing, even in retrospect, the impact of **the Three Mile Island accident illustrates this point. The predominant impact** of the accident was not the several man-rems of radiation exposure which occurred. Instead it **was the stress suffered by those living near the plant and the longer-term influence of the accident on national energy policies**.

## **\*\*\*Budget**

### **Budget affects optimal risk calculations – how many lives are you willing to sacrifice?**

**Cox 8** – Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from MIT [Anthony, Editor-in-Chief of Risk Analysis: An International Journal, honorary full professor of Mathematics at University of Colorado, and President of Cox Associates, a Denver-based applied research company specializing in quantitative risk analysis, causal modeling, advanced analytics, and operations research, “Some Limitations of “Risk=Threat×Vulnerability× Consequence” for Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1753, December 2008, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

4.1. Example: Priority Ranking May Not Support Effective Resource Allocation 4.1.1. Setting Suppose that an agency must allocate a limited budget to reduce risks of terrorist attacks. Three opportunities have been identified to reduce risks, as follows: • Act A reduces risk from 100 to 80. It costs \$30. • Act B reduces risk from 50 to 10. It costs \$40. • Act C reduces risk from 25 to 0. It costs \$20. Here, “risk” is measured on a scale such as expected casualties in the event of an attack, i.e., it is a conditional risk. (This example can also be constructed so that all three acts start from the same base level of risk, say 50, and A, B, and C reduce risk by 20, 40, and 25, respectively. Using different base levels allows for the possibility that options A, B, and C protect different subpopulations.) The goal for resource allocation is to achieve the largest possible total risk reduction for the available budget. Problem: What priority ranking of A, B, and C achieves the largest risk reduction from allocation of limited funds, if resources are allocated from the top of this priority list down until they are exhausted? Solution: No priority ranking exists that answers this question. Instead, the correct answer depends on the budget. For a budget of \$45, the largest feasible risk reduction is achieved by funding B, so the best priority order puts B first. If the budget is \$50, then funding A and C achieves the greatest risk reduction, so B should be ranked last. At \$60, the best investment is to fund B and C, so now A should be ranked last. Thus, no rank ordering of A, B, and C optimizes resource allocations independent of the budget. For example, no possible rank order is optimal for budgets of both \$49 and \$50. The difficulty illustrated here is that resource constrained investments in reducing risks cannot in general be optimized using priority rankings. Resource allocation problems that can be solved this way have been characterized, (6) but selecting a portfolio of expensive risk-reducing activities to maximize the risk reduction achieved is not a problem of this type.

## \*\*\*Conservative

**Cost-benefit analysis is decidedly conservative – ascribing arbitrary numbers to values ensures continuation of the status quo**

**Skrzycki 9** – regulatory columnist for Bloomberg News [Cindy, “Is Sunstein a Sheep in Wolf’s Clothes?,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 17, 2009, LexisNexis, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

Cass Sunstein, the new president's choice to oversee rules for everything from global warming to workplace safety, may be a regulatory sheep in wolf's clothing. Mr. Sunstein's support for cost-benefit analysis, balancing the costs of proposed federal rules against their benefits, makes him look more like an industry-friendly Bush appointee than a crusader for reining in corporations, some supporters of President Barack Obama say. As head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Mr. Sunstein, a Harvard Law School professor, would be the arbiter of debates on rules for auto safety, environmental protection, union organizing and dozens of other issues. Some critics question his commitment to imposing tougher standards on companies. "Progressives have expressed concern because Professor Sunstein's long track record on regulatory issues is decidedly conservative," said seven law professors in a Jan. 26 paper published by the Center for Progressive Reform, an Edgewater, Md., academic policy research organization. "We fear that Cass Sunstein's reliance on cost-benefit analysis will create a regulatory fiefdom in the White House that will deal with needed regulations in very much the same way that the Bush administration did," Rena Steinzor, a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law, said in releasing the report. Skeptics interpret his prolific writings as conservative, pointing to an article he wrote last year in which he questioned the authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to regulate. "The appointment is a little bit strange," said Sidney Shapiro, one of the authors of the report and a professor at Wake Forest University School of Law in Winston-Salem, N.C. "He pumps out all this great scholarship which puts him left of center on many issues. Just not this one." Mr. Sunstein, 54, was a colleague of Mr. Obama's at the University of Chicago, a friend and an informal adviser. He hasn't yet been formally nominated for the post that administration officials say he has been selected for. The position is in anticipation of Mr. Sunstein's eventual confirmation hearing before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. The panel, at the urging of advocacy groups, is likely to ask him about his philosophy of regulation and how he will use the power of his post within the Office of Management and Budget. Critics said Mr. Sunstein would use economics to decide if it's worthwhile to invest heavily in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Some say he knows the limitations of depending on just numbers to justify regulation while still using such calculations. Groups that say they want to reverse neglect of health and safety rules during the Bush administration are drawing a line in the regulatory sand, said Jeffrey Lubbers, administrative law professor at American University's Washington College of Law. Still, just because Mr. Sunstein "is rigorous on regulatory analysis doesn't make him a conservative," he said. Interest is high in how Mr. Sunstein will perform because the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has wide reach over the execution of an administration's regulatory agenda. Over the years, OMB and its regulatory office have tightened control over how rules are made and the economic analysis that must go into them. Critics of that approach want OMB's role to be advisory, or nonexistent, leaving it to federal agencies to make rules at the direction of Congress. Many environmental, consumer and public health groups object to use of cost-benefit analysis, viewing it as a tool to block rules. They object to the practice of assigning monetary value to human life and longevity and to intangibles such as a pristine mountain view, fewer child cases of asthma or clean water. They argue the Bush administration depended on inflated cost estimates from industry and created an eight-year drought in health and safety regulation. Now, they are worried they may have to run the cost-benefit gauntlet again with Mr. Sunstein. What skeptics are doing is cherry-picking sometimes provocative academic writings that cover his views on how the public perceives risk, how government should evaluate risk, and the regulatory response to it. Others, who have worked with Mr. Sunstein, have said he's a creative and pragmatic thinker. Mr. Sunstein has written books that address the thorniest aspects of regulation, including "The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection," "Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment" and "Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle." "Groups all over town are looking at his writing and trying to see what they mean," said Rick Melberth, director of federal regulatory policy at OMB Watch in Washington. There aren't many other tea leaves to read because Mr. Sunstein isn't allowed to talk to the press. His boss-to-be, OMB Director Peter Orszag, said during his own confirmation hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, "We need to re-examine how we can best protect public health, the environment and public safety through the regulatory process." The administration began that exercise when it announced on Jan. 30 that it would overhaul the procedures in place since 1993 for reviewing rules at OMB. It also eliminated two earlier executive orders that were widely criticized for exerting more White House control over the regulatory process. Regulatory experts said it was unlikely that the Obama administration would forsake looking carefully at the cost of the rules it proposes that



affect ailing industries, such as autos, when the economy is in a ditch. Adam Finkel, a former Labor Department official, who now is executive director of the University of Pennsylvania Law School Program on Regulation, said he hoped Mr. Sunstein would moderate his views. "When you do it right, you see there are a lot of things we need to regulate significantly." Frank O'Donnell, president of Clean Air Watch said in a blog posting: "It would seem vital for senators to quiz Sunstein closely. He shouldn't get a pass just because he was nominated by Obama."

### Consequentialism 119

## **\*\*\*Errors**

### **Statistical errors in probability invalidate their extinction claims**

**Ludwig 99** – Departments of Mathematics and Zoology, University of British Columbia [Donald, “Is It Meaningful to Estimate a Probability of Extinction?,” Ecological Society of America, Ecology, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 298, January 1999, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

INTRODUCTION Population viability analysis (PVA) has been a popular tool for conservation biology since its development (Shaffer 1981, Gilpin and Soule 1986, Shaffer 1987). PVA offers the prospect that sophisticated mathematical tools can be used to provide quantitative estimates of important quantities relating to threatened populations, such as the expected time to extinction or the probability of surviving for a target period such as 100 yr. More recently several authors have raised doubts about the usefulness of estimates derived from PVA. Here I raise some additional doubts based upon statistical difficulties. I consider the effect of possible errors in counts or estimates in population data, and the consequences for the precision of the resulting estimates of the probability of survival. If unaccounted for, such errors may produce a serious bias in estimates of quantities such as the intrinsic growth rate and carrying capacity. In addition, data containing observation errors are less informative than data that are free of error. When this difference is taken into account, confidence intervals are lengthened. In the majority of cases where I have applied the technique to population data, extremely wide confidence intervals result from the corrected analysis. The confidence intervals are so wide that the analysis provides little or no information about the magnitude of extinction probabilities. An additional difficulty is the possibility of natural catastrophes, which may produce much larger probabilities of extinction than otherwise (Mangel and Tier 1994, Ludwig 1996). Since catastrophes are rare by definition, data will seldom be available to estimate the frequency or size distribution of catastrophes. These severe statistical difficulties preclude simple patterns of decisionmaking that are appropriate for well-identified and predictable systems. Instead, some form of decision-making that takes explicit account of uncertainty appears to be required. There is substantial disagreement in the literature concerning the usefulness of PVA for conservation purposes. I first describe some general surveys of PVA and its uses, and then I examine three possible defects of the method: (1) the lack of precision of the estimates for the probability of extinction, (2) the sensitivity of such estimates to model assumptions, and (3) the lack of attention to important factors influencing the extinction of populations.

### **Default to probability – they capitalize on fear and fail to account for uncertainty**

**Ludwig 96** – Departments of Mathematics and Zoology, University of British Columbia [Donald, “Uncertainty and the Assessment of Extinction Probabilities,” Ecological Society of America, Ecological Applications, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 1067-8, November 1996, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

INTRODUCTION Assessments of population viability or probability of extinction are important parts of efforts to mitigate or control human impacts upon natural populations (Soule 1987). The main objective of this work is to point out the large differences between the results of calculations of extinction probabilities that ignore our uncertainty and those that take uncertainty into account. I argue below that proper assessments must take account of uncertainty and that Bayesian decision theory is an appropriate means to this end. In ecological investigations the difficulties in performing properly controlled experiments over appropriate scales in space and time and the complexity of the underlying genetics, behavior, and component processes preclude clear inference in most situations. We are faced with the problem of making assessments when several or many competing hypotheses may be plausible in light of the data. A simple approach to inference via hypothesis testing is often inconclusive, since the null hypothesis is seldom rejected but the power of our tests to reject is often low. Under such circumstances it is foolish to adopt an estimate for the probability of extinction

based upon a null hypothesis when it has not been properly challenged. A second possible approach is to select the most likely hypothesis via a least squares or maximum likelihood estimation and **calculate a probability of extinction based upon the "best estimate."** Such an approach ignores our uncertainty. It is not a reliable guide to policy since it fails to take other plausible hypotheses into account (Lindley 1985, Morgan and Henrion 1990). A third approach to decision might be to attempt to minimize some risk or loss under the most unfavorable circumstances imaginable. Since there is no limit to the fertility of the human imagination, such a policy may be prisoner to the wildest current fear. It is better to attempt to assess the relative plausibilities of the various hypotheses and weight them accordingly. The statistical theory of decision was devised for this purpose (Chernoff and Moses 1959, Winkler 1972, Berger 1985, Lindley 1985). I shall follow that approach. The fundamental difference between standard (frequentist) statistical theory and statistical decision theory (Bayesian statistics) is in the interpretation of the term "probability" and the associated random variables. To a frequentist, "probability" can only refer to the result of an infinite series of trials under identical conditions, while a Bayesian interprets "probability" to refer to the observer's degree of belief. Weather forecasts or betting odds are often stated in terms of Bayesian probabilities. In such cases there is no question of an infinite series of trials under identical conditions, but rather an organized appraisal in light of previous experience. In the present context where only limited data are available and uncertainty is large, the Bayesian interpretation is more appropriate. Some scientists have difficulty in accepting Bayesian methods and interpretations in view of their apparent arbitrariness and subjectivity. These objections deserve a more lengthy discussion than can be given here (Lindley 1971). A short answer is that nothing in Bayesian theory is as arbitrary as the choice of 5% or 1% significance levels or the choice of null hypotheses. The "subjectivity" in Bayesian inference lies in the choice of the prior density for unknown parameters, and in differing amounts and types of information available to various observers. There are systematic methods to choose or elicit priors (e.g., Wolfson et al. 1996). They have the advantage that the corresponding assumptions are explicit, while often similar assumptions about sampling distributions in frequentist inference are unexamined (Berger 1985). The fact that Bayesian theory takes account of differences between observers is an advantage. It allows us to examine the differences in assessments and decisions due to varying amounts of information, and hence to assess the value of additional information. In this work I show how Bayesian methods may be used to calculate the probability of extinction from population census data. In order to simplify the exposition, I have neglected a number of important features, such as possible inaccuracy in the census data and random "catastrophes." These neglected features are important, but the simplified theory is adequate to assess the importance of including uncertainty. I develop a population dynamics model, a formula for the probability of early collapse, and a statistical model for estimation of the population parameters. I then contrast Bayesian linear regression theory with a frequentist treatment. These results are used to obtain the Bayes posterior distribution for the parameters. Finally, I contrast the Bayesian result with a conventional maximum likelihood approach for three data sets.

## **There's always a risk extinction doesn't occur – means we can't weigh the impact**

**Ludwig 96** – Departments of Mathematics and Zoology, University of British Columbia [Donald, "Uncertainty and the Assessment of Extinction Probabilities," Ecological Society of America, Ecological Applications, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 1074, November 1996, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

CONCLUDING REMARKS The major conclusion of this work is that the great difference between maximum likelihood estimates of extinction probabilities and corresponding Bayes estimates should not be ignored in a proper assessment. However, the present work cannot be used to make a proper assessment because it neglects some important effects. It ignores errors and inaccuracies in the census data. These are known to cause severe bias in estimates and to lead to underestimation of the uncertainty in the resulting estimates (Ludwig and Walters 1981, Walters and Ludwig 1981). The calculations given here ignore the effects of occasional catastrophes upon extinction probabilities. This neglect is known to lead to under-estimates of the probability of extinction (Ludwig 1996). The Gompertz model and the diffusion approximation were used here in order to simplify later calculations: they should not be used without an investigation of their accuracy (Ludwig 1996). Nevertheless, these defects do not affect the validity of the conclusion that point

estimates are inappropriate for assessment of extinction probabilities. A similar contrast between results from point estimates such as maximum likelihood and the Bayes estimates may be expected whenever the quantity of interest (in the present case, the probability of early population collapse) varies strongly and asymmetrically with one or more of the unknown parameters (Ellison 1996). Such quantities as the expected time to extinction or a minimum viable population may be expected to have similar properties, but I do not recommend their use for assessment (Ludwig 1996). One might wonder whether a proper assessment is feasible in light of the difficulties noted above. I believe that all of the difficulties listed above can be overcome, but the calculations will require much more computing resources than the present work (D. Ludwig, unpublished manuscript) and very extensive data sets. This leaves open the issues of <sup>Consequentialism.122</sup> ageor stage-structured populations, spatial effects, genetics, and a host of species and ecosystem-specific considerations. We may never achieve a proper assessment that includes all that should be included. However, present attempts at management of natural populations typically make a systematic underestimation of hazards (Ludwig et al. 1993). We can strive to eliminate this unfortunate bias.

## Errors in analysis – sequencing and arbitrary interpretations

**Cox 8** – Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from MIT [Anthony, Editor-in-Chief of Risk Analysis: An International Journal, honorary full professor of Mathematics at University of Colorado, and President of Cox Associates, a Denver-based applied research company specializing in quantitative risk analysis, causal modeling, advanced analytics, and operations research, “Some Limitations of “Risk=Threat×Vulnerability× Consequence” for Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1754, December 2008, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

\*we reject gendered language

5.1.2. Example: Ambiguity of Threat Estimates Suppose that an adversary will attack a facility within the next year if and only if he knows that the attack will succeed with probability at least 0.8. Suppose that a perfectly reliable and well-calibrated vulnerability assessment expert announces that the probability that an attack on the facility will succeed (assuming, for purposes of the vulnerability assessment, that it is attempted) is 0.33, based on knowledge that an attack can succeed if and only if the adversary has a secret weapon (or inside help, etc.), and the probability of obtaining this required advantage in the next year is only 0.33. A threat assessment expert knowing these probability numbers might well conclude that the facility will not be attacked in the next year (since  $0.33 < 0.8$ ). But in reality, the probability of an attack on this facility in the next year is 0.33, the probability that the adversary will gain the secret weapon and then attack. (A 100% chance of a 33% chance of success at the time the adversary makes a go-no go decision would indeed guarantee no attack, but a 33% chance of a 100% chance of success does not.) 5.2. “Vulnerability” Can Be Ambiguous and Difficult to Calculate via Event Trees The concept of “vulnerability” as the conditional probability that an attack succeeds, given that it is attempted, is vague about how the attack is conducted and what contingency plans an attacker uses if some setbacks are encountered. These details can greatly affect the calculated vulnerability values. 5.2.1. Example: Ambiguity of Attack Success Probabilities Elicited from Experts, Due to Unspecified Implications of an Attack Suppose that we ask an expert in terrorism risk analysis for (a) the probability that a certain facility will be attacked within the next year (the “threat” to that facility) and (b) the probability that an attack will succeed in destroying or compromising the facility, assuming that an attack is made (the “vulnerability” of the facility). The expert knows (although we do not) that an attack will be made in the next year if and only if the potential attackers first obtain a device that is guaranteed to make the attack successful. Any attack made without that device will fail. The probability that the device is obtained in the next year is 1/3. Based on this knowledge, the answer to question (a) is that the threat is 1/3. But the correct answer to question (b) depends on exactly how the expert interprets the question. If she interprets “assuming that an attack is made” to mean

“assume that an attack is made, whether or not the attackers have the device,” then the probability that the attack will succeed is only 1/3 (the probability that the device is obtained prior to the attack). But if she interprets “assuming that an attack is made” to imply that the attackers will necessarily have the device (since otherwise they would not attack), then the probability that the attack will succeed is 1. Which answer, 1/3 or 1, the expert gives in response to question (b) depends entirely on her assumptions about the implications of the assumption that an attack is made. Because no uniquely correct interpretation or set of implications is specified as part of the question, there is no unique correct answer. Using such elicited probabilities to allocate resources makes the allocation depend on interpretations of ambiguous hypothetical conditions, rather than on how terrorists will actually behave. Consequentialism<sup>123</sup> suggests that event tree analysis can be used to estimate vulnerability numbers because the question of exactly how plans, contingency plans, and adaptive responses (and, if necessary, replanning) of intelligent agents should be modeled so that they can be represented as event trees. The following examples show that treating activities of intelligent attackers as random variables in a standard event tree is generally not adequate for modeling how determined intelligent attackers learn from failure and adaptively modify their plans and behaviors. Risk assessment approaches that do not model such features of intelligent attacks can underestimate risks and misallocate resources.

### \*\*\*Feelings

#### **Risk analysis can never be technical – our feelings get in the way**

**Durodie 8** – associate fellow of the International Security Programme at Chatham House [Bill, “Between Iraq and a hard place,” The Times Higher Education Supplement, pp. 50 No. 1830, January 31, 2008, LexisNexis, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

Upon reaching the final page of University of Chicago professor Cass Sunstein's latest book on risk, two reasonable assumptions consequently inform his political (he would probably say ethical) persuasions first, that he opposed military intervention in Iraq in 2003, and, second, that he favours far-reaching international action on climate change. These are both perfectly respectable, if debatable, positions. It seems, however, as if this distinguished-service professor of jurisprudence, like many others across the political spectrum nowadays, is rather loath to debate things. Rather, he is in search of a technical tool to decide matters for us. Sunstein has found this in risk management. He starts off well enough, wanting to steer us on a course between the opposing perils of inaction and overreaction in the face of potentially catastrophic risks. The US, unlike Europe, he proposes, has developed an exaggerated fear of terror attacks while simultaneously underestimating the consequences of global warming. Why is this? His book, aimed at a wide audience, usefully debunks a number of myths along the way. American Republicans are not as intransigent as is often made out. He reminds readers that it was the US that originally led the charge on combating climate change, while Europeans developed the precautionary principle, invoked in going to war in Iraq. As others have done before him, Sunstein shows how little logic there is in precaution. Various used to justify both action and inaction, its consequences can be as uncertain as the uncertainties it is called upon to ward against. Hence, for Sunstein, war in Iraq to reduce the risk of terror would always create new risks that we would then have to live with. But this is where the analysis of a Chicago Law School lawyer is exposed as being as limited as those of both the pro-war and anti-war lobbies. Iraq should have been about more than calculating risk-risk tradeoffs. Political principles, such as state sovereignty, were at stake too. And no risk-management process can defend these. Unlike others who may read this book, I have no problem with the use of cost-benefit analysis or future discounting, although, as Sunstein accepts, neither is an exact science. However, when to the best of our abilities all the facts and pseudo-facts are in, decision-making in a democracy still remains a politically contested arena. It is never just information that determines policy, but rather how that information is interpreted through particular outlooks. Hence, absence of evidence for weapons of mass destruction might mean that they are not there, or that they are extremely well hidden. Either way, facts become secondary to the framework we apply to the world. Citing the work of Paul Slovic and others, Sunstein reveals his own preference for the influence of emotional and psychological factors over cultural and sociological ones. In this regard he is in tune with the times. A society that is little more than an aggregate of individuals has trouble conceptualising the import and impact of broader forces. Thus it is almost as an afterthought that he notes in his conclusions: "Of course, well-organized groups, the media and political leaders have power to influence the underlying dynamics." But there is precious little about these in the remaining pages. Perhaps they could serve as the subject for a future book? In fact, Sunstein unconsciously reveals the answer to the problems he addresses very early on in the book. Whenever he worried as a child, his mother would ask: "What's the worst that could happen?" Sunstein confides that "her confidence was contagious". It is precisely societies without confidence that obsess about worst-case scenarios.

## **\*\*\*Government**

### **Government inconsistent in risk analysis – only uses precautionary principle for military action**

**Loewenberg 3** – journalist who covers policy and politics [Samuel, "Precaution Is for Europeans," New York Times, May 18, 2003, LexisNexis, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

HERE'S another example of how the United States has decided that Europe is stuck in the past. Bush administration officials are exasperated with Europe's belief in the precautionary principle, a better-safe-than-sorry approach to regulating everything from corn flakes to chemical plants. As outlined in a treaty of the European Union, governments should regulate industries when they pose risks to public health and the environment -even before all the data about the threat has been collected. In keeping with this precautionary approach, Europe has prohibited bioengineered crops and American beef treated with growth hormones, and is now crafting legislation that will require chemical companies to spend billions of dollars on safety tests of their products. But what looks like a question of safety to the Europeans often seems more like protectionism to the United States. The Bush administration believes the precautionary principle is an unjustified constraint on business and does not even recognize the existence of the doctrine. "We consider it to be a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn," said John D. Graham, the administrator at the Office of Management and Budget in charge of vetting new regulations, in a recent speech to European Union regulators. The United States was once a leader in precautionary legislation. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, both enacted in the 1970's with bipartisan support, explicitly allow regulators to act in the face of uncertain findings. But in the Reagan era, precautionary regulation was seen as an enemy of the free market. It was not just a Republican aversion. Though the Clinton administration was far more active in adopting health and environmental regulations, it battled Europe over the bans on genetically engineered foods and hormone-treated beef. But the Bush administration has actively challenged the very premise on which the European actions are based. In a telephone interview, Mr. Graham said that rather than believing in a single precautionary principle, the administration acts when it determines that the economic and health benefits outweigh the costs. Before implementing a rule, the administration calculates the evidence of harm, the relative risk to a population and whether the effect on the population justifies taking regulatory measures. Mr. Graham cited the government's tightening of limits on diesel fuel emissions as an example of how his agency can act preventively when the numbers add up. "In the Bush administration, the focus is on smarter regulation, defined as applying science, engineering and economics, to proposed rules," said Mr. Graham, who became known for his cost-benefit theories after founding the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. Mr. Graham said that when he started in 2001, his office challenged dozens of rules proposed by federal agencies, but these days his office has not needed to send any rules back, as agencies have learned what is acceptable. Critics argue that Mr. Graham's cost-benefit analyses often lead to the delay or watering down of health and environmental regulations. "It is a cloak in many respects for limiting regulation without having to be openly antienvironmental or antiworker or anticonsumer," said Gary D. Bass, the director of OMB Watch, a government watchdog group. For instance, President Bush withdrew from the international agreement on reducing carbon emissions in order to limit global warming, arguing that more data was needed before taking action. In another split, Europe recently required industry to run extensive health and environmental tests on the 30,000 most common chemicals. Nearly all of these chemicals have been around for decades, but European officials say little data is available on the vast majority of the chemicals, and that the potential benefits more than justify the cost to industry. The Bush administration is up in arms over the proposal. The American Chemistry Council, the industry's main trade group, contends that the European Union wants to "eliminate all risks from daily life" and "replace science with speculation." The United States has a voluntary program in which companies disclose information on 2,200 of their most common chemicals. Mr. Graham says this is equally precautionary and a better use of limited resources. Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago who is writing a book on the precautionary principle, believes that strict adherence to the principle can be counterproductive -like curbs on biotechnology, which, he says, could help feed the developing world. At the same time, he argues that it is unreasonable for governments to demand absolute certainty

before they act. "It's nutty to require conclusive evidence when the risk, if it comes to fruition, is extremely serious," Mr. Sunstein said. This was the logic, Mr. Sunstein notes, of President Bush's pre-emptive strike on Iraq. President Bush argued that the risk of weapons of mass destruction was great enough to warrant an attack, without absolute proof that Iraq was hiding such weapons. That's the precautionary principle, American-style.

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### **\*\*\*Media**

#### **Cognitive risk analysis is skewed by media coverage and outcome uncertainty.**

**Renn 84** (Ortwin Renn, Professor of Environmental Sociology and Technology Assessment at the University of Stuttgart, "PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO STUDY RISK PERCEPTION" Environment International, Vol. 10, pp. 557-575, 1984 Nuclear Research Centre, Programme Group: Technology and Society .nt)

In consequentialism investigations suggest a different conclusion: most **people are not able to give reasonable judgements if asked to evaluate potentials of catastrophes. Since their experience with catastrophes is rather limited, their judgement about uncertain events can only be based on media coverage or general cognitive heuristics. If a risk source has been extensively covered by the media, people tend to overestimate the potential fatalities.** In the case that media or intuitive fantasy does not provide easily accessible images of disaster, **people heuristically perceive the risks of disaster stemming from various risk sources as being of the same order of magnitude.** Orientation towards the mean value is psychologically a typical response pattern when confronted with a stimulus that evokes high uncertainty. In addition, correlation analyses between perceived catastrophe potentials and risk perception indicated that, with the exception of a few risk sources, catastrophe potentials do not exercise a dominant influence on risk perception.

### **\*\*\*Narcissism**

**Decisions based on impact calculus are purely metaphysical and thus narcissistic – it is best to let society operate independent of personal moral judgements.**

**Davidson 15** (Marc D. Davidson, researcher and lecturer, University of Amsterdam environmental ethics and economics “Climate change and the ethics of discounting” WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:401–412. doi: 10.1002/wcc.347 .nt)

Some economists have argued that although **the choice of discount** rate may be a matter of ethics, it **should not be freely chosen** by governments, economists, or moral philosophers **on the basis of** their **own personal moral views**. To safeguard principles of democracy and consumer sovereignty, **the choice of the discount rate ought to be based on the preferences society reveals through the intertemporal choices made in actual saving behavior reflected through capital markets** (see e.g., Ref 42, pp. 113–114; Ref 43, pp. 57–58; Ref 44, p. 97; Ref 45, pp. 132–133; Ref 46). According to these economists, **a person’s saving is not aimed only at his or her own consumption and market rates would therefore reflect present people’s judgments of the benefits to future people too**. Marglin, for example, **called basing the discount rate on one’s own moral view ‘an authoritarian rejection of individual preferences’**<sup>47</sup> (p. 197) and considered it ‘axiomatic that a democratic government reflects only the preferences of the individuals who are presently members of the body politic’<sup>44</sup> (p. 97). In the IPCC’s Third Assessment, Arrow et al.<sup>4</sup> called this **the descriptive approach, in contrast to the prescriptive approach** that sees no difficulty in basing the discount rate on one’s own moral analysis (see for further discussion of this distinction<sup>48</sup>). More recently, the descriptive approach has been advocated by Nordhaus<sup>7</sup> and Weitzman<sup>49</sup> (p. 712), among others. In response to the moral choices made by Stern<sup>6</sup> in his Review, Nordhaus<sup>7</sup> (p. 691) remarks that The Review takes the lofty vantage point of the world social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers of the British Empire, in determining the way the world should combat the dangers of global warming. The world, according to Government House utilitarianism, should use the combination of time discounting and consumption elasticity that the Review’s authors find persuasive from their ethical vantage point.<sup>b</sup>

## \*\*\*Solvency

### Solvency outweighs risk

**Cox 8** – Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from MIT [Anthony, Editor-in-Chief of Risk Analysis: An International Journal, honorary full professor of Mathematics at University of Colorado, and President of Cox Associates, a Denver-based applied research company specializing in quantitative risk analysis, causal modeling, advanced analytics, and operations research, “Some Limitations of “Risk=Threat×Vulnerability× Consequence” for Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1753, December 2008, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

4. RISK RANKINGS ARE NOT ADEQUATE FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION After a risk assessment has been completed, how can its results be used to improve risk management decision making? One common answer is that risk managers should rank order estimated risks from highest to lowest based on the risk assessment results, and then allocate risk management resources to risk-reducing countermeasures (e.g., for vulnerability reduction or consequence mitigation) from the top of the list down, until available resources have been spent. For example, a Department of Energy (DOE) report states that: the risk values are then determined and ranked from the highest to the lowest producing a relative risk ranking. Obviously, resources should be used to reduce the vulnerabilities or mitigate the consequences from the highest ranked threat scenarios first. In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, it is stated “Protecting America’s critical infrastructures thus require that we determine the highest risks. ...” In planning security upgrades at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a select committee was established and this relative risk ranking concept was used for ordering the upgrade schedule.(5) However, allocating resources “to reduce the vulnerabilities or mitigate the consequences from the highest ranked threat scenarios first” may not be an effective way to allocate defensive resources to reduce risks. Effective risk management requires considering risk reductions achieved by different allocations of limited resources. These are not necessarily implied by the sizes of different risks because countermeasures may only partly reduce risks and because costs of different countermeasures constrain which ones can be implemented with available budget. In addition, if the optimal portfolio of risk-reducing activities requires diversifying defensive investment across multiple types of facilities with uncertain but correlated risks, then any priority rule that ranks all instances of one type above all instances of another is obviously inconsistent with an optimal (diversified) selection of risk-reducing activities.

## Taking Risks Good

### **Risk-takers are more likely to make altruistic decisions**

**Jones and Rachlin '09** (BRYAN A. JONES AND HOWARD RACHLIN Dr. Bryan Jones. Assistant Professor, Psychology. Howard Rachlin is Emeritus Research Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, State University of New York "DELAY, PROBABILITY, AND SOCIAL DISCOUNTING IN A PUBLIC GOODS GAME" JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 2009, 91, 61–73 NUMBER 1 (JANUARY) STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY .nt)

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**Participants who contributed higher percentages of their \$100 endowment to the common good in the PGG were more generous to others at various social distances** (shallower social discount functions) **and were less risk-averse** (shallower probability discount functions) **than were participants who contributed less in the PGG**. This is some evidence that **social and probability discount functions may be meaningful measures of individual altruism and social cooperativeness**.

However, **no significant correlation was found between delay discounting and PGG contribution**.

That is, **a participant's generosity to her future self, as measured by her individual delay discount function, did not predict her generosity to a group of fellow students, as measured by her PGG**

**contribution**. **Steepness of delay discounting has been repeatedly found to correlate with failure of self-control** or addiction in everyday life; individual delay discount functions have been obtained for alcoholics, cigarette smokers, gamblers, cocaine addicts, and heroin addicts; the delay discount functions of addicts were significantly greater than those of nonaddicts (Bickel & Marsch, 2001). Steepness of delay discounting has also been found to decrease with age of the discounter (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). **The high predictive power of the delay discounting measure in these cases together with the lack of correlation between delay discounting and social cooperation in the PGG** in Experiment 1 **is therefore evidence against Rachlin's (2002b) argument that selfcontrol (as measured by delay discounting) on the one hand, and social cooperation (as measured by social discounting) on the other, are ultimately the same process**.

## Taking Risks Bad

**The harms associated with undertaken or accepted risk are often dismissed, compared to the harms associated with forced risk-taking, which are psychologically inflated.**

**Renn 84** (Ortwin Renn, Professor of Environmental Sociology and Technology Assessment at the University of Stuttgart, "PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO STUDY RISK PERCEPTION" Environment International, Vol. 10, pp. 557-575, 1984 Nuclear Research Centre, Programme Group: Technology and Society .nt)

Qualitative Risk Features **The** related **circumstances**--the way **in which people are exposed to** a certain **risk--are** considered in the literature to be **an essential explanatory variable class for the perception of risks**. What is meant by this? The authors conducted a small experiment with 36 respondents chosen at random. The **subjects were asked** by the organizer of the test **to take part in a trial of pharmaceutical products**, which was supposed to be **testing** three different capsule coatings with respect to possible **unpleasant side effects**. According to the organizer of the test, **the coating of the first capsule contained radioactive material, the second bacterial material, and the third heavy metal**, with the effect that all three dissolved in the stomach more quickly than conventional capsules. The respondents were assured that none of the three capsules presented any risk to health. **(In reality, the capsules were three identical commercially available vitamin preparations.) One group was offered a free choice** from the three possibilities; to each member of the group one of the capsules was given by the organizer of the experiment. After taking the capsule the test subjects had to fill in a questionnaire, on which they were asked to indicate possible ill effects (stomach pains, nausea, etc.). The result of this experiment is depicted in Fig. 3. **Although all the test subjects had swallowed an identical capsule, the members of group 1, who had not been allowed to choose, said that they felt unwell on the average twice as often as those who had been able to choose a capsule.** This result was completely independent of which capsule coating they had chosen or were directed to take. An interesting marginal note is the fact that the allegedly radioactive capsule caused ill effects in both groups most frequently.

# Precautionary Principle

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## Precautionary Principle Bad

**Their posturing devolves to alarmism that engrains systemic suffering – cost-benefit analysis should come first**

**Goklany 4** – assistant director of science & technology policy in the US Department of Interior [Indur, "Book Reviews," Association for Politics and the Life Sciences, Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 78-80, September 2004, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

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In the past two centuries, despite – or is it because of? – modern economic growth and technological change, life-threatening risks have one-by-one been reduced or eliminated in the world's richer nations. From 1900 to 1970 in the U.S., for instance, life expectancy at birth (perhaps the single best indicator of the cumulative impact of life-threatening risks) increased from 47 to 71 years; today it stands at 77 years. Yet, fueled by increasing prosperity and technological achievements of the post-War era, expectations rose even faster, spawning, among other things, 1970s environmentalism, one of whose apparent characteristics is that the safer we have become, the more we obsess about the risks that remain. But as larger and more obvious risks are reduced, it becomes harder to identify the causes of the remaining risks and to establish cause-and-effect relationships, especially at levels at which many contaminants are currently found in the environment. Consequently the public-policy arena is riddled with conflicts over minutiae of risk analysis such as whether, or at what levels, Alar on apples, arsenic in water, or acrylonitrile in food are safe for consumption. The need to resolve such conflicts and surrounding issues powered a vast expansion of the regulatory state. America's burden of regulating environmental and workplace risks alone is now estimated at \$300 billion annually (excluding benefits and voluntary private expenditures), about 40-percent of Canada's gross economic product. "Risk and Reason" – part law, part risk analysis, and part behavioral psychology – is Cass Sunstein's insightful analysis of the regulatory state, and it finds that the U.S. public is being shortchanged. It gets less risk reduction than it pays for, not least because of the public itself and its inevitable influence on decision-making in a democratic society. He makes a persuasive case that one fundamental problem is that the general public – by definition, composed of non-specialists in toxicology and risk analysis – relies on "intuitive toxicology" to shape its attitudes and responses toward risks from chemicals and other environmental hazards. But intuitive toxicology is frequently based on misconceptions: e.g., that animal carcinogens are necessarily human carcinogens; that no safe level of exposure to a "cancer-causing" (sic) agent exists (an idea equivalent to the "no-threshold" model of carcinogenesis); that natural chemicals are more benign than synthetic chemicals; that zero risk is a practicable goal; that reducing one set of risks would not increase other risks; and that air, land, and water are more polluted now than ever before (pp. 35-36). To these dubious propositions he should have added the equally suspect notion that conservatism in risk analysis necessarily saves lives rather than squanders resources that could otherwise be used more gainfully elsewhere (including reducing other more worthwhile risks). Compounding matters, non-specialists rely on errorprone "mental shortcuts" such as assigning higher probabilities to types of hazards they can readily recall, e.g., nuclear plants are deemed more hazardous because they remember Chernobyl. Moreover, their reactions to risks are often emotionally driven toward an "alarmist bias" whereby they adopt the more alarming of competing narratives regarding a hazard (p. 45). He could also have added that today's technology frequently detects chemicals down to levels at which health impacts cannot be reliably replicated; e.g., some dioxins may be detected down to 0.1 part per trillion, equivalent to one penny in \$100 billion, but since absence of future harm is unprovable, non-specialists are by default left to their mental shortcuts to interpret the significance of such low dioxin levels. Well organized and frequently well funded groups, ranging from self-described "public interest" groups to industry, attempt to exploit – sometimes, as illustrated by the Alar case, with brilliant success (pp. 82-83) – the general public's false premises and cognitive failings to create "informational cascades" designed to bolster public demand for their policy agendas, which democratic governments and institutions are conditioned to heed. Thus, governments <sup>133</sup> "[o]ften ... devote resources to little problems rather than big ones. Sometimes they react to short term public outcries. Sometimes, [being unaware of the harmful, unintended side-effects of regulation] they make matters worse" (p. xiii). Consequently, he suggests, annually the regulatory state unwittingly sacrifices tens of thousands of lives prematurely (equivalent to hundreds of thousands of lifeyears) that could otherwise be saved without increasing total costs of risk reduction activities (p. 31). To buffer overly-responsive governments from forces that special-interest groups can generate and mobilize to skew society's risk-reduction priorities, Sunstein would establish

the primacy of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA, undertaken by scientifically literate technocrats using peer-reviewed science, would provide a full quantitative – and, where that's infeasible, qualitative – rendering of both the good and bad consequences of risk-reduction proposals (p. 106). It would, however, be a methodology to inform, rather than make, decisions. To ensure that risk regulation fulfills its purpose of reducing overall risks, agencies would have to show that their regulation's benefits would exceed costs (or explain why not) and show, by analyzing "health-health trade-offs," that it would not create larger countervailing risks. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which coordinates regulatory development within the Executive branch, would have greater authority "to deter unreasonable regulation and ... ensure reasonable regulation" (p. 117); Congress would ensure that the "system of risk regulation makes overall sense" (p.134); and courts would disallow, as arbitrary and capricious, regulations that would exacerbate overall risks (p. 134). To contain costs, Sunstein advocates smarter regulatory instruments such as economic incentives (e.g., emissions trading), risk-reduction contracts and, in a paradigm shift, "free market environmentalism," in lieu of traditional, but less cost-effective, command-and-control regulations. Sunstein notes that CBA can serve not just as a foil against popular but ill-informed and poorly evaluated actions purporting to reduce risks but as a prod to advance regulations if benefits outweigh costs. As proof-of-concept he offers the OIRA's innovative "prompt letters" urging, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to consider promoting automatic defibrillators in the workplace to reduce deaths following cardiac arrest. Anticipating criticisms that reliance on technocratic expertise is undemocratic, he echoes Jefferson that "without better [and more reliable] information, neither deliberation nor democracy is possible" (p. 257). Bravo! One cannot, however, embrace Sunstein's evaluation of 1970s environmentalism (p. 22) with equal enthusiasm. Clearly it has significantly improved America's quality of life, but progress toward solving its worst environmental health problems was well underway before 1970. Between 1900 and 1970 the death rate due to various water-related diseases (typhoid and paratyphoid, various gastrointestinal diseases, and dysentery) dropped from 1,860 to below 10 (per million), an improvement of 99.5 percent. The Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act, however, date to 1972 and 1974. Similarly, substantial air quality improvements preceded the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) for those pollutants and areas where they were of greatest concern. In many cases air quality improved faster before, than after, 1970, something glossed over in EPA's retrospective analysis of the CAA – and Sunstein's review of that study. Moreover, the 1972 DDT ban, one of 1970s environmentalism's signal achievements, reduced global DDT production and stigmatized its use. The subsequent reluctance of international aid agencies to fund its use contributed to malaria's resurgence in developing countries, with especially tragic consequences for SubSaharan Africa, whose malarial death rate, which had dropped from 1,840 to 1,070 per million between 1950 and 1970, rebounded to 1,650 in 1997, corresponding to an increase in absolute deaths from 300,000 in 1970 to a million in 1997. This increase in malaria, and its effects on human productivity, is one reason why SubSaharan Africa is one of world's few regions where life expectancy declined, and poverty and hunger increased, over the past decades. The reader would surely have benefited had Sunstein applied the same intellectual rigor and clarity of thought that permeate this book to some fundamental questions raised by his diagnosis of the current regulatory state. For instance, what is the significance of protecting against a lifetime increase in cancer of 1-in-1,000 or 1-in-1,000,000 (as agencies attempt to do) when the lifetime risk of dying from (as opposed to contracting) cancer in the U.S. is currently 1-in-4.5, and the lifetime risk of dying is 1-in-1 (p. 135)? Moreover, regardless of what value is assigned to a life, is it justifiable for society (as opposed to private parties) to assign in a CBA, say, \$6 million to "save" a life if more lives could be "saved" at the same cost via other means? Sunstein's scheme for reforming the regulatory state also doesn't address how, or even whether, success or failure of risk regulation can be measured post facto. Without such measurements, accountability and midcourse corrections are virtually impossible. As noted, nowadays pollutant concentrations, while measurable, are often below levels at which adverse health effects can be confidently identified and quantified. Thus, regulatory agencies attempt to prove success (or failure) by measuring not health improvements but declines in pollutant levels (e.g., in the environment or in blood or body). But the two are not identical; using the latter can seriously mislead. Consider, for instance, that asthma is one of the publicly offered drivers for controlling various air pollutants. Yet for much of the 1980s and 1990s air quality improved but mortality rates for asthma worsened (age-adjusted for the total population and for children under 15). Notwithstanding the divergence in these empirical trends, asthma still is part of the rhetoric (and rationale) advanced to control those pollutants. Despite Sunstein's compelling arguments for a technocratic "cost-benefit state," it is unlikely to prevail soon. Interest groups that have honed their ability to influence public policy through appeals to emotion and mastery of existing narrowly conceived, emotion-driven, single-purpose laws (rather than through dispassionate CBA) will not necessarily cooperate in overhauling the current system if that means ceding their comparative advantages in the public-policy arena. Not surprisingly, regulatory reform efforts have largely been stalemated in Washington over the past decade. But if the regulatory reform stalemate is ever broken, Sunstein's outstanding treatise lights the way forward.



## Precautionary principle flawed – probability should be taken into effect

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 92-94, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

\*we reject ableist language

C. The Precautionary Principle Probability neglect sheds light on the appeal and operation of the precautionary principle, which has played a significant role in environmental regulation, to the point where it has become ubiquitous.<sup>164</sup> Variations on the notion can be found in at least fourteen international documents.<sup>165</sup> The principle can be understood in many ways, but in Europe it tends to take a strong form, suggesting that it is important to build "a margin of safety into all decision making."<sup>166</sup> According to one definition, the precautionary principle means "that action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm has already occurred."<sup>167</sup> A comparably strong version states [T]he precautionary principle mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or environmental damage to others or to future generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur.<sup>168</sup> There is an obvious difficulty with the precautionary principle: Both regulation and nonregulation will often give rise to risks; if so, the principle would seem to be paralyzing, forbidding stringent regulation, inaction, and everything in between.<sup>169</sup> Consider, for example, the case of genetic engineering of food. The precautionary principle might seem to call for stringent regulation of genetic engineering, on the theory that this technology contains at least some risk of causing ecological harm.<sup>170</sup> But such regulation would also create risks of adverse effects, simply because genetic engineering holds out a prospect of producing ecological and health benefits.<sup>171</sup> The precautionary principle would seem both to require and to forbid stringent regulation of genetic engineering. The same can be said for many activities and processes, such as nuclear power and nontherapeutic cloning, simply because risks are on all sides of the situation.<sup>172</sup> How, then, can the precautionary principle seem to offer guidance in the real world, as it appears to do?<sup>173</sup> A large part of the answer lies in probability neglect-in the form of intense concern with one of the set of risks at stake, combined with an unwillingness to investigate the likelihood that the selected risk will actually come to fruition. In the case of genetic engineering, fear of the worst-case scenario, involving severe ecological damage, appears to drive reactions, even though the worst case is unlikely indeed and even though the alleged incidents are most often myths.<sup>174</sup> Of course, it might be possible to revise the precautionary principle in a way that takes account of both the magnitude and the severity of risks.<sup>175</sup> The suggestion here is that when the precautionary principle seems to offer guidance, it is often because of the operation of probability neglect.

## Gulf spill proves – precautionary principle incoherent

**WSJE 10** – Wall Street Journal, Europe [“The 'Paralyzing' Principle,” Wall Street Journal, Europe, June 22, 2010, LexisNexis, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

\*we reject ableist language

<sup>135</sup>  
The Gulf oil spill is having all sorts of nasty consequences well beyond damage to the regional environment and economy. Not least, the resulting political panic seems to be rehabilitating the thoroughly discredited theory of regulation known as the precautionary principle. This principle holds that government should attempt to prevent any risk -regardless of the costs involved, however minor the benefits and even without understanding what those risks really are. Developed in the late 1960s, this theory served as the intellectual architecture for the Environmental Protection Agency in

the U.S., which is still required to eliminate certain environmental risks no matter how expensive or pointless the effort is. This same mentality is now prompting not merely tighter safety standards, but President Obama's moratorium on all new deep water drilling, shutting down dozens of Gulf and Alaskan projects, maybe permanently. Last month, 26 Democrats demanded that the government fold up BP's other major Gulf operation, Atlantis, "to ensure that the explosion and mishap of the Horizon platform are not replicated." Meanwhile, Governor Charlie Crist and other Florida politicians want a Gulf drilling ban unto eternity, and the California, Washington and Oregon Senate delegations want one for the West Coast too. "Without a permanent ban on drilling off our shores," said Dianne Feinstein, "there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will not happen again." In other words, the precautionary principle is back with a vengeance. The irony is that the figure most responsible for dismantling its premises, Cass Sunstein, is now a member of the Obama Administration. Formerly of the University of Chicago and Harvard, and now the regulatory czar in the White House budget office, Mr. Sunstein calls the precautionary principle "incoherent" and "paralyzing," as he put it in an essay in the journal *Daedalus* two years ago. "Precautions cannot be taken against all risks," Mr. Sunstein elaborated in his 2005 monograph "Laws of Fear," "not for the important but less interesting reason that resources are limited, but simply because efforts to redress any set of risks might produce risks of their own." Mr. Sunstein's insight is that there are risks on all sides of a question -doing nothing can be dangerous, but acting might be more dangerous -so the only rational way to judge regulation is to quantify the costs and benefits. In a 2002 book, "Risk and Reason," Mr. Sunstein pointed out that the best way to prevent automobile pollution would be to eliminate the internal combustion engine. Should the EPA ban that too? "If these would be ridiculous conclusions -as I think they would be -it is because the costs of the bans would dwarf the benefits. Pollution prevention is not worthwhile as such; it is worthwhile when it is better, all things considered, than the alternatives." All of this puts into context the ex-post-facto claims that government and industry should have done more to avert a low-probability but high-severity event such as the BP disaster. Is a drilling ban better than the alternatives? These would include more imports, even though tanker accidents are more common than large oil well blowouts. And they would include severe economic damage to the oil-and-gas business when one in every 10 Americans is out of work. Mr. Sunstein has rarely been heard in public since he joined the Administration, and his "nudge" philosophy to encourage better choices in no way influenced the health-care bill. Perhaps he'd care to speak up now? With the reinvigoration of the precautionary principle, the country could use a little empiricism.

## **Precautionary principle ignores risks on the other side**

**Gardner 8** – columnist for Ottawa Citizen [Dan, "Better safe than sorry -weighing risk's risk," Windsor Star, May 1, 2008, LexisNexis, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

\*we reject ableist language

Banning baby bottles containing the chemical bisphenol A is the prudent thing to do, the federal government insists. A review of the science concluded that "exposure to newborns and infants is below levels that may pose a risk, however, the gap between exposure and effect is not large enough." And so the ban. "We have concluded that it is better to be safe than sorry," declared Health Minister Tony Clement. Better safe than sorry. Who could possibly disagree? It seems so reasonable. The scientific evidence of harm may not be conclusive, but the potential harm is serious and irreversible. Surely, under those circumstances, we should err on the side of caution. This line of thinking is the core of the "precautionary principle," an influential doctrine embraced by environmentalists and enshrined in many national and international laws. Legions of law professors and philosophers spend their days elaborating on it, but the precautionary principle's basic message is what Mr. Clement said last week: better safe than sorry. If only life were that simple. Consider the pesticides used in agriculture. Many are known carcinogens but whether they are harmful in trace quantities is disputed. There's a mountain of very complicated science on the subject and regulatory agencies have generally concluded that there's no cause for concern but the evidence is mixed -it almost always is in science and there's plenty we don't know. Many people have looked at this situation and decided that some or all pesticides should be banned. The science isn't settled. And the harm -if it exists -would be severe and irreversible. Surely the precautionary principle applies. But what would happen if some or all pesticides were banned? Crop yields would decline. Fruits and vegetables would become more

expensive and people would eat less of them. And since there is considerable evidence that eating fruits and vegetables in sufficient quantities protects against cancer, it is very likely that more people would get cancer. So there are risks on both sides. What does the precautionary principle tell us about resolving a dilemma like that? Nothing. And that flaw is fatal because we are routinely forced to choose between risks. Consider that the chlorination of drinking water produces carcinogenic byproducts. Presumably, the precautionary principle would direct us to stop chlorinating drinking water. But if we do that, the horrible water-borne diseases that were banished by chlorination could come roaring back. So the precautionary principle would tell us we must chlorinate drinking water. "Because risks are on all sides, the Precautionary Principle forbids action, inaction, and everything in between," writes law professor Cass Sunstein, a leading expert on risk regulation. It is "paralyzing; it forbids the very things it requires." As Sunstein demonstrates in his book *Laws of Fear*, there's a simple reason why "better safe than sorry" sounds more meaningful than it is: We pay close attention to some risks while ignoring others, which makes the dilemma of choosing between risks vanish. Worried about injecting your child with vaccines? Don't vaccinate your child and you will protect her from the harms you fear. Of course, we give vaccines to children to protect them against deadly diseases but if you don't even know what diphtheria is, that won't complicate your thinking. The precautionary principle is a bromide, a pleasant sentiment, a good starting point. But it's nothing more than that. If we are to be rational, we must be far more rigorous. "Rational risk regulation is a slow, careful and thoughtful examination of the dangers and costs in particular cases," writes a certain journalist -ahem -in a new book called *Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear*. "If banning certain synthetic pesticides can be shown to reduce a risk materially at no more cost than a modest proliferation of dandelions, it probably makes sense. If there are inexpensive techniques to reduce the amount of chlorine required to treat drinking water effectively, that may be a change that's called for. Admittedly, this is not exciting stuff. There's not a lot of passion and drama in it. And while there are always questions of justice and fairness involved -Who bears the risk? Who will shoulder the cost of reducing the risk? -there is not a lot of room for ideology and inflammatory rhetoric." So is it sensible to ban bisphenol A in baby bottles? It may be. I don't know. And I'm not sure Tony Clement knows either. What will replace the bottles? Do other plastic formulations raise concerns? Do glass bottles pose a hazard? Do the replacement bottles cost more and, if so, what effects will that have? As far as I can see, the minister and his government haven't rigorously addressed questions like these. Instead, they focused on one risk and piously declared "better safe than sorry." That's a fine way to do politics, but as a means of crafting public policy it leaves something to be desired.

# Probability

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## Probability Framing Good

**Err on the side of probability to check psychological bias toward long improbable internal link chains – we cite studies**

**Yudkowsky 8** – cofounder of Machine Intelligence Research Institute [Eliezer, research fellow at MIRI, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks,” Machine Intelligence Research Institute, pp. 7-8, 2008, <https://intelligence.org/files/CognitiveBiases.pdf>, Accessed 6/29/15]

Consequentialism <sup>139</sup> applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of “A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983” or “A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). In Johnson et al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of \$17.19, \$13.90, and \$7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats—such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (2008) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against “movie-plot scenarios” of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster (Schneier 2005). Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: “X is not an existential risk and you don’t need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E”; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. “We don’t need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely.” Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures survive after 4 years (Knaup 2005). Dawes (1988, 133) observes: “In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions (‘either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion’) in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.” The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result

of any of the existential risks we already know about—or some other cause which none of us foresaw.  
Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

## **Some risks are low enough to take out an impact**

**Hayenhjelm and Wolff 11** – associate professor at Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Umeå University AND Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at Umeå University, College London [Madeleine and Jonathan, “The Moral Problem of Risk Impositions: A Survey of the Literature,” European Journal of Philosophy, pp. e32, 2011, Wiley, Accessed 6/27/15]//schnall

The ethical worry is clearly put in the title of the influential paper: ‘How Safe is Safe Enough?’ (Fischhoff et al. 1978). The classical problem of risk within risk management was framed in terms of ‘tolerable risk’ and ‘acceptable risk’, assuming that the level of risk that was already accepted could be used as a benchmark for new risks (see, e.g., Otway and von Winterfeldt 1982). The field of risk perception studies sprung up as a study of general acceptance and response to different kinds of risks. The classical paper here is that of Chauncey Starr published in Science in 1969: with the revealing subtitle: ‘what is our society willing to pay for safety?’ (Starr 1969). Fischhoff and colleagues subsequently argued against the idea of a universal quantitative measure of an acceptable level of risk (Fischhoff et al. 1981). Later risk perception research came to focus on explaining public attitudes to different kinds of risk, rather than trying to map public preferences for a particular level of risk that could be applied to all sources of risk. Public attitudes to different sources of risks did not match the probability for death for each of those risks, so other factors explaining this otherwise seeming irrationality was proposed. The anthropologists Mary Douglas and Adam Wildavsky suggested four archetypical attitudes to risk in their initially influential Cultural Theory (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, see also Thompson 1986 and Adams 1995). Paul Slovic and others instead proposed what later became the dominant ‘psychometric’ framework, taking a statistical quantitative approach to explain public attitudes through large surveys. Here ethical considerations seem to influence public perception of acceptability: the degree to which the risk is controllable; how well-known it is (to science); the novelty of the risk; how equitable the imposition of risk is; how voluntary; and the severity of consequences, such as irreversible consequences, consequences with global catastrophic impact, and risks affecting future generations (see, e.g., Slovic et al. 1982). The public view can be summarized in the following terms. Some risky actions have such undesirable features that they should be impermissible. Some are perceived of as of such low risk that they can be permitted without further concern. Between these is a range of potentially problematic cases, but numerous factors, and not just the probability and magnitude of possible harm, influence their acceptability (see also Wolff 2006).

## **Probability comes first – don’t let them capitalize on your fear**

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 63-68, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

A. Cognition On the conventional view of rationality, probabilities matter a great deal to reactions to risks. But emotions, as such, are not assessed independently; they are not taken to play a distinctive role.<sup>6</sup> Of course, people might be risk-averse or risk-inclined. For example, it is possible that people will be willing to pay \$100 to eliminate a 1/1000 risk of losing \$900. But analysts usually believe that variations in probability should matter, so that there would be a serious problem if people were willing to pay both \$100 to eliminate a 1/1000 risk of losing \$900 and \$100 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing \$900. Analysts do not generally ask, or care, whether risk-related dispositions are a product of emotions or something else. Of course, it is now generally agreed that in thinking about risks, people rely on certain heuristics and show identifiable biases.<sup>7</sup> Those who emphasize heuristics and biases are often seen as attacking the conventional view of rationality.<sup>8</sup> In a way they are

doing just that, but the heuristics- and-biases literature has a highly cognitive focus, designed to establish how people proceed under conditions of uncertainty. The central question is this: When people do not know about the probability associated with some risk, how do they think? It is clear that when people lack statistical information, they rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry.<sup>9</sup> Of these rules of thumb, the "availability heuristic" is probably the most important for purposes of understanding risk-related law.<sup>10</sup> Thus, for example, "a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable." The point very much bears on private and public responses to risks, suggesting, for example, that people will be especially responsive to the dangers of AIDS, crime, earthquakes, and nuclear power plant accidents if examples of these risks are easy to recall.<sup>12</sup> This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. But salience is important as well. "The impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper."<sup>13</sup> So, too, recent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones. The point helps explain much risk-related behavior. For example, whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences.<sup>14</sup> If floods have not occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.<sup>15</sup> In the aftermath of an earthquake, the proportion of people carrying earthquake insurance rises sharply-but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.<sup>16</sup> For purposes of law and regulation, the problem is that the availability heuristic can lead to serious errors of fact, in terms of both excessive controls on small risks that are cognitively available and insufficient controls on large risks that are not.<sup>17</sup> The cognitive emphasis of the heuristics-and-biases literature can be found as well in prospect theory, a departure from expected utility theory that explains decision under risk.<sup>18</sup> For present purposes, what is most important is that prospect theory offers an explanation for simultaneous gambling and insurance.<sup>19</sup> When given the choice, most people will reject a certain gain of X in favor of a gamble with an expected value below X, if the gamble involves a small probability of riches. At the same time, most people prefer a certain loss of X to a gamble with an expected value less than X, if the gamble involves a small probability of catastrophe.<sup>20</sup> If expected utility theory is taken as normative, then people depart from the normative theory of rationality in giving excessive weight to low- probability outcomes when the stakes are high. Indeed, we might easily see prospect theory as emphasizing a form of probability neglect. But in making these descriptive claims, prospect theory does not specify a special role for emotions. This is not a puzzling oversight, if it counts as an oversight at all. For many purposes, what matters is what people choose, and it is unimportant to know whether their choices depend on cognition or emotion, whatever may be the difference between these two terms. B. Emotion No one doubts, however, that in many domains, people do not think much about variations in probability and that emotions have a large effect on judgment and decisionmaking.<sup>21</sup> Would a group of randomly selected people pay more to reduce a 1/100,000 risk of getting a gruesome form of cancer than a similar group would pay to reduce a 1/200,000 risk of getting that form of cancer? Would the former group pay twice as much? With some low-probability events, anticipated and actual emotions, triggered by the best-case or worst-case outcome, help to determine choice. Those who buy lottery tickets, for example, often fantasize about the goods associated with a lucky outcome.<sup>22</sup> With respect to risks of harm, many of our ordinary ways of speaking suggest strong emotions: panic, hysteria, terror. People might refuse to fly, for example, not because they are currently frightened, but because they anticipate their own anxiety, and they want to avoid it. It has been suggested that people often decide as they do because they anticipate their own regret.<sup>23</sup> The same is true for fear. Knowing that they will be afraid, people may refuse to travel to Israel or South Africa, even if they would much enjoy seeing those nations and even if they believe, on reflection, that their fear is not entirely rational. Recent evidence is quite specific.<sup>24</sup> It suggests that people greatly neglect significant differences in probability when the outcome is "affect rich"-when it involves not simply a serious loss, but one that produces strong emotions, including fear.<sup>25</sup> To be sure, the distinction between cognition and emotion is complex and contested.<sup>26</sup> In the domain of risks, and most other places, emotional reactions are usually based on thinking; they are hardly cognition-free. When a negative emotion is associated with a certain risk-pesticides or nuclear power, for example-cognition plays a central role.<sup>27</sup> For purposes of the analysis here, it is not necessary to say anything especially controversial about the nature of the emotion of fear. <sup>141</sup> The only suggestion is that when emotions are intense, calculation is less likely to occur, or at least that form of calculation that involves assessment of risks in terms of not only the magnitude but also the probability of the outcome. Drawing on and expanding the relevant evidence, I will emphasize a general phenomenon here: In political and market domains, people often focus on the desirability of the outcome in question and pay (too) little attention to the probability that a good or bad outcome will, in fact, occur. It is in such cases that people fall prey to probability neglect, which is properly treated as a form of quasi-rationality.<sup>28</sup> Probability neglect is especially large

when people focus on the worst possible case or otherwise are subject to strong emotions. When such emotions are at work, people do not give sufficient consideration to the likelihood that the worst case will actually occur. This is quasi-rational because, from the normative point of view, it is not fully rational to treat a 1% chance of X as equivalent, or nearly equivalent, to a 99% chance of X, or even a 10% chance of X. Because people suffer from probability neglect, and because neglecting probability is not fully rational, the phenomenon I identify raises new questions about the widespread idea that ordinary people have a kind of rival rationality superior to that of experts.<sup>29</sup> Most of the time, experts are concerned principally with the number of lives at stake,<sup>30</sup> and for that reason they will be closely attuned, as ordinary people are not, to the issue of probability. By drawing attention to probability neglect, I do not mean to suggest that most people, most of the time, are indifferent to large variations in the probability that a risk will come to fruition. Large variations can, and often do, make a difference-but when emotions are engaged, Consequentialism<sup>142</sup> the standard theory predicts. Nor do I suggest that probability neglect is impervious to circumstances. If the costs of neglecting probability are placed "on screen," then people will be more likely to attend to the question of probability.<sup>31</sup> In this light it is both mildly counterintuitive and reasonable, for example, to predict that people would be willing to pay less, in terms of dollars and waiting time, to reduce low- probability risks of an airplane disaster if they are frequent travelers. An intriguing study finds exactly that effect.<sup>32</sup> For similar reasons, market pressures are likely to dampen the impact of probability neglect, ensuring that, say, risks of 1/10,000 are treated differently from risks of 1/1,000,000, even if individuals, in surveys, show relative insensitivity to such differences. Acknowledging all this, I emphasize three central points. First, differences in probability will often affect behavior far less than they should or than conventional theory would predict. Second, private behavior, even when real dollars are involved,<sup>33</sup> can display insensitivity to the issue of probability, especially when emotions are intensely engaged. Third, and most important, the demand for legal intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect, so that government may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) probability that the relevant dangers will ever come to fruition.

## **You have an ethical responsibility to put probability first**

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, "Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 68-70, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

c. Law It is not at all clear how the law should respond to probability neglect. But at a minimum, the phenomenon raises serious legal issues in administrative law, at least under statutes banning agencies from acting unless they can show a "significant risk"<sup>34</sup> or can establish that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs.<sup>35</sup> If agencies are neglecting the issue of probability (perhaps because the public is doing so as well), they may well be acting unlawfully. Indeed, the law of judicial review shows an inchoate understanding of probability neglect, treating it as a problem for which judicial invalidation is a solution.<sup>36</sup> The only qualification is that the relevant law remains in an embryonic state. There is much to be done, especially at the agency level, to ensure that government is alert to the probability that harm will actually occur. Outside of the context of administrative law, an understanding of probability neglect will help us to make better predictions about the public "demand" for law. When a bad outcome is highly salient and triggers strong emotions, government will be asked to do something about it, even if the probability that the bad outcome will occur is low. Political participants of various stripes, focusing on the worst case, are entirely willing to exploit probability neglect. Those who encourage people to purchase lottery tickets, focusing on the best case, do the same. An understanding of probability neglect simultaneously helps show why jurors, and ordinary officials, are not likely to be moved much by a showing that before the fact, the harm was not likely to occur. For many people, what matters is that the harm did occur, not that it was unlikely to do so before the fact. For law, many of the most difficult questions are normative in character: Should government take account of variations in the probability that harms will occur? Should government respond to intense fears that involve statistically remote risks? When people suffer from probability neglect, should law and policy do the same thing? At first glance, we might think that even if people are neglecting probability, government and law at least should not—that the tort system and administrators should pay a great deal of attention to probability in designing institutions. If government wants to insulate itself from probability neglect, it will create institutions designed to ensure that genuine risks, rather than tiny ones,



receive the most concern. Such institutions will not necessarily require agencies to discuss the worst-case scenario.<sup>37</sup> And if government is attempting to increase public concern about a genuine danger, it should not emphasize statistics and probabilities, but should instead draw attention to the worst-case scenario. If government is attempting to decrease public concern with a risk that has a tiny probability of coming to fruition, it may be ineffective if it emphasizes the issue of probability; indeed, it may do better if it changes the subject or stresses instead the affirmative social values associated with running the risk.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, public fear, however unwarranted may be intractable, in the sense that it may be impervious to efforts at reassurance. And if public fear is intractable, it will cause serious problems, partly because fear is itself extremely unpleasant and partly because fear is likely to influence conduct, possibly producing wasteful and excessive private precautions. If so, a government's response, via regulatory safeguards, would appear to be justified if the benefits, in terms of fear reduction, justify the costs.

### **Extremely low probabilities should count as zero—even if there's some risk, policy decisions can't be justified by vanishingly small probabilities**

**RESCHER 2003** (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, *Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy*, p. 49-50)

On this issue there is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decision-oriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off. (De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, we can pretty well forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when  $x \leq E$ , then  $x = 0$ . We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote possibility can—for all sensible purposes—be viewed as being of probability zero. Accordingly, such remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long representing real possibilities. Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it: [P]eople...refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect.

## Probability Good – at: Schell

**We must weigh competing probabilities and dismiss threats to survival if they are very unlikely—the alternative is that we do nothing about any existential risk**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 19)

The reason for the hedge in “essentially” is that I want to avoid making claims of metaphysical certainty. From a scientific standpoint, anything is possible. But some possibilities really are too remote to be worth worrying about, such as the possibility that my next breath will create a black hole or that the entire human population will be persuaded to commit suicide. To put this differently, we have to be selective in responding to the catastrophic risks because if we allow our imaginations to multiply their number indefinitely we’ll end up doing nothing about any of them.

**The “any risk” logic would make all decisionmaking impossible—evaluate probability over magnitude**

**MESKILL 2009** (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The “One Percent Doctrine” and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, <http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html>)

Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment ([http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1)) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidian, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.

## Probability – AT Empirics Key

**The fact that our impact has not occurred before is a reason that it should be given higher probability—known catastrophes cause prevention but unpredictable ones do not**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Taleb (2005) suggests that hindsight bias and availability bias bear primary responsibility for our failure to guard against what Taleb calls Black Swans. Black Swans are an especially difficult version of the problem of the fat tails: sometimes most of the variance in a process comes from exceptionally rare, exceptionally huge events. Consider a financial instrument that earns \$10 with 98% probability, but loses \$1000 with 2% probability; it's a poor net risk, but it looks like a steady winner. Taleb (2001) gives the example of a trader whose strategy worked for six years without a single bad quarter, yielding close to \$80 million - then lost \$300 million in a single catastrophe. Another example is that of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose founders included two winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics. During the Asian currency crisis and Russian bond default of 1998, the markets behaved in a literally unprecedented fashion, assigned a negligible probability by LTCM's historical model. As a result, LTCM began to lose \$100 million per day, day after day. On a single day in 1998, LTCM lost more than \$500 million. (Taleb 2005.) The founders of LTCM later called the market conditions of 1998 a "ten-sigma event". But obviously it was not that improbable. Mistakenly believing that the past was predictable, people conclude that the future is predictable. As Fischhoff (1982) puts it: When we attempt to understand past events, we implicitly test the hypotheses or rules we use both to interpret and to anticipate the world around us. If, in hindsight, we systematically underestimate the surprises that the past held and holds for us, we are subjecting those hypotheses to inordinately weak tests and, presumably, finding little reason to change them. The lesson of history is that swan happens. People are surprised by catastrophes lying outside their anticipation, beyond their historical probability distributions. Then why are we so taken aback when Black Swans occur? Why did LTCM borrow leverage of \$125 billion against \$4.72 billion of equity, almost ensuring that any Black Swan would destroy them? Because of hindsight bias, we learn overly specific lessons. After September 11th, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration prohibited box-cutters on airplanes. The hindsight bias rendered the event too predictable in retrospect, permitting the angry victims to find it the result of 'negligence' - such as intelligence agencies' failure to distinguish warnings of Al Qaeda activity amid a thousand other warnings. We learned not to allow hijacked planes to overfly our cities. We did not learn the lesson: "Black Swans occur; do what you can to prepare for the unanticipated." Taleb (2005) writes: It is difficult to motivate people in the prevention of Black Swans... Prevention is not easily perceived, measured, or rewarded; it is generally a silent and thankless activity. Just consider that a costly measure is taken to stave off such an event. One can easily compute the costs while the results are hard to determine. How can one tell its effectiveness, whether the measure was successful or if it just coincided with no particular accident? ... Job performance assessments in these matters are not just tricky, but may be biased in favor of the observed "acts of heroism". History books do not account for heroic preventive measures.

## Probability Framing Bad

### **Low risk is no risk is a theoretically flawed concept – it's bad for policymaking**

**Peterson 8** (Martin, Professor of Philosophy and the Sue and Harry Bovay Professor of History and Ethics of Professional Engineering in the Department of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, "What Is a de Minimis Risk?", Risk Management, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2002), pp. 47-55 // AKONG)

\*de minimis principle = low risks should be discounted

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In the previous sections it has been argued that none of the traditional explications of the de minimis principle can be used for distinguishing negligible and non-negligible risk in a **satisfactory manner**. So how then, one might ask, should this line be drawn? The best answer to this question is, arguably, **that there is no sharp line to be drawn**, even though there are clear examples of negligible and non-negligible risks respectively. The concept of vagueness can be used to clarify this claim. Imagine, for instance, a city populated by 100 inhabitants - a clear example of a small city. Then assume that one additional person moves into the city, which now has 101 inhabitants, and is still a small city. Then one more person moves into the city, then one more, and so on. After a few years the city has ten million inhabitants, and is thus a clear example of a big city. But exactly when did the city become 'big' ? The traditional philosophical analysis of this kind of example is that there is no single inhabitant whose decision to move into the city made it big. Concepts like 'small city' and 'big city' are vague, that is, there is no sharp boundary between 'big' and 'small', or between 'big' and 'almost- big', and so on. That the concept of 'de minimis risk' is vague does not mean that there are no clear examples of de minimis risks but simply that there is no sharp boundary between those risks that are de minimis and those that are de manifestis, and between those that are de minimis and almost de minimis, etc. Suppose for instance that lifetime risks smaller than  $10^{10}$  are clear examples of de minimis risks, in the same sense that cities with ten million inhabitants are clear examples of big cities. What we now wish to claim is not that a lifetime risk of  $1.00001 \times 10^6$  is not de minimis, but rather that it is not the case that this risk is de manifestis. This difference is subtle, but of **high importance for decision makers**. For instance, different normative recommendations may be justified depending on whether the risk in question is de manifestis or only not de minimis. If we accept that the concept of de minimis risks is vague we can explain why it has been so difficult to reach consensus about whether a lifetime risk of, say,  $10^6$  is negligible or not, whereas no one seems to doubt that a lifetime risk of eg  $10^{12}$  is truly negligible. The explanation is that the latter risk is a clear example of a de minimis risk, whereas the former risk is located somewhere in the grey middle zone.

### **The acceptable risk of extinction is extremely low – anything greater than $10 \times 10^{-20}$ justifies action**

**Tonn 9** (Bruce, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, "Obligations to future generations and acceptable risks of human extinction", Futures 41 (2009) 427–435 // AKONG)

Futurists, philosophers, and others write extensively on obligations to future generations. For example, MacLean, Bodde, and Cochran (1981) and Schrader-Frechette (1991) argue for a fairness obligation, meaning that current generations ought not to impose risks upon future generations that they would not themselves accept. Weiss (1989), Tonn (1987), Golding (1981) and others argue for a "maintaining options" obligation, meaning that decisions made by current generations should not restrict possible futures that could be pursued by

future generations. Two eminent futurists, Bell (1993) and Slaughter (1994), have each developed thoughtful and extensive lists of obligations to future generations.

Bell's (1993) synthesis offers seven reasons current generations ought to care about future generations:

☐ A concern for present people implies a concern for future people.

☐ Thought experiments in which choosers do not know to which generation they belong rationally imply a concern for both  
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present and future people.

☐ Regarding the natural resources of the earth, present generations have no right to use to the point of depletion or to poison

what they did not create.

☐ Past generations left many of the public goods that they created not only to the present generation but to future generations as well.

☐ Humble ignorance ought to lead present generations to act with prudence toward the well being of future generations.

☐ There is a prima facie obligation of present generations to ensure that important business is not left unfinished.

☐ The present generation's caring and sacrificing for future generations benefits not only future generations but also itself.

Slaughter's (1994) synthesis makes these points:

☐ The human project is unfinished.

☐ Caring for future generations is ethically defensible.

☐ Humans are partly responsible for the dangers to future generations' well being.

☐ The global commons has been compromised by human activity and restorative actions are necessary.

☐ Not caring about future generations diminishes us.

☐ Caring for future generations is a cultural force that is valuable now and for the foreseeable future.

For the purposes of this research, we have distilled and synthesized the extensive research on obligations to future generations into the following three fundamental obligations (Tonn, 2009b):

☐ No regrets—Humanity has great things to accomplish; we would regret becoming extinct before those things are accomplished.  
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☐ Maintaining options—Future generations should not have their possible future paths restricted.

☐ Fairness—Future generations ought not endure risks that present generations find intolerable.

The main reason for limiting the number of obligations considered in this framework is that each has been explicitly assessed with respect to the acceptable risk of human extinction and possible changes in the thresholds over time (Tonn, 2009b):

☐ No regrets, 2 ☐  $10^{20}$ —Threshold becomes more restrictive over time. ☐ Maintaining options, 1 ☐  $10^{20}$ —Threshold stays the same over time. ☐ Fairness, 3 ☐  $10^{24}$ —Threshold becomes less restrictive over time.

For the purposes of this research, we assume that the acceptable risk of human extinction should not exceed  $10^{20}$  in any year over a 1000 year time period. If at any point in time over the planning horizon the risk of human extinction appears to be higher than this threshold, then the current generation is in violation of their obligations to future generations and should take action. As noted above, two of the philosophical perspectives are particularly sensitive to the planning horizon: The no regrets threshold becomes more restrictive over time, as humans near extinction, and the fairness threshold becomes less restrictive over time as there are fewer generations that will be alive in the future.

## **There's a cognitive bias towards structural impacts, even though high-magnitude impacts are quantitatively worse**

**Yudkowsky 8** (Eliezer, research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, which he co-founded, "Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks" // AKONG)

(2,000 / 20,000 / 200,000) migrating birds die each year by drowning in uncovered oil ponds, which the birds mistake for bodies of water. These deaths could be prevented by covering the oil ponds with nets. How much money would you be willing to pay to provide the needed nets? Three groups of subjects considered three versions of the above question, asking them how high a tax increase they would accept to save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds. The response—known as Stated Willingness-To-Pay, or SWTP—had a mean of \$80 for the 2,000-bird group, \$78 for 20,000 birds, and \$88 for 200,000 birds (Desvousges et al. 1993). This phenomenon is known as scope insensitivity or scope neglect. Similar studies have shown that Toronto residents would pay little more to clean up all polluted lakes in Ontario than polluted lakes in a particular region of Ontario (Kahneman 1986); and that residents of four western US states would pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in those states than to protect a single area (McFadden and Leonard 1993). The most widely accepted explanation for scope neglect appeals to the affect heuristic. Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade (1999) write: The story constructed by Desvousges et. al. probably evokes for many readers a mental representation of a prototypical incident, perhaps an image of an exhausted bird, its feathers soaked in black oil, unable to escape. The hypothesis of valuation by prototype asserts that the affective value of this image will dominate expressions of the attitude to the problem—including the willingness to pay for a solution. Valuation by prototype implies extension neglect. Two other hypotheses accounting for scope neglect include purchase of moral satisfaction (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) and good cause dump (Harrison 1992). Purchase of moral satisfaction suggests that people spend enough money to create a "warm glow" in themselves, and the amount required is a property of the person's psychology, having nothing to do with birds. Good cause dump suggests that people have some amount of money they are willing to pay for "the environment," and any question about environmental goods elicits this amount. Scope neglect has been shown to apply to human lives. Carson and Mitchell (1995) report that increasing the alleged risk associated with chlorinated drinking water from 0.004 to 2.43 annual deaths per 1,000 (a factor of 600) increased SWTP from \$3.78 to \$15.23 (a factor of 4). Baron and Greene (1996) found no effect from varying lives saved by a factor of ten. Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997), in a paper entitled "Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing," found evidence that our perception of human deaths, and valuation of human lives, obeys Weber's Law—meaning that we use a

logarithmic scale. And indeed, studies of scope neglect in which the quantitative variations are huge enough to elicit any sensitivity at all, show small linear increases in Willingness-To-Pay corresponding to exponential increases in scope. Kahneman, Ri- tov, and Schkade (1999) interpret this as an additive effect of scope affect and prototype affect—the prototype image elicits most of the emotion, and the scope elicits a smaller amount of emotion which is added (not multiplied) with the first amount. Albert Szent-Györgyi said: “I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the possible pulverization of our big cities, with a hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one man’s suffering by a hundred million.” Human emotions take place within an **analog brain**. The human brain cannot release enough neurotransmitters to feel emotion a thousand times as strong as the grief of one funeral. A prospective risk going from 10,000,000 deaths to 100,000,000 deaths does not multiply by ten the strength of our determination to stop it. It adds one more zero on paper for our eyes to glaze over, an effect so small that one must usually jump several orders of magnitude to detect the difference experimentally.

## **You can’t evaluate low probabilities because you don’t know the difference**

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 70-74, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

II. PROBABILITY NEGLECT: THE BASIC PHENOMENON When it comes to risk, a key question is whether people can imagine or visualize the worst-case outcome.<sup>39</sup> When the worst case produces intense fear, surprisingly little role is played by the stated probability that that outcome will occur.<sup>40</sup> An important function of strong emotions is thus to drive out quantitative judgments, including judgments about probability, by making the best case or the worst case seem highly salient.<sup>41</sup> But it is important to note that probability neglect can occur even when emotions are not involved. A great deal of evidence shows that whether or not emotions are involved, people are relatively insensitive to differences in probabilities, at least when the relevant probabilities are low. A. Insensitivity to Variations Among Low Probabilities Do people care about probability at all? Of course they do; a risk of 1/100,000 is significantly less troublesome than a risk of 1/1000. But many people, much of the time, show a remarkable unwillingness to attend to the question of probability. Several studies show that when people are seeking relevant information, they often do not try to learn about probability at all. One study, for example, finds that in deciding whether to purchase warranties for consumer products, people do not spontaneously point to the probability of needing repair as a reason for the purchase.<sup>42</sup> Another study finds that those making hypothetical, risky managerial decisions rarely ask for data on probabilities.<sup>43</sup> Or consider a study involving children and adolescents,<sup>44</sup> in which the following question was asked: Susan and Jennifer are arguing about whether they should wear seat belts when they ride in a car. Susan says that you should. Jennifer says you shouldn't .... Jennifer says that she heard of an accident where a car fell into a lake and a woman was kept from getting out in time because of wearing her seat belt.... What do you think about this?<sup>45</sup> In answering that question, many subjects did not think about probability at all.<sup>46</sup> One exchange took the following form: A: Well, in that case I don't think you should wear a seat belt. Q (interviewer): How do you know when that's gonna happen? A: Like, just hope it doesn't! Q: So, should you or shouldn't you wear seat belts? A: Well, tell-you-the-truth we should wear seat belts. Q: How come? A: Just in case of an accident. You won't get hurt as much as you will if you didn't wear a seat belt. Q: Ok, well what about these kinds of things, when people get trapped? A: I don't think you should, in that case.<sup>4</sup> These answers might seem odd and idiosyncratic, but we might reasonably suppose that some of the time, both children and adults focus primarily on bad scenarios, without thinking a great deal about the question of probability. Many studies find that significant differences in low probabilities have little impact on decisions. This finding is in sharp conflict with the standard view of rationality, which suggests that people's willingness to pay for small risk reductions ought to be nearly proportional to the size of the reduction.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps these findings reflect people's implicit understanding that in these settings, the relevant probability is "low, but not zero," and that finer distinctions are unhelpful. (What does a risk of 1/100,000 really mean? How different is it, for an individual, from a risk of 1/20,000 or 1/600,000?) In an especially striking study, Kunreuther and his coauthors found that mean willingness to pay insurance premiums did not vary among risks of 1/100,000, 1/1,000,000, and 1/10,000,000.<sup>49</sup> They also found basically the same willingness to pay for insurance premiums for risks ranging from 1/650, to 1/6300, to

1/68,000.<sup>50</sup> The study just described involved a "between subjects" design; subjects considered only one risk, and the same people were not asked to consider the various risks at the same time. Low probabilities are not likely to be terribly meaningful to most people, but most educated people would know that a 1/100,000 risk is worse than 1/1,000,000 risk. When low-probability risks are seen in isolation and are not assessed together, we have an example of the problem of "evaluability."<sup>51</sup> For most people, most of the time, it is very difficult to evaluate a low probability, and hence isolated decisions will pick up small or no variations between people's assessments of very different risks. But several studies have a "within subjects" design, exposing people simultaneously to risks of different probabilities, and even here, the differences in probabilities have little effect on decisions. An early study examined people's willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce various fatality risks. The central finding was that the mean WTP to reduce such risks was, for over 40% of the respondents, unaffected by a large variation in the probability of harm, even though expected utility theory would predict significant effects from such variations.<sup>52</sup> A later study found that for serious injuries, WTP to reduce the risk by 12/100,000 was only 20% higher than WTP to reduce the same risk by 4/100,000, even though standard theory would predict a WTP three times as high.<sup>53</sup> These results are not unusual. Lin and Milon attempted to elicit people's willingness to pay to reduce the risk of illness from eating oysters.<sup>54</sup> There was little sensitivity to variations in probability of illness.<sup>55</sup> Another study found little change in WTP across probability variations involving exposure to pesticide residues on fresh produce.<sup>56</sup> A similar anomaly was found in a study involving hazardous wastes, where WTP actually decreased as the stated fatality risk reduction increased.<sup>57</sup> There is much to say about the general insensitivity to significant variations within the category of low-probability events. It would be difficult to produce a rational explanation for this insensitivity; recall the standard suggestion that WTP for small risk reductions should be roughly proportional to the size of the reduction.<sup>58</sup> Why don't people think in this way? An imaginable explanation is that **in the abstract, most people simply do not know how to evaluate low probabilities.** A risk of 7/100,000 seems "small"; a risk of 4/100,000 also seems "small."<sup>59</sup> Most people would prefer a risk of 4/100,000 to a risk of 7/100,000, and I have noted that joint evaluation improves evaluability, which would otherwise be extremely difficult.<sup>60</sup> But **even when the preference is clear, both risks seem "small," and hence it is not at all clear that a proportional increase in WTP will follow.** As suggested by the findings of Kunreuther and his coauthors, it is likely that in a between-subjects design, WTP to eliminate a risk of 4/100,000 would be about the same as WTP to eliminate a risk of 7/100,000, simply because the small difference would not matter when each risk is taken in isolation. Note also that the studies just described involve contingent valuation, not real world choices. A significant question is whether and when actual behavior, in consumer choice or political judgment, shows a general neglect of differences among low probabilities. In labor markets, for example, are risks of 4/100,000 compensated at about the same level as risks of 7/100,000? If so, this would be a serious market failure. There appears to be no clear data on the question.<sup>61</sup> But we might expect that risk markets will reduce the problem of neglect, if only because some number of people will appreciate the relevant differences and drive wages and prices in the appropriate direction. Consider an analogy: Most people probably do not know whether the right price for many consumer items is what it now is, or 120% or 80% of what it now is. Small price differences would not matter to most consumers, at least for expensive products, and a consumer survey might well suggest that a modest increase or decrease in price would have no effect on most people. But lower-priced products will sell more, and hence markets will pick up differences that do not matter to, or even register for, most consumers. Perhaps risk markets work in the same way. Quite apart from the effects of markets, some imaginative studies attempt to overcome probability neglect through visual aids<sup>62</sup> or through providing a great deal of information about comparison scenarios located on a probability scale.<sup>63</sup> Without these aids, it is not so surprising that differences in low probabilities do not matter much to many people. **For most of us, most of the time, the relevant differences-between, say, 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000-are not pertinent to our decisions, and by experience we are not well equipped to take those differences into account.**

## Your author says the state can't round down to zero

**Sunstein 2** – Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science [Cass, "Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 61-107, pp. 74-75, October 2002, JSTOR, Accessed 6/26/15]//schnall

B. Safe or Unsafe? Of Thresholds and Certainty **A form of probability neglect can also be seen in the fact that people seem to treat situations as "safe" or "unsafe," without seeing that the real question is the likelihood of harm.**<sup>150</sup><sup>64</sup> Consider, for example, this remarkable discussion of the effects of natural disasters: One of the bargains men make with one another in order to maintain their sanity is to share an illusion that they are safe, even when the physical evidence in the world around them does not seem to warrant that conclusion. The survivors of a disaster, of course, are prone to overestimate the perils of their situation, if only to compensate for the fact that they underestimated those perils once before; but what is worse, far worse, is that they sometimes live in a state of almost constant apprehension because they have lost the human capacity to screen the signs of danger out of their line of vision.<sup>65</sup> What is most notable about this passage is the sharp division between ordinary people, who "share an illusion that they are safe," and those subject to a natural disaster, who "sometimes live in a state of almost constant apprehension." Part of the reason for the illusion is that



people tend to be unrealistically optimistic.<sup>66</sup> As a result, many low-level risks do not register at all. A related reason is that people tend to reduce cognitive dissonance, sometimes by treating risks as if they were insignificant, even worth ignoring.<sup>67</sup> When people think that they are "safe," even though they face a statistical risk, they might well be responding to emotions, seeking to avoid the anxiety that comes from an appreciation of the inevitability of risk. In part because people tend to be unrealistically optimistic,<sup>68</sup> many low-level risks do not register at all. At the individual level, a decision to disregard low-level risks is far from irrational, even if it is based in whole or in part on emotions; we lack the information that would permit fine-grained risk judgments, and when the probability really is low, it may be sensible to treat it as if it were zero. Of course, regulators should do better, if only because they are typically dealing with large populations, and a risk that is best ignored at the individual level, say 1/500,000, will deserve a good deal of attention if it is faced by 200 million people. And as the passage also suggests, risks can suddenly come "on screen," making people believe that where they once were "safe," they are now "unsafe." Of course, a form of probability neglect is at work when risks are placed into these two categories. Experimental work strongly supports this conclusion. With respect to the decision whether to insure against low-probability hazards, people show bimodal responses.<sup>69</sup> When a risk probability is below a certain threshold, people treat the risk as essentially zero and are willing to pay little or nothing for insurance in the event of loss. But when the risk probability is above a certain level, people are willing to pay a significant amount for insurance, indeed an amount that greatly exceeds the expected value of the risk.<sup>70</sup> Such bimodal responses provide further support for the intuitive suggestion that some risks are simply "off-screen," whereas others, statistically not much larger, can come "on-screen" and produce behavioral changes. And indeed, one study finds that when told that the probability of being killed in an accident is only 0.0000025 per trip, ninety percent of people said that they would not wear seatbelts—a finding apparently based on a judgment that so small a probability is essentially zero.<sup>7</sup>

## **Overconfidence in predictions causes us to underestimate extreme results—experimental data proves that events predicted at one-in-fifty occur forty percent of the time**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

What confidence do people place in their erroneous estimates? In section 1 on availability, I discussed an experiment on perceived risk, in which subjects overestimated the probability of newsworthy causes of death in a way that correlated to their selective reporting in newspapers. Slovic et. al. (1982) also observed: A particularly pernicious aspect of heuristics is that people typically have great confidence in judgments based upon them. In another followup to the study on causes of death, people were asked to indicate the odds that they were correct in choosing the more frequent of two lethal events (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977)... In Experiment 1, subjects were reasonably well calibrated when they gave odds of 1:1, 1.5:1, 2:1, and 3:1. That is, their percentage of correct answers was close to the appropriate percentage correct, given those odds. However, as odds increased from 3:1 to 100:1, there was little or no increase in accuracy. Only 73% of the answers assigned odds of 100:1 were correct (instead of 99.1%). Accuracy "jumped" to 81% at 1000:1 and to 87% at 10,000:1. For answers assigned odds of 1,000,000:1 or greater, accuracy was 90%; the appropriate degree of confidence would have been odds of 9:1... In summary, subjects were frequently wrong at even the highest odds levels. Moreover, they gave many extreme odds responses. More than half of their judgments were greater than 50:1. Almost one-fourth were greater than 100:1... 30% of the respondents in Experiment 1 gave odds greater than 50:1 to the incorrect assertion that homicides are more frequent than suicides.<sup>1</sup> This extraordinary-seeming result is quite common within the heuristics and biases literature, where it is known as overconfidence. Suppose I ask you for your best guess as to an uncertain quantity, such as the number of "Physicians and Surgeons" listed in the Yellow Pages of the Boston phone directory, or total U.S. egg production in millions. You will generate some value, which surely will not be exactly correct; the true value will be more or less than your guess. Next I ask you to name a lower bound such that you are 99% confident that the true value lies above this bound, and an upper bound such that you are 99% confident the true value lies beneath this bound. These two bounds form your 98% confidence interval. If you are well-calibrated, then on a test with one hundred such questions, around 2 questions will have answers that fall outside your 98% confidence interval. Alpert and Raiffa (1982) asked subjects a collective total of 1000 general-knowledge questions like those described above; 426 of the true values lay outside the subjects 98% confidence intervals. If the subjects were properly calibrated there would have been approximately 20 surprises. Put another way: Events to which subjects assigned a probability of 2% happened 42.6% of the time. Another group of 35 subjects was asked

to estimate 99.9% confident upper and lower bounds. They received 40% surprises. Another 35 subjects were asked for "minimum" and "maximum" values and were surprised 47% of the time. Finally, a fourth group of 35 subjects were asked for "astonishingly low" and "astonishingly high" values; they recorded 38% surprises. In a second experiment, a new group of subjects was given a first set of questions, scored, provided with feedback, told about the results of previous experiments, had the concept of calibration explained to them at length, and then asked to provide 98% confidence intervals for a new set of questions. The post-training subjects were surprised 19% of the time, a substantial improvement over their pre-training score of 34% surprises, but still a far cry from the well-calibrated value of 2% surprises. Similar failure rates have been found for experts. Hynes and Vanmarke (1976) asked seven internationally known geotechnical engineers to predict the height of an embankment that would cause a clay foundation to fail and to specify confidence bounds around this estimate that were wide enough to have a 50% chance of enclosing the true height. None of the bounds specified enclosed the true failure height. Christensen, Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) reported physician estimates for the probability of pneumonia for 1,531 patients examined because of a cough. At the highest calibrated bracket of stated confidences, with average verbal probabilities of 88%, the proportion of patients actually having pneumonia was less than 20%. In the words of Alpert and Raiffa (1982): 'For heaven's sake, Spread Those Extreme Fractiles! Be honest with yourselves! Admit what you don't know!' Lichtenstein et. al. (1982) reviewed the results of fourteen papers on thirty-four experiments performed by twenty-three researchers studying human calibration. The overwhelmingly strong result was that people are overconfident. In the modern field, overconfidence is no longer noteworthy; but it continues to show up, in passing, in nearly any experiment where subjects are allowed to assign extreme probabilities. Overconfidence applies forcefully to the domain of planning, where it is known as the planning fallacy. Buehler et. al. (1994) asked psychology students to predict an important variable - the delivery time of their psychology honors thesis. They waited until students approached the end of their year-long projects, and then asked the students when they realistically expected to submit their thesis, and also when they would submit the thesis "if everything went as poorly as it possibly could." On average, the students took 55 days to complete their thesis; 22 days longer than they had anticipated; and 7 days longer than their worst-case predictions. Buehler et. al. (1995) asked students for times by which the student was 50% sure, 75% sure, and 99% sure they would finish their academic project. Only 13% of the participants finished their project by the time assigned a 50% probability level, only 19% finished by the time assigned a 75% probability, and 45% finished by the time of their 99% probability level. Buehler et. al. (2002) wrote: "The results for the 99% probability level are especially striking: Even when asked to make a highly conservative forecast, a prediction that they felt virtually certain that they would fulfill, students' confidence in their time estimates far exceeded their accomplishments." Newby-Clark et. al. (2000) found that asking subjects for their predictions based on realistic "best guess" scenarios, and asking subjects for their hoped-for "best case" scenarios, produced indistinguishable results. When asked for their "most probable" case, people tend to envision everything going exactly as planned, with no unexpected delays or unforeseen catastrophes: the same vision as their "best case". Reality, it turns out, usually delivers results somewhat worse than the "worst case".

## **Focusing on one risk does not trade off with others**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 115-116)

Another of Easterbrook's articles commits the closely related "one risk at a time" fallacy. He thinks that maybe society "can conquer one risk at a time," and if so we should disregard the risk of biological weapons because there is "a weapon that we know can kill in vast numbers, because it already has: the [atomic] bomb." It is not true that society can conquer only one risk at a time, nor that hypothetical risk cannot be compared with one that has actually materialized in the past, as if only frequencies and never probabilities could furnish rational motives for action. We don't have to await a massive bioterrorist attack in order to have sufficient confidence in the danger to take preventive measures.<sup>152</sup> That would be like saying that the United and the Soviet Union should not have taken measures to prevent an accidental thermonuclear war until millions of people were killed by a hydrogen bomb. [the word "states" is omitted from "united states" in my copy of the book]

## Specific Impacts

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## War Outweighs

### War outweighs everything else

**AYERS 2006** (William, distinguished professor of education and senior university scholar at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Phi Delta Kappan, April)

A little truth-telling, then. War is catastrophic for human beings, and, indeed, for the continuation of life on Earth. With over 120 military bases around the globe and the second largest military force ever assembled, the U.S. government is engaged in a constant state of war, and American society is necessarily distorted and disfigured around the aims of war. Chris Hedges provides an annotated catalogue of the catastrophe: \* 108 million people were slaughtered in wars during the 20th century. \* During the last decade of that spectacular century, two million children were killed, 20 million displaced, six million disabled. \* From 1900 to 1990, 43 million soldiers died in wars and 62 million civilians were killed. In the wars of the 1990s the ratio was up: between 75% and 90% of all war deaths were civilian deaths. \* Today 21.3 million people are under arms - China has the largest military with 2.4 million people in service (from a population of 1.3 billion citizens), followed by the U.S. with 1.4 million (from a population of 300 million). About 1.3 million Americans are in Reserve and National Guard units. \* Vets suffer long-term health consequences including greater risk of depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, sleep disorders, and more. About one-third of Vietnam vets suffered full-blown post-traumatic stress disorder. Another 22% suffered partial post-traumatic stress disorder.<sup>17</sup> This is the nature of the beast. Anyone who's been there knows. On and on, 119 densely packed pages, fact sheet upon fact sheet, 24 pages of evidentiary footnotes, 15 pages of bibliography, all of it adding up to an inescapable conclusion: war is the greatest organized misfortune human beings have ever constructed and visited on one another. And as Adromache, captive widow of Hector, says at the opening of Seneca's Trojan Women: "It is not finished yet. There is always more and worse to fear, beyond imagination."<sup>18</sup> In the course of the play, her young son will be thrown from a tower and murdered, and the daughter of Hecuba and Priam will also be sacrificed. Beyond imagination.

## Environment outweighs poverty/racism

**Environmental destruction turns and outweighs poverty and racism—pollution disproportionately hurts minorities and causes extinction**

**CONE 2000** (James, Briggs Distinguished Professor at Union Theological Seminary, Cross Currents, Spring/Summer)

Black and other poor people in all racial groups receive much less than their fair share of everything good in the world and a disproportionate amount of the bad. Middle class and elite white environmentalists have been very effective in implementing the slogan "Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY). As a result, corporations and the government merely turned to the backyards of the poor to deposit their toxic waste. The poor live in the least desirable areas of our cities and rural communities. They work in the most polluted and physically dangerous workplaces. Decent health care hardly exists. With fewer resources to cope with the dire consequences of pollution, the poor bear an unequal burden for technological development while the rich reap most of the benefits. This makes racism and poverty ecological issues. If blacks and other hard-hit communities do not raise these ethical and political problems, they will continue to die a slow and silent death on the planet. Ecology touches every sphere of human existence. It is not just an elitist or a white middle class issue. A clean safe environment is a human and civil rights issue that impacts the lives of poor blacks and other marginal groups. We therefore must not let the fear of distracting from racism blind us to the urgency of the ecological crisis. What good is it to eliminate racism if we are not around to enjoy a racist free environment? The survival of the earth, therefore, is a moral issue for everybody. If we do not save the earth from destructive human behavior, no one will survive. That fact alone ought to be enough to inspire people of all colors to join hands in the fight for a just and sustainable planet. Expanding the Ecological Critique. We are indebted to ecologists in all fields and areas of human endeavor for sounding the alarm about the earth's distress. They have been so effective in raising ecological awareness that few people deny that our planet is in deep trouble. For the first time in history, humankind has the knowledge and power to destroy all life -- either with a nuclear bang or a gradual poisoning of the land, air, and sea.

### **No environment change can cause extinction – humanity is resilient**

**WFC Courier 5-30-04**

([http://www.wfcourier.com/articles/2004/05/30/news/top\\_news/afb195339636e12986256ea400138a72.txt](http://www.wfcourier.com/articles/2004/05/30/news/top_news/afb195339636e12986256ea400138a72.txt))

"The public is already primed for severe global warming in the future, though the scientific view is pretty shaky," said Spencer. "I am willing to believe things are maybe about one degree warmer now than they were 100 years ago. But it's not at all clear what's due to human activity and what is just coming out of ice ages of centuries past. The climate is always changing, and we're always looking at changes as something we're causing. We're forgetting the environment does change itself." Kenneth J. DeNault, an associate professor of geology at UNI, said what the Earth will do is unpredictable, but chances are humans will survive it. "I have no crystal ball, but humans are incredibly adaptable. All sorts of things change up and down," said DeNault. "New Orleans is already under water. There have been a lot of Greek cities around the Mediterranean that have been under water and are dry again. It's part of living in a dynamic planet. If Earth were like Mars, it would be very inhospitable."

# Systemic Impacts

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## Systemic Impacts First

**Large threats that are temporally and spatially distant hold little weight in motivating populations. Furthermore, immediate and cumulative systemic impacts are often ignored, even by those affected – climate change proves.**

**Leiserowitz 2005** (Anthony A. P.hDAnthony Leiserowitz is the Director of the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication[1] at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University. He is also a principal investigator at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University[2] and a research scientist at Decision Research. “American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?” Risk Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2005 pg. 1438-1439 .nt)

These results help explain the paradox in public risk perceptions, in which **Americans appear concerned about climate change, but do not consider it a high priority relative to other national or environmental issues.** This study found that, in aggregate, **Americans perceive climate change as a moderate risk, but think the impacts will mostly affect people and places that are geographically and temporally distant.** Critically, this study found that most **Americans lack vivid, concrete, and personally relevant affective images of climate change.** Furthermore, one of the most important findings was what was missing in these results. **There were no associations to the impacts of climate change on human health.** There were no associations to temperature-related morbidity and mortality (e.g., heat stroke), health effects of extreme weather events (tornadoes, hurricanes, or precipitation extremes), **air-pollution** health effects (e.g., asthma and allergies), **water- and food-borne disease** (e.g., cholera, Escherichia coli infections, giardia), or **vector- and rodent-borne disease** (e.g., malaria, West Nile Virus, Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome), all of which are potential health consequences of global climate change (McMichael & Githeko, 2001; National Assessment Synthesis Team, 2001; Patz et al., 2000). **Yet, human health impacts are likely to be among the greatest dangers of climate change for human societies,** especially for the poor and children in developing countries that lack access to adequate nutrition, clean water, or medical care (IPCC, 2001, p. 12; Watson & McMichael, 2001). This finding (or the lack thereof) that Americans do not currently associate global warming with impacts on human health is supported by the results of four questions that asked respondents to estimate the current and future human health effects of global warming (Fig. 3). On average, **Americans said that current deaths and injuries due to global warming number in the hundreds, and in 50 years will number in the thousands.** Perhaps more important, 38– 41% of respondents selected “don’t know” as their answer to these four questions—by far the dominant response. This is another strong indication that Americans do not currently perceive global warming as a grave danger to human health either now or in the future. Furthermore, this research also found that very few Americans associate global warming with extreme weather events, like heat waves, hurricanes, and droughts—all of which may increase in severity because of global warming.

**This is an impossible comparison—all systemic harms would be worse after a nuclear war, from murder to acid rain to mental illness, and as societies imploded we would be less capable of dealing with any of them** 157

**Systemic impacts cannot outweigh nuclear war—it would have systemic effects, killing billions more in future years**

**NISSANI 1992** (Moti, Professor at Wayne State, Lives in the Balance: The Cold War and American Politics 1945-1991, <http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html>)

*Human Populations.* The direct effects of war on human populations have already been discussed. Here I shall only superimpose the war's indirect effects on projection IV above, a projection which entailed one billion deaths in targeted countries as a result of near-term effects of nuclear bombs: blast, heat, initial radiation, and local fallout (the effects of the other three projections would be correspondingly lighter). The death toll will continue to climb for years after the war, as a consequence of widespread famine in targeted nations, famine in numerous non-targeted Third World countries whose people partly depend for survival on food or food-related imports from targeted nations, general deterioration of the health care and disease prevention system, lingering radioactivity, paucity of shelters, temporary but severe climatic changes, and the likelihood that some grief-stricken survivors will prefer death to a prolonged struggle for sheer physical survival. Several years after the war, the world's population may go down by another billion people. The longer-term impact of total war on human populations depends in part on whether social conditions resembling our own are re-established. If not, human populations could keep declining for decades. But even if such conditions are re-created, further reductions seem likely during the first few decades because young children, infants, and fetuses are more vulnerable to the stresses of a post-nuclear world (radiation, starvation, death of parents, etc.), and so proportionately more individuals in these age brackets will die. In addition, many people may refrain for years after from having children, so the death rate is likely to be higher than the birth rate. (I have confined the discussion here to dry statistics not because they are the most interesting, but because books like this one cannot possibly convey the countless individual tragedies these numbers imply.)



## AT Systemic Impacts Outweigh

**Their impact is biased towards the status quo—privileging a systemic impact because it's happening now doesn't assume that the world changes due to a large-scale impact like a nuclear war—massive impacts will have catastrophic, unpredictable, systemic effects which would overwhelm their impact even if the initial catastrophe didn't**

**Intervening actors solve magnitude—their impact may add up over time, but this only increases the chance that some action will eventually be taken to solve it**

**Systemic threats do not outweigh extinction—the availability heuristic causes us to underestimate both magnitude and probability**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

A general principle underlying the heuristics-and-biases program is that human beings use methods of thought - heuristics - which quickly return good approximate answers in many cases; but which also give rise to systematic errors called biases. An example of a heuristic is to judge the frequency or probability of an event by its availability, the ease with which examples of the event come to mind. R appears in the third-letter position of more English words than in the first-letter position, yet it is much easier to recall words that begin with "R" than words whose third letter is "R". Thus, a majority of respondents guess that words beginning with "R" are more frequent, when the reverse is the case. (Tversky and Kahneman 1973.) Biases implicit in the availability heuristic affect estimates of risk. A pioneering study by Lichtenstein et. al. (1978) examined absolute and relative probability judgments of risk. People know in general terms which risks cause large numbers of deaths and which cause few deaths. However, asked to quantify risks more precisely, people severely overestimate the frequency of rare causes of death, and severely underestimate the frequency of common causes of death. Other repeated errors were also apparent: Accidents were judged to cause as many deaths as disease. (Diseases cause about 16 times as many deaths as accidents.) Homicide was incorrectly judged a more frequent cause of death than diabetes, or stomach cancer. A followup study by Combs and Slovic (1979) tallied reporting of deaths in two newspapers, and found that errors in probability judgments correlated strongly (.85 and .89) with selective reporting in newspapers. People refuse to buy flood insurance even when it is heavily subsidized and priced far below an actuarially fair value. Kunreuther et. al. (1993) suggests underreaction to threats of flooding may arise from "the inability of individuals to conceptualize floods that have never occurred... Men on flood plains appear to be very much prisoners of their experience... Recently experienced floods appear to set an upward bound to the size of loss with which managers believe they ought to be concerned." Burton et. al. (1978) report that when dams and levees are built, they reduce the frequency of floods, and thus apparently create a false sense of security, leading to reduced precautions. While building dams decreases the frequency of floods, damage per flood is so much greater afterward that the average yearly damage increases. It seems that people do not extrapolate from experienced small hazards to a possibility of large risks; rather, the past experience of small hazards sets a perceived upper bound on risks. A society well-protected against minor hazards will take no action against major risks (building on flood plains once the regular minor floods are eliminated). A society subject to regular minor hazards will treat those minor hazards as an upper bound on the size of the risks (guarding against regular minor floods but not occasional major floods). Risks of human extinction may tend to be underestimated since, obviously, humanity has never yet encountered an extinction event.<sup>2</sup>

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# Timeframe

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## Framing Good

**Planning for extinction events far in the future, such as asteroid impacts, is a waste of resources.**

**Matheny 2007** (Jason G. Matheny, P.hD is a Program Manager at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007 Pg. 1335-1344 .nt)

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**Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations’ existence.** If we knew for certain that we would all die in 10 years, **it would not make sense for us to spend money on asteroid defense.** It would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261–262) defend discounting on these grounds—**we are uncertain about humanity’s long-term survival, so planning too far ahead is imprudent.**<sup>8</sup> **Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty about survival** (Ponthiere, 2003). **But it is unnecessary—an analysis of extinction risk should equate the value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanity’s future from that moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods** (Ng, 2005). If we discounted the expected value of humanity’s future, we would count future extinction risks twice—once in the discount rate and once in the undiscounted expected value—and underestimate the value of reducing current risks.

**Long timeframes decrease probability—the more distant the prediction, the more likely it is to be wrong**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 17)

**A compelling reason for not giving a great deal of thought to the remote future is the difficulty, often the impossibility, of making accurate predictions beyond a few years.** People in the year 1000 could have had only the vaguest conception of what the world would be like in the year 2004, and we can have only the vaguest conception of what it will be like in the year 3000, let alone the year 1,000,000. We have better predictive methods than people in 1000 did, but on the other had **the rate of technological change is higher now than it was** then. **Lacking the requisite foreknowledge we can’t know what we should be doing now to forestall the disasters that are possible, maybe even likely, on that timescale.**

**Conditional probability—short-timeframe existential risks effectively decrease the probability of long-timeframe ones—we can only die once**

**BOSTROM 2011** (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>)

Finally, when considering existential-risk probabilities, we must recognize that **one existential catastrophe can preempt another.** **If a meteor wipes us out next year, the existential risk from future machine superintelligence drops to zero.** **The sum of all-things-considered probabilities of disjoint (mutually exclusive) existential risks cannot exceed 100%.** Yet

conditional probabilities of disjoint existential risks (conditional, that is to say, on no other existential disaster occurring preemptively) could well add up to more than 100%. For example, some pessimist might coherently assign an 80% probability to humanity being destroyed by machine superintelligence, and a 70% conditional probability to humanity being destroyed by nanotechnological warfare given that humanity is not destroyed by machine superintelligence. However, if the unconditional (all-things-considered) probability of our being eradicated by superintelligence is 80%, then the unconditional probability of our being eradicated by nanotech war must be no greater than 20%, since we can only be eradicated once.

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## Framing Bad

**Humans are incapable of seeing past their own gain to what is beneficial for the species – resist the temptation to pull the trigger on timeframe.**

**Davidson 15** (Marc D. Davidson, researcher and lecturer, University of Amsterdam environmental ethics and economics “Climate change and the ethics of discounting” WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:401–412. doi: 10.1002/wcc.347 .nt)

Other <sup>Consequentialism 164</sup> authors, however, **have disagreed with the idea that the discount rate used for climate policy analysis ought to be based upon the preferences revealed in capital markets.** First, **it is doubtful whether society’s saving behavior actually reveals any societal preferences as to how to weigh climate damage against present consumption losses.** Although people may also save for their descendants, **capital markets primarily reveal current consumers’ preferences toward transferring their own consumption to the future,** while **climate change policy is about weighing up changes in consumption across different people and generations** (see e.g., Refs 51, 52 and Ref 53, p. 396). There is little reason to consider the two related: from the observation that I am saving an apple so I can eat it tomorrow, it cannot be deduced that I am either willing or morally obliged to save an apple so someone else can eat it tomorrow. Neither can it be deduced from the fact that I do not save an apple for myself that I am unwilling to save it for someone else. One reason is that the welfare of future generations may be viewed as a public good and that people therefore face a social dilemma: I may only be willing to save for the future if I know that others are doing the same, rather than free riding on my efforts.<sup>44,52,54</sup> Moreover, it has been argued that if people’s preferences count, **it is problematic that future generations are themselves unable to express their preferences in capital markets** (see also e.g., Ref 52, p. 482; Ref 55, p. 61, Ref 48). Finally, there are no alternative investments with a risk profile and time span comparable with those of investments to mitigate climate impacts from which to deduce revealed preferences (Ref 56, p. 71; Ref 9, p. 229). However, **even if capital markets revealed societal preferences as how to weigh climate damage against present consumption losses, it is not obvious that governments ought to base their policies on them. If a government has reason to believe that the majority of people have preferences for something that is morally wrong, it also may have reason to override people’s preferences.** As Pigou remarked (Ref 56, p. 29): **‘The state should protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants.’** Depending on one’s political views, one may deem governments justified to act paternalistically and protect people against temporal myopia, as in the case of compulsory savings to provide adequately for retirement, for example (Ref 57, p. 120). Moreover, there is a distinction between the policy that a government may recommend and communicate to society, and the policy that it implements after public deliberation. In this respect, the moral choice of discount rate is no different from the scientific assessment of climate change. In the latter case, too, governments may recommend climate policy on the basis of the scientific state of the art as assessed by the IPCC, although they may be bound by democratic principles to base actual policy on popular (dis)belief regarding climate change (Ref 21, p. 42). This difference between a government’s policy recommendations and actual policy implementation is congruent with Marglin’s plea for consumer sovereignty and democracy (Ref 44, pp. 97–98), which according to him is not to suggest a simplistic “recording machine” theory of government,<sup>164</sup> in which the government plays only the passive role of registering and carrying out the articulated desires of the members of society. I certainly would allow an educational role for government, including the education of today’s citizens to the “rightful claims” of future generations. In other words, **even if capital markets revealed societal preferences on how to weigh climate damage and one rejects ‘Government House utilitarianism’ as Nordhaus does, governments could still inform society about the climate policy it deems necessary on the basis of its own moral judgment.**

## **The focus on short-term impacts is bad—failure to think on a longer time scale invites human extinction**

**VERSCHUUR 1996** (Gerrit, Adjunct Prof of Physics at U of Memphis, Impact: the Threat of Comets and Asteroids, p. 216)

There is an even more subtle reason why we are unlikely to take collective and significant action to assure the long-term survival of our species. It manifests as the psychological syndrome known as the "illusion of invulnerability." Individuals cannot believe that they will personally succumb in the next catastrophe. This syndrome is at play in those who live happily in earthquake zones, in floodplains, or on the sides of active volcanoes. The existence of the syndrome poses a paradox. If we are concerned about the long-term survival of civilization, we must overcome our genetic predisposition to deal only with the immediate future. Dealing with short-term issues is natural in all animals, and represents the practical way in which to survive from day to day. However, this predisposition is not conducive to assuring a long-term existence. Perhaps that is what is at issue. We have learned much about the natural universe in recent years, and the mind's eye has only just developed the ability to scan millions of years of time. Yet that seems to be no more than an intellectual exercise with little practical use. Perhaps the evolution of our species may yet depend on whether we can succeed in making very long term plans and carrying them out for the benefit of life on earth. Scientific discovery has brought us to the point where we confront the awesome probability that collision with an earth-crossing object will bring an end to civilization. It is no longer a question of whether a massive impact will occur in the future; it is only a matter of when. Even if we think it will be a thousand years from now, the point of raising the issue is to ask ourselves what we plan to do about it. It may be time to think in terms of thousands of years into the future. I am assuming that we care that our species will be around for a long time, and that this question is worth thinking about.

# Predictions

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# Frontlines

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# Predictions Incorrect Frontline

## Expert predictions are wrong—we can't know the future

**MENAND 2005** (Louis, "Everybody's an Expert," The New Yorker, December 2005, [http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo\\_books1?currentPage=1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo_books1?currentPage=1))

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock's new book, "Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?" (Princeton; \$35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they're wrong, they're rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert's predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. "Expert Political Judgment" is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living "commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends," and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.

Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a "three possible futures" form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. "We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly," he reports. "In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in 'reading' emerging situations." And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. "Experts in demand," Tetlock says, "were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight." People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock's results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. Expert Political Judgment" is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists' diagnoses were no better than the secretaries'. The experts' trouble in Tetlock's study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not

embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn't deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like "The McLaughlin Group," these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and the more chains of causation he or she can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-

speculative sequentialism. 169

Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn't fit with what they already believe. Tetlock's experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn't fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper's famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan. Also, people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it's just a random scatter of dots, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow's invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock's researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events "fit together" in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less. The classic "Linda problem" is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, "Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations." They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are "bank teller" and "bank teller and active in the feminist movement." People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist—rather than one. It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about why some people make better forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin's metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," to illustrate the difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who "know one big thing," aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who "do not get it," and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible "ad hocery" that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. A hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the "actor-dispensability thesis," according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only "off on timing," or are "almost right," derailed by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out.

## The future can't be predicted

**SHERDEN 1998** (William, business consultant, The Fortune Sellers, p. 7)

Current science is proving this deterministic view of the world to be naïve. The theories of chaos and complexity are revealing the future as fundamentally unpredictable. This applies to our economy, the

stock market, commodity prices, the weather, animal populations (humans included), and many other phenomena. There are no clear historical patterns that carve well-marked trails into the future. History does not repeat itself. The future remains mostly unknowable.

## **Empirical evidence doesn't matter—history does not predict the future**

### **SHERDEN 1998**

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(William, business consultant, *The Fortune Sellers*, p. 199)

History does not repeat itself. The evolution of society is continually new, novel, and full of surprises, with no recurring cycles. Wars, revolutions, trends, and movements are as different from one another as snowflakes. “One must expect that events of an intrinsically new character will emerge,” wrote Popper. “Every single event in social life can be said to be new, in a certain sense. It may be classified with other events; it may even resemble those events in certain aspects; but it will always be unique in a very definite way...Belief in historical destiny is sheer superstition.”

## **War is particularly unpredictable**

### **FONT AND RÉGIS 2006** (Joan Pere Plaza i Font UAB – Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain Dandoy Régis UCL – University of Louvain – Belgium

“Chaos Theory and its Application in Political Science” IPISA – AISP Congress Fukuoka, 9 – 13 July 2006

[http://www.sciencespo.site.ulb.ac.be/dossiers\\_membres/dandoy-regis/fichiers/dandoy-regis-publication18.pdf](http://www.sciencespo.site.ulb.ac.be/dossiers_membres/dandoy-regis/fichiers/dandoy-regis-publication18.pdf))

Betts (2000) observed a useful application of chaos to strategy and international security. In his view, doubts about government's capacity to cause intended effects through strategy are reinforced by the chaos theory, given the fact that the strategy results do not follow plans. The complexity and the contingency preclude controlling causes well enough to produce desired effects and little connection between the design and the denouement of strategies is observed. The author stressed that, in this case, the chaos theory emphasizes how small, untraceable events produce major changes, referring to the ‘butterfly effect’ characteristic. Chaos theory sees war as a nonlinear system that produces ‘erratic behaviour’, through disproportionate relationships between inputs and outputs or synergies, and in which the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts (Beyerchen, 1992). However, Betts conceded that chaotic nonlinearity is common in war strategies, but neither absolute nor pervasive. “If chaos theory meant that no prediction is possible, there would be no point in any analysis of the conduct of the war” (Betts, 2000: 20). Those who criticize social science approaches to strategy for false confidence in predictability cannot rest on a rejection of prediction altogether without negating all rationale for strategy. Finally, one should mention that the nonlinear perspective misrepresents the structure of the problem as the military strategy seeks disequilibrium, a way to defeat the enemy rather than to find a mutually acceptable price for exchange. More precise but still rhetorical examples of the application of the chaos theory in the field of the international relations can be found in the example of the spontaneous and mass revolutions as the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 that is considered a massive rupture of chaotic uncertainties and bifurcations into unpredictable dynamical changes in a political system (Farazmand, 2003:341), similarly to the predictions made on the post-castro environment in Cuba (Radu, 2000). A single man – Adolf Hitler – was considered as the ‘butterfly's wing’ that could cause the German system to bifurcate from democracy to totalitarianism (Peled, 2000:31). Similarly, the events of September 2001 in the United States, the appearance of the Macedonian Alexander that ruled the Persian Empire are assessed as good examples of how small scale chaotic events can lead to large scale chaotic consequences with far reaching implications. (Farazmand, 2003:353). But political scientists do not only use metaphors for describing political and IR phenomena. For example, Saperstein (1988) studied empirically whether the development of SDI in the United States would lead to a transition from an offensive to a defensive mode of strategy from ICBM attacks. His complex model appears to be sensitive to noise and even chaotic. The outcomes of the system clearly show erratic oscillations and predict an undesired escalation of risk of strategic intercontinental nuclear war in the case of the development of SDI. They confirmed that, in the political science field, the transition from predictability to chaos in deterministic mathematical system is possible.

## Unpredictable changes in initial conditions alter the outcome—human societies are too chaotic to predict

**WARD 1996** (Brian, "The Chaos of History: Notes Towards a Postmodernist Historiography," *Limina*, Vol 2, [http://www.limina.arts.uwa.edu.au/previous/volumes\\_15/volume\\_2?f=73934](http://www.limina.arts.uwa.edu.au/previous/volumes_15/volume_2?f=73934))

Porush establishes the link between narrative-as-history and chaos theory by recognising that before chaos theory, a view of human experience based on the metaphor of the Butterfly Effect was 'dismissed as pertinent only to the realm of accident, coincidence, kismet, and messy human affairs'.<sup>35</sup> Now however, chaos theory suggests that unpredictable or nonlinear events are not only the product of human experience but are also a part of 'reality'. Stephen H. Kellert contends that historical events can be seen to unfold as the Butterfly Effect suggests because history teems 'with examples of small events that led to momentous and long-lasting changes in the course of human affairs.'<sup>36</sup> Porush and Kellert share this belief with physicists like Marcelo Alonso and Gottfried Mayer-Kress. Alonso states that because 'social systems are not linear, certain local fluctuations (inventions, discoveries, revolutions, wars, [and the] emergence of political leaders etc.) may result in major changes'.<sup>37</sup> Mayer-Kress also uses the Butterfly Effect as a historical metaphor to argue that nation states can be described as chaotic systems, and that in such systems small events such as terrorist bombings or minor military deployments can act as catalysts, resulting in all-out nuclear war.<sup>38</sup> Chaos theory thus appears to have direct historiographical implications. One consequence of chaos for historiography is that a linear model of causality can no longer be used to determine the causes and effects of historical events. A postmodernist historiography demonstrates the ineffectiveness of linear causality, which cannot take into account the inherent discontinuity and indeterminism of historical events. A new historiography that relies on the techniques of literary criticism to achieve its deconstruction of historical narratives is developing. This postmodernist historiography takes nonlinear causality into account, and acknowledges that a single historical text cannot represent the whole of an event.<sup>39</sup> Because of this, any piece of information within the text is considered to be significant, and no detail, however irrelevant or unimportant it appears, can be overlooked. A postmodern historiography accepts that detail within the historical text is crucial and tiny details or fragments of information may have great relevance and importance to the event being studied. William V. Spanos calls these details 'minute particulars', and argues that knowing the minute particulars of a historical event can make a difference to the analysis of that event.<sup>40</sup> Ankersmit argues that the postmodernist historiographer must be 'capable of linking a small, insignificant detail in one part of the work he investigates to an apparently unrelated detail in another part of that work' in order to gain information and meaning out of a historical event recorded in a text or a series of texts.<sup>41</sup>

## Various world systems exist in a critical state where sudden and unpredictable collapse is possible at any time—it is literally impossible to learn from history or identify a cause of war even minutes before it breaks out

**BUCHANAN 2002** (Mark, *Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen*, p. 62)

This book is not only about earthquakes. It is about ubiquitous patterns of change and organization that run through our world at all levels. I have begun with earthquakes and discussed them at some length only to illustrate a way of thinking and to introduce the remarkable dynamics of upheavals associated with the critical state, dynamics that we shall soon see at work in other settings. "When it comes to disastrous episodes of financial collapse, revolutions, or catastrophic wars, we all quite understandably long to identify the causes that make these things happen, so that we might avoid them in the future. But we shall soon find power laws in these settings as well, very possibly because the critical state underlies the dynamics of all of these different kinds of upheaval. It appears that, at many levels, our world is at all times tuned to be on the edge of sudden, radical change, and that these and other upheavals may all be strictly unavoidable and unforeseeable, even just moments before they strike. Consequently, our human longing for explanation may be terribly misplaced, and doomed always to go unsatisfied.

Chaotic interactions are the only possibility for a nuclear war

**MILLIKEN 2001** (Jennifer, The social construction of the Korean War: conflict and its possibilities, google books)

Schelling (1966: 55), commenting on the possibility of a 'major nuclear war', claimed that it could only result 'from a process that is not entirely foreseen, from reactions that are not fully predictable, from decisions that are not wholly deliberate, from events that are not fully under control'. I have not been examining the prospect of a major nuclear war (which was not materially a possibility in 1950), but rather how the Korean War could have become a more generalised war than it already was. The routes to general war that I have traced none the less show that Schelling's comments also applied in this Cold War context. A general war was then not fully predictable either it could have resulted from decisions not to fight that type of conflict, but rather to do other things. But - the point to my counterfactual scenarios - these processes were 'foreseeable', meaning here embedded in the conflict grammars of participants in the Korean War and how they could have interacted with one another.

## **Predictions are wrong – current science disproves**

**SHERDEN 1998** (William, business consultant, The Fortune Sellers)

Current science is proving this deterministic view of the world to be naïve. The theories of chaos and complexity are revealing the future as fundamentally unpredictable. This applies to our economy, the stock market, commodity prices, the weather, animal populations (humans included), and many other phenomena. There are no clear historical patterns that carve well-marked trails into the future. History does not repeat itself. The future remains mostly unknowable.

## Predictions Correct Frontline

### **Extinction risks in particular are underestimated—their critique of predictions is backwards**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

I am sometimes asked: "If <existential risk x> is real, why aren't more people doing something about it?" There are many possible answers, a few of which I have touched on here. People may be overconfident and over-optimistic. They may focus on overly specific scenarios for the future, to the exclusion of all others. They may not recall any past extinction events in memory. They may overestimate the predictability of the past, and hence underestimate the surprise of the future. They may not realize the difficulty of preparing for emergencies without benefit of hindsight. They may prefer philanthropic gambles with higher payoff probabilities, neglecting the value of the stakes. They may conflate positive information about the benefits of a technology as negative information about its risks. They may be contaminated by movies where the world ends up being saved. They may purchase moral satisfaction more easily by giving to other charities. Or the extremely unpleasant prospect of human extinction may spur them to seek arguments that humanity will not go extinct, without an equally frantic search for reasons why we would. But if the question is, specifically, "Why aren't more people doing something about it?", one possible component is that people are asking that very question - darting their eyes around to see if anyone else is reacting to the emergency, meanwhile trying to appear poised and unflustered. If you want to know why others aren't responding to an emergency, before you respond yourself, you may have just answered your own question.

### **Their predictions arguments don't apply to our disadvantages—imagining unintended catastrophes is both accurate and necessary—this is the author that did their studies**

**TETLOCK 2009** (Philip Tetlock is the Mitchell Endowed Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and the author of *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?*, *The National Interest*, August 25, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22040>)

The authors point out too that just because something—like geopolitical risk—is hard to quantify does not give you license to ignore it. Rough approximations are better than tacitly treating the risk as zero. Ask the energy companies that rushed into Yeltsin's Russia in the 1990s to make large fixed-capital investments and were then compelled by Putin in the next decade to "renegotiate." This means we need to value contrarian thinkers, even though they can be a royal pain and slow down the adoption of policies preferred by insiders. And SO the authors suggest we might consider one much-hyped, but still-useful, method of prying open otherwise-closed minds: scenario planning. This requires policy advocates to envision worlds in which things don't work out as planned—a world in which we are not greeted as liberators in Iraq; or a world in which deregulation leads not to greater market efficiencies but rather to excessive borrowing that severely destabilizes financial markets. History rarely overtly repeats itself but it often rhymes— and there is an advantage to those who can pick up the more subtle similarities. Saddam Hussein bore some resemblance to Hitler, but he also bore some to Ceaucescu, Mussolini, Kim Il Sung and Stalin, all of whom played a far more risk-averse geopolitical game. The case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq loses much of its rhetorical force when we use historical analogies in a more nuanced fashion. The authors are even nimble enough to see that although there are many settings in which foxes like themselves have an advantage—they are slower to jump to premature conclusions and are quicker to change their minds in response to new evidence—hedgehogs are still sometimes remarkably prescient. As far back as 1933, Churchill classified Hitler as a grave threat to Great Britain—a category into which, incidentally, he also tossed Gandhi. Similarly, the most bearish and bullish financial pundits occasionally have their days in the sun.

## **Tetlock underestimates the accuracy of experts—he excludes questions that would disrupt his model**

**CAPLAN 2007** (Dr. Bryan Caplan, Dept of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, Critical Review 19:1)

For purposes of this review, I took Tetlock's fox-hedgehog test. Even though I knew his results in advance, the test pegs me as a moderate hedgehog. Nevertheless, I find Tetlock's evidence for the relative superiority of foxes to be compelling. In fact, I agree with his imaginary "hard-line neopositivist" critic who contends that Tetlock cuts the hedgehogs too much slack. I part ways with Tetlock on some major issues, but I do concur that he underestimates my own cognitive style. My main quarrels are, rather, that Tetlock underestimates experts in general, and does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his results. How does Tetlock underestimate the experts? In a nutshell, his questions are too hard for experts, and too easy for chimps. Tetlock deliberately avoids asking experts what he calls "dumb questions." But it is on these so-called dumb questions that experts' predictions shine, relative to random guessing. Conversely, by partitioning possible responses into reasonable categories (using methods I will shortly explain), Tetlock saved the chimps from severe embarrassment that experts would have avoided in their own. Furthermore, even if the experts are no better than Tetlock finds, he does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his results as a vindication of populism. There is only one major instance in which Tetlock compares the accuracy of experts to the accuracy of laymen. The result: The laymen (undergraduate Berkeley psychology majors—quite elite in absolute terms) were far inferior not only to experts, but to chimps. Thus, the only relevant data in Expert Political Judgment further undermine the populist view that the man in the street knows as much as the experts. But the back cover of Tetlock's book still features a confused blurb from The New Yorker claiming that "the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock's new book" is "that people who make prediction their business...are no better than the rest of us." Tetlock found no such thing. But in his quest to make experts more accountable, he has accidentally encouraged apologists for popular fallacies. It is important for Tetlock to clear up this misunderstanding before it goes any farther. His goal, after all, is to make experts better, not to delude the man in the street into thinking that experts have nothing to teach him.

## **The unreliability of prediction works both ways—this denies the predictions of experts who say that our impact will not happen**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 112)

Polarization of views is a marked tendency of public-intellectual discourse. Intellectuals appeal to a popular audience by taking extreme positions that arrest attention and differentiate the speaker or writer from his competitors in the public-intellectual market. Environmental extremists, such as Paul Ehrlich, have learned this lesson well. At the same time, their extremism makes them broad targets—but the tendency of public-intellectual discourse toward extreme positions leads the attackers to overshoot the mark. An early example is a book by John Maddox called *The Doomsday Syndrome* (1972), which uses the excesses of Ehrlich, Barry Commoner, Rachel Carson, and other well-known environmentalists to disparage doomsday scenarios. The book is well written and well informed, but the author's impercipient regarding advances in bioengineering and computerization is striking. Not that he could be expected to have predicted them, but he shouldn't have thought he could see the future clearly enough to dismiss the risks that continued advances in these fields might create.

**Even if our predictions are bad the possibility of extinction means that we should use them**



**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 18)

The example suggests that the reason human survival beyond, say, the twenty-second century has little resonance with most of us is merely that the future is hazy; the haziness illustrates the operation of imagination cost. The future that is now the present was as hazy to the Romans as our future is to us. But that would not have been a good reason for their risking the destruction of the human race in what to them was the remote and therefore weightless future. Where the example is misleading, however, is in failing to extrapolate from the Romans' assumed ability (assumed Consequentialism 175) (obviously the assumption is contrary to fact) to build a particle accelerator 2,000 years ago. If they had had that much knowledge in 4 A.D., then probably within a few hundred more years they would have learned how to avoid an accelerator disaster, and so the risk of extinction by 2004 would have been smaller than 1 in 500. Nevertheless the example is relevant to whether we should be utterly insouciant about the fate of our remote descendants ("remote" on the scale of thousands, not millions or billions, of years). It does not answer the question how much we "owe" the remote future, but the answer may not be important. The threat that the catastrophic risks pose in the near future, the current century, may be a sufficient basis for taking effective action now to prevent the risks from ever materializing.

**Recognizing that we can't see the future means we should try even harder to predict and avoid disasters—we have an ethical responsibility even if we don't always guess correctly**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientific futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter's total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

**We have an obligation to make predictions and act now—delay is unethical and decreases the chance that interventions are effective**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, *Constellations*, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”<sup>36</sup> Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

# Predictions Accurate

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## Predictions Accurate Frontline

**Predictions of catastrophe are no longer dominated by experts—they're becoming more accurate every year**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

Combining a sense of shared contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage. Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil society's capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the heart of their mandates.<sup>17</sup> These organizations are often the first to detect signs of trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions, and to warn the international community about impending dangers; to wit, the lead role of environmental groups in sounding the alarm about global warming and species depletion or of humanitarian agencies regarding the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, frequently months or even years before Western governments or multilateral institutions followed suit. What has come into being, then, is a loose-knit network of watchdog groups that is acquiring finely tuned antennae to pinpoint indicators of forthcoming or already unfolding crises.

**New technology and information processing makes future predictions accurate—we can accurately assess probability and trends**

**KRESSLEY 97** (Konrad, teaches Political Science and Public Administration at the University of South Alabama, "From Prophecy to Forecasting: Future Studies Grow Up," Nov 25 <http://www.theharbinger.org/xvi/971125/future.html>)

A number of technological and scientific breakthroughs in the last half century have made this approach to future studies possible. Of these, remote sensing via satellite, ultra-sensitive instrumentation, and information science have been the most significant. Satellites have made it possible to gain a total world view, producing observations of areas that up to now had been inaccessible or overlooked. This power of observation has been augmented by a wide variety of sophisticated instruments capable of measuring minute differences of chemical compositions, temperatures, and the like. Finally, the advent of the computer spawned information science, with the capacity for storing and analyzing vast amounts of information from the natural and social environment. Natural and social scientists were now able to construct global inventories of information. Perhaps the most powerful conclusion was the complex interdependence of various elements of the natural and social world. It's called "systems analysis." Computer-generated models suggest that factors such as population growth, resource use, pollution and climate change could be linked. Likewise, economic models link data about employment, inflation, interest rates and related factors. This interdependence also makes predictions possible. We'll discuss some global and national forecasts in a later installment. For now, let's just consider a small example of how scientific advancements influence future studies. Take hurricane forecasting, which interests everyone on the Gulf Coast. Dr. Miriam Fern, a local geologist, has found a way to track hurricanes over several past centuries by examining the mud of freshwater lakes adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico. Her research project involved sampling layers of mud in Lake Shelby at Gulf Shores. Dr. Fern hypothesized that powerful hurricane force winds would blow beach sand inland, creating layers of sand in nearby lake bottoms. After the storm, normal lake sedimentation would resume, trapping layers of hurricane-borne sand between the layers of mud. The research involves taking core samples from the lake bottom. Back at the laboratory, researchers record the volume and location of the sand which indicates the force of the storm, while organic matter in the surrounding mud layers is amenable to radioactive

dating. Dr. Fern now has a fairly good record of how often severe hurricanes visit the region. But don't ask her to predict when the next big one will come. That's a statistical probability. You'll need to get the date from Nostradamus.

### **Large-scale predictions are accurate—even if individual actions cannot be predicted, aggregate group trends can**

**FLECHTHEIM 1972** (Ossip, "Futurology: the New Science of Probability?" <http://iranscope.ghandchi.com/Anthology/Flechtheim.htm>)

Mathematical probability is the tool used for the understanding of that segment of future social reality which, in its structure, resembles the world of nature. Wherever actions and relationships of relatively large numbers of analogous persons or groups are under investigation which are recurrent and unchanging over a certain period of time, the quantitative method typical of the exact sciences can be applied and the probability of future occurrences can be numerically determined. According to Professor Phelps, "predictions improve in accuracy when they are based upon trend- lines and probable error and reach their highest validity in the statistics of the insurance actuary." More recently, trend predictions have been ventured with increasing accuracy in the fields of population movement and business fluctuation, and they are making headway in education, psychology, and criminology. With the help of statistics, changes in public opinion and election results are now forecast regularly.' In many instances, such mass phenomena can be correctly predicted by statistical means though the future behavior of the individual component of the mass may be completely unpredictable.

### **Expert predictions are accurate and are always improving—studies and financial success prove**

**KRESSLEY 97** (Konrad, teaches Political Science and Public Administration at the University of South Alabama, "From Prophecy to Forecasting: Future Studies Grow Up," Nov 25 <http://www.theharbinger.org/xvi/971125/future.html>)

Skeptics sometimes ask me about the accuracy of forecasts and whether they're really worth the high fees charged by professional futurists. The success of the industry should be evidence enough, and a number of studies show the growing success rate of forecasting over the last several decades. Edward Cornish, President of the World Future Society, recently evaluated a set of forecasts made in the inaugural issue of The Futurist in 1967. Out of 34 forecasts, there were 23 hits and 11 misses in 1997, just 30 years later. For example, the futurists were right about such things as use of artificial organ parts, growth in agricultural production, and the common use of drugs to treat psychiatric disorders. They erred in predicting widespread availability of desalinated sea water, three-dimensional TV, and that most urban people would live in high-rise buildings. And what is the future of Future Studies? While earlier forecasting focused mainly on science, technology and economics, the current crop of futurists also takes great interest in issues of culture, society, human development and spirituality.

## Multiple Authors Prove Accuracy

**Our evidence is from multiple authors—this aggregate opinion makes the predictions more accurate**

**TETLOCK 2009** (Philip Tetlock is the Mitchell Endowed Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and the author of Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?, The National Interest, August 25, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22040>)

The best thing I can say for the superpundit model is likely to annoy virtually all of that ilk: they look a lot better when we blend them into a superpundit composite. Aggregation helps. As financial journalist James Surowiecki stressed in his insightful book The Wisdom of Crowds, if you average the predictions of many pundits, that average will typically outperform the individual predictions of the pundits from whom the averages were derived. This might sound magical, but averaging works when two fairly easily satisfied conditions are met: (1) the experts are mostly wrong, but they are wrong in different ways that tend to cancel out when you average; (2) the experts are right about some things, but they are right in partly overlapping ways that are amplified by averaging. Averaging improves the signal-to-noise ratio in a very noisy world. If you doubt this, try this demonstration. Ask several dozen of your coworkers to estimate the value of a large jar of coins. When my classes do this exercise, the average guess is closer to the truth than 80 or 90 percent of the individual guesses. From this perspective, if you want to improve your odds, you are better-off betting not on George Friedman but rather on a basket of averaged-out predictions from a broad ideological portfolio of George Friedman–style pundits. Diversification helps.

## AT Tetlock

### **Their Tetlock arguments are wrong—his model is bad and experts predictions are accurate**

**CAPLAN 2007** (Dr. Bryan Caplan, Dept of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, Critical Review 19:1)

Once Tetlock puts matters this way, however, it suggests that we should focus more attention on the mousetrap and less on the mouse. How sophisticated did the mousetrap have to be to make the experts' performance so poor? What kinds of questions—and question formats—did Tetlock wind up using? This is one of the rare cases where Tetlock gets a little defensive. He writes that he is sorely tempted to dismiss the objection that “the researchers asked the wrong questions of the wrong people at the wrong time” with a curt, “Well, if you think you'd get different results by posing different types of questions to different types of people, go ahead.’ That is how science is supposed to proceed” (185). The problem with his seemingly reasonable retort is that Tetlock deliberately selected relatively hard questions. One of his criteria was that questions must

pass the “don't bother me too often with dumb questions” test...No one expected a coup in the United States or United Kingdom, but many regarded coups as serious possibilities in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and so on. Experts guffawed at judging the nuclear proliferation risk posed by Canada or Norway, but not the risks posed by Pakistan or North Korea. Some “ridiculous questions” were thus deleted. On reflection, though, a more neutral word for “ridiculous” is “easy.” If you are comparing experts to the chimp's strategy of random guessing, excluding easy questions eliminates the areas where experts would have routed the chimps.

Perhaps more compellingly, if you are comparing experts to laymen, positions that experts consider ridiculous often turn out to be popular (Caplan 2007; Somin 2004; Lichter and Rothman 1999; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Thaler 1992; Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic 1992). To take only one example, when asked to name the two largest components of the federal budget from a list of six areas, the National Survey of Public Knowledge of Welfare Reform and the Federal Budget (Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University 1995) found that foreign aid was respondents' most common answer, even though only about 1 percent of the budget is devoted to it. Compared to laymen, then, experts have an uncanny ability to predict foreign aid as a percentage of the budget. Tetlock also asks quite a few questions that are controversial among the experts themselves. If his goal were solely to distinguish better and worse experts, this would be fine. Since Tetlock also wants to evaluate the predictive ability of the average expert, however, there is a simple reason to worry about the inclusion of controversial questions: When experts sharply disagree on a topic, then by definition, the average expert cannot do well. But Tetlock does more to help the chimp than just avoiding easy questions and asking controversial ones. He also crafts the response options to make chimps look much more knowledgeable than they are. When questions dealt with continuous variables (like GDP growth or stock market closes), respondents did not have to give an exact number. Instead, they were asked whether variables would be above a confidence interval, below a confidence interval, or inside a confidence interval. The catch is that Tetlock picked confidence intervals that make the chimps' strategy fairly effective: The confidence interval was usually defined by plus or minus 0.5 of a standard deviation of the previous five or ten years of values of the variable. ...For example, if GDP growth had been 2.5 percent in the most recently available year, and if the standard deviation of growth values in the last ten years had been 1.5 percent, then the confidence band would have been bounded by 1.75 percent and 3.25 percent. (244) Assuming a normal distribution, Tetlock's approach ensures that variable will go up with a probability of 31 percent, stay the same with a probability of 38 percent, and go down with a probability of 31 percent. As a consequence, the chimp strategy of assigning equal probabilities to all events is almost automatically well-calibrated. If, however, Tetlock had made his confidence interval zero—or three—standard deviations wide, random guessing would have been a predictive disaster, and experts would have shined by comparison. To truly level the playing field between experts and chimps, Tetlock could have asked the experts for exact numbers, and made the chimps guess from a uniform distribution over the whole range of possibilities. For example, he could have asked about defense spending as a percentage of GDP, and made chimps equally likely to guess every number from 0 to 100. Unfair to the chimps? Somewhat, but it is no more unfair than using complex, detailed information to craft three reasonable choices, and then concluding that the chimps' “guesswork” was almost as good as the experts'

judgment. To amplify this lesson, consider the classic question of how long it would take a chimp typing at a keyboard to write War and Peace. If the chimp could type anything he wanted, the sun might go out first. But what if each key on the keyboard printed a book rather than a letter, and one of those books was War and Peace? It is a lot easier for a chimp to “write” War and Peace when someone who actually knows how to do so paves the chimp’s way. At this point, one could reasonably object that my corrections merely increase the advantage of experts over chimps. But they do nothing to narrow the gap between experts and the real winners of Tetlock’s horserace: case-specific extrapolations and formal statistical models. Both of these methods continue to work well when questions are easy and/or require exact numbers. Fair enough, but what are the implications? Suppose that, properly measured, experts crush chimps, but still lose to extrapolations and formal models. Does that make experts’ forecasting abilities “good,” or “bad”? In my view, the right answer is: pretty good. Almost no one is smart enough to run extrapolations or estimate formal models in his head. For experts to match formal models, they would have to approach Tetlock’s questions as a consulting project, not “just a survey.”



## AT Experts Inflate Risk

**Their experts argument is backwards—there is a lack of expertise which causes us to underestimate catastrophic risk**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 93-94)

One reason for widespread indifference to the catastrophic risks is the abysmal state of scientific knowledge among non-scientists. Scientific ignorance is a well-known factor in the public's systematic misperceptions of the risk of different hazards, and while such ignorance could exacerbate fears of what science might do to us, it seems, rather, to allay them. Although American elementary and junior high school students do better on tests of scientific knowledge than their counterparts in most other countries, by the last year of high school they are performing below the level of their foreign counterparts. Despite this, the overall scientific literacy of the U.S. population is greater than that of the populations of the European Union, Japan, and Canada. And Americans are more attentive to science than these other populations. But this isn't saying much. Only a third of American adults know what a molecule is, 39 percent believe that astrology is scientific, and 46 percent deny that human beings evolved from earlier animal species. Only 52 percent do *not* believe in astrology, 50 to 60 percent believe in ESP, only a little more than half know that it takes the earth a year to revolve around the sun (some don't know it takes a year; some don't know the earth revolves around the sun), about a third believe in UFOs, and similar percentages believe in ghosts and in communication with the dead. It is possible that science is valued by most Americans merely as another form of magic.

## AT Predictions Historically Fail

**The failure of past predictions is the reason why ours should be taken seriously—doomsday fiction has created inertia**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 102)

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Futuristic novels are better regarded as conditional predictions, that is, warnings, rather than as unconditional predictions—that “this is what the future holds.” In some of these novels the future is allegorical. H.G. Wells’s *War of the Worlds* is about the horrors of war and (again reflecting his Darwinian preoccupations) adaptive fitness (the Martian invaders die because they have no natural immunity against bacteria); he didn’t really expect Martians to invade the earth. But the only point relevant to my concerns is that the body of futurist writing taken as a whole describes catastrophic risks that have failed to materialize, and this tends to make people blasé about catastrophe. You watch a movie in which an asteroid collides with the earth and causes cataclysmic damage but write it off as science fiction rather than recognizing it as a more or less realistic depiction of a possible though unlikely real-life event.

**Failure of apocalyptic predictions in the past does not mean we can tolerate risk of extinction**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 113)

He states that “biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture,” that “evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs,” and that “no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.” All true, but misleading (obviously mammals have not been conditioned to resist *all* germs) or irrelevant, including “have never lived up to their billing in popular culture” or “it seems unlikely to happen in the future.” The fact that something is unlikely to happen is no reason to ignore the risk of its happening, especially when the “it” may be the extinction of the human race. A sensible person is concerned with probabilistic as well as certain death and so doesn’t play even one round of Russian roulette (even—I argue in the next chapter—if offered a huge sum of money to play), though he will probably survive it. Nor does a sensible person give controlling weight to the fact that a risk has not yet materialized. You would be dumb to cross a street against the light on the ground that no one had ever been run down at that particular intersection. You would be especially dumb to do so if until today the street had been used only by rickshaws. Until gene splicing, which is recent, and the emergence, also recent, of apocalyptic terrorism, the danger of bioterrorism may have been slight, although Japan killed thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Chinese with biological weapons during World War II; but it is slight no more.

## AT No Historical Evidence

**The fact that our impact has not occurred before is a reason that it should be given higher probability—known catastrophes cause prevention but unpredictable ones do not**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

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Taleb (2005) suggests that hindsight bias and availability bias bear primary responsibility for our failure to guard against what Taleb calls **Black Swans**. Black Swans are an especially difficult version of the problem of the fat tails: sometimes most of the variance in a process comes from exceptionally rare, exceptionally huge events. Consider a financial instrument that earns \$10 with 98% probability, but loses \$1000 with 2% probability; it's a poor net risk, but it looks like a steady winner. Taleb (2001) gives the example of a trader whose strategy worked for six years without a single bad quarter, yielding close to \$80 million - then lost \$300 million in a single catastrophe. Another example is that of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose founders included two winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics. During the Asian currency crisis and Russian bond default of 1998, the markets behaved in a literally unprecedented fashion, assigned a negligible probability by LTCM's historical model. As a result, LTCM began to lose \$100 million per day, day after day. On a single day in 1998, LTCM lost more than \$500 million. (Taleb 2005.) The founders of LTCM later called the market conditions of 1998 a "ten-sigma event". But obviously it was not that improbable. Mistakenly believing that the past was predictable, people conclude that the future is predictable. As Fischhoff (1982) puts it: When we attempt to understand past events, we implicitly test the hypotheses or rules we use both to interpret and to anticipate the world around us. If, in hindsight, we systematically underestimate the surprises that the past held and holds for us, we are subjecting those hypotheses to inordinately weak tests and, presumably, finding little reason to change them. The lesson of history is that swan happens. People are surprised by catastrophes lying outside their anticipation, beyond their historical probability distributions. Then why are we so taken aback when Black Swans occur? Why did LTCM borrow leverage of \$125 billion against \$4.72 billion of equity, almost ensuring that any Black Swan would destroy them? Because of hindsight bias, we learn overly specific lessons. After September 11th, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration prohibited box-cutters on airplanes. The hindsight bias rendered the event too predictable in retrospect, permitting the angry victims to find it the result of 'negligence' - such as intelligence agencies' failure to distinguish warnings of Al Qaeda activity amid a thousand other warnings. We learned not to allow hijacked planes to overfly our cities. We did not learn the lesson: "Black Swans occur; do what you can to prepare for the unanticipated." Taleb (2005) writes: It is difficult to motivate people in the prevention of Black Swans... Prevention is not easily perceived, measured, or rewarded; it is generally a silent and thankless activity. Just consider that a costly measure is taken to stave off such an event. One can easily compute the costs while the results are hard to determine. How can one tell its effectiveness, whether the measure was successful or if it just coincided with no particular accident? ... Job performance assessments in these matters are not just tricky, but may be biased in favor of the observed "acts of heroism". History books do not account for heroic preventive measures.

## AT History Does Not Repeat

**Historical memory does not reduce the risk of catastrophe—we forget historical disasters and underestimate ones that haven't happened yet**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 248-249)

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It is not just small probabilities that people have difficulty with, it is also unmemorable events. A remarkable fact is how unafraid people are of influenza, even though the 1918-1919 pandemic killed upwards of 20 million people in a short period of time, a similar pandemic could recur, there is still no cure for the disease, and flu vaccines are unreliable because of the mutability of the virus. Because influenza is not disfiguring and even in the 1918-1919 pandemic the mortality rate was low, although total mortality can be very great and was then, and most curiously of all because no famous people died in the pandemic, its victims being almost all young adults, the pandemic has faded from our historical memory. This doesn't show that people are dopes or are irrational, only that human mental capacity is limited and the mind uses various triggers to direct its attention. At present those triggers are lacking not only for influenza but also for asteroid collisions, even though many people are fearful of much lesser threats, such as low-level radiation and ambient cigarette smoke. There is no historical memory of asteroids colliding with the earth and so we find it hard to take the threat of such collisions seriously even if we accept that it exists. This is an example of the distinction that I pointed out in the introduction between notional and motivational beliefs.

**History is important—it makes predictions better**

**Ingram 2001** [Edward, Emeritus Professor of Imperial History at Simon Fraser University, *The British Empire as a world power*, p. 3]

Political scientists who do not read history have to go into business as water diviners or, like economists, as prophets who wait patiently for the future to prove them wrong. The past in which political scientists who do read history claim to test their ideas is, however, often unrecognizable to historians. It resembles Alice's Wonderland, in which the more one thinks one recognizes, the bigger are the surprises in store. And the past serves a different purpose for each discipline. Whereas the past shows the political scientist standing in the present the way to a future already planned, the historian standing in the past is content to look around him and is supposed not to know ahead of time what may turn up next.

## AT Experts Bad

### **Civic organizations are expanding the scope of risk analysis—it's not dominated by experts**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

This network of 'early warners' are working to publicize potential and actual emergencies by locating indicators of consequential catastrophic patterns of interpretation, culturally meaningful chains of events whose implications become discernable for decision-makers and ordinary citizens ('this is why you should care').<sup>18</sup> Civic associations can thus invest perilous situations with urgency and importance, transforming climate change from an apparently mild and distant possibility to an irreversible and grave threat to human survival, and genocide from a supposedly isolated aberration to an affront to our common humanity. The growing public significance of preventive message in global affairs is part and parcel of what Ignatieff has termed an "advocacy revolution,"<sup>19</sup> since threatened populations and allied organizations are acting as early warning beacons that educate citizens about certain perils and appeal for action on the part of states and multilateral institutions. Global civil society players have devised a host of 'naming and shaming' strategies and high-profile information campaigns to this effect, including press conferences, petitions, mass marches, and boycotts, and spectacular stunts that denounce bureaucratic inertia, the reckless pursuit of profit, or the preponderance of national interests in world affairs.<sup>20</sup> The advocacy revolution is having both 'trickle-down' and 'trickle-up' effects, establishing audiences of constituents and ordinary citizens conversant with some of the great challenges facing humanity as well as putting pressure on official institutions to be proactive in their long-term planning and shorter-term responses. None of this would be possible without the existence of global media, whose speed and range make it possible for reports of an unfolding or upcoming disaster to reach viewers or readers in most parts of the world almost instantaneously. Despite the highly selective character of what is deemed newsworthy and state and commercial influence on what is broadcast, several recent attempts to hide evidence of acts of mass violence (Tiananmen Square, East Timor, Chechnya, etc.) and crises (e.g., during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union or the SARS outbreak in China) have failed; few things now entirely escape from the satellite camera, the cellular telephone, or the notebook computer. And although the internet may never become the populist panacea technological determinists have been heralding for years, it remains a key device through which concerned citizens and activists can share and spread information. While media coverage almost always follows a crisis rather than preceding it, the broadcast of shocking images and testimonies can nevertheless shame governments and international organizations into taking immediate steps. The 'CNN or BBC effect,' to which we should now add the 'Al-Jazeera effect,' is a surprisingly powerful force in impacting world public opinion, as the now notorious Abu Ghraib prison photographs remind us. The possibility that the threat of media exposure may dissuade individuals and groups from enacting genocidal plans or reckless gambles with our future is one of the lynchpins of prevention in our information-saturated age. Are forewarnings of disasters being heard? The mobilization of official intervention and popular interest has certainly been mixed, yet global civil society is having some success in cultivating audiences and advocates coalescing around specific perils (mass human rights violations, ecological devastation, genetic engineering, epidemics, and so on). After Bhopal and Chernobyl, after 'mad cow disease' and the war in Iraq, citizens are scrutinizing, questioning and even contesting official expertise in risk assessment more than ever before.<sup>21</sup> Hence, in a world where early warnings of cataclysms are often available, pleading ignorance or helplessness to anticipate what may come in the future becomes less and less plausible.

# Predictions Good

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## Debate Predictions Good

**Debate about possible futures is critical to create a compromise between alarmism and fatalism—our strategy checks the dominance of elites while theirs only paralyzes us**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

Foremost among the possible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of 'weapons of mass destruction'; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of 'homeland security'; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible ('the world will not be so bad after all'), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism ('things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive').<sup>37</sup> Much more common, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting 'depublicization' of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.

**Debate solves the flaws of prediction—we can weigh competing risks outside of elite circles to counteract alarmism**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

Lastly, I contended that the work of preventive foresight can parry alarmist misappropriation or resignation by advocating a process of public deliberation that blends the principles of precaution and global justice. A farsighted politics can function through the public use of reason and the honing of the capacity for critical judgment, whereby citizens put themselves in a position to debate, evaluate, and challenge different dystopian narratives about the future and determine which ones are more analytically plausible, ethically desirable, and politically effective in bringing about a world order that is less perilous yet more

just for our descendants. Many fora, ranging from local, face-to-face meetings to transnational, highly mediated discursive networks, are sowing the seeds of such a practice of participatory democracy.

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## Inaccurate Predictions Still Good

**Even if our predictions aren't perfect, we should still make them—national policy based on predictions of the future are critical to prevent disaster**

**NYE 2003** (Joseph, Professor at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 02-03)

Can we do better as we enter the twenty-first century? The apocrypha of Yogi Berra warns us not to make predictions, particularly about the future. Yet we have no choice. We walk around with pictures of the future in our heads as a necessary condition of planning our actions. At the national level, we need such pictures to guide policy and tell us how to use our unprecedented power. There is, of course, no single future; there are multiple possible futures, and the quality of our foreign policy can make some more likely than others. When systems involve complex interactions and feedbacks, small causes can have large effects. And when people are involved, human reaction to the prediction itself may make it fail to come true. We cannot hope to predict the future, but we can draw our pictures carefully so as to avoid some common mistakes. A decade ago, a more careful analysis of American power could have saved us from the mistaken portrait of American decline. More recently, accurate predictions of catastrophic terrorism failed to avert a tragedy that leads some again to foresee decline. It is important to prevent the errors of both declinism and triumphalism. Declinism tends to produce overly cautious behavior that could undercut influence; triumphalism could beget a potentially dangerous absence of restraint, as well as an arrogance that would also squander influence. With careful analysis, the United States can make better decisions about how to protect its people, promote values, and lead toward a better world over the next few decades. I begin this analysis with an examination of the sources of U.S. power.

**Even inaccurate predictions of disaster are good—they encourage change to avoid negative impacts**

**BISHOP 1998** (Peter, Futurologist, "Future Studies: What are they?" July 21  
<http://www.mediamente.rai.it/mmold/english/bibliote/intervis/b/bishop.htm>)

People often ask me how right I am, when I go back and look at the predictions that I have made in the past, and unfortunately they are not asking the right question. The question we ask in Future is: how useful is a forecast? A forecast can be wrong and still be useful, particularly a negative forecast, forecasting problems or catastrophes. If people take a forecast seriously, they will work to prevent and avoid those problems. The forecast itself is wrong, but the forecast is useful, because it created a better future. Which are the forecasts that give people images of the future that are not necessarily accurate predictions of what is going to happen, but give them an understanding of the dynamics of change, and how things could occur, given certain circumstances, and secondly empower them to choose the right future for them, and begin to try and create that? Those are useful forecasts which, whether they are correct or not, can still be useful for making a better future.

## Not Predicting Wose

**The future will only get better if we make predictions and act on them—this is the only ethical strategy**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

To believe otherwise, I would argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history ('let it unfold as it may'), the technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions ('let others decide for us'), or to gambles about the time-lags of risks ('let our progeny deal with their realization'). But, as I have tried to show here, this will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a better future. It must be made, starting with us, in the here and now.

## Predictions Ethical

**We must make predictions of catastrophe—this is the only way to build an ethic of prevention that can prevent global destruction**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

As we ~~lose~~ <sup>consequentialism, 193</sup> ~~lose~~ <sup>lose</sup> a number of post-millennial angst, the future appears to be out of favor. Mere mention of the idea of farsightedness – of trying to analyze what may occur in our wake in order to better understand how to live in the here and now – conjures up images of fortune-telling crystal balls and doomsday prophets, or of eccentric pundits equipped with data-crunching supercomputers spewing forth fanciful prognostications. The future, then, has seemingly become the province of mystics and scientists, a realm into which the rest of us rarely venture. This curious situation goes back to a founding paradox of early modernity, which sought to replace pagan divination and Judeo-Christian eschatology with its own rational system of apprehending time. Thus came into being the philosophy of history, according to which human destiny unfolds teleologically by following a knowable and meaningful set of chronological laws leading to a final state of perfection; Condorcet, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to name but a few, are the children of this kind of historicism that expresses an unwavering faith in the Enlightenment's credo of inherent progress over time. Yet in our post-metaphysical age, where the idea of discovering universal and stable temporal laws has become untenable, the philosophy of history lies in ruins. What has stepped into the breach is a variety of sciences of governance of the future, ranging from social futurism to risk management. By developing sophisticated modeling techniques, prognosticators aim to convert the future into a series of predictable outcomes extrapolated from present-day trends, or a set of possibilities to be assessed and managed according to their comparative degrees of risk and reward.<sup>1</sup> Although commendable in their advocacy of farsightedness, these scientific forms of knowledge are hampered by the fact that their longing for surefire predictive models have inevitably come up short. If historicism and scientific governance offer rather unappealing paradigms for contemplating the future, a turn to the conventional political forecasts of the post-Cold War world order hardly offers more succor. Entering the fray, one is rapidly submerged by Fukuyama's "end of history," Huntington's "clash of civilizations," Kaplan's "coming anarchy," or perhaps most distressing of all, the so-called 'Bush Doctrine' of unilateral pre-emption. For the Left, this array of unpalatable scenarios merely prolongs the sense of hope betrayed and utopias crushed that followed the collapse of the socialist experiment. Under such circumstances, is it any wonder that many progressive thinkers dread an unwelcomed future, preferring to avert their gazes from it while eyeing foresight with equal doses of suspicion and contempt? But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian 'Not-Yet' remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future. In the twenty-first century, the lines of political cleavage are being drawn along those of competing dystopian visions. Indeed, one of the notable features of recent public discourse and socio-political struggle is their negationist hue, for they are devoted as much to the prevention of disaster as to the realization of the good, less to what ought to be than what could but must not be.<sup>2</sup> The debates that preceded the war in Iraq provide a vivid illustration of this tendency, as both camps rhetorically invoked incommensurable catastrophic scenarios to make their respective cases. And as many analysts have noted, the multinational antiwar protests culminating on February 15, 2003 marked the first time that a mass movement was able to mobilize substantial numbers of people dedicated to averting war before it had actually broken out. More generally, given past experiences and awareness of what might occur in the future, given the cries of 'never again' (the Second World War, the Holocaust, Bhopal, Rwanda, etc.) and 'not ever' (e.g., nuclear or ecological apocalypse, human cloning) that are emanating from different parts of the world, the avoidance of crises is seemingly on everyone's lips – and everyone's conscience. From the United Nations and regional multilateral organizations to states, from non-governmental organizations to transnational social movements, the determination to prevent the actualization of potential cataclysms has become a new imperative in world affairs. Allowing past disasters to occur and

unprecedented calamities to unfold is now widely seen as unbearable when, in the process, the suffering of future generations is callously tolerated and our survival is being irresponsibly jeopardized. Hence, we need to pay attention to what a widely circulated report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identifies as a burgeoning “culture of prevention,”<sup>3</sup> a dynamic that carries major, albeit still poorly understood, normative and political implications. Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings – and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources – it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism.

## **We have an ethical obligation to make predictions—responsibility to the future is the basis of all responsibility**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, *Constellations*, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

What can be done in the face of short-sightedness? Cosmopolitanism provides some of the clues to an answer, thanks to its formulation of a universal duty of care for humankind that transcends all geographical and socio-cultural borders. I want to expand the notion of cosmopolitan universalism in a temporal direction, so that it can become applicable to future generations and thereby nourish a vibrant culture of prevention. Consequently, we need to begin thinking about a farsighted cosmopolitanism, a chrono-cosmopolitics that takes seriously a sense of “intergenerational solidarity” toward human beings who will live in our wake as much as those living amidst us today.<sup>26</sup> But for a farsighted cosmopolitanism to take root in global civil society, the latter must adopt a thicker regulative principle of care for the future than the one currently in vogue (which amounts to little more than an afterthought of the nondescript ‘don’t forget later generations’ ilk). Hans Jonas’s “imperative of responsibility” is valuable precisely because it prescribes an ethico-political relationship to the future consonant with the work of farsightedness.<sup>27</sup> Fully appreciating Jonas’s position requires that we grasp the rupture it establishes with the presentist assumptions imbedded in the intentionalist tradition of Western ethics. In brief, intentionalism can be explained by reference to its best-known formulation, the Kantian categorical imperative, according to which the moral worth of a deed depends upon whether the a priori “principle of the will” or “volition” of the person performing it – that is, his or her intention – should become a universal law.<sup>28</sup> Ex post facto evaluation of an act’s outcomes, and of whether they correspond to the initial intention, is peripheral to moral judgment. A variant of this logic is found in Weber’s discussion of the “ethic of absolute ends,” the “passionate devotion to a cause” elevating the realization of a vision of the world above all other considerations; conviction without the restraint of caution and prudence is intensely presentist.<sup>29</sup> By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the

future's indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.<sup>30</sup> From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life," or "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life."<sup>31</sup> What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

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## Predictions Solve Extinction

### **Our predictions are necessary to build a global culture of prediction that can influence states and prevent catastrophic destruction**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

In the Consequentialism 196 ~~Consequentialism 196~~ foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the 'warners,' who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors' messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster.

Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational "strong publics" with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that "weak publics" with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.<sup>4</sup> Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the 'inside' and pressuring them from the 'outside,' as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into "risk communities" that transcend geographical borders.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impending catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing 'below' the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.<sup>6</sup> The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally-minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to 'move up' and become institutionalized via strong publics.<sup>7</sup>

### **Dystopian predictions motivate action to prevent global disaster**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).<sup>11</sup> Huxley’s *Brave New World* and Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like *The Matrix* and novels like Atwood’s *Oryx and Crake* – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.<sup>12</sup> And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.<sup>13</sup> Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any consequentialism brings both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s *Handmaid’s Tale* for Western feminism, *McWorld* and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

## Predictions Turn Neoliberalism

### **Predictions of catastrophe solve neoliberalism**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

In recent years, the rise of a dystopian imaginary has accompanied damning assessments and widespread recognition of the international community's repeated failures to adequately intervene in a number of largely preventable disasters (from the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and East Timor to climate change and the spiraling AIDS pandemics in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). Social movements, NGOs, diasporic groups, and concerned citizens are not mincing words in their criticisms of the United Nations system and its member-states, and thus beginning to shift the discursive and moral terrain in world affairs. As a result, the callousness implicit in disregarding the future has been exposed as a threat to the survival of humanity and its natural surroundings. The Realpolitik of national self-interest and the neoliberal logic of the market will undoubtedly continue to assert themselves, yet demands for farsightedness are increasingly reining them in. Though governments, multilateral institutions, and transnational corporations will probably never completely modify the presentist assumptions underlying their modes of operation, they are, at the very least, finding themselves compelled to account for egregious instances of short-sightedness and rhetorically commit themselves to taking corrective steps. What may seem like a modest development at first glance would have been unimaginable even a few decades ago, indicating the extent to which we have moved toward a culture of prevention. A new imperative has come into being, that of preventive foresight.

### **Critiquing predictions maintains violent capitalist exploitation and silence in the face of genocide**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

The variations on these themes are numerous. One is the oft-stated belief that prevention is a luxury that we can scarcely afford, or even an unwarranted conceit. Accordingly, by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate. Why squander time, energy, and resources to anticipate and thwart what are, after all, only hypothetical dangers? Why act today when, in any case, others will do so in the future? Why not limit ourselves to reacting to cataclysms if and when they occur? A 'bad faith' version of this argument goes even further by seeking to discredit, reject, or deny evidence pointing to upcoming catastrophes. Here, we enter into the domain of deliberate negligence and "culpable ignorance,"<sup>25</sup> as manifest in the apathy of US Republican administrations toward climate change or the Clinton White House's disingenuous and belated responses to the genocides in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. At another level, instrumental-strategic forms of thought and action, so pervasive in modern societies because institutionally entrenched in the state and the market, are rarely compatible with the demands of farsightedness. The calculation of the most technically efficient means to attain a particular bureaucratic or corporate objective, and the subsequent relentless pursuit of it, intrinsically exclude broader questions of long-term prospects or negative side-effects. What matters is the maximization of profits or national self-interest with the least effort, and as rapidly as possible. Growing risks and perils are transferred to future generations through a series of trade-offs: economic growth versus environmental protection, innovation versus safety, instant gratification versus future well-being.



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## Predictions Turn Social Equality

### **Failure to predict disasters undermines the ethical basis for social equality in the present**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, *Constellations*, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

In the previous section, I described how the capacity to produce, disseminate, and receive warning signals regarding disasters on the world stage has developed in global society. Yet the fact remains that audiences may let a recklessness or insouciance toward the future prevail, instead of listening to and acting upon such warnings. There is no doubt that the short-sightedness and presentism are strong dynamics in contemporary society, which is enveloped by a “temporal myopia” that encourages most individuals to live in a state of chronological self-referentiality whereby they screen out anything that is not of the moment.<sup>22</sup> The commercial media, advertising, and entertainment industries are major contributors to this “tyranny of real time”<sup>23</sup> that feeds a societal addiction to the ‘live’ and the immediate while eroding the principle of farsightedness. The infamous quip attributed to Madame de Pompadour, ‘après nous, le déluge,’ perfectly captures a sense of utter callousness about the future that represents one of presentism’s most acute manifestations. Two closely related notions underlie it: the belief that we should only concern ourselves with whether our actions, or lack thereof, have deleterious consequences visible to us in the short to medium-term (temporally limited responsibility); and sheer indifference toward the plight of those who will come after us (generational self-centeredness). Substantively, the two are not much different because they shift the costs and risks of present-day decisions onto our descendants. “The crisis of the future is a measure of the deficiency of our societies, incapable as they are of assessing what is involved in relationships with others,” Bindé writes. “This temporal myopia brings into play the same processes of denial of others as social shortsightedness. The absence of solidarity in time between generations merely reproduces selfishness in space within the same generation.”<sup>24</sup> Thus, to the NIMBY (‘not-in-my-backyard’) politics of the last few decades can be added the ‘not-in-my-lifetime’ or ‘not-to-my-children’ lines of reasoning. For members of dominant groups in the North Atlantic region, disasters are something for others to worry about – that is, those who are socio-economically marginal, or geographically and temporally distant.

## Space Predictions Good

### **Predictions about the future of space are possible—debating them improves policymaking and solves the reasons that predictions fail**

**HUNTLEY et al 2010** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

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Few space activities have been used on the possibilities for cooperation to function more organically as an element of the evolution of human space activities, rather than simply as a structure applied to that evolution. The more organic possibility reflects the potential over time for cooperative agreements and institutions to change state interests themselves. Processes facilitating such evolution include strategic interest convergence, information creation and sharing, “spillover” and “feedback” effects, issue scope expansion and integration, and the facilitation of transnational linkages. Interacting synergistically with the interests they are influencing, such cooperation evolves dynamically as well. As such cooperation deepens its roots among all parties, it can begin to endure self-sustainably.<sup>21</sup> The potential for more organic principles and cooperative institutions to shape the nature of political relations themselves suggests a more expansive concept of the underlying nature of interstate relations e one that need not always resemble the realist image of a Hobbesian “war of all against all”. Hedley Bull’s “anarchical society” and Daniel Deudney’s “negarchy,” for example, capture the past and present existence of international political orders that, despite the absence of hierarchical government, have functioned as qualitatively distinct governance systems.<sup>22</sup> Application of concepts of qualitatively distinct political ordering principles to developing governance conditions of the future human presence in space is as yet largely unexplored.<sup>23</sup> The fluidity of interests and capabilities with respect to space activities suggests a relatively large potential for organized cooperation to influence their evolution. Such cooperative principles and institutions would then become intrinsic to the dynamic political forces shaping the expanding human presence in space, growing and evolving with them, rather than acting as exogenous static structures seeking to constrain those forces.<sup>24</sup> The rate and uncertainty of change in both the technological and political dimensions of expanding human space activities complicates this task. Herein lies the value of “realistic visions”. Rigorous articulations of the interplay of the wide variety of constraints, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and values entailed in human expansion into space can facilitate evaluation of the applicability of alternative governance concepts to human space activities in the context of dynamic change. Among other things, such visions can explore how alternative futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and exploratory development of space presume increasing international integration and collaboration. A future in which space becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human presence embodied in today’s growing commercial and exploratory activities. Choices among alternative futures for the human presence in space may depend upon choices among alternative futures for life on Earth as well. The following section reviews the potential for scenariobuilding techniques to inform these choices by providing rigorous detailed visions of future worlds that account for a wide range of current realities and span the spectra of the most important uncertainties. The resulting plausible, integrated visions can yield feasible policy-relevant insights that demonstrably enable current policy making to be more farsighted. Beyond the fruits of the exercises themselves, the longer time-frames entailed in scenario building also facilitate dialogue among diverse parties divided on nearer-term questions. The collaboration enabled can inspire innovation and integrated analysis among diverse experts, leading to the development of a productive “epistemic community”<sup>25</sup> addressing the full scope of future human space activities. Vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. Comprehensive knowledge generation and strategies for policy making are also required. But vision development is currently the least well advanced. All global policy debate, including US national security policy making, can benefit from having a fuller range of rigorous and credible assessments of long-term prospects from which to draw.

### **Even if our specific predictions turn out to be wrong, making them is still good—it refines space policy and avoids nuclear war**

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**HUNTLEY et al 2010** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

On 16 March 1966 Neil Armstrong deftly piloted the Gemini VIII within 0.9 meters of the pre-launched Agena Target Vehicle, then slowly accomplished the world’s first orbital docking. Armstrong and co-pilot David Scott were still in a celebratory mood, when Scott noticed the Gemini beginning to roll. Armstrong used the Orbit Attitude and Maneuvering System thrusters, but the moment he throttled down, they started to roll again. Turning off the Agena seemed to stop the problem for a few minutes. But when it began again, the roll was accelerating. They undocked and with a long burst of

translation thrusters moved away from the Agena. But the roll continued to accelerate. Tumbling now at one revolution per second, the astronauts were in danger of impaired vision and loss of consciousness. But Armstrong was able to bring the wild oscillations under control thanks in part to preparation by a flight simulation training exercise that many pilots disliked, believing the simulation was too unlikely to waste their scarce training time and energy on.<sup>26</sup> Fortunately, NASA did not plan the astronauts' training based on the most likely scenarios. Instead, they planned on the basis of plausible and important scenarios. Developing plausible scenarios helps us take the long view in a world of great uncertainty.<sup>27</sup> Scenarios are narratives of the future defined around a set of unpredictable drivers, intended to expand insight by identifying unexpected but important possible directions and outcomes. Scenarios have a timeline over which meaningful change is possible. They are a useful tool for examining a number of different possible futures. They provide a means to stimulate new thinking, challenge assumptions, and provide an effective framework for dialogue among a diverse group of stakeholders. They can inspire new ideas and innovations by helping identify common goals and interests that transcend current political divides. Scenarios thus help to develop the means to work towards preferred futures.<sup>28</sup> Scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow; they do not need to be likely, but they ought to be plausible, internally consistent, and relevant. It is precisely by considering possible, even if not necessarily likely, scenarios that we are best prepared for the unpredictability of the future. By encouraging creative thinking beyond the future we anticipate, scenarios help us become more resilient to unexpected events. With respect to their utility in guiding policy development, three features distinguish good scenarios from simple speculations, linear predictions or fanciful musings of the future: Scenarios are decision focused. Successful scenarios begin and end by clarifying the decisions and actions the participants must make if they are to deal successfully with an uncertain future. One common misconception of scenarios is that they are prescient, path dependent predictions of the future. On the contrary, scenarios are used to order our thoughts amid uncertainty, build common ground among differing perspectives, and think rationally about our options. The value of a set of scenarios accrues not from their accuracy or likelihood, but from their plausibility and the insights they generate. Scenarios are imaginative. In examining a decision within the context of a number of different futures, scenarios require us to look behind fixed assumptions. They encourage participants to challenge conventional wisdom, create new contexts for existing decisions, and think creatively about options for surmounting obstacles. At their core, then, scenarios are about learning.<sup>29</sup> Scenarios are logical. The scenario process is formal and disciplined in its use of information and analysis. The creativity and imagination inspired by scenarios can only be as effective as it is based in realistic assessments. In requiring participants to challenge each others' thoughts, perceptions, and mind-sets, the process helps clarify that reality. Scenarios first emerged following World War II as a method of military planning. This approach was reflected in Herman Kahn's assertion of the need to "think the unthinkable" concerning the possibilities and implications of war in the atomic age. "In our times", Kahn wrote in 1966, 'thermonuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible'.<sup>30</sup> Kahn's motivation was, in part, recognition of the counter-intuitive notion that planning could be a necessary means of avoidance. Analyzing scenarios reached greater methodological sophistication with the work of Pierre Wack, a planner at the London offices of Royal Dutch/Shell. Wack and his colleagues refined the application of scenario thinking to private enterprise. This work helped Shell anticipate the consequences of the emergence of a cartel among oil exporting countries, and to develop various plans to cushion the blow that would (and did) result from formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Shell was also able to anticipate massive economic and political change in the then USSR in the late 1980s.<sup>31</sup> Scenario analysis came to be used in the political arena when associates of Wack assisted stakeholders in South Africa in the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. Many doubted the country's prospects; in 1987, the Guardian Weekly quoted Margaret Thatcher's former spokesman Bernard Ingham as saying that anyone who believed the African National Congress (ANC) would one day rule South Africa was "living in cloud cuckoo land."<sup>32</sup> But with operations in South Africa and an interest in preventing anarchy following the downfall of apartheid, Shell sent some of Wack's protégés, including Adam Kahane, to convene meetings of top governmental, religious, civic and business leaders at a conference site there called Mont Fleur. From February 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, to April 1994, when the first all-race elections were held, participants identified relatively certain and uncertain but plausible factors, and then formed into teams to research various alternative futures. In the midst of deep conflict and uncertainty, "Mont Fleur" brought people together from across ideological and political divides to think creatively about the future of their country. The collaboratively drafted scenarios were not a panacea, but did contribute to establishing a common vocabulary and enough mutual understanding for participants to find common ground on complex decisions. In particular, the consensus on the undesirability of three particular scenarios contributed to developing the perception of shared interests that was an important element in the success of the governmental transition.<sup>33</sup> Scenario-building and analysis has become a distinct tool of US government policy making, and has been applied directly to future space security issues. For example, one major US Air Force scenario-based study evaluated 25 emerging technologies and 40 separate potential weapons systems through the lens of six "alternative futures" in an effort to guide future Air Force policy choices.<sup>34</sup> This exercise (and others like it) exemplifies the potential for applying nonlinear future planning methodologies to large-scale public policy topics, including the future of space. The principal deficiency of such government-sponsored efforts is simply the narrowness of their focus e they are, by design, only concerned about a single government's decision points and are shaped by the goals, dilemmas and uncertainties most relevant to that single party. Lacking is a parallel process to achieve the same kind of expansive thinking while also incorporating a full range of stakeholders. Such exercises can hardly be generated by governments.

## Debates about future space scenarios are good—they minimize uncertainty

**HUNTLEY et al 2010** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

It is this last type of scenario-building and analysis that is most appropriate for initiating and continuing dialogue around the future use of space. Generative scenarios are particularly well suited to addressing three core challenges: anticipating the technological changes relevant to the full range of the growing human utilization of space that will inevitably unfold over the coming decades; guiding and planning integration across the full range of human space activities in conjunction with evolving terrestrial political conditions; identifying and responding to the critical uncertainties over the directions and implications of long-term developments in both the previous dimensions. Scenario building can address these challenges by providing rigorous, detailed visions of future worlds accounting for a wide range of variables, inevitable change and uncertainty. The collaboration entailed in scenario building can also inspire the creativity and imagination of an expert community representing diverse viewpoints on immediate issues. The resulting plausible, integrated visions, responsive to current realities and robust against future uncertainties, can yield feasible policy-relevant ideas for promoting peaceful development of the future human presence in space despite the wide range of possible future developments both in space and on Earth. As noted earlier, vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. A comprehensive knowledge base and strategies for policy-making are also required. By integrating expertise in these other areas into vision development, scenario-building exercises can contribute valuable long-term insights to policy debates. The following section reports the results of one such exercise.

# AT Predictions Overestimate

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## Underestimate – Religion

**Americans underestimate catastrophic risk because of religious belief**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 109)

Earlier I suggested a tension between the religious and the scientific worldview. Reflection on the movies that I have been discussing suggests a more direct tension between religiosity on the one hand and the recognition of the gravity of the catastrophic risks on the other. The most influential religions in the United States are Christianity and Judaism, and they are both messianic: everything is to come right in the end. The messianic theme is prominent in science fiction—indeed in all the science-fiction movies that I have discussed—and blunts an awareness of looming disasters. A benign providence would not permit the human race to become extinct—unless it was arranging a better life for us in the hereafter. Science fiction casts a salvific aura over science and the future.

## Underestimate – Availability Heuristic

**Systemic threats do not outweigh extinction—the availability heuristic causes us to underestimate both magnitude and probability**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

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A general principle underlying the heuristics-and-biases program is that human beings use methods of thought - heuristics - which quickly return good approximate answers in many cases; but which also give rise to systematic errors called biases. An example of a heuristic is to judge the frequency or probability of an event by its availability, the ease with which examples of the event come to mind. R appears in the third-letter position of more English words than in the first-letter position, yet it is much easier to recall words that begin with "R" than words whose third letter is "R". Thus, a majority of respondents guess that words beginning with "R" are more frequent, when the reverse is the case. (Tversky and Kahneman 1973.) Biases implicit in the availability heuristic affect estimates of risk. A pioneering study by Lichtenstein et. al. (1978) examined absolute and relative probability judgments of risk. People know in general terms which risks cause large numbers of deaths and which cause few deaths. However, asked to quantify risks more precisely, people severely overestimate the frequency of rare causes of death, and severely underestimate the frequency of common causes of death. Other repeated errors were also apparent: Accidents were judged to cause as many deaths as disease. (Diseases cause about 16 times as many deaths as accidents.) Homicide was incorrectly judged a more frequent cause of death than diabetes, or stomach cancer. A followup study by Combs and Slovic (1979) tallied reporting of deaths in two newspapers, and found that errors in probability judgments correlated strongly (.85 and .89) with selective reporting in newspapers. People refuse to buy flood insurance even when it is heavily subsidized and priced far below an actuarially fair value. Kunreuther et. al. (1993) suggests underreaction to threats of flooding may arise from "the inability of individuals to conceptualize floods that have never occurred... Men on flood plains appear to be very much prisoners of their experience... Recently experienced floods appear to set an upward bound to the size of loss with which managers believe they ought to be concerned." Burton et. al. (1978) report that when dams and levees are built, they reduce the frequency of floods, and thus apparently create a false sense of security, leading to reduced precautions. While building dams decreases the frequency of floods, damage per flood is so much greater afterward that the average yearly damage increases. It seems that people do not extrapolate from experienced small hazards to a possibility of large risks; rather, the past experience of small hazards sets a perceived upper bound on risks. A society well-protected against minor hazards will take no action against major risks (building on flood plains once the regular minor floods are eliminated). A society subject to regular minor hazards will treat those minor hazards as an upper bound on the size of the risks (guarding against regular minor floods but not occasional major floods). Risks of human extinction may tend to be underestimated since, obviously, humanity has never yet encountered an extinction event. 2



## Underestimate – Hindsight bias

**The fact that their impact is already happening causes us to overestimate it—every high magnitude impact should be seen as highly probable**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Hindsight bias is when subjects, after learning the eventual outcome, give a much higher estimate for the predictability of that outcome than subjects who predict the outcome without advance knowledge. Hindsight bias is sometimes called the I-knew-it-all-along effect. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) presented students with historical accounts of unfamiliar incidents, such as a conflict between the Gurkhas and the British in 1814. Given the account as background knowledge, five groups of students were asked what they would have predicted as the probability for each of four outcomes: British victory, Gurkha victory, stalemate with a peace settlement, or stalemate with no peace settlement. Four experimental groups were respectively told that these four outcomes were the historical outcome. The fifth, control group was not told any historical outcome. In every case, a group told an outcome assigned substantially higher probability to that outcome, than did any other group or the control group. Hindsight bias is important in legal cases, where a judge or jury must determine whether a defendant was legally negligent in failing to foresee a hazard (Sanchiro 2003). In an experiment based on an actual legal case, Kamin and Rachlinski (1995) asked two groups to estimate the probability of flood damage caused by blockage of a city-owned drawbridge. The control group was told only the background information known to the city when it decided not to hire a bridge watcher. The experimental group was given this information, plus the fact that a flood had actually occurred. Instructions stated the city was negligent if the foreseeable probability of flooding was greater than 10%. 76% of the control group concluded the flood was so unlikely that no precautions were necessary; 57% of the experimental group concluded the flood was so likely that failure to take precautions was legally negligent. A third experimental group was told the outcome and also explicitly instructed to avoid hindsight bias, which made no difference: 56% concluded the city was legally negligent. Judges cannot simply instruct juries to avoid hindsight bias; that debiasing manipulation has no significant effect. Viewing history through the lens of hindsight, we vastly underestimate the cost of preventing catastrophe. In 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded for reasons eventually traced to an O-ring losing flexibility at low temperature. (Rogers et. al. 1986.) There were warning signs of a problem with the O-rings. But preventing the Challenger disaster would have required, not attending to the problem with the O-rings, but attending to every warning sign which seemed as severe as the O-ring problem, without benefit of hindsight.

## Underestimate – Tech Optimisim

**Technological optimism causes us to downplay risk**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 116)

What I have called the optimistic backlash against the doomsters actually is not merely reactive; it has roots in a long history of technological optimism in American culture. People have difficulty holding in their head at one and the same time that modern technology is creating both enormous benefits and enormous risks, and that both the benefits and the risks are growing—the latter quite possibly more rapidly—with continued technological progress. This difficulty, which is rooted in the mental quirk that psychologists call “cognitive dissonance,” is of a piece with the tendency of people to write down risks to safety when they perceive benefits to an unsafe activity and write them up when they perceive no benefits.

## Underestimate – Magnitude

**The magnitude of our impact causes underestimation—we don't want to believe the worst outcomes so we give defense more credibility than it deserves**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Wasons <sup>2009</sup> Consequentialism 209 form of confirmation bias; people seek confirming but not falsifying evidence. "Cold" means that the 2-4-6 task is an affectively neutral case of confirmation bias; the belief held is logical, not emotional. "Hot" refers to cases where the belief is emotionally charged, such as political argument. Unsurprisingly, "hot" confirmation biases are stronger - larger in effect and more resistant to change. Active, effortful confirmation biases are labeled motivated cognition (more ordinarily known as "rationalization"). As put by Brenner et. al. (2002) in "Remarks on Support Theory": Clearly, in many circumstances, the desirability of believing a hypothesis may markedly influence its perceived support... Kunda (1990) discusses how people who are motivated to reach certain conclusions attempt to construct (in a biased fashion) a compelling case for their favored hypothesis that would convince an impartial audience. Gilovich (2000) suggests that conclusions a person does not want to believe are held to a higher standard than conclusions a person wants to believe. In the former case, the person asks if the evidence compels one to accept the conclusion, whereas in the latter case, the person asks instead if the evidence allows one to accept the conclusion. When people subject disagreeable evidence to more scrutiny than agreeable evidence, this is known as motivated skepticism or disconfirmation bias. Disconfirmation bias is especially destructive for two reasons: First, two biased reasoners considering the same stream of evidence can shift their beliefs in opposite directions - both sides selectively accepting only favorable evidence. Gathering more evidence may not bring biased reasoners to agreement. Second, people who are more skilled skeptics - who know a larger litany of logical flaws - but apply that skill selectively, may change their minds more slowly than unskilled reasoners. Taber and Lodge (2000) examined the prior attitudes and attitude changes of students when exposed to political literature for and against gun control and affirmative action. The study tested six hypotheses using two experiments: 1. Prior attitude effect. Subjects who feel strongly about an issue - even when encouraged to be objective - will evaluate supportive arguments more favorably than contrary arguments. 2. Disconfirmation bias. Subjects will spend more time and cognitive resources denigrating contrary arguments than supportive arguments. 3. Confirmation bias. Subjects free to choose their information sources will seek out supportive rather than contrary sources. 4. Attitude polarization. Exposing subjects to an apparently balanced set of pro and con arguments will exaggerate their initial polarization. 5. Attitude strength effect. Subjects voicing stronger attitudes will be more prone to the above biases. 6. Sophistication effect. Politically knowledgeable subjects, because they possess greater ammunition with which to counter-argue incongruent facts and arguments, will be more prone to the above biases. Ironically, Taber and Lodge's experiments confirmed all six of the authors' prior hypotheses. Perhaps you will say: "The experiment only reflects the beliefs the authors started out with - it is just a case of confirmation bias." If so, then by making you a more sophisticated arguer - by teaching you another bias of which to accuse people - I have actually harmed you; I have made you slower to react to evidence. I have given you another opportunity to fail each time you face the challenge of changing your mind. Heuristics and biases are widespread in human reasoning. Familiarity with heuristics and biases can enable us to detect a wide variety of logical flaws that might otherwise evade our inspection. But, as with any ability to detect flaws in reasoning, this inspection must be applied evenhandedly: both to our own ideas and the ideas of others; to ideas which discomfort us and to ideas which comfort us. Awareness of human fallibility is a dangerous knowledge, if you remind yourself of the fallibility of those who disagree with you. If I am selective about which arguments I inspect for errors, or even how hard I inspect for errors, then every new rule of rationality I learn, every new logical flaw I know how to detect, makes me that much stupider. Intelligence, to be useful, must be used for something other than defeating itself. You cannot "rationalize" what is not rational to begin with - as if lying were called "truthization". There is no way to obtain more truth for a proposition by bribery, flattery, or the most passionate argument - you can make more people believe the proposition, but you cannot make it more true. To improve the truth of our beliefs we must change our beliefs. Not every change is an improvement, but every improvement is necessarily a change. Our beliefs are more swiftly determined than we think. Griffin and Tversky (1992) discreetly approached 24 colleagues faced with a choice between two job offers, and asked them to estimate the probability that they would choose each job offer. The average confidence in the choice assigned the greater probability was a modest 66%. Yet only 1 of 24 respondents chose the option initially assigned the lower probability, yielding an overall accuracy of 96% (one of few reported instances of human underconfidence). The moral may be that once you can guess what your answer will be - once you can assign a greater probability to your answering one way than another - you have, in all probability, already decided. And if you were honest with yourself, you would often be able to guess your final answer within seconds of hearing the question. We change our minds less often than we think. How fleeting is that brief unnoticed moment when we can't yet guess what our answer will be, the tiny fragile instant when there's a chance for intelligence to act. In questions of choice, as in questions of fact. Thor Shenkel said: "It ain't a true crisis of faith unless things could just as easily go either way." Norman R. F. Maier said: "Do not propose solutions until the problem has been discussed as thoroughly as possible without suggesting any." Robyn Dawes, commenting on Maier, said: "I have often used this edict with groups I have led - particularly when they face a very tough problem, which is when group members are most apt to propose solutions immediately." In computer security, a "trusted system" is one that

you are in fact trusting, not one that is in fact trustworthy. A "trusted system" is a system which, if it is untrustworthy, can cause a failure.

When you read a paper which proposes that a potential global catastrophe is impossible, or has a specific annual probability, or can be managed using some specific strategy, then you trust the rationality of the authors. You trust the authors' ability to be driven from a comfortable conclusion to an uncomfortable one, even in the absence of overwhelming experimental evidence to prove a cherished hypothesis wrong. You trust that the authors didn't unconsciously look just a little bit harder for mistakes in equations that seemed to be leaning the wrong way, before you ever saw the final paper. And if authority legislates that the mere suggestion of an existential risk is enough to shut down a project; or if it becomes a de facto truth of the political process that no possible calculation can overcome the burden of a suggestion once made; then no scientist will ever again make a suggestion, which is worse. I don't know how to solve this problem. But I think it would be well for estimators of existential risks to know something about heuristics and biases in general, and disconfirmation bias in particular.

## Underestimate – Data

**Their predictions arguments only apply to impact defense because we underestimate extreme results—experimental data proves that events predicted at one-in-fifty occur forty percent of the time**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

What Consequentialism <sup>211</sup> in their erroneous estimates? In section 1 on availability, I discussed an experiment on perceived risk, in which subjects overestimated the probability of newsworthy causes of death in a way that correlated to their selective reporting in newspapers. Slovic et. al. (1982) also observed: A particularly pernicious aspect of heuristics is that people typically have great confidence in judgments based upon them. In another followup to the study on causes of death, people were asked to indicate the odds that they were correct in choosing the more frequent of two lethal events (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977)... In Experiment 1, subjects were reasonably well calibrated when they gave odds of 1:1, 1.5:1, 2:1, and 3:1. That is, their percentage of correct answers was close to the appropriate percentage correct, given those odds. However, as odds increased from 3:1 to 100:1, there was little or no increase in accuracy. Only 73% of the answers assigned odds of 100:1 were correct (instead of 99.1%). Accuracy "jumped" to 81% at 1000:1 and to 87% at 10,000:1. For answers assigned odds of 1,000,000:1 or greater, accuracy was 90%; the appropriate degree of confidence would have been odds of 9:1... In summary, subjects were frequently wrong at even the highest odds levels. Moreover, they gave many extreme odds responses. More than half of their judgments were greater than 50:1. Almost one-fourth were greater than 100:1... 30% of the respondents in Experiment 1 gave odds greater than 50:1 to the incorrect assertion that homicides are more frequent than suicides.'

This extraordinary-seeming result is quite common within the heuristics and biases literature, where it is known as overconfidence. Suppose I ask you for your best guess as to an uncertain quantity, such as the number of "Physicians and Surgeons" listed in the Yellow Pages of the Boston phone directory, or total U.S. egg production in millions. You will generate some value, which surely will not be exactly correct; the true value will be more or less than your guess. Next I ask you to name a lower bound such that you are 99% confident that the true value lies above this bound, and an upper bound such that you are 99% confident the true value lies beneath this bound. These two bounds form your 98% confidence interval. If you are well-calibrated, then on a test with one hundred such questions, around 2 questions will have answers that fall outside your 98% confidence interval. Alpert and Raiffa (1982) asked subjects a collective total of 1000 general-knowledge questions like those described above; 426 of the true values lay outside the subjects 98% confidence intervals. If the subjects were properly calibrated there would have been approximately 20 surprises. Put another way: Events to which subjects assigned a probability of 2% happened 42.6% of the time. Another group of 35 subjects was asked to estimate 99.9% confident upper and lower bounds. They received 40% surprises. Another 35 subjects were asked for "minimum" and "maximum" values and were surprised 47% of the time. Finally, a fourth group of 35 subjects were asked for "astonishingly low" and "astonishingly high" values; they recorded 38% surprises. In a second experiment, a new group of subjects was given a first set of questions, scored, provided with feedback, told about the results of previous experiments, had the concept of calibration explained to them at length, and then asked to provide 98% confidence intervals for a new set of questions. The post-training subjects were surprised 19% of the time, a substantial improvement over their pre-training score of 34% surprises, but still a far cry from the well-calibrated value of 2% surprises. Similar failure rates have been found for experts. Hynes and Vanmarke (1976) asked seven internationally known geotechnical engineers to predict the height of an embankment that would cause a clay foundation to fail and to specify confidence bounds around this estimate that were wide enough to have a 50% chance of enclosing the true height. None of the bounds specified enclosed the true failure height. Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) reported physician estimates for the probability of pneumonia for 1,531 patients examined because of a cough. At the highest calibrated bracket of stated confidences, with average verbal probabilities of 88%, the proportion of patients actually having pneumonia was less than 20%. In the words of Alpert and Raiffa (1982): 'For heaven's sake, Spread Those Extreme Fractiles! Be honest with yourselves! Admit what you don't know!' Lichtenstein et. al. (1982) reviewed the results of fourteen papers on thirty-four experiments performed by twenty-three researchers studying human calibration. The overwhelmingly strong result was that people are overconfident. In the modern field, overconfidence is no longer noteworthy; but it continues to show up, in passing, in nearly any experiment where subjects are allowed to assign extreme probabilities. Overconfidence applies forcefully to the domain of planning, where it is known as the planning fallacy. Buehler et. al. (1994) asked psychology students to predict an important variable - the delivery time of their psychology honors thesis. They waited until students approached the end of their year-long projects, and then asked the students when they realistically expected to submit their thesis, and also when they would submit the thesis "if everything went as poorly as it possibly could." On average, the students took 55 days to complete their thesis; 22 days longer than they had anticipated; and 7 days longer than their worst-case predictions. Buehler et. al. (1995) asked students for times by which the student was 50% sure, 75% sure, and 99% sure they would finish their academic project. Only 13% of the participants finished their project by the time assigned a 50% probability level, only 19% finished by the time assigned a 75% probability, and 45% finished by the time of their

99% probability level. Buehler et. al. (2002) wrote: "The results for the 99% probability level are especially striking: Even when asked to make a highly conservative forecast, a prediction that they felt virtually certain that they would fulfill, students' confidence in their time estimates far exceeded their accomplishments." Newby-Clark et. al. (2000) found that asking subjects for their predictions based on realistic "best guess" scenarios, and asking subjects for their hoped-for "best case" scenarios, produced indistinguishable results. When asked for their "most probable" case, people tend to envision everything going exactly as planned, with no unexpected delays or unforeseen catastrophes: the same vision as their "best case". Reality, it turns out, usually delivers results somewhat worse than the "worst case".

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# Miscellaneous

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# Cost-Benefit

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# Cost-Benefit Good

## Decisions must use cost-benefit logic—it's the only way to deal with heuristics and bias

**SUNSTEIN 2000** (Cass, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School, Journal of Legal Studies, June)

Cost-benefit analysis is often justified on conventional economic grounds, as a way of preventing inefficiency. But it is most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition.  
Poor judgments, by individuals and societies, can result from certain heuristics, from informational and reputational cascades, from thinking processes in which benefits are "on screen" but costs are not, from ignoring systemic effects of one-shot interventions, from seeing cases in isolation, and from intense emotional reactions. Cost-benefit analysis serves as a corrective to these cognitive problems. In addition, it is possible to arrive at an incompletely theorized agreement on cost-benefit analysis—an agreement that does not depend on controversial arguments (for example, the view that willingness to pay should be the basis for all social outcomes) and that can attract support from a variety of reasonable views. There is discussion as well of the role of distributional weights and other equitable factors in cost-benefit analysis. The conclusion is that the best argument for cost-benefit analysis is rooted in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.

## Those policy making heuristics distort reaction to existential threat—teaching these skills has a literally infinite impact

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer - someone who, faced with any discomfiting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball. Conclusion Why should there be an organized body of thinking about existential risks? Falling asteroids are not like engineered supervivuses; physics disasters are not like nanotechnological wars. Why not consider each of these problems separately? If someone proposes a physics disaster, then the committee convened to analyze the problem must obviously include physicists. But someone on that committee should also know how terribly dangerous it is to have an answer in your mind before you finish asking the question. Someone on that committee should remember the reply of Enrico Fermi to Leo Szilard's proposal that a fission chain reaction could be used to build nuclear weapons. (The reply was "Nuts!" - Fermi considered the possibility so remote as to not be worth investigating.) Someone should remember the history of errors in physics calculations: the Castle Bravo nuclear test that produced a 15-megaton explosion, instead of 4 to 8, because of an unconsidered reaction in lithium-7: They correctly solved the wrong equation, failed to think of all the terms that needed to be included, and at least one person in the expanded fallout radius died. Someone should remember Lord Kelvin's careful proof, using multiple, independent quantitative calculations from well-established theories, that the Earth could not possibly have existed for so much as forty million years. Someone should know that when an expert says the probability is "a million to one" without using actuarial data or calculations from a precise, precisely confirmed model, the calibration is probably more like twenty to one (though this is not an exact conversion). Any existential risk evokes problems that it shares with all other existential risks, in addition to the domain-specific expertise required for the specific existential risk. Someone on the physics-disaster committee should know what the term "existential risk" means; should possess whatever skills the field of existential risk management has accumulated or borrowed. For maximum safety, that person should also be a physicist. The domain-specific expertise and the expertise pertaining to existential risks should combine in one person. I am skeptical that a scholar of heuristics and biases, unable to read physics equations, could check the work of physicists who knew nothing of heuristics and biases. Once upon a time I made up overly detailed scenarios, without realizing that every additional detail was an extra burden. Once upon a time I really did think that I could say there was a ninety percent chance of Artificial Intelligence being developed between 2005 and 2025, with the peak in 2018. This statement now seems to me like complete gibberish. Why did I ever think I could generate a tight probability distribution over a problem like that? Where did I even get those numbers in the first place? Skilled practitioners of, say, molecular nanotechnology or Artificial Intelligence, will not automatically know the additional skills needed to address the existential risks of their profession. No one told me, when I addressed myself to the challenge of Artificial Intelligence, that it was needful for such a person as myself to study heuristics and biases. I don't remember why I first ran across an account of heuristics and biases, but I remember that it was a description of an overconfidence result - a casual description, online, with no references. I was so incredulous that I contacted the author to ask if this was a real experimental result. (He referred me to the edited volume Judgment Under Uncertainty.) I should not have had to stumble across that reference by accident. Someone should have warned me, as I am warning you, that this is knowledge needful to a student of existential risk. There should be a curriculum for people like ourselves; a list of skills we need in addition to

our domain-specific knowledge. I am not a physicist, but I know a little - probably not enough - about the history of errors in physics, and a biologist thinking about superviruses should know it too. I once met a lawyer who had made up his own theory of physics. I said to the lawyer: You cannot invent your own physics theories without knowing math and studying for years; physics is hard. He replied: But if you really understand physics you can explain it to your grandmother, Richard Feynman told me so. And I said to him: "Would you advise a friend to argue his own court case?" At this he fell silent. He knew abstractly that physics was difficult, but I think it had honestly never occurred to him that physics might be as difficult as lawyering. One of many biases not discussed in this chapter describes the biasing effect of not knowing what we do not know. When a company recruiter evaluates his own skill, he recalls to mind the performance of candidates he hired, many of which subsequently excelled; therefore the recruiter thinks highly of his skill. But the recruiter never sees the work of candidates not hired. Thus I must warn that this paper touches upon only a small subset of heuristics and biases; for when you wonder how much you have already learned, you will recall the few biases this chapter does mention, rather than the many biases it does not. Brief summaries cannot convey a sense of the field, the larger understanding which weaves a set of memorable experiments into a unified interpretation. Many highly relevant biases, such as need for closure, I have not even mentioned. The purpose of this chapter is not to teach the knowledge needful to a student of existential risks, but to intrigue you into learning more. Thinking about existential risks falls prey to all the same fallacies that prey upon thinking-in-general. But the stakes are much, much higher. A common result in heuristics and biases is that offering money or other incentives does not eliminate the bias. (Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) offered subjects living in the People's Republic of China the equivalent of three months' salary.) The subjects in these experiments don't make mistakes on purpose; they make mistakes because they don't know how to do better. Even if you told them the survival of humankind was at stake, they still would not thereby know how to do better. (It might increase their need for closure, causing them to do worse.) It is a terribly frightening thing, but people do not become any smarter, just because the survival of humankind is at stake. In addition to standard biases, I have personally observed what look like harmful modes of thinking specific to existential risks. The Spanish flu of 1918 killed 25-50 million people. World War II killed 60 million people. 107 is the order of the largest catastrophes in humanity's written history. Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of thinking - enter into a "separate magisterium". People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, "Well, maybe the human species doesn't really deserve to survive." There is a saying in heuristics and biases that people do not evaluate events, but descriptions of events - what is called non-extensional reasoning. The extension of humanity's extinction includes the death of yourself, of your friends, of your family, of your loved ones, of your city, of your country, of your political fellows. Yet people who would take great offense at a proposal to wipe the country of Britain from the map, to kill every member of the Democratic Party in the U.S., to turn the city of Paris to glass - who would feel still greater horror on hearing the doctor say that their child had cancer - these people will discuss the extinction of humanity with perfect calm. "Extinction of humanity", as words on paper, appears in fictional novels, or is discussed in philosophy books - it belongs to a different context than the Spanish flu. We evaluate descriptions of events, not extensions of events. The cliché phrase end of the world invokes the magisterium of myth and dream, of prophecy and apocalypse, of novels and movies. The challenge of existential risks to rationality is that, the catastrophes being so huge, people snap into a different mode of thinking. Human deaths are suddenly no longer bad, and detailed predictions suddenly no longer require any expertise, and whether the story is told with a happy ending or a sad ending is a matter of personal taste in stories. But that is only an anecdotal observation of mine. I thought it better that this essay should focus on mistakes well-documented in the literature - the general literature of cognitive psychology, because there is not yet experimental literature specific to the psychology of existential risks. There should be. In the mathematics of Bayesian decision theory there is a concept of information value - the expected utility of knowledge. The value of information emerges from the value of whatever it is information about; if you double the stakes, you double the value of information about the stakes. The value of rational thinking works similarly - the value of performing a computation that integrates the evidence is calculated much the same way as the value of the evidence itself. (Good 1952; Horvitz et. al. 1989.) No more than Albert Szent-Györgyi could multiply the suffering of one human by a hundred million can I truly understand the value of clear thinking about global risks. Scope neglect is the hazard of being a biological human, running on an analog brain; the brain cannot multiply by six billion. And the stakes of existential risk extend beyond even the six billion humans alive today, to all the stars in all the galaxies that humanity and humanity's descendants may some day touch. All that vast potential hinges on our survival here, now, in the days when the realm of humankind is a single planet orbiting a single star. I can't feel our future. All I can do is try to defend it.

# Opportunity Cost

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## Opportunity Cost Good

### **Opportunity cost is the only way to make decisions—there's no rational alternative**

**RESCHER 2003** (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, *Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy*, p. 4-5)

In pursuing objects of multidimensional value, the payment of what economists call opportunity costs becomes unavoidable. All of our efforts to obtain good objects or achieve valued objectives require us to make compromises. Throughout the domain of valued goods it transpires that some among the relevant value-consuming features can be enhanced only at the price of diminishing others. It thus lies in the nature of things that value realization is always a matter of balance, of trade-offs, of compromise. Different aspects of merit always compete in point of realization. We can never have it both ways: a concurrent maximum in every dimension is simply unavailable in this or indeed in any other realistically conceivable world. With inherently conflicting desiderata, across-the-board maximization is in principle impossible—in practice and generally in theory as well. All that one can ever reasonably ask for is an auspicious overall combination of values. Perfection—maximum realization of every value dimension all at once—is unrealizable. And it makes no sense to ask for the impossible.

### **Every decision must involve opportunity costs—debate must focus on how to optimize those choices**

**RESCHER 2003** (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, *Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy*, p. 5-6)

The commitment to any object of choice invariably involves such complex trade-offs among the conflicting desiderata involved. And this means that any choice is a matter of compromise—of a negotiation among those conflicting aspects of value. All choices are accordingly a matter of closing doors, of forgoing opportunities to augment some desiderata. Every choice narrows horizons—sacrificing possibilities that, in some respect, realize certain desiderata to a greater degree than we presently accept. In such circumstances we have a situation of the inevitability of regret. Every increase in one of the relevant assets involves some loss in point of another; every gain has its dark side, invoking some sort of loss. We must acknowledge the deep and wide truth of John Gay's couplet in the *Beggar's Opera*: How happy could I be with either, Were t'other dear charmer away! We cannot escape the exclusionary nature of choice—to opt for more of a desideratum is ipso facto to opt for less of another. Of course, there is another side of the coin. In choosing we always sacrifice certain desiderata, but we do not do so without compensation. The sacrifices we make do—or, when we choose wisely, should—have a more than compensating return by way of benefit in respect of other desiderata. It is just that we cannot have it both ways. Man is *Homo optans*—choosing man, a creature that must make choices. And being a rational creature as well through his status as *Homo sapiens*, this means that those choices have to be made on the basis of rationally configured evaluations. Man is thus *Homo aestimans*, evaluative man, as well. Comparative evaluation is also an unavoidable requisite of the human condition. The burden of choice—and thereby of reason-guided evaluation—is one of the definitive features of the human condition.

# Crisis Politics

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## Crisis Politics Good

If we win our impact, their argument is backwards—the plan causes a crisis, whereas we prevent it through foresight—the point of uniqueness is to prove that there’s no crisis now—rather than jumping from one crisis to the next, we manage a stable system that prevents or contains disasters

### **Political calculation prevents otherwise inevitable crisis-based decisions**

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**FITZSIMMONS, 2007** [Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, *Survival*, Winter 06-07, online]

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challenging. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decisionmakers.<sup>15</sup> And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic surprise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’<sup>16</sup> The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

# Bioterrorism

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## Impact

**Bioterrorism is the most probable extinction threat.**

**Matheny 2007** (Jason G. Matheny, P.hD is a Program Manager at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007 Pg. 1335-1344 .nt)

**Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest** compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; **the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible** and because **biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population** (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at \$5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).



## Defense

**Bioterror is a low-risk threat as long as there are counter-measures to disease spread in place.**

**Green et al. 2007** (Manfred S. Green MD,PhD Head, School of Public Health, Faculty of Social Welfare and Health Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel. "Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Strategies in Bioterrorism Preparedness" April 27, 2007 google.books.preview .nt)

<sup>Consequentialism 223</sup>  
**To minimize the effects of a biological attack**, public health authorities need to be aware of the threat biological agents may have in biological warfare and bioterrorism. **Physicians need to be alerted and well-trained, have a high suspicion** for these agents, **and must recognize the clinical symptoms** derived from such an infection. Symptoms of those exposed to such agents may be nonspecific and resemble common flu-like diseases. Many biological threat agents are zoonotic. Animals may show the first symptoms of a clinical infectious disease after a deliberate release of a biological agent. In such cases, **veterinarians may be the first to encounter the disease** caused by a zoonotic threat agent. Planning for necessary actions, **national and global coordination, responsibility, enhanced law enforcement, medical countermeasures, and implementing efficient syndromic surveillance systems are all essential parts of bioterrorism preparedness.** In addition, **designing efficient detection systems for early warning, and rapid and reliable diagnostic systems contributes to improve the response efforts.** The avian flu outbreak in several Asian countries killing approximately 50 million chickens has revealed the need for establishing rapid molecular diagnostics for mass screening of the flu carriers to improve public health responses [14]. **Early detection** to a release of biological agents **may decrease the infectious rate** and the people exposed (Figure 1). By the time the clinical symptoms have emerged, it might be too late for treatment. In some cases, antibiotics may be effective as postexposure prophylaxis, but this treatment needs to start before the onset of symptoms.

# Empirics Bad

## **Empirics fail for human impacts – uncertainty of intention tanks probability**

**Ayyub et al 7** – Director at the Center for Technology and Systems Management [Bilal, professor of Civil Engineering at University of Maryland, “Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk Analysis: An All-Hazards Framework,” Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 790, August 2007, Wiley, Accessed 6/28/15]//schnall

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2. BACKGROUND 2.1. Challenges with Human-Caused Threats In recent years, decisionmakers charged with protecting critical assets have taken an all-hazards approach to risk management that focuses on both Natural and human-caused hazards,(21) where each individual hazard type is physically unique and presents its own set of challenges with its characterization and assessment.(22) However, in contrast to natural hazards that are indiscriminate and without malicious intent, a unique challenge with assessing risks due to the deliberate actions of intelligent human adversaries is their ability to innovate and adapt to a changing environment. While one can rely on historical data to estimate annual occurrence rates for natural hazards affecting a region given that the timescale of geological and meteorological change is much greater than the planning horizon for most homeland security decisions,(14) assets in this same region are always plausible targets for adversaries despite a lack of past incidents. The uncertainty associated with adversary intentions is largely epistemic, and in principle can be reduced given more knowledge about their intentions, motivations, preferences, and capabilities. In general, the threat component of the security risk problem is the most uncertain owing to the fact that defenders are often unaware of the adversary’s identity and objectives. Less uncertain is the security vulnerability component of the risk equation, since countermeasures to defeat adversaries are relatively static in the absence of heightened alert. However, since the effectiveness of a security system depends on the capabilities and objectives of the attacker (which is uncertain), the performance of a security system under stress is more uncertain than the consequences following a successful attack. Thus, it seems that to build a security risk profile for an asset, it is prudent to start with those aspects of the risk problem that are most certain (i.e., consequence), and proceed with the less certain aspects (i.e., vulnerability then threat) as necessary to support resource allocation decisions.

# Impact Vagueness

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## Vague Impacts Good

**The vagueness of our impact only makes it more threatening—specificity relies on a logical fallacy—the conjunctive hypothesis**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

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The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of \$17.19, \$13.90, and \$7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures<sup>3</sup> survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.'

# Intervening Actors

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## AT Intervening Actors Check

**This argument is just terrible impact defense—they have to win not only that someone will respond but that this intervention will be successful—every catastrophe in human history proves that intervening actors cannot always stop an impact**

**The more intervening actors, the less likely they are to stop our impact—just causes diffusion of responsibility and you should always assume you are the key actor**

**YUDKOWSKY 2006** (Eliezer, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, "Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks," forthcoming in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, August 31)

My last bias comes, not from the field of heuristics and biases, but from the field of social psychology. A now-famous series of experiments by Latane and Darley (1969) uncovered the bystander effect, also known as bystander apathy, in which larger numbers of people are less likely to act in emergencies - not only individually, but collectively. 75% of subjects alone in a room, noticing smoke entering from under a door, left to report it. When three naive subjects were present, the smoke was reported only 38% of the time. A naive subject in the presence of two confederates who purposely ignored the smoke, even when the room became hazy, left to report the smoke only 10% of the time. A college student apparently having an epileptic seizure was helped 85% of the time by a single bystander and 31% of the time by five bystanders. The bystander effect is usually explained as resulting from diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance. Being part of a group reduces individual responsibility. Everyone hopes that someone else will handle the problem instead, and this reduces the individual pressure to the point that no one does anything. Support for this hypothesis is adduced from manipulations in which subjects believe that the victim is especially dependent on them; this reduces the bystander effect or negates it entirely. Cialdini (2001) recommends that if you are ever in an emergency, you single out one single bystander, and ask that person to help - thereby overcoming the diffusion.

### **Reliance on intervening actors is unethical**

**AITKEN 77** (William, teaches philosophy at Chatham College, *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, p 93-94)

Some have maintained that there is a fourth minimal condition which a potential helper of a person in need must satisfy in order to be obligated to act—the condition of being the 'last resort'. Richard Brandt suggests such a condition in his book, *Ethical Theory*. He specifies that it is only in cases where "we are the only one in a position to help" that we have a moral obligation to assist a person in dire need and that the person in need has a right to our assistance. There is a danger in adopting this 'last resort' condition since it poses an additional epistemological difficulty, that is, the determination of whether or not I am the last resort. Beyond this, it is an undesirable condition because it will justify inaction where more than one person could act but where no one is acting. In most emergency situations there is more than one potential assistor. For instance, five persons may simultaneously come across a drowning child. Each would be obligated to act if he were the last resort, but since no single one is the last resort, then all five may refuse to act, claiming that it is not their duty to act any more than it is the duty of the other four and so each one would be justified in not acting. If this condition is placed on the right to be saved, the child could drown and none of the five spectators could be held morally accountable. But surely the presence of another person at an accident site does not automatically relieve me of a moral duty to assist the victim in need, any more than the presence of one police officer called to the scene of a bank robbery relieves other officers in the area from attempting to apprehend the suspects. The condition of last resort is too strong; it is not a minimal condition for obligation.

### **Natural human tendencies reduce the chance that intervening action is successful**

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 122-123)

I mentioned earlier the optimistic backlash against the doomsters. I was commenting on the content rather than on temperament, but temperament is part of the reason for the difficulty of getting people to focus constructively on the catastrophic risks. Some people have a natural bent towards optimism; their outlook is sunny. Others are naturally pessimistic; they have a tendency toward depression. In still others neither characteristic is strongly marked, and it is among those people that support for constructive responses to the catastrophic risks must be sought. Optimists would tend to be hopeful that effective responses to these risks would be devised and implemented, but, being optimists, they would heavily discount the risks themselves. They are not fearful of low-probability events, however dreadful. Pessimists would tend to worry about the risks—even to exaggerate them—but would despair of being able to do anything about them. Optimists are hopeful but fearless; pessimists are fearful but hopeless. (So pessimists are more imaginative than optimists.) Though for opposite reasons, neither group is strongly motivated to think seriously about devising effective responses to catastrophic risks. The two groups together are not the entire population, but they are a large part of it and this operates as a drag on the prospects for adoption of proposals for dealing with the risks.

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**We should act now to prevent future disasters—predictions make survival possible but intervening actors won't save us**

**KURASAWA 2004** (Fuyuki Kurasawa is Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, *Constellations*, Vol 11, No 4 [Blackwell])

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind's supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical 'quick-fixes' is hardly reassuring. What's more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning,

coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others.

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# Privacy Good

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## Util

### **Privacy's value as a social tool for constructing a healthier society means it's justified under your utilitarian calculations as well**

**Solve 15** [ Daniel,John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School," The meaning and value of privacy, Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Pg.78-80]

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Another problem with the way privacy is often conceptualized involves how its value is assessed. Traditional liberalism often views privacy as a right possessed by individuals. For example, legal theorist Thomas Emerson declares that privacy "is based upon premises of individualism, that the society exists to promote the worth and dignity of the individual ... The right of privacy ... is essentially the right not to participate in the collective life - the right to shut out the community" (Emerson 1970: 545, 549). In the words of one court: "Privacy is inherently personal. The right to privacy recognizes the sovereignty of the individual" (Smith v. City of Artesia 1989).

Framing privacy exclusively in individualistic terms often results in privacy being undervalued in utilitarian balancing, which is the predominant way policymakers resolve conflicts between various interests. When individual interests are pitted against the common good, the latter often wins out. The interests often in tension with privacy - free speech, efficient consumer transactions, or security - are frequently understood as valuable for all of society. Privacy, in contrast, is seen as a zone of respite for the sake of the individual.

There is a way, however, **to justify privacy from a utilitarian basis.** Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey has articulated the most coherent theory of how protecting individual rights furthers the common good. For Dewey, there is no strict dichotomy between individual and society. The individual is shaped by society, and the good of both the individual and society are often interrelated rather than antagonistic: "We cannot think of ourselves save as to some extent social beings. Hence we cannot separate the idea of ourselves and our own good from our idea of others and of their good" (Dewey 1908: 268, original emphasis). Dewey contended that the value of protecting individual rights emerges from their contribution to society. In other words, individual rights are not trumps, but are protections by society from its intrusiveness. Society makes space for the individual because of the social benefits this space provides. Therefore, Dewey argues, rights should be valued based on "the contribution they make to the welfare of the community" (Dewey 1936: 374). Otherwise, in any kind of utilitarian calculus, individual rights would not be valuable enough to outweigh most social interests, and it would be impossible to justify individual rights. As such, Dewey argued, we must insist upon a "social basis and social justification" for civil liberties (Dewey 1936: 375).

I contend, like Dewey, that the value of protecting the individual is a social one. Society involves a great deal of friction, and we are constantly clashing with each other. Part of what makes a society a good place in which to live <sup>232</sup> is the extent to which it allows people freedom from the intrusiveness of others. A society without privacy protection would be suffocating, and it might not be a place in which most would want to live. When protecting individual rights, we as a society decide to hold back in order to receive the benefits of creating the kinds of free zones for individuals to flourish.

As Spiros Similis declares, “privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual problems; rather, they express conflicts afflicting everyone” (Simitis 1987: 707, 709).<sup>2</sup> Privacy, then, is not the trumpeting of the individual against society’s interests but the protection of the individual based on society’s own norms and practices. Privacy is not simply a way to extricate individuals from social control, as it is itself a form of social control that emerges from the norms and values of society.

We protect individual privacy as a society because we recognize that a good society protects against excessive intrusion and nosiness into people’s lives. Norms exist not to peek into our neighbors windows or sneer into people’s houses. Privacy is thus not an external restraint on society but is in fact an internal dimension of society (Post 1989:957,968, arguing that privacy is society’s attempt to promote norms of civility). Therefore, privacy has a social value. Even when it protects the individual, it does so for the sake of society. It thus should not be weighed as an individual right against the greater social good. Privacy issues involve balancing societal interests on both sides of the scale.

## **We need to act now**

**Solove 15** [ Daniel, John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School,” The meaning and value of privacy, Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Pg.71-72]

**Our privacy is under assault.** Businesses are collecting an unprecedented amount of personal data, recording the items we buy at the supermarket, the books we buy online, our web-surfing activity, our financial transactions, the movies we watch, the videos we rent, and much more. Nearly every organization and company we interact with now has tons of personal data about us. Companies we have never heard of also possess our profiles. Digital dossiers about our lives and personalities are being assembled in distant databases, and they are being meticulously studied and analyzed to make judgments about us: What products are we likely to buy? Are we a good credit risk? What price would we be willing to pay for certain items? How good a customer are we? Are we likely to be cooperative and not likely to return items or complain or call customer service?

Today, government has an unprecedented hunger for personal data. It is tapping into the data possessed by businesses and other organizations, including libraries. Many businesses readily comply with government requests for data. Government agencies are mining this personal data, trying to determine whether a person might likely engage in criminal or terrorist activity in the future based on patterns of behavior, purchases, and interest (O’Harrow 2005). If a government computer decides that you are a likely threat, then you might find yourself on a watch list, you might have difficulty flying, and there might be further negative consequences in the future.

The threat to privacy involves more than just records. Surveillance cameras are popping up everywhere. It is getting increasingly harder to have an unrecorded moment in public. In the United States, the National Security Agency is engaging in massive telephone surveillance. In the United Kingdom, millions of CCTV cameras monitor nearly every nook and cranny of public space (Rosen 2004). At work, many employers monitor nearly everything - every call their employees make, every keystroke they type, every website they visit.

Beyond the government and businesses, we are increasingly invading each others privacy - and exposing our own personal information. The generation of young people growing up today is using blogs and social network websites at an unprecedented rate, spilling intimate details about their personal lives online that are available for anybody anywhere in the world to read (Solove 2007). The gossip that circulates in high school and college is no longer ephemeral and fleeting - it is now permanently available on the Internet, and it can readily be accessed by doing a Google search under a persons name.

With all these developments, many are asking whether privacy is still alive. With so much information being gathered, with so much surveillance, with so much disclosure, how can people expect privacy anymore? If we can't expect privacy, is it possible to protect it? Many contend that fighting for privacy is a losing battle, so we might as well just grin and bear it.

## “Right to Privacy” Good

**The surveillance state violates the spirit of the fourth amendment and guarantees tyranny.**

**Gray and Citron 13** [David and Danielle, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project; Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, “The Right to Quantitative Privacy”, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 98, 2013, March 5, 2013]

Recognizing a constitutional interest in quantitative privacy buttresses Fourth Amendment defenses against a surveillance state. Until now, practical limitations inherent to many investigative techniques, cultural constraints on mutual surveillance, and existing Fourth Amendment doctrines have provided a virtual guarantee that traditional investigative techniques would not produce the kind of broad and indiscriminate monitoring that raises the specter of a surveillance state. There simply are not enough police officers to follow all of us all of the time. As a society, we have stalwartly resisted the temptations of mutual surveillance that also preserved an archipelago of safe spaces and activities beyond the gaze of government agents. As a consequence, we have until now sustained a fairly stable balance between government power and private citizenship that allows us to pursue projects of self-development free from fear that the government is watching.

Recent technological developments, such as the NSA’S broad and indiscriminate data collection, aggregation, and retention programs, New York’s Domain Awareness System, aerial drones, and GPS-enabled tracking devices threaten to alter this balance. By their nature, these technologies make possible the monitoring of everyone all the time. As consequence, granting the government unfettered access to these technologies opens the door to a surveillance state and the **tyranny** it entails. It is therefore at the point of unfettered access to those technologies that the Fourth Amendment should intervene. As we have argued here, this technology-centered approach to quantitative privacy holds great promise in our continuing efforts to strike a reasonable balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and citizen privacy while preserving the critical service of the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark against the rise of a surveillance state.

**There are flagrant unjustified privacy violations occurring in the status quo. (wow!)**

**Gray and Citron 13** [David and Danielle, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project; Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, “The Right to Quantitative Privacy”, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 98, 2013, March 5, 2013]

In June and July 2013, documents leaked by a government contractor revealed details of three expansive surveillance pro-grams operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense on behalf of the National Security Agency (NSA). The first requires that Verizon and other telecommunication companies provide to the NSA on a daily basis “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.” Although this program does conversations, telephony metadata is a rich source of information, giving authorities vast knowledge about callers’ identity, location, and social networks. A second program, referred to in leaked

documents as “PRISM,” reportedly allows the NSA and the FBI to access “audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs” collected by nine leading U.S. internet companies, including Google and Facebook. The third program, called XKeyscore, provides analysts with the capacity to mine content and metadata generated by e-mail, chat, and browsing activities through a global network of servers and internet access points. These revelations confirm previous reports about a comprehensive domestic surveillance program that seeks to provide government agents with contemporary and perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and everything we do, say, or write, particularly when using or in the company of networked technologies networked communications, however. Consider aerial drones. No longer just a feature of modern warfare, unmanned aerial drones now populate domestic airspace. Military-style drones operate along the United States border with Mexico. Farther inland, law enforcement agencies are starting to use a variety of drones during their routine police operations. Many of these drones are hardly visible, and some are as small as insects. Among the primary advantages of these drone surveillance systems is that they are “covert.” As one operator reported: “You don’t hear it, and unless you know what you’re looking for, you can’t see it.” Drones are also increasingly inexpensive, with some costing just a few hundred dollars. Given the diversity, power, secrecy, and increasingly modest cost of aerial drones, we should expect them to become a more and more common presence in our skies.

We are also increasingly subject to surveillance by systems capable of aggregating and analyzing large quantities of information from a variety of sources. Take, for example, New York’s “Domain Awareness System” (DAS), which was unveiled by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly in August 2012. Developed in conjunction with Microsoft, DAS aggregates and analyzes video streams from 3,000 public and private security cameras, images from license-plate readers and traffic cameras, and data from government and private databases. DAS will ensure the surveillance of New Yorkers and the city as a whole, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Confronted with comparisons to George Orwell’s “Big Brother,” Bloomberg replied, “What you’re seeing is what the private sector has used for a long time. If you walk around with a cell phone, the cell phone company knows where you are . . . . **We’re not your mom and pop’s police department anymore.**

## **A Right to privacy is vital to the creation of a deliberative democracy and individual projects of self-development – current surveillance practices need to be checked.**

**Gray and Citron 13** [David and Danielle, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project; Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, “The Right to Quantitative Privacy”, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 98, 2013, March 5, 2013]

Similar questions came before the Court last year in United States v. Jones.<sup>21</sup> In that case, law enforcement officers used a GPS-enabled tracking device to monitor Jones’s movements for four weeks, gathering over 2,000 pages of data in the process. Although Jones was resolved on narrow grounds, concurring opinions indicate that at least five justices have serious Fourth Amendment concerns about law enforcement’s growing surveillance capabilities. Those justices insisted that citizens possess a Fourth Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain private, even if they have no such expectations with respect to any of the discrete particulars of that information. Thus, even if the use of a GPS-enabled tracking device to effect “relatively short-term

monitoring of a person's movements on public streets" does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, "the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."

According to critics and supporters alike, this quantitative account of Fourth Amendment privacy is revolutionary. In his majority opinion in *Jones*, Justice Scalia describes some of the challenges and dangers. Foremost among these is the burden of explaining quantitative privacy's Fourth Amendment pedigree. A quantitative approach to the Fourth Amendment appears to undercut well-established rules, Consequentialism 337, observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine. Defenders of quantitative privacy must chart a conceptual link to these precedents or provide compelling reasons for changing course. Advocates also must provide a workable test that law enforcement and courts can employ in drawing the line between quantities of data that do and do not trigger the Fourth Amendment. This Article responds to these demands by engaging the Information Privacy Law Project.

Although information privacy law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence have a shared interest in defining and protecting privacy, with the exception of a few information privacy scholars, these two fields have largely been treated as theoretically and practically discrete. It is time to end that isolation and the mutual exceptionalism it implies. For nearly fifty years, scholars, activists, and policymakers working on information privacy law have warned about the dangers of surveillance technologies, including their capacity to chill projects of ethical self-development that are both core to our liberty interests and essential to a functioning democracy. As we argue here, these concerns have clear Fourth Amendment salience and provide critical guidance as courts and legislatures search for ways to regulate emerging surveillance technologies in the shadow of *Jones*.

As a protection afforded to "the people," the Fourth Amendment erects a crucial constitutional bulwark against law enforcement's tendency to engage in broader and ever more intrusive surveillance when officers and agencies are left to their own discretion. As Justice Jackson pointed out in *Johnson v. United States*, law enforcement is a competitive enterprise in which government agents will seek any strategic advantage available to them. Pursuit of that advantage impels government agents, even those acting with the best of intentions, toward broader and more intrusive forms of surveillance. Our eighteenth-century forebears knew well the dangers of leaving these natural motivations unchecked. Before America's founding, British agents routinely abused general warrants, including writs of assistance, to subject our forefathers to the eighteenth century equivalent of a surveillance state. The Fourth Amendment responded to these abuses by limiting the right of law enforcement to effect physical searches and seizures and the authority of politically driven legislatures and executives to license programs of broad and indiscriminate search.

Granting law enforcement unfettered access to twenty-first century surveillance technologies like aerial drones, DAS, and sweeping data collection efforts, implicates these same Fourth Amendment interests. This does not mean that law enforcement should be barred from conducting searches using modern surveillance technology<sup>237</sup>. Instead, in the present, as in the past, all that the Fourth Amendment requires is a set of policies and practices that limit the discretion of law enforcement, provide for meaningful judicial review, and effect a reasonable accommodation of both the legitimate interests of law enforcement in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting crime, and the privacy interests of citizens subject to surveillance. Here again, the work of information privacy law scholars offers important guidance in striking that balance.

## NSA BAD

**Even assuming that the NSA is essential for national security substantive reforms are needed for it to be both ethical and legal under Article 17 of ICCPR.**

**Sinha 13** [Alex, Human Rights Watch; American Civil Liberties Union, “NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy” August 31, 2013]

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Both the Human Rights Committee and Manfred Nowak argue that Article 17 permits interference with the right to privacy only when it is lawful, non-arbitrary, and proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate aim. The preceding analysis highlights a number of ways in which the NSA program seems both unlawful and arbitrary: fatal flaws under the dominant interpretation of Article 17. Even if the United States were to take the position—in good faith—that the NSA program is essential for national security, the standard analysis would seem to suggest that the program needs substantial revisions to bring it into line with the terms of the ICCPR

We have already foreclosed the possibility that national security could justify unlawful and arbitrary interference with the right to privacy; that reading is implausible because of its implications, not to mention the fact that it is in tension with the major interpretations of the ICCPR and the European Convention. But perhaps there is a more promising indicator for the United States in the deference shown by the ECtHR where states parties assert national security as the justification for their interference with the right to privacy.

Recall that the ECtHR places substantial weight on the existence of “formal legality and procedural guarantees.” More specifically, in addition to insisting that the state act in accordance with its own domestic laws (thus ensuring formal legality), clarity about the “scope and manner of exercise” of the state’s activities are important considerations in assessing the permissibility of interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention. If those conditions are met, and the purpose of the interference is legitimate (such as protecting national security), then the ECtHR is likely to defer to the state actor.

Even here, however, the United States would struggle. Set aside the fact that, for much of its duration, the NSA program lacked formal legality. Perhaps more significantly, even now the program has weak procedural guarantees, with (among other things) a limited role for the courts, frequent over-collection of information by the government, and only the most modest of roles for particularized suspicion in targeting. Moreover, as the ongoing leaks about the program demonstrate, many of the government’s activities remain hidden from public view, necessarily rendering impossible a wide understanding of their nature and scope. Perhaps the United States could modify the NSA program in a way that would allow it to retain its breadth while also complying with the sorts of criteria valued by the ECtHR. Perhaps the government could reveal the program more fully to the public. But until and unless that happens, a favorable verdict by analogy is unlikely.

In sum, it is obviously difficult to reach conclusive opinions about the legality of the NSA program (or its various constituent parts) under the ICCPR in part because some of our analysis is built on credible but disputed reporting on the program itself. At the very least, we need additional, concrete information about how the government executes the program. Further, the arguments on either side are relatively



complicated and can develop in a range of different ways. But at a minimum, even on conservative assumptions about the nature of the program and the scope of the ICCPR, we face the legitimate and frightening prospect that the United States is systematically and massively violating the human right to privacy.

What happens now? Selective leaks in the media help to shed light on parts of the program, but the government is unlikely to turn over any more comprehensive information voluntarily. The limited congressional oversight that occurred shortly after the program became known fell far short of the public accountability created by investigations into spying abuses in the mid-1970s. Despite a string of recent revelations, the current political climate is even less likely to lead to significant oversight than it was in 2005 and 2006, as administrations of both parties have now formally endorsed the FAA, thereby illustrating their commitment to the NSA program.

But suppose we look at the issue from another angle. Why is it that the arguments on both sides are so complicated and uncertain? In part, the reason is that international human rights bodies have not paid enough attention to the risks posed to privacy by government surveillance programs. We have inferred the various points of illicit contact between the NSA program and the ICCPR by carefully reading both news reports about the program and commentaries on the treaty. But the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on the right to privacy is over twenty-five years old, and no more than two-pages long; it lacks important detail, and does not specifically address surveillance practices that are certain to be in wide use around the world today.

This Article essentially presents a case study about the human right to privacy in the United States, as implicated by a single—albeit major—national security initiative. The NSA has multiple surveillance programs, and it is not the only agency within the U.S. government that conducts surveillance here. Most importantly, other countries conduct their own surveillance, making this a global issue. Governments can discern the basic form of their human rights obligations; they cannot be excused for ignoring those obligations simply because it is possible to obscure their activities behind the cloak of national security policy. Nevertheless, it is much easier for them to duck their obligations when they can claim ambiguity in the law.

If human rights bodies were to take the matter seriously, Articles like this one would not be necessary. Governments will continue to hide information about their surveillance activities, and it may be difficult to change that. But emphasis by human rights bodies on the significance of the right to privacy, and the elaboration of clear standards for compliance with it, would constitute crucial steps in ensuring that states do not trample on this core human right.

## **National security threats are not a justification for unlawful and arbitrary surveillance used by the NSA**

**Sinha 13** <sup>239</sup> [Alex, Human Rights Watch; American Civil Liberties Union, “NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy” August 31, 2013]

Because Article 17 of the ICCPR does not offer an explicit exception for national security concerns (or for any other reason), Volio is skeptical of the possibility of justified interference with the right to privacy. Nowak takes a less stringent view, noting that although Article 17 does not explicitly admit of

exceptions, assessing interference that is both lawful and non-arbitrary “requires a precise balancing of the circumstances in a given case, paying regard to the principle of proportionality.” He claims that to inform our analysis of which purposes might justify interference with the right to privacy under the ICCPR, we need to look at limitation clauses from Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, and 22 of the ICCPR—as well as, potentially, the limitations from Article 8(2) of the European Convention. But as a rule of thumb, he suggests the following:

In evaluating whether interference with privacy by a State enforcement organ represents a violation of Article 17, consequentialism should be reviewed whether, in addition to conformity with national law, the specific act of enforcement had a purpose that seems legitimate on the basis of the Covenant in its entirety, whether it was predictable in the sense of rule of law and, in particular, whether it was reasonable (proportional) in relation to the purpose to be achieved.

Nowak’s position seems to echo the view of the Human Rights Committee, which states that “[i]nterference authorized by States can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.” The Committee also observes that “[t]he introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims[,] and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”

In light of the foregoing, Volio’s position appears to be implausibly strong. Nowak’s description of the debate around the passage of Article 17 suggests that states accepted the existence of reasons that might justify interfering with the right to privacy, even if no explicit list of limitations appears in the Article itself. Indeed, Nowak points to several other articles in the ICCPR to inform our understanding of what sorts of reasons might justify interference with the right to privacy, and all of those articles list national security, public safety, or both among factors that can limit the relevant rights. Thus, we can stipulate for the purposes of this Article’s analysis that legitimate concerns about national security (or public safety) would give the United States a reason to justify its interference with the right to privacy.

The main question that remains is whether national security concerns can justify interference with the right to privacy even if that interference is unlawful or arbitrary. A plain reading of the text of Article 17 might imply an affirmative answer, for the right protected there is, specifically, freedom from unlawful and arbitrary interference with one’s privacy, correspondence, and so on. Thus, an exception to those protections would seem to be an exception to the prohibition of unlawful and arbitrary interference—not an exception to the prohibition of interference per se. Clearly, the most favorable position to the United States would be that national security justifies unlawful or arbitrary interference with the right to privacy.

Yet “unlawful” and “arbitrary”—as discussed in more detail below—are particularly egregious forms of interference, such that it would seem strange to admit of broad exceptions to their prohibition. Moreover, even legitimate national security concerns do not obviously require that a state have the authority to engage in unlawful or arbitrary interference with any interest, let alone a privacy interest (as opposed to lawful, non-arbitrary interference). Both the Human Rights Committee and Nowak suggest that lawfulness and non-arbitrariness are necessary conditions for justifiable interference—that is, that a state party could only justify lawful, non-arbitrary interference—and that such a state can only interfere with privacy in a manner proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate aim (perhaps like national security). Additionally, a similar analysis appears to prevail in the case of the European Convention,

where lawfulness remains a necessary condition for interference with the right to privacy (though it may be worth noting that lawfulness is built into the exceptions clause of Article 8(2) of the European Convention).

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# Re-Evolution

Consequentialism 242

## AT Re-Evolution

### Evolution of new intelligent life is unlikely and doesn't take out our impact

**BOSTROM 2011** (Nick, Prof. of Philosophy at Oxford, The Concept of Existential Risk (Draft), <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>)

Although it is conceivable that, in the billion or so years during which Earth might remain habitable before being overheated by the expanding sun, a new intelligent species would evolve on our planet to fill the niche vacated by an extinct humanity, this is very far from certain to happen. The probability of a recrudescence of intelligent life is reduced if the catastrophe causing the extinction of the human species also exterminated the great apes and our other close relatives, as would occur in many (though not all) human-extinction scenarios. Furthermore, even if another intelligent species were to evolve to take our place, there is no guarantee that the successor species would sufficiently instantiate qualities that we have reason to value. Intelligence may be necessary for the realization of our future potential for desirable development, but it is not sufficient. All scenarios involving the premature extinction of humanity will be counted as existential catastrophes, even though some such scenarios may, according to some theories of value, be relatively benign. It is not part of the *definition* of existential catastrophe that it is all-things-considered bad, although that will probably be a reasonable supposition in most realistic cases.

# Terrorism

Consequentialism 244

## Statistics

### **Our statistics are complex and robust – we define terms and account for variables**

**Greenberg and Cox 10** – Distinguished Professor and Associate Dean of the Faculty at Rutgers AND Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from MIT [Michael and Anthony, Greenberg has written more than 30 books and more than 300 articles, Cox is Editor-in-Chief of Risk Analysis: An International Journal, honorary full professor of Mathematics at University of Colorado, and President of Cox Associates, a Denver-based applied research company specializing in quantitative risk analysis, causal modeling, advanced analytics, and operations research, "Introduction to Special Issue: Advances in Terrorism Risk Analysis," Risk Analysis: An International Journal, pp. 1-5, 2010, Wiley, Accessed 6/27/15]//schnall

Defending a country against terrorist threats raises new challenges and opportunities for risk analysis, different from those that are familiar from risk analysis of natural disasters and complex technological systems. Terrorists can be informed, deceived, deterred, or distracted – options that are not available for managing the risks from hurricanes or unreliable systems and workers. This special issue of Risk Analysis: An International Journal examines recent progress in understanding, modeling, and managing the threats from terrorism, emphasizing some of the most useful and important papers on this subject published in the journal over the past five years. We hope to prepare similar special issues on other timely and important subjects, so please tell us of your ideas about how to use this special "virtual" issue format to maximize reader benefits. 1. DEFINITIONS AND AN EXAMPLE Some papers in this special issue define terms and concepts, and others assume them. So that all readers begin in a similar place, we begin with some conventional definitions used in risk analysis, many of which are challenged by risk analysis of terrorism. There are no generally accepted standard definitions, and we do not expect every reader to agree with these definitions, but they are our starting point. Dozens of definitions of risk exist in the literature. William Lowrance's 1976 definition is perhaps the most widely quoted: "Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse events." (1) Risk analysis is commonly divided into risk assessment and management. Risk assessors answer three broad questions: (1) What adverse events might occur? (2) How likely are they to occur? (3) What are their probable consequences, if they do occur? Risk managers address multiple questions, which we have simplified into three: (1) What actions can reduce the likelihoods (or expected annual frequencies) or mitigate the adverse consequences of events? Answers may range from engineering and security precautions to insurance arrangements that pool, spread, or transfer the financial losses from events. (2) What can be done to recover from an event, should it occur? (3) What communications and organizational and institutional structures and functions facilitate successful risk management decisions and operations? (2-4) Vulnerability, mitigation, prevention, resilience, threat, intelligence and system state are additional key terms. "Vulnerability" is a weakness in the physical, organizational, or human attributes of a system that allow its performance to be degraded by a hazard event. (A "hazard" is a source of risk, and is sometimes called a "threat" in security and terrorism risk analysis. Natural hazards include hurricanes and earthquakes; man-made hazards include deliberately provoked failures in reliability systems and cyberattacks on power grids. A "threat" arises from the intent or assumed intent of an attacker to degrade a target during some time interval.) "Mitigation" is a deliberate investment in technology, organization and people to reduce the adverse consequences of events. "Prevention" (or "avoidance") refers to actions taken to make adverse events less likely or frequent. "Resilience" is the ability to cope with and recover from an event quickly and fully. "Intelligence" consists of obtaining critical information about the threat to support prevention or mitigation. "System state" is the status of all system attributes at any given moment that determine its response (or probabilities of responses) to inputs. To illustrate the complexity of risk analysis, consider attacks on buses. The Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) has extensively studied criminal attacks on buses around the world. (5) Their reports include data from the year 1920 and are complete through 2009. They report on attacker tactics and weapons, concentrating on those that have been most successful for attackers. They also report actions by security, bus operators, and passengers that prevented attacks from succeeding, or that reduced their impact. The MTI database lists 37 types of targets, 26 categories of attacks, numbers and types of devices, and how they were delivered to the target. Only three attacks in the database occurred in North America, (5) two in Mexico and one in Canada. Most bus-related attacks are by guerilla groups and occur in countries in Asia and the Middle East, where buses are a primary mode of transportation. The attackers typically use military ordnance, for example mines. By contrast, terrorist attacks in the United States involve very different means and motives. Data from the period 1997-2007 show that over 40%

of US terrorist attacks were by anti-abortionists, 25% by the Earth Liberation Front and another 16% by animal liberation groups. (5) These data do not mean that bus-related terrorist attacks are to be ignored in areas where they have not yet occurred. For example, in 1997, 2003, 2004, and 2007, plots to attack the New York City subway system and tunnels between New Jersey and New York City were foiled. It is not much of a leap to assume that plotters have also considered buses. This assumption is strengthened by the MTI group's conclusion that terrorists place priority on causing at least some damage, and by the fact that buses are relatively easy targets. MTI observed that the vast majority of surface transportation attacks have occurred since 1970 and that the annual average of attacks has increased by a factor of over eight, from fewer than 10 to over 80 a year. Buses and bus stations account for more than half of all the attacks, and these averaged 10 deaths per attack, or about half of the average deaths associated with attacks on trains and train stations. With these data as background, we look again at the typical risk analysis process and the definitions noted earlier. The typical attack (threat) was a single non-suicide attack on a single bus. However, there were many other forms of terrorist attack on buses, bus stops and bus stations. We can't rule out other modes of attacks against buses. Nor can we assume that explosives will be the weapon of choice, especially in the United States where guns and semiautomatic weapons are relatively easy to obtain. With regard to likelihood, the chances of an attack per passenger-hour are extremely low, even in Asia and the Middle East. The consequences in terms of deaths and injuries can be estimated from the MTI data. Indirect consequences, such as reduced rider confidence in buses, loss of confidence and security forces to protect people, and other indirect effects can be determined by follow-up research. **Existing data are most informative about risk management.** About 60% of the attacks failed to kill or injure people. Some of these failures were caused by poorly built explosive devices, but others were prevented or reduced in magnitude by bus security, operators and passenger actions.